The Archidamian War

BY DONALD KAGAN

The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

The Archidamian War

The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition

The Fall of the Athenian Empire

The Great Dialogue: A History of Greek Political Thought from Homer to Polybius

Great Issues in Western Civilization, editor with Brian Tierney and L. Pearce Williams

Problems in Ancient History, editor

Hellenic History, with G. W. Botsford and C. A. Robinson, Jr.

The Archidamian War

DONALD KAGAN

Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges a grant
from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation that
aided in bringing this book to publication.

Copyright © 1974 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 1974 by Cornell University Press.
Reissued, 1987, by Cornell University Press, with corrections.
Third printing 1991.
First published, Cornell Paperbacks, 1990.
Third printing 1996.

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kagan, Donald.
The Archidamian war / Donald Kagan.
p. cm.
"First published in Ithaca by Cornell University Press in 1974".
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8014-0889-X (alk. paper)
ISBN 0-8014-9714-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Greece—History—Peloponnesian War, 431–404 B.C. I. Title.
DF229.3.K33 1990
938'.05—dc20 89-28639

♾ The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

For Myrna

Preface

This book is a sequel to *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* and is part of a general history of that war which will require another volume or two to complete. The subject has not been treated on a large scale since the turn of the century; the important scholarship that has intervened and the continued interest in the war amply justify an attempt at a new history.

The present volume deals with the first ten years, the Archidamian War. That struggle, beginning in 431, deserves a volume of its own, for to contemporaries it appeared to be a war complete in itself. Only hindsight and the special perception of Thucydides placed it, together with the diplomatic maneuverings of the Peace of Nicias in 421 and with the events from the resumption of hostility after the Sicilian expedition to the surrender of Athens in 404, as a single war of twenty-seven years and separated it from the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians of 461–445. The Archidamian War, moreover, was the war planned by the Peloponnesian and Athenian strategists, and so the one that tested their skill and prescience. Because the conditions and character of the war could be foreseen, as far as such things are ever predictable, it is possible to make some judgment of the wisdom of each policy and the effectiveness of its execution. The main purpose of this volume, however, is to attempt a general history of the Greek states in their conduct of the war that does justice to military, political, diplomatic, and economic developments and shows how closely they were related.

My views about the use of ancient sources other than

Thucydides, the interpretation of the speeches in Thucydides, and the problem of the composition of his history remain those I set forth in the Preface to *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Since these matters remain controversial, I have argued for my opinion at appropriate places in this volume.

I have chosen to organize the book annalistically, as Thucydides organizes his. This method has shortcomings, for which Thucydides has been reproached. It leads to the artificial division of continuing events and prevents their most effective presentation; it may lead to repetition or confusion. I have consciously run these risks in an attempt to avoid the paralyzing force of hindsight, to present the events in the contexts in which they appear to the participants. I hope in that way to emphasize the choices open to them and their lack of any sense of predestination. I hope the gain in immediacy and reality will offset the loss in fluidity and grace.

Most readers will quickly recognize my debt to three great German historians, Georg Busolt, K. J. Beloch, and Eduard Meyer, and of these my debt to the wise, sober, and judicious Busolt is the heaviest. Among the scores of modern historians who have helped to shape my knowledge and understanding of the period, I must single out for special mention A. W. Gomme and the continuators of his splendid commentary on Thucydides, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover; also Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, whose fine edition of the Greek inscriptions has done so much for historians, and B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, whose publication of *The Athenian Tribute Lists* initiated an era in the study of Greek history.

I am grateful to B. M. W. Knox and to Ronald P. Legon for reading the manuscript and for their encouragement. Thanks are due also to the two anonymous publisher's readers, who made many valuable suggestions and helped to eliminate a number of errors. I also want to thank Janalyn Gibb for typing the manuscript and John Hale for helping to prepare the maps. Finally, I wish to express my thanks to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to Yale University for providing me with time to complete this volume.

DONALD KAGAN

New Haven, Connecticut

Contents

	Abbreviations and Short Titles	13
1.	Plans and Resources	17
2.	The First Year of the War	43
3.	The Plague and Its Consequences	70
4.	The Third Year of the War: Phormio	101
5.	The Revolt at Lesbos	124
6.	Sicily and Corcyra	147
7.	Demosthenes	187
8.	Pylos and Sphacteria	218
9.	Megara and Delium	260
10.	The Coming of Peace	305
	Conclusions	350
	Appendix A: Pericles and Athenian Income	363
	Appendix B: Pericles' Last Speech	365
	Bibliography	369
	General Index	377
	Index of Modern Authors	386
	Index of Ancient Authors and Inscriptions	388

Maps

1. Attica and Boeotia 45
2. The Peloponnesus 60
3. Central Greece 61
4. The Aegean 133
5. Sicily 190
6. Pylos and Sphacteria 226
7. Northeast Peloponnesus 253
8. The Chalcidic Peninsula and Amphipolis 292

Abbreviations and Short Titles

AClass	*Acta Classica*
AFD	B. D. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
ASI	E. Badian, ed., *Ancient Society and Institutions*
ATL	B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and F. M. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*
BCH	*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
BSA	*Proceedings of the British School at Athens*
Beloch, *Bevölkerung*	K. J. Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*
Beloch, *GG*²	K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2d ed.
Bengtson, *GG*	H. Bengston, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2d ed.
Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*	H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.*
Busolt, *GG*	G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*
CAH	*Cambridge Ancient History*
CIA	*Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CR	*Classical Review*
Delbrück, *Strategie*	H. Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Perikles*
Duncker, *GdA*	M. Duncker, *Geschichte des Altertums*
FGrH	F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*
GHI	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*

Gomme, *HCT*	A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*
Grote	George Grote, *A History of Greece*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
Henderson, *Great War*	B. W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta*
Hignett, *HAC*	C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
Kagan, *Outbreak*	D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*
Meyer, *Forsch.*	E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, II
Meyer, *GdA*	E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*
PA	*Prosopographia Attica*
PACA	*Proceedings of the African Classical Association*
PW	Pauly-Wissowa and others, *Realenzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
Sealey, *Essays*	R. Sealey, *Essays in Greek History*
Westlake, *Essays*	H. D. Westlake, *Essays on Greek Historians and Greek History*

The Archidamian War

1. Plans and Resources[1]

In the spring of 431 a band of more than three hundred Thebans, under cover of darkness, launched a surprise attack on the neighboring city of Plataea. Because Thebes was an ally of Sparta and the Plataeans were allied to Athens, this action was an open breach of the Thirty Years' Peace of 445. So began the great Peloponnesian War, which lasted, with several interruptions, for twenty-seven years. Since ancient times the first ten years of the great war, concluded by the Peace of Nicias in 421, have been regarded as a unit and called, after the name of the Spartan king who led its early campaigns, the Archidamian War.

Examination of the Archidamian War as a unit apart from the events that followed is useful and revealing. Although many surprises took place in the decade of its course, the war was fought essentially within the framework established by those who embarked on it. Departures from the original strategies were necessary, but none compared with the great changes that followed the Peace of Nicias. The sending of an Athenian army into the heart of the Peloponnese in 418, the invasion of Sicily, the shift of the center of warfare from the mainland to the Aegean and the Hellespont, all were unforeseen by the men who began the war. They could not have anticipated what happened after 421, when conditions and personnel presented a completely new situation. Although most of the events of the Archidamian War itself do not in retrospect seem entirely surprising, it is

[1] This chapter owes much to the intelligent and fully detailed account of Busolt (*GG* III:2, 854–902).

interesting for us to ask how well the several states and their leaders anticipated the course of action. How promising were the strategies followed by each side? Did the Athenians' and Spartans' estimation of the situation in 431 justify their decisions to run the risks of war?

A successful strategy must rest on a clear understanding of the aims for which a war is undertaken and an accurate assessment of one's own resources and weaknesses and those of the enemy. It aims at employing one's own strength against the enemies' weakness. It makes use of, but is not bound by, the experience of the past. It adjusts to changes in conditions, both material and psychological. It considers in advance that its first expectations may be disappointed and has an alternate plan ready. Rarely, however, has a state or statesman embarking upon war been well enough prepared strategically.

Sparta's declared aim in breaking the Thirty Years' Peace was "to liberate Greece," [2] that is, to restore autonomy to the Greek states subject to Athens.[3] Thucydides tells us that the Spartans' true motive was their fear of Athens' growing power.[4] Although the Spartans were always slow to go to war, Athens' use of her power against Sparta's allies made the situation unendurable, "and the Spartans decided they must try with all their might to destroy that power if they could and to launch this war." [5] Whether the Spartans made war to free the Greeks, to defend their allies against Athens and thus to continue to enjoy the security provided by the Spartan alliance, or to restore the uncontested primacy that Sparta had enjoyed in the time of the Persian War, or for all these reasons, makes no difference. Each of these goals seemed to the Spartans to require the destruction of Athenian power, that is, of Athens' walls, which made her secure against the power of the Spartan army, of her fleet, which gave her command of the seas, and of her empire, which provided the money that supported her navy. A strategy aiming

[2] 2.8.4. All references are to Thucydides unless otherwise indicated.
[3] 1.139.3. By far the best account of Sparta's strategy in the Archidamian War is provided by P. A. Brunt in *Phoenix* XIX (1965), 255–280.
[4] 1.23.6; 88. [5] 1.118.

at a peace that left these intact was of no value. Sparta's war aims required that she must take the offensive.

When the war began, the Peloponnesian forces included all the states in the Peloponnese with the exception of the neutral states, Argos and the towns of Achaea other than Pellene.[6] Outside the Peloponnese the members of the Spartan alliance included the Megarians, Boeotians, northern Locrians, and Phocians,[7] and in the west the Corinthian colonies of Ambracia, Leucas, and Anactorium. In Sicily the Spartans were allied to Syracuse and all the Dorian cities except Camarina, and in Italy to Locri and their own colony Taras.[8] The great strength of the Spartan alliance lay in its splendid, heavily armed infantry made up of Peloponnesians and Boeotians. This was two or three times the size of the Athenian hoplite phalanx and universally regarded as abler and more experienced.[9]

At the beginning of the war Pericles had to admit that in a single battle the Peloponnesian army was a match for all the rest

[6] 2.9.2.

[7] 1.9.2; Gomme, *HCT* II, 11. Busolt (*GG* III:2, 854) believes that the alliances with central Greek states were made immediately before the outbreak of the war: "Während sie [die Lakedaimonier] mit den Athenern verhandelten." There is no evidence for such an assumption, and we may believe that some of the treaties, that with Thebes, for instance, go back to the time of the First Peloponnesian War.

[8] 3.86.2; 6.34.4; 44; 104.

[9] Pericles announced that the Athenians had 13,000 hoplites fit for combat and not engaged in garrison duty at the beginning of the war (2.13.6). Thucydides does not supply us with figures for the size of the Peloponnesian army, but Plutarch says that 60,000 hoplites invaded Attica in 431 (Plut. *Per.* 33.5). Since only two-thirds of each contingent took part in the invasion, Plutarch would have 90,000 hoplites available to the Spartan alliance, and that figure is much too large. Busolt believes that the invading army consisted of 22–23,000 Peloponnesians and 7,000 Boeotians, for a total of 30,000, and his calculations are persuasive (*GG* III:2, 858–861). Beloch (*Bevölkerung*, 152), Meyer (*GdA* IV:2, 26 and n. 2), and De Sanctis (*Pericle* [Milan and Messina, 1944], 257) agree. Other modern estimates are: Duncker (*GdA* IX, 425) and Bengtson (*GG*, 221) 40,000, Adcock (*CAH* V, 193) 34,000, Hammond (*History of Greece to 322* B.C., [Oxford, 1959], 345) 50,000, Henderson (*Great War*, 29) 60,000. The figure given by Androtion (Frg. 39 in *FGrH*) is corrupt and has been read as either 100,000 or 200,000. Either figure is impossible.

of Greece,[10] and recent history had shown that the Athenians had long been aware of the relative weakness in their hoplite army. In 446 a Spartan army had invaded Attica. Instead of fighting, the Athenians made a truce which soon led to the end of the First Peloponnesian War with the Thirty Years' Peace. The Athenians abandoned their land empire in central Greece and conceded Spartan hegemony on the Greek mainland.[11] The Spartans had good reason to believe that they would be invincible in a land battle against Athens. Such considerations were behind the eagerness of the Spartan war party to undertake the war and their unwillingness to heed the cautious warnings of their King Archidamus. To them the proper strategy was obvious and success inevitable: the Spartans needed merely to invade Attica during the growing season. Almost surely the Athenians would not stay behind their walls and watch their crops, homes, and property destroyed. Either they would yield as they had in 446, or, if their courage allowed, they would come out to fight and be destroyed. In either case the war would be short and Spartan victory certain.

To be sure, the Spartans realized that the Athenians might choose neither to fight nor to surrender immediately, for Athens was like no other Greek city—it was defended by stout walls, as was its port, Piraeus, and the two were connected by the Long Walls, no less strong. Greek armies rarely took a fortified place by assault, and the Spartans were less skillful at siege warfare than most.[12] The Athenians, because of their navy and their empire, could hold out by bringing supplies from abroad even though deprived of their own lands. Still, the Spartans did not believe that any people could put up with such conditions for long: the Athenians might hold out for a year or two, but certainly not more. When the war began the Spartans expected that "they would destroy the power of the Athenians in a few years if they wasted their land."[13] Nor did that expectation seem rash, for the Athenians themselves were in a pessimistic mood,[14] and Thucydides tells us that at the beginning of the war the Greeks in general shared their view: if the Peloponnesians

[10] 1.141.6. [11] See Kagan, *Outbreak*, 124–130. [12] 1.102.2.
[13] 5.14.3. [14] 6.11.5.

should invade Attica, "some thought that Athens could hold out for a year, some for two, but no one for more than three years." [15]

King Archidamus was more cautious. He expected that Athens could hold out indefinitely without either giving battle or surrendering. In such circumstances superiority in arms and numbers would be of no use. The Spartans would need another strategy, but what could it be? The only alternative was to incite rebellion among the allies of Athens and thereby deprive her of the men, ships, and money she needed to survive. But, since the Athenian Empire was chiefly maritime, this strategy required that Sparta have the ships necessary to encourage and support rebellions of the islanders, and these, in turn, required money. As Archidamus pointed out, the Peloponnesians were vastly inferior in financial resources, "having neither money in the public treasury nor being able readily to raise money from taxation." [16]

On the eve of the war the Peloponnesians had a fleet of about 100 triremes,[17] most of these recently built by Corinth for the war against Corcyra. These required rowers, steersmen, and captains skilled in the maneuvers of modern naval warfare which had been perfected by the Athenians. Such men were in short supply in the Peloponnese; for their war against Corcyra the Corinthians had been forced to hire rowers at high pay from all over Greece.[18] Most of these must have come from the Aegean, the Athenian sphere of influence, and they would no longer be available to the Peloponnesians in a war against Athens. At the battle of Sybota both the Corinthian and Corcyrean fleets had employed archaic tactics.[19] In a naval war the Peloponnesians would be inferior in ships, sailors, and tactics.

Conscious of these weaknesses, Archidamus advised the Spartans to consider the Athenian offer of arbitration rather than go to war immediately. If negotiation failed he urged them at least to wait until they had repaired their naval and financial deficiencies.[20] The Corinthians, eager for war, tried to make light of the difficulties described by Archidamus, because of the Peloponnesian superiority in numbers, military experience, and discipline.

[15] 7.28.3. [16] 1.80.4. [17] Busolt, *GG* III:2, 863–864.
[18] 1.31.1. [19] 1.49. [20] 1.82, 85.

They believed that the fleet could be paid for with funds from the Delphic and Olympian treasuries and with money contributions from the Peloponnesian allies themselves. One victory at sea would destroy Athenian power, for it would lead the allied rowers, mere mercenaries, to defect to the winning side. If, on the other hand, the war continued, time was on the Peloponnesian side for it could be used to acquire the naval experience which, combined with superior courage, would guarantee victory. Besides, the Corinthians argued, they could persuade the Athenian allies to revolt, erect permanent forts in Attica, and use all "all the other such devices as cannot now be foreseen." [21]

The last few words tell how little conviction the Corinthian arguments carried for Spartans like Archidamus. They emphasized the vagaries of war which "least of all follows fixed rules and itself contrives its own devices to meet events," [22] but Pericles also knew the vanity of Corinthian optimism. He pointed out that the Peloponnesians were farmers, without naval skills and unable to leave their fields for long. They would face difficulty in recruiting experienced sailors from the Athenian Empire even with the offer of higher pay, for the sailors would be reluctant to risk exile from home when the chances of victory seemed slight. The prospects of the Peloponnesians acquiring naval skill were dim, for this required much practice, and the overwhelming preponderance of the Athenian navy guaranteed that few Peloponnesian sailors who had the experience of a naval battle against the Athenians would survive to benefit from it.[23] Naval training, moreover, required money which the Peloponnesians did not have and could not get. Pericles saw little possibility of "contributions." Most of the Peloponnesian states were poor; they were unable or unwilling to make such contributions. Besides, "accumulated wealth, not forced contributions, sustain a war." [24] The suggestion that money could be obtained from the sacred places was chimerical. The Eleans, who controlled Olympia, would not have allowed it, nor were the priests there or at

[21] 1.122.1; the Corinthian argument is presented in 1.121–122.
[22] 1.121.1.
[23] 1.141.4; 143.2; 142.6; see Brunt, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), 259.
[24] 1.141.5.

Delphi likely to have approved. To seize the treasures by force would be sacrilege and might alienate the Hellenic good will so necessary for Spartan success. The suggestion was never acted upon during the war, even in moments of the greatest need. Brunt may be right when he says that the Corinthians made the suggestion because "they were more exposed to the sophistic *Aufklärung* than the majority of the Peloponnesians." [25]

The Spartans and their friends hoped, no doubt, for help from abroad, but with little justification. At the start of the war, the Spartans ordered their allies in Sicily to provide them with a fleet and money, but they should not have been surprised when it was not forthcoming. The Greeks of the west had not intervened in the affairs of mainland Greece in the past and they would not do so during the Archidamian War.[26] Nor should the Spartans have expected a favorable reply from the Great King of Persia. They found it difficult even to get a messenger safely through to the court at Susa, and when they did they found themselves irreconcilably at odds with the Persians. The Great King, of course, had good reason to fear the might of the Athenian navy. He would have been glad to see Athens humbled, but he was not likely to run the risk of a war as long as her fleet was intact. In any case, the king's major interest in such a war was the recovery of the territory inhabited by the Greeks of Asia Minor. The Spartans who were fighting "to bring freedom to the Greeks" could hardly have agreed to his terms.[27]

We can see, and the Spartans should have realized, that Archidamus was right. At the beginning of the war Sparta was with-

[25] Brunt, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), 261.

[26] Thucydides (2.7.2) tells us that the Spartans asked for 500 ships at the start of the war. Diodorus (12.41.1) gives the figure of 200. Both numbers are impossible, for no such fleet was available nor were the Sicilians likely to build one. Busolt (*GG* III:2, 866) thinks that Thucydides gives this figure ironically, but Gomme does not think so (see Gomme, *HCT* II, 7). It is difficult to explain the passage. Perhaps the optimistic request was made by the war party in full knowledge of its absurdity, with the intention chiefly of responding to the arguments of Archidamus and reassuring hesitating Spartans with visions of powerful naval support.

[27] Brunt, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), 262–263.

out a fleet or the prospect of getting one large enough to attack the Athenian fleet and so was unable to attack her empire or encourage defections from it. The Spartans had to face the fact that their only plan of warfare was likely to founder on the Athenian unwillingness to give battle, even if the Spartans invaded and destroyed their crops and homes. If the Athenians were willing to follow such a policy the Spartans could not defeat them, yet the Spartans went to war. The reason is not far to seek. For all the good sense of Archidamus, his countrymen did not want to believe him. They were moved by fear, anger, and their memory of the past. In 446 when the Spartans invaded Attica, the Athenians had chosen not to fight, but to accept a reduction in their power rather than destruction at the hands of the Spartan phalanx. At that time, too, the Athenians had walls, ships, and money, yet no more than other Greeks could they stand by and see their fields wasted. But even if Archidamus were right and the Athenians were not now like other enemies, they might hide behind their walls for a year or two, possibly three, but then they must surrender. What did it matter if alternate strategies were defective? They had no need of other strategies. So thought the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks as well.[28]

The war aims of Athens under Pericles were completely defensive. She had no ambitions for territorial gain and no intention of destroying Spartan power or hegemony in the Peloponnese. Pericles himself made this clear when he spoke to the Athenians on the eve of war: "Many other things, too, lead me to expect victory if you will agree not to try to extend your empire while you are at war and not to expose yourselves to dangers of your own choosing." [29] He spelled out his meaning in greater detail shortly after the war had begun,[30] and Thucydides recapitulates the policy he advocated when he speaks of the death of Pericles: "He said that if the Athenians would remain quiet, take care of their fleet, refrain from trying to extend their empire in wartime and thus putting their city in danger, they would prevail." [31] Precisely what victory might mean is not, of course, clear. The success of Pericles' plan would lead to a stale-

[28] See above, pp. 20–21. [29] 1.144.1. [30] 2.13.2. [31] 2.65.7.

mate that would at least guarantee the security of Athens and her empire. Brunt, however, points out that "a stalemate might be more than a defensive success. If Sparta failed in her published aims and real designs, the reaction might be momentous. The shock to her reputation might dissolve her confederacy. Athens might recover control of the Isthmus, and even displace Sparta in the hegemony of the Peloponnese." [32] These expectations seem far too optimistic. Sparta had suffered Peloponnesian defections in the past and always managed to put the rebellions down. She would do so again in 421. Athens could only hope to produce such grand results if she were prepared to send an army into the Peloponnese to face the Spartans, and this Pericles was unwilling to do. Whatever the value of these speculations, we have no reason to believe that they played any part in the thoughts of Pericles. He never mentions such notions in his speeches even though they might have helped win support for his unusual strategy. We may believe that his aims when the war began were to restore the status quo as of 445, a world in which Athens and her empire and Sparta with her league, realizing that they had no way of imposing their will on Athens, would live peacefully, each respecting the integrity of the other.

The achievement of these moderate war aims seemed to Pericles well within the capacity of Athens. At the outbreak of the war the Athenians could boast of free allies like Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, who provided ships of their own to add to the Athenian fleet, and the Plataeans, the Messenians who inhabited Naupactus, the Zacynthians, and most of the Acarnanians, who supplied infantry and money when called upon.[33] They could also count on the cavalry of the Thessalians [34] and, if it should be necessary to counter the western allies of Sparta, they had their own allies in the west, Rhegium and Leontini.[35] In addition they could call on the considerable resources of their tribute-paying imperial allies for money and men. That empire included, as Thucydides tells us, the seaboard cities of Caria,

[32] Brunt, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), 259.
[33] 2.9.4–6; Gomme, *HCT* II, 12.
[34] 1.102.4, 2.22.4.
[35] 3.86.3, *GHI*, nos. 63 and 64.

Ionia, the Hellespont, and Thrace, as well as all the islands "which lie between the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, except Melos and Thera." [36]

The power and hopes of Athens rested on her magnificent navy. In her dockyards lay at least 300 seaworthy triremes; to these could be added a number of older ships which could be repaired and used in case of need.[37] In addition Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra could provide ships, perhaps over 100 in all.[38] The men who steered and rowed these ships, both Athenian citizens and allies, were far more skilled than their opponents, as the battle of Sybota had already shown and as the whole course of the Archidamian War would continue to demonstrate.[39]

The Athenians had strong financial resources to maintain the ships and pay their crews. In 431 the annual income of Athens was 1,000 talents, of which 400 came from internal revenue and 600 from the tribute and other imperial sources.[40] Although the considerable sum of about 600 talents annually was available for the costs of war, it would hardly be adequate. Athens would need to dip into her capital, and here, too, she was uniquely well provided. In the spring of 431, Pericles encour-

[36] 2.9.4–5. By 430–429, Thera was paying tribute to Athens, although Thucydides does not tell us how she came to do so. See Gomme, *HCT* II, 12.

[37] 2.13.8; Busolt, *GG* III:2, 868 and n. 1.

[38] Busolt, *GG* III:2, 869–870. Meyer (*Forsch.*, II, 169 and n. 3) and Miltner (*P.W.* XIX [1937], s.v. "Perikles," 781) following the Old Oligarch (3.4) set the figure of Athenian triremes at 400. Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.1.27) and Andocides (3.9) give the same figure. Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 544) and Aeschines (2.175) support the figure 300. Meyer and Miltner resolve the contradiction by adding the 100 ships which were set aside as a reserve force after the Spartan invasion of 431 to the original 300. They may be right.

[39] Brunt, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), 259–260.

[40] The figure for the annual revenue comes from Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.1.27). Thucydides tells us that an average of 600 talents came from tribute (2.13.3). Since the tribute lists show that so high a figure is impossible, it is generally agreed that Thucydides is speaking loosely and means "all the revenue contributed by the allies" (Gomme, *HCT* II, 17; see also *ATL* III, 333–334). The other 400 talents, coming from such sources as rents, customs duties, market taxes, and court fees, went to pay for current expenses and provided no surplus (Busolt, *GG* III:2, 876; *ATL* III, 333; cf., however, Gomme, *HCT* II, 19. For another view see A. French, *Historia* XXI [1972], 1–20).

aged his fellow citizens by pointing out that there were in reserve on the Acropolis 6,000 talents of coined silver remaining from the maximum figure of 9,700 which had been reached some time before.[41] In addition there was uncoined gold and silver worth at least 500 talents on the Acropolis as well as no small sum in other temples. Finally, if the Athenians were in desperate straits they could melt down the gold plates with which the great statue of Athena on the Acropolis was covered. These were removable and worth 40 talents.[42] Such an income and such a reserve fund were unexampled among the Greek states and certainly not to be matched by all the Peloponnesian allies together.

These resources would be needed also to support the land forces of Athens which, though not equal to those of the enemy, were far from inconsiderable. These included 13,000 hoplites of an age and condition suitable for service in the field. There were also 16,000 others who were metics and men too young or too old for the battlefield; these troops were capable of defending the border forts of Attica and the city walls of Athens and the Piraeus as well as the Long Walls connecting them.[43] The Athenians also had available 1,200 cavalry including mounted archers and 1,600 bowmen on foot.[44] These were ample for the defensive strategy Pericles had in mind.

But what, precisely, was that strategy? Most scholars agree that the aims of the Athenians were defensive and did not include conquest, but how were those aims to be achieved?

[41] 2.13.3. I accept the figures given in the manuscripts rather than those provided by a scholiast to Aristophanes' *Plutus* 1193 which are defended by the authors of *ATL* (III, 118–132). Their arguments appear strained and not weighty enough to support the scholiast against the unanimous evidence of the MSS as well as Diodorus (12.40.2) and Isocrates (8.69 and 15.234). Gomme makes an effective attack against the *ATL* arguments (*Historia* II [1953], 1–21, and *HCT* II, 16–33).

[42] 2.13.4–5; for a discussion of the disagreement among ancient authors on the value of the gold on the statue see Gomme, *HCT* II, 24–25.

[43] 2.13.6–7. Diodorus (12.40.4–5) gives the figures as 12,000 hoplites for the field and 17,000 garrison troops. Although the Thucydidean figures have been challenged they stand up well and I accept them. They are ably defended by Gomme in *CQ* XXI (1927), 142–150, and again in *HCT* II, 34–39.

[44] 2.13.8.

Thucydides' account of the words of Pericles as well as his own summary of the Periclean strategy[45] make it plain that the Athenians were to reject a battle on land, abandon their fields to devastation, retreat behind their walls, and wait until the exhausted enemy was ready to make peace. Just how the enemy was to be exhausted is not clear. It would be annoying, of course, to march out each summer and spend a month or so ravaging the Attic countryside, but not exhausting. Pericles mentioned two possible means of doing damage to the Peloponnesians: building a fortified camp in the Peloponnesus and launching seaborne attacks upon the Peloponnesian coast.[46] The scheme of planting a fort in the Peloponnese need not be taken seriously, for it was not seriously intended by Pericles. The suggestion was made as part of a hypothetical situation: "Suppose the enemy does establish a fort in Attica and damages our land with raids and receives our deserters, still he will not be able to prevent us from sailing to his land where we can build a fort, nor from attacking him by sea."[47] The fort in the Peloponnese was suggested merely as a possible response to a possible Spartan action. The Spartans did not take that action until well after the Archidamian War was over, so that Pericles did not need to think of the fort again unless it formed a part of his original plan. In fact, he never mentioned the idea again so far as we know. More telling yet, he made no attempt to establish such a fort in the first year of the war, although he did engage immediately in seaborne raids on the Peloponnese. We may therefore disregard the construction of a fortress on the Peloponnese as part of the offensive element of the Periclean strategy.

It remains to decide what part the Athenian fleet was meant to play in forcing the Spartans to make peace. Some scholars, critical of Pericles' strategy in greater or lesser degree, consider his employment of the fleet of no value whatever.[48] Others see

[45] 2.65.7. [46] 1.142.4. [47] *Ibid.*

[48] Beloch (*GG*² II:1, 300, n. 1) speaks of "die unfruchtbare Flottendemonstration"; De Sanctis (*Storia dei Greci* [Florence, 1963], II, 267–268) says that the Athenians' reaction to the Peloponnesian invasions "non poteva consistere che nel dannagiare i commerci e nel operare piccoli sbarchi sulle coste del Peloponneso." Henderson (*Great War*, 62) believes that "these naval parades round the Peloponnese were extraordinarily futile."

coastal landings and raids as having had some purpose as countermeasures to the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica; these might have had some strategic value, if only in raising Athenian morale.[49] But there is more general agreement that the naval campaigns urged by Pericles were neither pointless nor trivial in their aims. One view that has won considerable support is that the main task of the Athenian navy was to impose and maintain a blockade of the Peloponnesus.[50] In its most ambitious form this view suggests that Pericles intended to cut off the grain supply to the Peloponnesus by closing off the Gulf of Corinth through control of Naupactus.[51] Such a scheme was impossible. In the first place it is far from clear that imported grain was necessary for the survival of the Peloponnesians and that the deprivation of imported grain would have been more than an annoyance. More important, a blockade of the entire peninsula could not have been achieved. "The Peloponnese has a long coastline containing many harbours easily accessible to ancient ships, and whereas triremes, not being designed to carry large quantities of food and water, normally hugged the shore and did not remain long away from their bases, merchant ships did not share these limitations and could, if necessary, cross the open sea." [52]

A blockade of coastal states on or near the isthmus, such as Corinth, Megara, and Sicyon, might have been more serious and more successful.[53] However dependent on imports the Peloponnesians may have been, there can be no doubt that their economic prosperity would have been severely damaged if these areas were cut off from markets in the Aegean, Asiatic, and Hellespontine areas by Athenian domination [54] or if an Athenian

[49] Bengtson, *GG*, 222, speaks of the landings as "Gegenaktionen"; Grundy, *Thucydides*, 331, gives some support to the notion of Athenian morale as the point of the raids. See the discussion of Westlake, *Essays*, 91–92.

[50] Some version of this theory has been held by Busolt (*GG* III:2, 899–900) and Miltner ("Perikles," 781).

[51] Miltner, "Perikles," 781. [52] Westlake, *Essays*, 88.

[53] The Corinthians mention the danger of Athenian naval power to the economy even of inland states, 1.120.2.

[54] Busolt (*GG* III:1, 588) and Miltner ("Perikles," 781) make a great point of Athenian control of grain shipments passing through Byzantium that permitted even allies of Athens to obtain grain only under special conditions (*IG*^{2} 57 = *GHI* 65, 11.35ff.). There is no evidence that these

squadron at Naupactus cut them off from important markets in the west. The establishment of an effective blockade would have done great harm to states like Corinth, which depended on the export of bronze work, pottery, textiles, and other goods for much of its prosperity. We may perhaps believe that, "if Athens were successful in the blockade, or even in interrupting trade to a large extent, a pressing state of distress would gradually grow in the Peloponnese, then the unfailing economic ruin of the coastal states, especially Corinth, would also involve the hinterland," [55] but such a blockade was not part of Pericles' plan at the outbreak of the war. The most crucial element of such a blockade would have been the location of a fleet at Naupactus and this the Athenians did not carry out until the winter of 430/29.[56] Two campaigning seasons were permitted to go by before Pericles even attempted to seal off the Gulf of Corinth. He could not, therefore, have been thinking of a blockade as part of his battle plan in 431.

Still other historians, making no use of the notion of an Athenian blockade, nonetheless believe that Pericles planned a vigorous use of the fleet in an offensive strategy. "If the strategy of Pericles was defensive by land, it was offensive by sea." [57] The navy would force encounters on the sea and make landings on the Peloponnese; "and if occasion arose, it might establish fortified posts on enemy territory." [58] Another version says, "If Pericles recognized the necessity of conducting a defensive war and avoiding any battle, that did not mean that Athens should sink into passivity. On the contrary, if the Peloponnesians devastated Attica, Athens, with its fleet and landings and devastation of their coastal territory, could do at least equal damage." [59] We have already seen that Pericles did not intend to establish forts in the Peloponnese, and it is also plain that the devastations of the

---

provisions were part of any blockade, in fact it is likely that they were intended chiefly to guarantee the grain supply of Athens. In any case the inscription belongs in 426/5, so we have no reason to believe that a policy of blockade at the Hellespont was part of the Periclean strategy at the start of the war.

[55] Busolt, *GG* III:2, 900. [56] 2.69.1.

[57] Hammond, *History of Greece*, 348. [58] *Ibid.*, 347.

[59] Meyer, *GdA* IV, 32.

Peloponnesian coast could not have done as much damage as the leveling of Attica.[60]

Westlake offers the most plausible explanation of Pericles' offensive intentions: "The devastation of enemy territory, which was the chief achievement of these operations, was also their chief object, being designed to cause so much economic distress that political consequences would ensue and the Peloponnesian League would have no heart to continue the war."[61] This suggestion has the advantage of not projecting onto the Periclean strategy actions which were never taken during the lifetime of Pericles and of assuming that the actions that were undertaken in that period has a purpose connected with their results. Seaborne raids might cause distress "both physical and psychological"; political opposition, typically democratic, within the affected city would try to bring in the Athenians and to overthrow the pro-Spartan oligarchs.[62] Unfortunately, three instances adduced by Westlake to support his suggestion come from a period well after the death of Pericles, when policy was in the hands of the successors whom Thucydides found so unworthy, and the fourth, the attack on Epidaurus in 430, will not bear scrutiny. Thucydides tells us nothing about the internal condition of Epidaurus when Pericles attacked it, nor does any other ancient authority. Westlake's inclusion of that incident is based on an unsupported conjecture by Adcock.[63]

The other three instances offered by Westlake in support of his thesis are the attempted seizure of Megara and the alliances Athens made with Troezen and Halieis.[64] In Troezen and

[60] See Beloch, *GG*^{2} II:1, 300; De Sanctis, *Storia di Greci* II, 268, and Westlake, *Essays*, 94.

[61] Westlake, *Essays*, 99–100. [62] *Ibid.*, 95.

[63] *CAH* V, 200, cited by Westlake, *Essays*, 95. Delbrück, who may have been the source of Adcock's speculation, makes the same suggestion, and his reason is clear. He is trying to explain why Pericles did not launch so potentially important a campaign in the very first year of the war, and as one of two lame attempts at explanation he invents a revolutionary party in Epidaurus which was ready to support Athens in 430 but not yet in 431 (*Strategie*, 121–122). We have no reason to believe that the attack on Epidaurus was prepared by negotiations with dissidents within the city or that it was anything but a simple assault.

[64] Megara: Thuc. 3.51; 4.66–74; Troezen: Thuc. 4.45.2, 118.4; Halieis: Thuc. 4.45.2; *IG* I^2, 87, Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* II, 184.

Halieis there is evidence for Athenian raids followed by a treaty; there is no evidence for political strife in the cities or for a domestic upheaval. In all three cases, the final Athenian action —treaties concluded in two cases, an attack aided by treason in the other—the ground had been prepared by the establishment of a fortress in the vicinity—Minoa, an island near Megara, and Methana, a town in the region of Troezen and Halieis. That is, the final stroke came as a result of the policy eschewed by Pericles in the years he was in command. None of these actions took place until after 425, in the seventh and eighth years of the war. It should not surprise us that one of the demands made by Cleon, the devotee of an active and aggressive strategy, was the restoration of Troezen to Athens.[65] We have no reason, therefore, to attribute so aggressive a policy to Pericles at the outbreak of the war.

The fact is that the Athenian failure to prosecute the naval war more actively has led to criticism of Pericles not only by those who deplore the defensive strategy in general[66] but by those who approve the general strategy and try to defend it and Pericles. Busolt, for instance, judges Pericles' plan "fundamentally right" but concedes that it was "somewhat one-sided and doctrinaire, and in its execution it was lacking in energetic procedure and in the spirit of enterprise."[67] Bengtson, too, while defending the Periclean plan against its critics, admits "that the carrying out of the offensive part of the plan appears to modern viewers as not very energetic and resolute."[68] By far the ablest and most influential defender of Pericles' strategy is Delbrück; he vigorously rejects those who would have had the Athenians launch an aggressive war on land and awards Pericles a place "among the greatest generals in world history" for his ability to impose upon a free people the difficult, unpopular, but necessary strategy of exhaustion.[69] Still, he too is troubled by the Athenian failure to use the navy more aggressively to help bring about that exhaustion.

[65] 4.21.3. [66] E.g., Beloch, Duncker, Pflugk-Hartung.
[67] *GG* III:2, 901. [68] *GG*, 221, n. 5.
[69] *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* I, *Das Altertum* (Berlin, 1920), reprinted 1964, 124–133.

Delbrück's defense of Pericles is based upon a comparison with the strategy of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War. Frederick was able to win a great and difficult war by use of the strategy of exhaustion. But that war was finally decided by major battles which Frederick undertook when he was ready. Where were the equivalent actions of Pericles and how did he hope to win his war? [70] Delbrück argues first that we should not look for precise parallels where historical circumstances are different. Frederick was weaker than his opponents but had forces of the same kind, a land army; thus he could use the strategy of exhaustion to bring about a decisive battle on his own terms. Pericles faced a situation where neither side could bring the other to battle since one was a naval power and the other military; thus he had to plan to damage the enemy in other ways. Delbrück lists first the wasting of the enemy's land by raids and grossly overvalues their effect. Next Pericles could create a secondary theater of war, such as the one later established in Acarnania, where a partial force might dare to fight limited land battles under certain conditions. Also, he could establish forts on the enemy coast, such as the one later established at Pylos in Messenia. "Finally, the conquest or the taking by surprise of enemy coastal states: Epidaurus, Hermione, Gytheum, perhaps even Megara or Troezen." [71] Then he confronts the difficult question: if the physical exhaustion of the enemy was intended and these tactics were suitable for bringing on that exhaustion, why did not Pericles employ them all in the first year of the war instead of contenting himself with coastal raids and devastations which appear to have had little effect? Here Delbrück's answer is unconvincing: "The greatest power in the strategy of exhaustion is time, and hence one of the fundamental laws, the economy of resources. However much might be achieved even in a first campaign with the indicated strategems, they would still not have brought the enemy to defeat or to peace." [72] But we must ask if it would not have been far more effective to begin immediately to do real damage to the Peloponnese instead of being satisfied with trifling annoyances? Would it not have had a great effect on Athenian morale to bring off a real achievement

[70] *Strategie*, 101, 108. [71] *Ibid.*, 112–113. [72] *Ibid.*, 113.

on the offensive side and thus help justify the difficult strategy of passivity in Attica? If the enemy were to be worn down, the first year of the war would seem to be a splendid time to begin in earnest.

Delbrück is keenly aware of the weakness of his argument for he returns to it more than once. Why, he asks, did Pericles not decide on such a powerful blow as the attack on Epidaurus in the first year of the war instead of waiting until 430? "If such a conquest had succeeded, any success in Acarnania, any campaign of devastation, however intensive, any fortification of a coastal spot in Messenia would disappear in comparison." The possession of Epidaurus would have faced Troezen, Hermione, and perhaps Sicyon with the prospect of a similar fate. If it did not bring peace immediately it would at least help diminish the eagerness for war of the Peloponnesian states. He is compelled to answer, "We do not know." [73] All he can do is to offer two attempts at explanation which are unsupported by the evidence and unpersuasive.[74] Delbrück also considers the fact that the

[73] *Ibid.*, 121

[74] One, which suggests that the Athenians delayed the attack for a year because they were waiting for a dissident faction in Epidaurus to be ready, we have discussed above in n. 63. The unlikelihood of the suggestion is plain when we consider not only that the ancient sources make no mention of internal dissension in Epidaurus in 430 but also that they make no mention of any civil strife there at any time during the Peloponnesian War. This is true even though the territory of Epidaurus was the scene of fighting for much of the war and the Athenians built a fort in the region on one occasion. These are the classical conditions for bringing on internal rebellion, yet Thucydides gives us no hint of any in Epidaurus, though he tells us of such a rebellion in neighboring Argos. The argument from silence here is very strong. Delbrück's second argument is that Pericles waited until 430 to attack Epidaurus because he did not want to entrust the campaign to another general, and he, himself, could not afford to leave Athens in 431. This is even weaker than the first. In the first place, Pericles often entrusted important difficult campaigns to trusted generals. The fact is that after the attack on Epidaurus had failed, the Athenians put the fleet and army into the hands of Hagnon, a reliable associate of Pericles, and sent him to try to take Potidaea. Besides, if it was not politic for Pericles to leave Athens in 431 it was even less so a year later when the plague had broken out, the people were restless, the opposition powerful, and the need for Pericles' influence at home enormous.

Athenians sent a fleet to Naupactus only in the autumn of 429, although the closing of the Corinthian Gulf was one of the most important Athenian weapons of war. "This measure appears so natural that we ask why wasn't it hit upon the first day of the war?" Conceding that no positive answer is possible, he suggests that the cost of maintaining 20 ships the year round, which he places at 240 talents, more than half the annual tribute collected from the allies, deterred Pericles. The ships were finally sent out in connection with the establishment of a new theater of warfare in Acarnania. This double function, presumably, justified the expense.[75] If Pericles could not afford to send a fleet to close off the Corinthian Gulf, particularly in the first year of the war, the whole strategy of exhaustion was absurd. Nothing was more likely to cause economic damage to the Isthmian states and to bring home to them the high price of fighting the Athenians.[76]

This discussion is designed to show that no theory, not even those argued so intelligently and learnedly by Westlake and Delbrück, that tries to see in the strategy employed by Pericles at the start of the war an aggressive attempt to exhaust the Peloponnesians physically by the use of the fleet alone or in conjunction with the army will hold. Pericles failed to take the offensive vigorously in the first year of the war not because he lacked the ability or daring as a commander to execute the measures he had planned as a strategist; his strategy did not include a serious attempt at offense. The fact is that Pericles did not intend to exhaust the Peloponnesians physically but psychologically. He meant to convince the Spartans, the important enemy, that they could not win a war against Athens. When convinced, they must make peace. The strategy of Pericles, both its major defensive and slight offensive aspects, was aimed at this goal, and Adcock has put it well: "[Pericles] must first prove that the existence of Athens and of the Athenian Empire could not be destroyed and then that Athens, too, could harm her enemies. . . . It was a reasonable calculation that the nerve and

[75] Delbrück, *Strategie*, 132–133.

[76] For a discussion of other, less thorough and less persuasive, arguments for an aggressive Periclean policy see the concluding chapter.

will-power of her opponents might well be exhausted before the treasures on the Acropolis, and that they might admit that the power and determination of Athens were invincible." [77]

An important question remains: how long did Pericles expect the Spartans to hold out? The question is generally not asked by those who regard the outcome of the Archidamian War as the justification for his strategy, but their implicit reasoning is that a war of ten years was not outside his calculations. No doubt this view rests in part on Pericles' speech to the Athenians on the eve of the war. The Peloponnesians, he says, "have had no experience with wars overseas or extended in time; they only wage brief wars against each other because of their poverty." [78] As men who farm their own lands (*autourgoi*), they cannot stay away from their farms and must bear the cost of expeditions from their own funds. Such men will risk their lives rather than their property, "for they have confidence that they will survive the dangers but they are not sure that they won't use up their funds first, especially if the war lasts longer than they expected, which is quite likely." [79]

Pericles rightly argued that the Peloponnesians lacked the resources to launch the kind of campaign which would have endangered the Athenian Empire, but nothing prevented them from continuing to undertake annual invasions and devastations of Attica. This is essentially what they did until the taking of Spartan hostages at Sphacteria in 425 put an end to such invasions. Pericles could not have foreseen this fortuitous benefit and must have counted on such campaigns as a regular feature of the war, for there was no material reason why the Peloponnesians could not continue them for an indefinite time. A better test of Pericles' expectations is to ask how long he thought Athens could continue the war pursuing the strategy with which she began it. Busolt seems to be alone in having studied this question in some detail.[80] He calculates that "the available money supply was sufficient to carry on the naval war against the

[77] *CAH* V, 195–196. [78] 1.142.3.

[79] 1.141.5–6. The key clause is τὸ δὲ οὐ βέβαιον μὴ οὐ προαναλώσειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν παρὰ δόξαν, ὅπερ εἰκός, ὁ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς μηκύνηται.

[80] *GG* III:2, 876–878. 893 with n. 3; see also III:1, 551, n. 1.

Peloponnesians energetically and with superior power, without exhausting all reserves, for about four or five years." [81] He reasons that the experience of the Samian War would justify an estimate of about 1,500 to 1,600 talents annually to support the war; if it lasted five years it would cost 7,500 to 8,000 talents. The Athenians began the war with a reserve fund of 5,000 talents, excluding the 1,000 that they set aside for extreme emergency, "in case the enemy should attack the city with a fleet." [82] To this sum should be added 3,000 talents for five years, revenue from the empire at 600 per annum, bringing the total fund available to Athens for five years of war to 8,000 talents. The Athenians would be unable to pay for the sixth year of such a war.[83]

These calculations certainly do not overestimate the cost of the war; in fact the expense Pericles could expect to incur by the strategy we have described might well have come to over 2,000 talents annually. Epigraphical evidence shows that the Athenians borrowed 1,404 talents from the treasury of Athena for the war against Samos and the suppression of Byzantium connected to that war.[84] Busolt uses this figure as the basis for arriving at his estimate of the total cost of the war. But that is to assume that the Athenians did not employ the full 600 talents that they received as income from the empire before borrowing whatever they needed in addition, a most unlikely assumption. Thus we may conclude that the cost of the Samian War, on which Pericles might have based his expectations of the cost of the Archidamian War, was probably about 2,000 talents annually.[85]

[81] *GG* III:2, 878; on page 892 he says that Pericles "could not conceal that the war would last for some time, but he probably expected it to end victoriously within five years."

[82] 2.24.1.

[83] Busolt, *GG* III:2, 893, n. 3. Busolt's calculations of the cost of the Samian War are to be found in *GG* III:1, 551, n. 1.

[84] *IG* I², 293 = *GHI*, 55.

[85] Duncker (*GdA* IX, 215 and n. 1). already had pointed out that the annual tribute should be added to the borrowed sum, but Busolt ignored the argument. There is no need to refute Isocrates (XV, 111), who gives the figure 1,000, or Nepos (*Timotheus* 1) and Diodorus (12.28.3: τιμησάμενος αὐτὰς ταλάντων ‹χιλίων› διακοσίων, with the insertion of *chiliōn* before *diakosiōn*), who set it at 1,200, for the inscriptions make a higher figure for the total cost of the war necessary.

A reasonable estimate of the actual cost of the first few years of the Archidamian War, moreover, shows that 2,000 talents annually cannot be far from the truth.

This conclusion is well supported by an examination of the cost of the first year of the war, which was as unadventurous as any year could be while Athens was still in good fighting condition.[86] When the Peloponnesians invaded Attica in the spring of 431 the Athenians sent 100 ships round the Peloponnese.[87] At the same time they sent a squadron of 30 ships to Locris, where they were to operate and at the same time protect Euboea.[88] There were already about 70 ships blockading Potidaea from the sea.[89] This gives a total of 200 Athenian ships in service for the year. If we accept the usual estimates of about one talent as the cost of maintaining a trireme at sea for a month, and eight months as the period that a fleet could be kept at sea, we arrive at a figure of 1,600 for naval expenses.[90] To this must

[86] Succeeding years in the lifetime of Pericles saw such undertakings as the sending of 4,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry to Epidaurus in 430 and the sending of Phormio with 20 ships to Naupactus in 429.

[87] 2.25.1. [88] 2.26.1.

[89] Thirty had been sent with the first expedition under Archestratus (1.57) and an additional 40 under the command of Callias (1.61). We are not told if any triremes were sent with the reinforcements led by Phormio (1.67), but there probably were some.

[90] The figure of a talent a month for each trireme is arrived at by multiplying the 200 men who manned a trireme by thirty days in an average month by the salary of one drachma per sailor (the salary attested by Thucydides [3.17.3, 6.31.3]) yielding 6,000 drachmas or one talent per month. The figure of eight months is given by Plutarch (*Per.* 11.4) for the peacetime navy. Probably the ships blockading Potidaea and those guarding Euboea remained in service throughout the year, in which case our figure must be raised considerably. For a slightly lower estimate of the cost of maintaining a trireme see S. K. Eddy, *GRBS* IX (1968), 142–143. The figure could be cut in half by setting the pay of rowers at three obols. That is what A. Boeckh (*Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, 3d ed. [Berlin, 1886], I, 344) did, and he was followed by Gomme, among others. In 6.31.3, however, Thucydides says flatly that in 415 rowers were paid a drachma a day; in 3.17.3 he says that in Potidaea even the servants of the hoplites received that wage. In 6.8.1, he tells us that the Segestans brought to Athens sixty talents as a month's pay for sixty ships, which comes to a drachma per man each day. The evidence for a salary of a drachma during the war and even before is solid. See the excellent discussion by Dover and Andrewes in Gomme, *HCT* IV, 293.

be added the military costs, of which the greatest portion was spent at Potidaea. There were never fewer than 3,000 hoplites engaged in the siege there, and to that number Phormio added 1,600 who did not, however, remain throughout the whole siege. We may conservatively set the average number of troops at Potidaea at 3,500. These men were paid a drachma for themselves and one for a retainer each day, so that the daily cost of the army was at least 7,000 drachmas, or one and one-sixth talents. If we multiply this by 360 days, a round number for a year, we arrive at 420 talents. In addition, whenever the Spartans invaded Attica, 16,000 men were needed to man the fortifications of Athens, Piraeus, and the Long Walls.[91] We do not know whether they were paid; if they were, it was probably not at the full rate for fighting men. We also know that the Athenians launched annual invasions of the Megarid and stayed long enough to ravage the country.[92] In 431 the invasion force numbered 10,000. Once again, we do not know whether or how much they were paid nor precisely how long they stayed, but there must have been some cost. Even if we include only the naval costs and the expenses for Potidaea we arrive at a sum over 2,000 talents.[93]

A similar conclusion can be arrived at by quite a different kind of calculation. Inscriptions give us the accounts of the Athenian *logistai* recording loans to the state from the sacred treasuries during the Archidamian War.[94] They show that in the seven years 433 to 426 the Athenians borrowed almost 4,800 talents from the sacred treasuries. Beyond that, the interest figures recorded show that the bulk of the borrowing fell in the period 432–429. The epigraphers have made a reasonably accurate estimate of annual borrowing and suggest a figure of

[91] 2.13.6–7. [92] 2.31.1–3.

[93] Thucydides gives the figure 2,000 talents as the total cost of the siege of Potidaea (2.70.2). Since the siege took about two and one-half years, the average annual cost is about 800 talents. Isocrates (15.113) gives the figure as 2,400. If he is right the average would be 960 talents annually. If we are right in calculating the cost of soldiers at 420 and if we add to it 560 talents for 70 ships in service eight months a year we get very close to the Isocratean number. This reckoning, thought inexact, seems to lend some support to our previous calculation.

[94] *GHI*, 72.

1,370 talents for the first year of the war.[95] If this figure is approximately right and we add to it the 600 talents annually received from the empire, we once again, by a different route, come close to the figure of 2,000 as the cost of the first year of the war.

Clearly, Pericles must have expected to spend at least 1,500 but probably 2,000 talents a year to carry on the war. Three years of such a war would probably cost 6,000 talents. If we add to the usable reserve fund of 5,000, three years of imperial income, 1,800, we get 6,800.[96] Pericles could thus maintain his strategy for three years, but not for a fourth. No more than the other Greeks should he have believed that Athens could hold out for more than three years.[97] But even if he expected it to last only three years we may wonder why he did not take so obviously effective a step as sending a fleet to Naupactus immediately at the start of the war.

A closer examination of Pericles' expectations and a more precise expression of them shows that his hope was to bring about a change of opinion in Sparta, the true decision maker in the Peloponnesian League in matters of war and peace.[98] Such a hope should not seem unreasonable when we remember with what reluctance Sparta was drawn into the war. She had tried to persuade the Corinthians to arbitrate their quarrel with Corcyra, fearing that it might lead to a conflict with Athens.[99] The Spartans had not sent aid to beleaguered Potidaea even after their ephors had promised it.[100] Their vote that Athens had broken the Thirty Years' Peace was powerfully influenced by a concerted campaign of propaganda executed by Corinth, Aegina, Megara, and, perhaps, other allies. Even then a strong Spartan faction led by no less a figure than King Archidamus had opposed the motion, which seems to have carried by a close margin.[101] Still later, after a state of war had been recognized,

[95] *ATL* III, 341–342; *GHI*, 217, accept the figure in general "without claiming literal accuracy for it."

[96] See Appendix A. [97] 7.28.3. [98] See Kagan, *Outbreak*, 9–30.

[99] *Ibid.*, 225. [100] *Ibid.*, 279–280.

[101] *Ibid.*, 286–316. In *Outbreak*, I argued that both votes called for at the Spartan assembly showed a large majority for war and that the second was called only to emphasize the size of the margin. I am now per-