

DAVID H. PINKNEY

# French Revolution of 1830



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## The French Revolution of 1830



THE  
FRENCH REVOLUTION  
OF 1830

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by David H. Pinkney

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To  
DAVID  
1953-1969



## PREFACE

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IN 1958 I presented a paper to the Second Newberry Library Conference on French History (later published in *French Historical Studies*, Fall 1958) in which I noted that American historians had almost completely failed to make contributions to French history comparable to the great works of the French themselves, such as Lefebvre's *Les Paysans du Nord* or Soboul's *Les Sans-culottes de l'an II*. I attributed this failure to the inability of Americans, owing to geographical separation, to do the sustained research in French archives that was the foundation of the great French books. I urged my American colleagues to cease trying to meet our French friends on their own ground with monographs but instead to write on broader subjects that are of interest to Americans concerned with European history and not merely to French historians, to draw on the detailed works of others, and to study in depth in archives only neglected or debated aspects of the subject—a possible task for an American on sabbatical leave and occasional summer research trips. I argued, too, that as outsiders we could bring to many subjects in French history valuable objective judgments that our more involved French colleagues could not.

I have taken my own advice. I have chosen to write on a major event in nineteenth century French history, and I have used monographs and articles in areas of the subject where they are available and researched in depth in archives and contemporary publications where little or no work had been done or where disagreement called for reexamination of sources. I wrote with Americans in mind as my principal readers yet with the conviction that I had something to say to Frenchmen, too. I hope that the result may prove instructive and interesting to readers on both sides of the Atlantic.

I am indebted to many persons and institutions for help in bringing this book to completion. A fellowship from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation made pos-

## PREFACE

sible a year of research in France, and a Faculty Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council helped finance a semester's leave for writing and a return trip to France. The University of Missouri and the University of Washington granted me sabbatical leaves, and the University of Missouri Research Council gave valued financial help. Many persons aided me, some in ways they scarcely knew through a question, a comment, or a suggestion; I think particularly of Louis Chevalier, Louis Girard, Raymond Grew, Daniel Resnick, Charles Tilly, and Charles Mullett. I am grateful to all of them and to others who go unnamed. To G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Sherman Kent, and Helen R. Pinkney, who read and criticized the entire manuscript, I reserve a very special thanks.

*David H. Pinkney*

Seattle, Washington  
July 1971

## CONTENTS

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Preface	vii
I Conflict without Compromise	3
II The Sources of Opposition	44
III Surprise, Confusion, Disorder, July 25, 26, 27	73
IV Days of Revolution, July 28 and 29	109
V Struggle for Power, July 30-August 9	143
VI The Revolution in the Provinces	196
VII The Little Things: Liquidation of a Revolution	227
VIII The Crowd in the Revolution	252
IX Purge and Replacement	274
X Revolution Unresolved, August- November 1830	296
XI The Close of the Revolution, November-December 1830	330
Bibliography	369
Index	386



## The French Revolution of 1830

## ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations of major source collections are used in the footnotes.

- AHMG Archives historiques du Ministère de la Guerre
- AN Archives nationales de France
- AP Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris
- AS Archives du Département de la Seine et de la Ville de Paris
- BHVP Bibliothèque historique de la Ville de Paris
- BN Bibliothèque nationale

## Conflict Without Compromise

ON MONDAY morning, July 26, 1830, Parisians picking up the day's official newspaper, the *Moniteur universel*, noticed that the entire first page was devoted to a report to the King in which his ministers called for and justified extraordinary measures against the periodical press of the opposition, an opposition that in the preceding few weeks had won a resounding victory in the general elections. Turning the page they read the texts of royal ordinances—issued without parliamentary approval—instituting a rigorous censorship of the press, dissolving the newly elected Chamber of Deputies, changing the electoral law to favor conservative candidates, and ordering new elections. Here was the rumored royal coup d'état. Some had hoped for it. Many feared it. Probably most politically aware Frenchmen half-expected it yet thought that it would never occur.<sup>1</sup>

The ordinances of July 25 were the culmination of a conflict between the crown and the liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies dating back to the liberals' victory in the general election of 1827 and in more exacerbated form to the appointment of the unpopular Polignac Ministry in August 1829. At the center of the conflict was the aging monarch, Charles X, seventy-three years old in 1830. He had fled the Revolution in 1789 and spent the next twenty-five years of his life in exile, escaping the fate of his brother, Louis XVI. He returned to France in 1814, and during the reign of his second brother, Louis XVIII, he earned a reputation for ostentatious piety and emerged as the leader of the dissident ultraroyalists who thought the regime too liberal. He hated the Revolution and all its works, and he tended to see in all liberal opposition a revolutionary threat

<sup>1</sup> See below, Ch. III.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

to his throne. During the first three years of his reign a well-disposed royalist majority dominated the chamber, and the problem of harmony between the ministry and parliament had never arisen. By 1827, however, the majority was disintegrating, and elements of it were in rebellion against Comte Joseph de Villèle, who had been the first minister since 1822. Villèle, unwilling either to compromise or to give up the office and power he cherished, called a general election, hoping to win a renewed majority and perhaps, should the liberals gain additional seats, frighten dissident royalists into solidarity behind him. He set the election for November 17 and 24, but he made no announcement of it until November 5, intending to take his opposition by surprise and to allow them no time to organize a campaign. But the liberals were better prepared than he expected; a warning from the police told of an efficient organization that, they claimed, reached into every street of Paris and into every department.<sup>2</sup> Villèle probably discounted this report, but a committee of liberals, called "Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera," did exist. It had been founded early in 1827 under the presidency of François Guizot, a popular professor and writer and a former official of the Ministry of the Interior, for the purpose of aiding liberal candidates and electors in combating official efforts to keep them off the ballot and electoral lists. Prefects and subprefects exhibited great ingenuity in exploiting all provisions of the electoral law that would permit disqualification of known opponents of the government and qualification of reliable supporters. When Villèle called his surprise election of 1827, the "Aide-toi" was ready to direct the liberals' resistance against these machinations and to support the campaigns of liberal candidates.<sup>3</sup> After all the

<sup>2</sup> AN, F<sup>7</sup> 6772, Police générale, Affaires politiques, Préfet de Police to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Sept. 19, 1827.

<sup>3</sup> Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration* (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 390-92; Achille de Vaulabelle, *Histoire des deux Restaurations jusqu'à l'avènement de Louis-Philippe (de janvier 1813 à octobre 1830)*, 5th ed. (Paris, 1860), VIII, 97-98; Charles H. Pouthas, *Guizot pendant la Restauration: préparation de l'homme d'état, 1814-1830* (Paris, 1923), pp. 370-80.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

ballots had been counted, the Villèle royalists had won 150 to 180 seats in the new chamber. The liberals, who had elected fewer than twenty of their candidates in the preceding general election four years earlier, had as many seats as the Villèlists, and the right opposition had sixty to eighty seats.<sup>4</sup>

Repudiated by Right and Left and no longer able to command a majority in the chamber Villèle could not remain in office, and Charles X had his first opportunity to appoint a prime minister. Nonetheless, he parted with Villèle reluctantly, and he expected his new ministry to continue the policies of the old.<sup>5</sup>

The new council, named in January 1828, included several Villèlists, two opponents of the preceding ministry, and some officials without clear political affiliation, but it was Left-Center in political orientation. It had no president; Vicomte Jean-Baptiste Martignac, who took the Ministry of the Interior, became its spokesman in parliament. The King's hope to continue the Villèlist system was futile, for a majority in the chamber were anti-Villèlists, a combination of the Left and the Defection, a band of dissident royalists, followers of François Chateaubriand. The ministry found itself in an impossible position—if it satisfied the parliamentary majority, it would alienate the King, and if it followed the King's wishes, it would have no majority. Charles, adopting a neutral position, at first allowed the ministry to try to please the majority with concessions to the Left, but the results—a liberalized press law and measures against the Jesuits—did not please him, and he began to think of a new ministry based on all the elements of the shattered royalist majority of the early 1820s, a ministry that would take a hard line against what Charles saw as the revolutionary aspirations of the liberals.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, p. 392. Strict precision in determining the strength of each group is impossible because they were not organized and disciplined parties with each adherent unmistakably labeled.

<sup>5</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, p. 406.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 405-14; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Le Comte Ferdinand de*

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

The King wanted his good friend, Prince Jules de Polignac, a former émigré warmly devoted to the Bourbons and sympathetic with Charles's conception of a strong monarchy, to head the ministry. In January 1829 the imminent resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comte Pierre de La Ferronnays, due to ill-health, offered him an opportunity to advance his plan. He proposed to name Polignac to the vacant post and at the same time to replace Martignac in the Ministry of the Interior with Auguste Ravez, an extreme rightist. Martignac would move to the Ministry of the Navy. The incumbent ministers protested this shake-up and threatened to resign, and Charles turned to the appointment of an entirely new ministry. About January 20 Polignac was summoned back from London, where he had been serving as the French ambassador, and immediately began a round of talks with potential ministers. He made little progress, and the date for the reconvening of parliament, January 27, was approaching. Charles did not want to face the new session with a ministry in formation or dissolution, and he ordered Polignac back to London, putting an end to the Prince's ministerial explorations.<sup>7</sup>

But the King did not abandon his hopes for a new ministry. In March he asked his close adviser, the ultraroyalist Comte Ferdinand de Bertier, and Comte François de La Bourdonnaye, another rightist, to draw up two ministerial lists—one including some of the present ministers who might be persuaded to stay on and the other composed of new men. Thinking that circumstances would more likely require the latter, Bertier wrote to the King on April 1 proposing a new ministry that included Polignac in Foreign Affairs and La Bourdonnaye at the Interior. Within the same week a ministerial crisis threatened to provoke Martignac's resignation, giving Charles the opportunity he

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*Bertier (1782-1864) et l'énigme de la Congrégation* (Paris, 1948), p. 432; Charles d'Haussez, *Mémoires du Baron d'Haussez, dernier Ministre de la Marine sous la Restauration* (Paris, 1896, 1897), II, 86.

<sup>7</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restauration*, pp. 414-15; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, pp. 432-34, 439.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

sought, but the difficulty was resolved. Martignac agreed to stay on, and the King postponed his project until after the end of the parliamentary session in the summer. Bertier, nonetheless, continued his preparations and kept up a secret correspondence with Polignac, advising him on the names being considered in discussions centering around Bertier, La Bourdonnaye, and the King. They were thinking at this time not of a ministry that would defy the chamber in some kind of a coup d'état, as many of their enemies suspected, but of a combination that would win the support of a majority of the deputies. Bertier thought that they could count on a majority of forty votes in the lower house. The parliamentary session ended on July 31. Polignac, following Bertier's advice, had arrived in Paris a few days earlier and had at once entered into talks looking toward the formation of a new ministry.<sup>8</sup>

The results were announced in the *Moniteur* of August 9. Polignac and La Bourdonnaye stood out as the leading personalities of the new combination, the former taking the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, the latter that of the Interior. La Bourdonnaye opposed having a president of the council, perhaps because he objected to Polignac in that role, and the ministry had no president other than the King. The choice of the Minister of War had been left to the Dauphin, who controlled higher military appointments, and he chose *Comte Louis de Bourmont*, a high-ranking general in the royal army. The Ministry of Finance went to *Comte Gilbert de Chabrol*, a holdover from Martignac's ministry. Jean Courvoisier, a magistrate, former deputy, and a fanatical Catholic, took the Ministry of Finance. The King's choice for the Ministry of the Navy, Admiral Henri de Rigny, the hero of the Battle of Navarino in 1827, declined, and that post was filled by a career prefect, Baron Charles d'Haussez. *Comte Guillaume de Montbel*, a devoted partisan of Villèle and his successor as Mayor of Toulouse, completed the

<sup>8</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 418-19; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, pp. 438-45; *Moniteur universel* (Paris), Aug. 1, 1829, p. 1366.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

council, taking the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction. Bertier had hoped for a portfolio in return for his faithful services to the Bourbons, but La Bourdonnaye thought him too compromised by clerical connections and blocked his appointment.<sup>9</sup>

Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, the historian of the Bourbon Restoration, has declared that Charles and his advisers could scarcely have put together a combination of men less competent for the tasks confronting the government or more likely to disturb and irritate public opinion. The appointments of Polignac, La Bourdonnaye, and Bourmont were capital blunders. Polignac had spent thirty of his fifty-eight years outside France; he was little attuned to the changes that revolution and war had wrought in his country since he fled it as a child in 1789. He had served in the army of Condé, returned to France in 1804 and was promptly arrested for his part in the Cadoudel Plot against Napoleon; he spent the next decade of his life in prison. After the Restoration Louis XVIII appointed him to the Chamber of Peers, but during Louis's reign he was one of the dissatisfied ultraroyalists who gathered around the King's brother, the future Charles X. From 1823 to 1829 he again lived abroad, serving as the ambassador to the Court of Saint-James's. He was a devout Catholic, a convert from eighteenth century skepticism, and his title of Prince, which he regularly used, had been bestowed by the Pope. He was an Anglophile and married to an Englishwoman, which endeared him to few Frenchmen. He had many admirable personal qualities, but, as Bertier observes, "there are few men in French history who have been so universally disliked." His unpopularity alone would probably have made him an ineffectual minister, but it was compounded by stubbornness, a supreme self-confidence, and an unwillingness—perhaps borne of his long imprisonment—to come to grips with reality.<sup>10</sup> La

<sup>9</sup> *Moniteur*, Aug. 9, 1829, p. 1395; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 420-22; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, pp. 441-44.

<sup>10</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 420-21, Vincent W. Beach, "The Polignac Ministry: A Re-evaluation," *University of Colorado*

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

Bourdonnaye, a man of reactionary views and intemperate language, was associated in the public mind with the worst excesses of the White Terror after the defeat of Napoleon.<sup>11</sup> In a speech before a secret session of the Chamber of Deputies, which he himself later published, he called for "a salutary terror" against enemies of the monarchy. "To stop their criminal conspiracies we must have irons, executioners, torture. Death and death alone can put an end to their plots."<sup>12</sup> The appointment of Bourmont was an affront to all patriotic Frenchmen, for he had fought with the Chouans during the Revolution, later rose to high position in the Imperial armies, again rallied to Napoleon in 1815 only to desert him on the eve of Waterloo. In that same year he testified against Marshal Ney in the trial that ended in the condemnation and execution of the marshal, Napoleon's "bravest of the brave."<sup>13</sup>

The announcement of the new ministry was greeted with approval by royalists, by indignant outcries from the liberals. The Villèlist *Gazette de France* declared, "For all men not blinded by passion, the formation of the present ministry is the result of that cry heard from all friends of order: *no more concessions*." The next day it categorically denied that the Charter was in any way threatened, this in response to the liberal press that was warning of an imminent coup d'état.<sup>14</sup> Most eloquent of the voices on the left was the *Journal des débats*. "So here again," it declared on August 10, "is broken that tie of love and confidence that unites the people to the monarch! Here again the court with its old rancors, the emigration with its prejudices, the clergy

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*Studies*, Series in History No. 3 (Jan. 1964), pp. 95-96; Pierre Robin-Harmel, *Le Prince Jules de Polignac, ministre de Charles X, 1780-1847* (Paris, 1941), *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, p. 421; Beach, "Polignac Ministry," p. 93.

<sup>12</sup> Prosper Duvergier de Hauranne, *Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France, 1814-1848* (Paris, 1857-71), III, 309, 310.

<sup>13</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, p. 421; Beach, "Polignac Ministry," p. 93.

<sup>14</sup> Charles de Rémusat, *Mémoires de ma vie* (Paris, 1958-67), II, 277.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

with its hatred of liberty that come to interpose themselves between France and its King. . . . Unhappy France! Unhappy King!" A few days later it dramatically denounced the association of the three leading personalities of the ministry with three shameful episodes in France's history—the emigration, the defeat at Waterloo, and the White Terror. "Coblentz, Waterloo, 1815, there are the three principles, there are the three personalities of the ministry. Turn it to any side you wish, on all sides it irritates. It has no aspect that is not sinister, not one face that is not menacing."<sup>15</sup> The *Journal* joined other liberal papers in discovering an ominous English influence in the appointment of the Anglophile Polignac and of Bourmont, who had contributed to English victory at Waterloo.<sup>16</sup> However, interest in the responses of the articulate minority in Paris should not obscure the fact that the masses were indifferent. According to police reports the announcement of the new ministry caused no ruffle in the calm of the Parisian summer.<sup>17</sup>

The opposition attributed to the ministry a direction and sense of purpose that it sorely lacked. The ministers assumed office with only the vaguest conceptions of what they would do with the powers suddenly vested in them. In January 1829 the King, Polignac, La Bourdonnaye, and Bertier had agreed that a new ministry should strive to strengthen royal authority and to give the landed aristocracy a larger role in government while at the same time extending the suffrage, the four leaders being convinced apparently that the public was loyal to the monarchy and that, properly controlled, it would elect partisans of the King. In a memorandum dated September 10, 1829, Polignac declared his dissatisfaction with the power of the middle class in France, the abuses of the press, and usurpation of royal prerogatives by ministers,

<sup>15</sup> *Journal des débats* (Paris) Aug. 15, 1829.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 16, 17, 25, 1825; Charles Ledré, *La Presse à l'assaut de la monarchie, 1815-1848* (Paris, 1960), pp. 90-91.

<sup>17</sup> AN, F<sup>7</sup> 3883, Préfecture de Police de Paris, "Bulletin de Paris," Aug. 10-18, 1829.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

and he expressed the wish that the doors of the Chamber of Deputies might somehow be closed to "mediocre men driven by turbulent and revolutionary passions." Their places, he obviously thought, should be taken by members of the aristocracy. But these were no more than aspirations, and in his memorandum Polignac put forward no specific program. The ministry certainly had no plan for a coup d'état or any other dramatic violation of the Charter, and as the weeks after August 8 passed into months with nothing attempted, nothing accomplished, it became apparent that the ministry had no plan of domestic action whatsoever.<sup>18</sup>

When the ministry was organized, the King and his advisers had counted on the support of a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but Chateaubriand's refusal of his endorsement, dramatized by his resignation as Charles's ambassador in Rome, put his followers among the deputies into the opposition and ruined those hopes. The only practical course for the ministers, were they really determined to survive, would have been to use the King's power of issuing ordinances, granted by Article 14 of the Charter, to change the electoral law in a way that would assure the choice of sympathetic deputies in a new election. But this required resolute leadership and willingness to meet the charge of violating the Charter, for the power granted by Article 14 was ill-defined and doubtful, and Polignac was both irresolute and committed to respect the Charter.<sup>19</sup>

La Bourdonnaye, the most vigorous member of the council, might have been competent to lead it into a defiance of the parliamentary majority and their supporters, but he was a contentious and difficult colleague, soon at odds with his fellow ministers. Annoyed and frustrated, he used the min-

<sup>18</sup> Berthier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, p. 433; Vincent W. Beach, *Charles X of France: His Life and Times* (Boulder, Colo., 1971), pp. 296-97, 300; *Moniteur*, Dec. 17, 1830, p. 1728.

<sup>19</sup> Article 14 read, "The king is the supreme head of the state. He commands the land and sea forces, declares war, makes treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce, appoints all public officials, and makes all regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the security of the state" (Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, p. 67).

istry's vote in November to reestablish the office of president of the council of ministers as the occasion to resign. Two of his colleagues, Chabrol and Haussez, anxious to be rid of him and knowing his strong opposition to the appointment of a president when the ministry was formed, may have initiated the proposal with the intent of forcing his resignation. Polignac became the titular head of the ministry. The Villèlists wanted to bring their chief, the former first minister, into the council as La Bourdonnaye's successor in the Ministry of the Interior, and Bertier had hopes of winning the portfolio denied him in August, but both projects foundered, the first owing to Villèle's unwillingness to cooperate and the second owing to opposition of the Villèlists and probably also to the reluctance of Polignac to have a colleague who possessed such close ties with the King. Montbel reluctantly moved up to the Ministry of the Interior. To his place in the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction the King named Comte Martial de Guernon-Ranville, the Procurer-General in Lyon, chosen for his reputed ability as a speaker, a talent in unfortunately short supply in a ministry that would soon need effective spokesmen before an unsympathetic parliament.<sup>20</sup>

The change in the ministry in November brought no alteration in its policy nor in the liberals' opposition to it. The council continued to meet in long sessions four times weekly—twice at the seat of a minister, all being visited in succession, and twice at the palace under the presidency of the King. The talk dragged on—Polignac drew doodles on a

<sup>20</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, pp. 442, 453-54; *Moniteur*, Dec. 17, 1830, p. 1728; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 88; Montbel to Villèle, Aug. 1829, Joseph de Villèle, *Mémoires et correspondance* (Paris, 1888-90), v, 379; Montbel to Villèle, Nov. 16, 1829, *ibid.*, 391-92; Genoude to Villèle, Nov. 15, 1829, *ibid.*, 388; Villèle to Montbel, Nov. 1829, *ibid.*, 393; Montbel to Villèle [Nov. 1829], *ibid.*, 394-95; Rémusat, *Mémoires*, II, 279; Alexis de Tocqueville, *Oeuvres et correspondance inédites de Alexis de Tocqueville* (Paris, 1861), II, 6; Guillaume de Montbel, *1787-1831; souvenirs du Comte de Montbel, ministre de Charles X* (Paris, 1913), pp. 217-19.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

tablet, ministers frequently went to sleep. They discussed the timing of the next session of the chambers, what bills to introduce that might have chance of approval by the almost certainly hostile deputies, and especially how to get the budget passed. Early in January they fixed the opening of the legislative session for March 2 and decided to offer it only the budget and one other bill, which they hoped could be noncontroversial.<sup>21</sup> Rumors of a coup d'état directed against the Chamber of Deputies continued to circulate, but the council did not at this time contemplate so drastic a step, preferring first to seek the cooperation of the existing chamber.<sup>22</sup>

The opposition was not idle. The liberal press kept up a barrage of attacks on the ministry and continually warned that the ministers would not hesitate to violate the Charter if the deputies refused their cooperation. It urged resistance by all legal means, including refusal to pass the budget and refusal to pay taxes, if the government should attempt to collect them without parliamentary approval. On January 3, 1830, a new journal appeared in Paris to add its persistent voice to the clamor against the ministry, and it did not spare the King himself. It was the *National*, founded by a group of journalists with the support of Talleyrand and the liberal banker, Jacques Laffitte, and edited by three bright young men, Adolphe Thiers, François Mignet, and Armand Carrel. In a cascade of brilliantly written and provocative articles they maintained that an acceptable monarchy must have as ministers only men enjoying the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, argued that refusal of the budget was a constitutional right, and, drawing a parallel between France in 1830 and England in 1688, implied that if the

<sup>21</sup> Haussez, *Mémoires*, pp. 128-31; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, p. 426; Beach, "Polignac Ministry," p. 106; Montbel to Villèle, Oct. 28, 1829, Villèle, *Mémoires*, v, 386-87; Genoude to Villèle, Nov. 29, 1829, *ibid.*, 399.

<sup>22</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, p. 455; *National* (Paris), Jan. 5, 1830; AN, CC 547, Chambre et Cour des Pairs, "Note adressé à M. de Polignac par M. Guernon-Ranville," Dec. 15, 1829.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

King violated the Charter he should be replaced by the head of the most closely related family, the Duc d'Orléans.<sup>23</sup> The opposition expressed itself in other ways, too. The society "Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera" alerted its members and organized new committees in expectation of new elections. Associations of taxpayers committed to refuse to pay taxes not duly voted by parliament appeared in several departments. Throughout the autumn of 1829 and the succeeding winter and spring officers of the Gendarmerie in the provinces reported frequently on liberals' efforts to organize tax resistance. Many newspapers gave their support to the movement, and the courts blocked most of the government's efforts to silence them for violation of the press laws. On the other side of the political spectrum the rightist press heightened the fears of the opposition and added to the growing political tension by urging the King to use the powers authorized by Article 14 to deal with the revolutionary menace to monarchical government.<sup>24</sup>

While the ministry continued in its indecisive course in domestic affairs during the fall of 1829 and the succeeding winter, it did resolve on action abroad—the decision to send a combined naval and land expedition against Algiers. The French navy had been blockading the port of Algiers since 1827 in retaliation for an insult by the Dey of Algiers to the French consul and in an effort to coerce that ruler into acceptance of French proposals for settlement of disputes over France's long-standing fishing and trading rights in Algeria and over a debt that the Dey claimed the French government owed him. The blockade had been ineffective and costly, and the French were anxious to discontinue it, but the latest attempt to resume negotiations had ended on August 3, 1829, with the Algerians firing on the ship of the

<sup>23</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 426-27; Ledré, *Presse*, pp. 96-99; *National*, Jan. 3, 29, 1830.

<sup>24</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 426-27; Pouthas, Guizot, pp. 423-25; Daniel L. Rader, "The Breton Association and the Press: Propaganda for 'Legal Resistance' before the July Revolution," *French Historical Studies*, 2 (Spring 1961) 64-82; *National*, Jan. 6, 1830; AN, F<sup>7</sup> 6777, 6778, Police gén., Rapports de Gendarmerie, 1829-30.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

French representatives. The King in his opening address to parliament in 1828 and again in 1829 had called for action to terminate the intolerable situation across the Mediterranean, and the episode of August 3 gave new impetus to these proposals just as the Polignac Ministry took office. In October 1829 Haussez, the Minister of the Navy, urged the council of ministers to consider a naval expedition against the port. The Dauphin voiced his strong opposition, and the King decided to follow Polignac's counterproposal to attempt to induce the Sultan of Turkey to put pressure on his vassal, the Dey of Algiers, to negotiate a settlement. Polignac also toyed with the idea of using the forces of the Pasha of Egypt, supported by French money and ships, to attack the Dey, a fantastic scheme, which illustrates Polignac's frail grasp on reality. Neither plan materialized, and in mid-December the ministry agreed that force, applied by the French army and navy, offered the only solution. Formidable defenses of the port of Algiers ruled out either a naval bombardment or an effective naval siege. Bourmont, the Minister of War, recommended capture of the city from the land side by an army put ashore some distance away. This appealed to the ministers, and they instructed Bourmont and Haussez to examine the problems presented by such an expedition and to report back to the council. The proposal immediately ran into opposition from general officers of the navy, who claimed that the almost uninterrupted bad weather along the Algerian coast, the strong coastal defenses, the heat, the lack of water, the trackless sands and hostile tribes of the interior made the expedition impractical and dangerous. They warned that the government would be unable to find a general officer to command it. Haussez, nonetheless, was sure that a successful landing could be made, and he got support for his position from two captains who had served with the blockading squadron off Algiers and from a handful of other officers.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 434-36; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 132-33, 160-61; Martial de Guernon-Ranville, *Journal d'un ministre* (Caen, 1873), pp. 10, 13-14, 27-29, 32.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

The ministry discussed the arguments for and against the proposed expedition, and on February 6 voted unanimously to recommend to the King a landing on the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch, twelve miles from Algiers, and an attack on the city from the land. The next day the King gave his approval. The expedition was to be ready to sail in six months—in August, when the weather along the Algerian coast was most propitious, and the city could be taken in no more than two months. The enthusiastic Haussez said the navy would be ready by May 15, even by May 1 if the weather were favorable.<sup>26</sup>

Polignac informed the principal foreign powers of his government's intention to send the expedition against Algiers. He assured them that it was punitive in purpose and that no change would be made in the regime of North Africa without consulting them. Russia, Austria, and Prussia readily gave their approval, but Britain, with more direct interests in the Mediterranean, was suspicious of French intentions. To the British, the extent of the preparations suggested more than a mere punitive expedition, and in both London and Paris they pressed for explanations and for a promise that France was not planning conquest and the establishment of a French colony. Despite their repeated *démarches* Polignac refused to give them any more precise assurances than he had offered to all the powers. The British government was annoyed, and its sympathies with the Bourbon regime, which it had helped to found only a decade and a half earlier, noticeably cooled.<sup>27</sup>

Neither the surviving records of the ministry's deliberations nor its official pronouncements permit a conclusive determination of the motives behind the decision to mount the expedition against Algiers. In his circular to the powers on March 12 Polignac declared that his government sought, in addition to redress of grievances arising from the dispute

<sup>26</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 129-32; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 163.

<sup>27</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restauration*, pp. 436-37; Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 38-39, 61, 78-79; Etienne d'Audiffret-Pasquier, *Histoire de mon temps: mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier* (Paris, 1895), VI, 210-13.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

over French rights in Algiers and over the debt claimed by the Dey, to put an end to piracy based on the Algerian coast, to the enslavement of Christians, and to the exaction of tribute from nations trading in the Mediterranean. An official justification of the expedition published in the *Moniteur* of April 20, 1830, put little emphasis on the latter humanitarian motives, and they may be regarded as window dressing intended to win the sympathy of the great powers. Economic motives seem to have played no significant part. Villèle's Minister of War had in 1827 called attention to economic advantages that possession of Algeria might bring France, but little trade moved between the two countries, and French businessmen, even in Marseille, showed almost no interest in the opposite coast of the Mediterranean and little enthusiasm for the expedition. Although a few Frenchmen saw an opportunity to establish a permanent foothold across the Mediterranean, the government at this time had no clear intent of winning a new colony for France. Among the political opposition many feared that the real motive of the expedition was to distract and mislead public opinion and to corrupt the army and undermine its loyalty to the laws in preparation for an assault on the Charter.<sup>28</sup> "They have," warned the *Journal des débats*, "the insane hope of making a victory against Algiers a victory against our liberties. . . ."<sup>29</sup>

One student of the subject has argued that the principal motivation behind the decision was the desire to gain possession of the Dey's treasury, estimated in 1827 to amount to 150 million francs. In their hands it would give Charles and his ministers a measure of independence of the chamber should it refuse to vote the budget. They may also have thought to use it, the same author suggests, to assure the

<sup>28</sup> Bertier de Sauvigny, *Restoration*, pp. 436-37; Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, p. 32; Marcel Emerit, "Une Cause de l'Expédition d'Alger: le trésor de la Casbah," *Actes du 79<sup>e</sup> Congrès national des sociétés savantes, Alger (1954)*, pp. 171-73; *Moniteur*, Apr. 20, 1830, pp. 434-35; Pierre Renouvin, *Histoire des relations internationales* (Paris, 1953-58), v, 108-09.

<sup>29</sup> *Journal des débats*, May 17, 1830.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

loyalty of key army officers in the critical days of confrontation with the deputies that perhaps lay just ahead. But this implies a clarity of purpose and a determination on the domestic political scene that the Polignac ministry lacked. The probable motive behind the expedition, aside from the desire to end the costly blockade and to settle immediate grievances with Algiers, was to enhance the prestige of the ministry by a demonstration of patriotic enterprise, to reassure its supporters, and to appeal to all who thought the Bourbons overly passive in foreign affairs. The hoped-for advantage was a general strengthening of the government's political position, not a preparation for a coup d'état, something the ministry did not then contemplate.<sup>80</sup>

Having decided upon the Algerian expedition and launched preparations for it, the ministry turned its attention to the chambers, scheduled to assemble in about three weeks. The ministry reaffirmed its earlier decision to limit its legislative program to the budget and a few noncontroversial bills. It took no steps, however, to win support even for this modest program, entered into no negotiations with influential deputies, offered no judicious persuasion in jobs or money, which, Haussez thought, might have assured a friendly majority. Several ministerial sessions were devoted to the address from the throne to be delivered at the royal session on March 2. All members brought their ideas for it to the meeting of February 13, where they discussed them and then charged Courvoisier, the Minister of Justice, to draw up a complete draft. All agreed that the ministry must demonstrate its firmness, and Courvoisier's text, presented on February 20, included a sharp warning that the government would not yield to any illegal pretensions of the chamber.<sup>81</sup> "If criminal maneuvers raise up obstacles against my government, which I hope will not be the case, I will find the strength to overcome them in my resolution to

<sup>80</sup> Emerit, "Expédition d'Alger," pp. 174-75; Renouvin, *Histoire*, v, 108.

<sup>81</sup> Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 153, 154, 171-76; Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 32-34.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

maintain public order, in the just confidence of the French people, and in the love that they have always demonstrated for their kings."<sup>32</sup> Guernon-Ranville feared that the statement might be interpreted as a threat to govern by decree, and he suggested a milder version appealing for the chambers' cooperation. After the mention of the King's determination to maintain public order he would have put these words: "in the loyal support that I have the right to expect from the two chambers. . . ." This proposal stirred a long and heated debate, but it ended in the adoption of Courvoisier's original version.<sup>33</sup>

Only a handful of deputies and a few peers turned up for the traditional mass held at Notre Dame on the eve of the opening of parliament, but for the royal session of March 2 in the Louvre scarcely a seat on the floor was vacant; the galleries were overflowing, and crowds gathered in the streets around the palace. The King arrived shortly after 1 P.M., and after a ceremonial reception by delegations of deputies and peers, he was escorted to the throne, took his seat and began to read in his high-pitched voice the carefully prepared address. At one point he rased his head in a gesture of emphasis, and his diamond-studded hat fell off, dropping at the feet of the Duc d'Orléans, who stood at his left; the Duke picked it up and held it until the King finished speaking. Most of the address was given over to a routine report on the nation's foreign relations and finances. Toward the end Charles spoke of "the sacred rights" of the crown and of his obligation to pass them on intact to his successors and then gave the warning that the ministers had agreed upon. At the end there were polite applause and a few "vives le roi."<sup>34</sup>

To the opposition deputies the King was threatening the dissolution of the chamber and perhaps resort to Article 14

<sup>32</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, p. 35.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>34</sup> Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 177; Charlotte de Boigne, *Récits d'une tante: mémoires de la comtesse de Boigne, née d'Osmond* (Paris, 1921-25), III, 226; *Moniteur*, Mar. 3, 1830, p. 245.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

to assure the return of a more amenable body of deputies in the next elections. In the succeeding days they proclaimed their refusal to be intimidated by naming two prominent opposition deputies, Pierre Royer-Collard and Casimir Périer, as their first choices for the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and by electing only opposition members to the committee charged with drafting the reply to the royal address.<sup>85</sup>

This committee deliberated for several days, and on March 15 presented its text of the proposed reply.<sup>86</sup> The critical passage—the response to Charles's warning—came near the end.

Sire, the Charter, which we owe to the wisdom of your august predecessor, and which Your Majesty is firmly committed to defend, consecrates, as a right, the participation of the country in the discussion of public affairs. That intervention ought to be, it is in fact, indirect, wisely regulated, fixed within limits exactly drawn, and we would never permit that anyone dare violate those limits, but it is positive in its result, because it is based on the permanent accord between the political views of your Government and the wishes of your people, the indispensable condition of the normal conduct of public affairs. Sire, our loyalty, our devotion compel us to tell you that this accord does not now exist.

An unwarranted mistrust of the feelings and thoughts of France is today the fundamental attitude of the Administration. Your people are distressed by this because it is an affront to them; they are worried by it because it is a threat to their liberties.<sup>87</sup>

For two days the chamber discussed the proposed reply in secret session. The presence of virtually all the deputies and all save one of the ministers (Courvoisier was ill) attested to

<sup>85</sup> *Moniteur*, Mar. 5, p. 255, Mar. 10, 1830, p. 275; Pasquier, *Mémoires*, VI, 217.

<sup>86</sup> *Moniteur*, Mar. 15, 1830, p. 296.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1830, p. 309.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

the importance that all factions attached to the debate. Montbel and Guernon-Ranville spoke for the government. The former denied that the country was alarmed or even concerned and charged that the purpose of the proposed reply was to force the King to change the ministers against his will, and this was in violation of the Charter and of the royal prerogative. If the choice of ministers were given to the chamber, he said, the country would fall into anarchy. Guernon-Ranville insisted that the King's power to change his ministers was absolute; no limits could be imposed upon it. Both men avowed, moreover, that the ministers would not resign except on orders of the King. The liberal lawyer André Dupin replied that the chamber was not demanding that the King change his ministers; it was only pointing out that the country's distrust of the present government frustrated the essential cooperation between the crown and the legislative chambers. The resolution of the difficulty fell within the King's prerogative; the chamber was not prescribing it. But despite this disclaimer the opposition speakers left no doubt that in their view the only solution to the conflict was a change of ministers. Some deputies of the Right-Center proposed an amendment that would have tempered the defiance expressed in the committee's text while still affirming the chamber's dissatisfaction, but it won only thirty supporters. In the final roll call 221 deputies voted to support the committee's draft of the reply; 181 voted against it.<sup>88</sup> The next day the royalist *Quotidienne* declared, "Two hundred twenty-two [*sic*] men who swore fidelity to the King have sanctioned the first manifesto of the Revolution of 1830,"<sup>89</sup> a prophetic statement wholly unfounded at the time. The 221 thought of themselves as *defenders* of the constitution, not revolutionaries; few, if any, of them contemplated the overthrow of the King.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 15, p. 296, Mar. 16, p. 300, Mar. 17, 1830, p. 303; *Journal des débats*, Mar. 16, 17, 1830; *Gazette de France* (Paris), Mar. 16, 17, 1830. The *Journal des débats* and the *Gazette de France* published lengthy accounts of the secret sessions of the chamber based on reports of persons present.

<sup>89</sup> *Quotidienne* (Paris), Mar. 18, 1830.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

The lines of conflict between the crown and the majority in the Chamber of Deputies were now drawn. The 221 had declared that the ministers must be responsible to the majority in the chamber. The King and his partisans insisted that the ministers were his appointees, responsible to him alone. At a meeting of the council of ministers on March 17 the King declared that he would never submit to what he regarded as the illegal pretensions of the chamber. The parliament had a constitutional procedure, he continued, for expressing its lack of confidence in a ministry; it could reject the ministry's legislative proposals when they were submitted to it. The majority in the lower chamber was now refusing its cooperation without even knowing what the ministry's proposals were, and this was a defiance of royal power. Moreover, the King was convinced that the chamber was divided into so many factions that *no* ministry could win and hold a majority in it. Seeing that Charles would accept no compromise solution, Montbel proposed that he prorogue the chamber and prepare for new elections; counting on victories in almost all the departmental colleges, Montbel was confident of winning a majority favorable to the King and his present ministers.<sup>40</sup> Guernon-Ranville feared that a new assembly might be more dangerous than the present one, and he urged the King and ministers to make an attempt to work with the present chamber in the expectation that some deputies might be enticed away from the 221. He would introduce no legislation but the budget; he hoped that the chamber would approve it, but if not, rejection would be a clear violation of the Charter, and the King would then be justified in taking extraordinary measures. But only Chabrol endorsed Guernon-Ranville's proposals. The majority agreed to prorogue the chambers

<sup>40</sup> Elections took place in two stages. First, all electors met in the so-called "collèges d'arrondissement" and chose 258 deputies. Then the one-fourth most highly taxed electors in every department met in departmental colleges and elected 172 deputies. Peter Campbell, *French Electoral Systems and Elections Since 1789*, 2d ed. (London, 1965), p. 60.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

until September; dissolution would be ordered only after completion of preparations for new elections.<sup>41</sup>

One minister wanted to emphasize the King's rejection of the chamber's pretensions by a royal refusal even to receive the reply, but the others decided that the King should hear it in the traditional manner. The next morning, March 18, a deputation from the lower chamber waited upon the King at the Tuileries; he received them seated on his throne, surrounded by his ministers and the officers of the court. Royer-Collard, the president of the chamber, read the reply. The King listened attentively, and when Royer-Collard finished, he read a brief statement drawn up the preceding day.<sup>42</sup>

Sir, I have heard the address that you present to me in the name of the chamber of deputies. I had the right to count on the cooperation of the two chambers in order to accomplish all the benefits that I contemplated; my heart is grieved to see the deputies of the departments declare that, for their part, that cooperation does not exist.

Gentlemen, I announced my resolves in my address at the opening of the session. These resolves are unalterable; the interests of my people forbid my deviation from them.

My ministers will inform you of my intentions.<sup>43</sup>

The next day, when the Chamber of Deputies assembled just after noon, the visitors' galleries were filled, spectators unable to find seats crowded the corridors, and the gathering deputies talked animatedly among themselves. The session opened at 1:30, and the president had read letters from two resigning deputies, when ushers announced the arrival of

<sup>41</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 40-51; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 179-80, 182; Pasquier, *Mémoires*, VI, 220.

<sup>42</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, p. 51; *Courrier français* (Paris), Mar. 19, 1830; Pasquier, *Mémoires*, VI, 221; *Moniteur*, Mar. 19, 1830, p. 309.

<sup>43</sup> *Moniteur*, Mar. 19, 1830, p. 309.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of the Navy. They took their places on the ministerial bench, and Montbel drew a paper from his portfolio and handed it to the president. Royer-Collard, glancing at it, announced that he had received a proclamation of the King. "The session of 1830 of the chamber of peers and of the chamber of deputies of the departments," he read, "is prorogued until the first of September next." He announced that in conformity with law the session was immediately terminated. The deputies of the Right promptly rose and shouted, "Vive le Roi!" Those on the Left, apparently taken by surprise, remained silent in their seats until someone shouted "Vive la Charte!" All the Left rose and took up the cry. The galleries joined in, and the session ended in a tumult of shouting.<sup>44</sup>

After the burst of activity forced upon it by the meeting of parliament the Polignac Ministry subsided into its usual lethargy. It should, Ferdinand de Bertier thought, have ordered immediate elections while the opposition was still off-balance from the government's show of determination on March 19 and still unprepared, but it let this opportunity slip by. Polignac then accepted the advice offered by Bertier and two other friends who would shortly join the ministry, Comte Charles de Peyronnet and Baron Guillaume Capelle, to postpone elections until at least September. The electoral lists would be revised in August and September, and the government could assure revision favorable to its chances in the elections. Officers of the Army of Africa, most of whom were royalist electors, would by then be back in France, and the government could count on the support of a victorious army. The King and ministers at first agreed on this course but later decided that so long a postponement would, owing to the long delay in passing the budget, confront the government with grave financial difficulties. In early April they decided to hold the elections soon after the landing of the Algerian expedition, hoping to benefit from the success—

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 20, 1830, p. 315; *Courrier français*, Mar. 20, 1830; *Journal des débats*, Mar. 20, 1830; *Gazette de France*, Mar. 20, 1830; AN, F<sup>7</sup> 6777, "Prorogation des Chambres, Correspondance particulière."

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

which seemed probable—of that operation. On April 17 the Ministers of War and the Navy reported that the landings would begin about May 20 or 22, and the ministry proposed to the King that he call elections for the end of June and set the opening of the new parliamentary session at the beginning of August. The enabling ordinance appeared in the *Moniteur* on May 17. It dissolved the chamber as of May 16 and called the arrondissement electoral colleges for June 23 and the departmental colleges for July 3. The delay in the publication of this decision is probably explicable as a move to reduce the time available to the opposition to prepare for the elections. Haussez urged the ministry to prepare for them and for the troubles that they were likely to excite by purging the high military commands and the top administrative posts of all men of doubtful loyalty or determination, strengthening garrisons in Paris and other cities, assembling additional troops within easy call of Paris, and drafting new electoral and press laws. The ministry endorsed his recommendations, but Polignac took no action.<sup>45</sup> Pressed by his colleagues and even by the King he would reply, "We will think of it, Sire, we think of everything, everything will come in time."<sup>46</sup>

While the council deliberated on the issue of elections, politicians both within and outside the government mounted an effort to effect a change in the ministry. Courvoisier, Montbel, and Chabrol urged that Villèle be brought in as president of the council. Two deputies of the opposition called on Villèle, who arrived in Paris on March 23, and promised that a majority of the centrist deputies would support a ministry headed by him. They feared that Polignac, too stubborn to compromise, would attempt a coup d'état and by his political ineptness throw the country into revolution. Villèle replied that he would return only if requested by the King to form a new ministry at his own

<sup>45</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 62-63, 67-71, 76-77; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 183-85; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, pp. 456-58; *Moniteur*, May 17, 1830, p. 541.

<sup>46</sup> Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 192.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

choosing. The two deputies then attempted to put their proposal before the King but were rebuffed. Polignac himself, however, called on Villèle, asked for his help, and invited him to join the ministry, even as president; Villèle declined, not wishing to be involved in a combination in which he had so little confidence. He returned to his home in the south in mid-April, and the ministry remained unchanged. Polignac apparently still enjoyed the full confidence of the King.<sup>47</sup>

When it decided on the timing of the elections, the ministry agreed that if the electoral colleges should return a favorable majority, the government would seek enactment of a more restrictive electoral law and a more rigorous press law. But not all foresaw that the elections would be favorable. The advice from the prefects, although it included routine expressions of confidence, was not entirely reassuring. The possibility of a hostile chamber emboldened by its new mandate had to be considered, and the ministry was divided on how to deal with such a body. Guernon-Ranville thought that Polignac was prepared to use Article 14 and legislate by royal ordinance and that he could count on the support of the heads of the two military ministries, Bourmont and Haussez. Courvoisier opposed the use of such powers; he urged that the ministry resign if it were defeated in the elections and announced that he would certainly resign. Chabrol took the same position. Guernon-Ranville and Montbel would use the emergency powers only with great reluctance and as a last resort. Montbel, anxious to avoid association with such measures, recommended that after the elections but before the opening of the next session the King dismiss the present ministry and form a new combination more likely to win a majority in the new chamber. Chabrol, Courvoisier, and Guernon-Ranville favored his recommendation, he claimed, but the King showed no interest in it.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Montbel, *Souvenirs*, pp. 222-24; Villèle, *Mémoires*, v, 416, 418-21, 422-24; Bertier de Sauvigny, *Ferdinand de Bertier*, pp. 457-58.

<sup>48</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 68-69, 72-74, 91; Montbel, *Sou-*

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

This division within the ministry could only render it more ineffectual and would certainly weaken it before the chamber. Guernon-Ranville confided to his diary on May 2 that the ministers were on the verge of quarreling. "This state of affairs," he wrote, "cannot last."<sup>49</sup> Polignac had already decided that it must be changed. Courvoisier and Chabrol were determined to resign, and Polignac wanted to bring Comte de Peyronnet to the Ministry of the Interior to direct the government's preparations for the elections. The Dauphin was planning a visit to the armed forces assembling at Marseille and Toulon for the descent on Algiers, and he would make stops in the principal cities and towns along his route. Assuming that this publicizing of the government's grand plans would enhance its prestige, Polignac apparently decided to delay announcement of the ministerial changes until the Dauphin returned.<sup>50</sup>

Angoulême was back in Paris on May 15, and four days later the King signed the ordinance effecting the new appointments. Peyronnet, who had served as Minister of Justice under Villèle, was named to the Ministry of the Interior. Montbel, the incumbent Minister of the Interior, asked to be permitted to resign when he learned of Polignac's intention to appoint Peyronnet, but on the personal appeal of the King, who was anxious to assure the support of the Villèlists for the new ministry, he agreed to move to the Ministry of Finance, replacing Chabrol but only with the understanding that he would resign after the elections. Courvoisier's replacement in the Ministry of Justice was Comte

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*venirs*, pp. 225-26; AN, CC 546, Chambre et Cour des Pairs, "Déclaration de M. Courvoisier, ancien Garde des Sceaux," Dec. 2, 1830; *Moniteur*, Dec. 16, p. 1721, Dec. 17, 1830, p. 1728; AN F<sup>7</sup> 6767, Police gén., Préfet de Seine-et-Marne to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Mar. 20, 1830; F<sup>7</sup> 6770, Préfet de la Haute-Marne to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Mar. 22, 1830, Préfet de la Moselle to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Mar. 10, 1830; F<sup>7</sup> 6772, Préfet de la Côte-d'Or to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Mar. 24, 1830.

<sup>49</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 79-80.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78, 80; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 192-93; AN, CC 549, Chambre et Cour des Paris, Polignac to Chantelauze, April 30, 1830; Montbel, *Souvenirs*, p. 228.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

Jean de Chantelauze, President of the Royal Court of Grenoble and a deputy of the Right-Center. Polignac wanted to bring into the ministry to help prepare for the elections Baron Capelle, Prefect of the Department of Seine-et-Oise, who under Villèle had been a specialist of electoral affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. To accommodate him the Administration of Public Works was separated from the Ministry of the Interior and established as a separate ministry under his direction. Neither the King nor Polignac obtained from the three new appointees any formal commitment to agree to the use of Article 14 should the new chamber prove hostile, but in response to discreet inquiries all agreed that they would not oppose it should "energetic measures" become necessary.<sup>51</sup>

The changes did nothing, of course, to appease the opposition and scarcely strengthened the ministry or contributed to its unity. Polignac made his choices in consultation with the King and the Dauphin and never took his colleagues into his confidence on this matter of grave concern to them. The appointment of Peyronnet displeased the Villèlists, who hoped for the return of Villèle himself to this post. Peyronnet was, moreover, thoroughly unpopular, and the opposition considered his appointment an affront to them.<sup>52</sup> The *Journal des débats* called him "a man violent among the most violent, blind among the most blind."<sup>53</sup> Chantelauze, who had declined a portfolio in August 1829, joined the ministry without enthusiasm, and his colleagues had little enthusiasm for him. Montbel thought well of him but Haussez, a more acute judge, thought him lacking in dignity, without political standing, and naive in his judgments.

<sup>51</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 89, 98, 100-101; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 201-3; Montbel, *Souvenirs*, pp. 229-33; *Moniteur*, May 16, p. 539, May 20, 1830, p. 553; Montbel to Villèle, May 24, 1830, Villèle, *Mémoires*, v, 434-37.

<sup>52</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, pp. 95-96, 101; Montbel, *Souvenirs*, pp. 227-29; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 193, 199; *Gazette de France*, May 22, 23, 1830; *Journal des débats*, May 20-24, 1830; *National*, May 23, 1830; Villèle to Comtesse de Villèle, May 30, 1830, Villèle, *Mémoires*, v, 441; Pasquier, *Mémoires*, VI, 228.

<sup>53</sup> *Journal des débats*, May 20, 1830.

## CONFLICT WITHOUT COMPROMISE

Haussez's opinion of Capelle was no more flattering. This new minister brought to the council a record of incompetence in the elections of 1827, a habit of talking too much, and a vexing affinity for contradiction. Moreover, despite the changes the ministry still lacked a really effective public speaker to represent it before the chambers. It was a combination ill-suited for the difficult and dangerous days that lay ahead.<sup>54</sup>

All the ministers, new and old, assembled for the first time, on May 20, at a special meeting under the presidency of the King at the Tuileries.<sup>55</sup> Charles opened the session with a short statement directed particularly to the new members.

Gentlemen, I want to explain to you in a few words the system that I wish to follow and that I have already developed several times before the council; my firm determination is to defend the charter; I do not wish to deviate from it on any point, but I will not permit others to deviate from it. I hope that the chamber of deputies will be composed of sober men, sufficiently devoted to their country to second my intentions; if it should be otherwise, I will know how, while still respecting the constitution, to assure respect for my prerogative, which I regard as the best guarantee of public order and of the happiness of France.<sup>56</sup>

Charles was apparently prepared to use his ordinance power should the new chamber again be dominated by the opposition, a position now vigorously endorsed by the royalist press. At this time, however, the ministry did not even discuss resort to Article 14.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> AN, CC 547, Chambre et Cour des Pairs, Chantelauze to his brother, May 18, 1830, Chantelauze to Polignac, May 9, 1830, Testimony of Chantelauze, Sept. 9, 1830; Montbel, *Souvenirs*, p. 228; Haussez, *Mémoires*, II, 203-7.

<sup>55</sup> Guernon-Ranville, *Journal*, p. 92.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Gazette de France*, May 19, 1830; *Drapeau blanc* (Paris), May 18, 1830.

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

All energies not consumed by routine business were now concentrated on winning the elections, only a month away, and particularly on defeating the 221. At the preceding council meeting Montbel, still Minister of the Interior, had predicted a government majority of thirty to forty seats, but reports from the prefects and the Gendarmerie indicated that the liberals were actively preparing for the elections throughout the country and that the government could not count on a certain victory. The reporting officials expressed especial concern over the rumors that they attributed to liberal agents—reports that the Polignac government planned to restore the national lands confiscated from émigrés and the church during the Revolution, reestablish feudal dues and tithes, reinstitute primogeniture, and pay the clergy an indemnity for lost lands.<sup>58</sup> The government responded with efforts to marshal its supporters. Circulars were sent to government employees and to army officers informing them that the ministry expected their support. Bishops and other clergy, trusting not in prayer alone, publicly urged electors to cast their votes for government candidates.<sup>59</sup> Even before the shake-up in the ministry the King and Polignac had decided, without consulting the ministers, that Charles would make a direct appeal to the voters in a royal proclamation sometime before the election. The ministers were asked only to pass on the form and the timing of this dubious expedient. They agreed on a text early in June, and on June 13 the King issued it along with

<sup>58</sup> Montbel, *Souvenirs*, p. 234; Pasquier, *Mémoires*, vi, 231; AN, F<sup>7</sup> 6740, Police gén., Papers on election of 1830, Préfet de la Haute-Vienne to Ministre de l'Intérieur, June 15, 1830; F<sup>7</sup> 6768, Police gén., Préfet de Tarn-et-Garonne to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Mar. 4, 1830; F<sup>7</sup> 6741, Police gén., Letter to electors of Boulogne (Pas-de-Calais), June 17, 1830; F<sup>7</sup> 6777, Police gén., Reports of Gendarmerie royale, May, June 1830; F<sup>7</sup> 6778, Reports of Gend. roy., Apr., May, June 1830.

<sup>59</sup> AN, CC 547, Circulars from officials of Ministry of Finance to employees, May 1830, Ministre de la Guerre to Lts.-gén. Cmdts. des Div. milit., May 1830, F<sup>7</sup> 6741, Préfet du Var to Ministre de l'Intérieur, July 10, 1830; *Moniteur*, Dec. 19, 1830, pp. 1755, 1758; Paul Droulers, *Action pastorale et problèmes sociaux sous la Monarchie de Juillet chez Mgr d'Astros, Archevêque de Toulouse, censeur de La Mennais* (Paris, 1954), pp. 45-46.