

**INTELLIGENCE**

**POWER IN**

**PEACE AND WAR**

**Michael Herman**

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Intelligence services form an important but controversial part of the modern state. Drawing mainly on British and American examples, this book provides an analytic framework for understanding the 'intelligence community' and assessing its value. The author, a former senior British intelligence officer, describes intelligence activities, the purposes which the system serves and the causes and effects of its secrecy. He considers 'intelligence failure' and how organization and management can improve the chances of success. Using parallels with the information society and the current search for efficiency in public administration as a whole, the book explores the issues involved in deciding how much intelligence is needed and discusses the kinds of management necessary. In his conclusions Michael Herman discusses intelligence's national value in the post-Cold War world. He also argues that it has important contributions to make to international security, but that its threat-inducing activities should be kept in check.



## **Intelligence power in peace and war**

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# Intelligence power in peace and war

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Michael Herman

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# Contents

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|  |             |     |
|--|-------------|-----|
| <i>List of figures</i>                     | <i>page</i> | ix  |
| <i>Preface and acknowledgements</i>        |             | xi  |
| <i>Glossary of terms and abbreviations</i> |             | xvi |
| Introduction                               |             | 1   |
| <b>I – Evolution and outline</b>           |             |     |
| 1 Antecedents                              |             | 9   |
| 2 Organizations                            |             | 16  |
| 3 Resources, stages and subjects           |             | 36  |
| <b>II – Components and boundaries</b>      |             |     |
| 4 Collection sources                       |             | 61  |
| 5 Collection characteristics               |             | 82  |
| 6 All-source analysis and assessment       |             | 100 |
| 7 Boundaries                               |             | 113 |
| <b>III – Effects</b>                       |             |     |
| 8 Intelligence and national action         |             | 137 |
| 9 International action                     |             | 156 |
| 10 Intelligence and security               |             | 165 |
| 11 Intelligence threats                    |             | 183 |
| 12 Intelligence cooperation                |             | 200 |
|  |             | vii |

**IV – Accuracy**

|    |                                  |     |
|----|----------------------------------|-----|
| 13 | Failure and remedies             | 221 |
| 14 | Problems of defence intelligence | 240 |
| 15 | Top level assessment             | 257 |

**V – Evaluation and management**

|    |                        |     |
|----|------------------------|-----|
| 16 | The production process | 283 |
| 17 | Managing the community | 305 |
| 18 | The agency manager     | 322 |

**VI – The 1990s and beyond**

|    |                          |     |
|----|--------------------------|-----|
| 19 | National importance      | 341 |
| 20 | International dimensions | 362 |

**VII – Summary**

|    |                           |     |
|----|---------------------------|-----|
| 21 | Modern intelligence power | 379 |
|----|---------------------------|-----|

|  |  |     |
|--|--|-----|
|  | <i>Suggestions for further reading</i> | 386 |
|--|--|-----|

|  |              |     |
|--|--------------|-----|
|  | <i>Index</i> | 397 |
|--|--------------|-----|

## Figures

---

|    |   |                |
|----|---|----------------|
| 1  | United States intelligence structure  | <i>page</i> 30 |
| 2  | British intelligence structure  | 31             |
| 3  | Total intelligence activities   | 33             |
| 4  | Intelligence process in outline   | 39             |
| 5  | Fuller intelligence process   | 43             |
| 6  | All-source stage as a funnel  | 45             |
| 7  | Humint's pyramid of source sensitivity, quantity and value                                | 63             |
| 8  | Sigint's pyramid of source sensitivity, quantity and value                                | 71             |
| 9  | Complete intelligence process   | 103            |
| 10 | Relationship between strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence and combat information | 123            |
| 11 | Various meanings of 'security'  | 167            |
| 12 | Components of information security  | 169            |
| 13 | Intelligence support for information security   | 173            |
| 14 | Levels of intelligence contests   | 179            |
| 15 | Effects of intelligence power   | 193            |
| 16 | Military concept of the intelligence cycle  | 285            |
| 17 | Complexity of 'requirements'  | 291            |
| 18 | Intelligence cycle with intelligence as the driving force                                 | 295            |
| 19 | Intelligence–security spiral of threat perceptions  | 371            |



## Preface and acknowledgements

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This book has dual origins. One is in the thirty-five years I spent as a professional intelligence practitioner, after two earlier ones as a national serviceman in the British Intelligence Corps just after the Second World War. This career coincided almost exactly with the Cold War. It was spent mainly as a member of a collection agency, with spells in other intelligence jobs in the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence. Over the years I became increasingly interested in how big intelligence institutions operated, and in the way they fitted together into a national 'system'. By accident or inclination my viewpoint came to be that of an Organization Man.

The second origin is in the contact I was free to make after retirement with the world of scholarly 'intelligence studies' (mainly in the United States and Canada but now developing in Britain), and with the academic faculties in which it is based. I was able to do some writing and teaching about intelligence and explore its literature. My base in Nuffield College Oxford also helped me to make some forays into social science's studies of organizations and their transmission and use of information.

From these origins has come this attempt to add to existing theory about intelligence power and the institutions through which it works. By 'theory' I mean nothing more than concepts and generalizations that seek to explain things. I have always been struck by the attention paid to concepts of war, both in academic 'war studies' and in practical military education, and have felt that intelligence studies and practitioners' vocational training both lack a corpus of this kind. There is some good North American work on intelligence concepts of various kinds, but it is incomplete; and outside a small academic circle is not as well known in Britain as it should be.

Hence this work, which tries to evaluate and extend the existing literature and merge it with my own experience and reflection. It is intended neither to attack intelligence nor to defend it; my object is simply that it should be better understood. This writing is directed at

anyone interested in the subject, inside and outside official circles, critics as well as defenders.

The case for writing in this way is easily stated. Intelligence is now big business, with a legal status and a public persona; it is no longer sensible to pretend that it does not exist. Democracies have to recognize it, and public opinion and those who form it need some basis for informed views. Governments have to judge what to expect of it, how much to spend on it, and how to control it. Academically the disciplines of modern history, war studies (and peace studies), international relations and political science are incomplete without some literacy in the subject. Practitioners, especially those just coming into the profession, need to learn something from books; intelligence is now so diverse that after a working lifetime one realizes the great gaps in one's understanding of it. All those involved with intelligence in these various ways need some idea of its special features and how it relates to the rest of the world. Retired diplomats and service officers produce useful insights about their own professions, and former intelligence practitioners can contribute in the same way.

The plan for doing so here is set out in the Introduction, but two preliminary comments are needed. The first is that I do not deal with the controversial issues of intelligence's democratic accountability, legal status and implications for individuals' rights. These are important, and merit the extensive attention that they have received in US literature, and in recent British books by Gill and (jointly) by Lustgarten and Leigh. Sensible discussion of these matters depends on knowing what intelligence does, without either demonizing or romanticizing it, and I hope that this book will contribute in that way. But to deal specifically with this mixture of political, moral and legal issues would need separate and different treatment.

The second concerns the effect of secrecy. Even though this is no work of autobiography, security considerations have formed a constant background to what I have written. Intelligence is now no longer a forbidden subject, and the flow of official US releases and authorized publications by retired senior professionals has been accompanied by recent British moves towards greater openness. But the need for reticence about some operational secrets is still genuine enough. Moreover real secrets must in practice be surrounded by a wider glacis of secrecy if they are to be successfully defended; there are gradations rather than black-and-white distinctions between what is damaging and what is not. Opinions differ considerably (and change over time) on where security lines should be drawn. But few would deny that formal defences have to be erected somewhere.

Hence this book has been written from the beginning on the understanding that it would be submitted for official scrutiny. Like other retired intelligence officers I have undertaken not to communicate certain types of information without authorization, and am bound by the special restrictions of the current Official Secrets Act. In any case I am a believer in having an official scrutiny procedure, provided that it is driven by reasonable interpretations of national security: for intelligence, mainly the protection of current and future sources. (It would be better if the procedure included arrangements of some kind for appeals against official rulings; but that is a separate matter.) I am glad to say that, subject to some deletions and changes, security clearance has been given for the text of this book, as it was for my earlier articles and lectures on which it draws. Nevertheless I am conscious that observant readers will find some deliberate obscurities and circumlocutions, and a lower level of proof for some assertions than they might expect in a normal academic work. I must of course add that this official clearance carries with it no official responsibility for any of the contents, or approval for them.

I hope that, despite the security limitations, this combination of personal experience with ideas developed in an academic milieu will be found useful. My main regret over the rather abstract treatment is that it has precluded describing why modern intelligence appeals to those engaged in it, in peace as well as in war. My time as a practitioner coincided almost exactly with the Cold War, in a period in which the USSR was continually improving its information defences, and Western intelligence was always running hard to keep up and draw ahead if possible. Methods were revolutionized by computers, and parts of intelligence production were transformed into rather special, high-technology factories. I saw intelligence become in some ways like a large-scale, multinational news agency, constantly seeking to handle more information more quickly to meet an ever-increasing demand for authentic world news. Part of the fascination and challenge of this enterprise was in promoting efficiency and job satisfaction, and in the wealth of human contacts this entailed. In these respects there was nothing unique about intelligence. What gave the work its special flavour was the profound conviction that, if done properly, it was helping Western governments to manage East–West conflict sensibly and avoid the disaster of nuclear war.

I touch on these aspects of intelligence management in Part V, particularly chapter 18. I have also made suggestions elsewhere about some practical matters of organization and effectiveness. But on the whole this book is safely distanced from personal impressions, and distils

them as abstractions rather than recollections. It is not intended to provide any original source material for intelligence history. The aim is to provide generalized ideas of what intelligence is for and how it does it. These may help historians, but I hope will also have some direct bearing on the present and future.

So if I am criticized for producing an unscintillating book on an absorbing subject I plead extenuating circumstances. But 'theory' has its place if things are to be properly understood. And intelligence has had enough titillating revelations already.

In this work I have had help from many people and much kindness. In the official world I was indebted to Sir Peter Marychurch, Director GCHQ, when I first began it. His successor Sir John Adye has been characteristically open-minded and helpful in important ways; he may not wish to be labelled as encouraging a practitioner's book about intelligence, but I must express gratitude for a distinctly benevolent neutrality. Other former colleagues still in official service have had the labour of scrutinizing successive versions of this draft as well as my earlier articles; I am glad to say that arguments over security clearance have been conducted in civilized terms, on the whole with tolerable conclusions.

For my return to Oxford and the eight years spent there I owe much to Sir Michael Howard, and to the Warden and Fellows of Nuffield College for making me a Gwilym Gibbon Research Fellow in 1987–8 and an Associate Member for six years thereafter. I received special encouragement in the college from Byron Shafer and the late John Vincent, and from others in Oxford including Robert O'Neill, Adam Roberts and David Robertson. I am grateful to those who allowed me to try out ideas in papers at various British, American and Canadian universities; at meetings of the International Studies Association; and in teaching intelligence courses at Birmingham University and King's College London. An earlier version of chapter 15 was given to the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies in October 1994 and has been published in *Intelligence and National Security* for October 1995. Nick Woodward and others at Templeton College introduced me to management theory; Blaise Cronin, now at Indiana University, opened my eyes to 'informatics' and other writing about the information age; and Kevin Cunningham of the United States Army provided hospitality at West Point and frequent insights into US thinking. I apologize to the many others whose help I have failed to acknowledge here.

As a Chatham House project the book originated in the enthusiasm of



Sir James Eberle and John Roper, and I gratefully acknowledge the support provided in 1988–9 by the Leverhulme Trust. John Roper conducted negotiations with Whitehall at a time when the Peter Wright case seemed to be blighting the prospect of any serious intelligence writing, and subsequently chaired a Chatham House study group which considered early drafts. His successor Trevor Taylor patiently prodded me to decide what I was trying to say. In more recent years Jack Spence and Margaret May have kept faith in the work and arranged publication.

Chapters have been read in various forms by Geoffrey Best, Ken Booth, John Ferris, Andrew Hurrell, Sheila Kerr, Ken Robertson, Maurice Scott and Maxwell Taylor, from all of whom I have had helpful comments. Philip Barton provided great help with early versions and word processing, at times when help was much needed. I am also specially grateful to Robert Lane, who combined the roles of model Oxford landlord, social science sage on his summer sabbaticals from Yale, and friend and mentor to this fugitive from my less reputable, non-academic profession.

I owe even more to my wife Ann's constant tolerance and support for this way of spending retirement years, and to her eventual insistence that writing had to come to an end; that the shipbuilder had to stop endless carpentry, painting and polishing, and get the ship into the water. Katy Cooper, as copy-editor, then helped to make the vessel seaworthy, and showed exemplary patience with my last-minute finishing touches as it went down the slipway, while Barbara Hird coped with the complications of the index.

However my greatest debt is to Michael MccGwire – naval officer, rugby player, intelligence expert on the Soviet navy, academic, convivial talker, and friend of long standing in all these guises – who first encouraged me to write about intelligence and was generous with his time thereafter. To complete the nautical image: without MccGwire's motivating, this book would have remained yet another dream-ship, safe in the imagination, never exposed – at long last – to the practical test of seeing whether it floats.

*December 1995*

## Glossary of terms and abbreviations

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Abbreviations and acronyms are included only if repeated without expansion in the text. Professional intelligence terms are limited to those I have used. I have given notes on those that have variable meanings, often reflecting transatlantic and service–civilian differences, and have explained where I have chosen particular meanings. Some new terms, without any previous use, have been suggested and explained in the text but have not been included here.

As elsewhere, ‘intelligence’ in the abbreviations, acronyms and terms listed here denotes knowledge, organization or activities (or all three), the meaning depending on the context.

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Acoustint         | Acoustic intelligence: tracking and identification from underwater sound; minor above-water source. Sometimes also Acint.                   |
| Analysis          | Used here mainly for all-source work; though single-source work also has its analysis components, for example ‘traffic analysis’ in Sigint. |
| ASAT              | Anti-satellite systems.   |
| Assessment        | Used here for definitive all-source product written for executive users, often with policy implications; for example JIC assessments.       |
| Assessments Staff | Small Cabinet Office group producing JIC reports.   |
| Bletchley Park    | British Second World War Sigint centre.   |
| CDI               | Chief of Defence Intelligence. Head of DIS; now also with responsibilities for armed forces’ intelligence as a whole.                       |
| CDS               | Chief of Defence Staff.   |
| CIA               | Central Intelligence Agency.  |

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| CIGs                | Current Intelligence Groups producing assessments in the JIC system.  |
| Codes and ciphers   | Sigint targets. The semantic difference between the two is unimportant here.  |
| Combat information  | Military term. Used here to denote military information obtained in combat by forces under operational control, and not by intelligence-controlled collection.  |
| Comint              | Communications intelligence; Sigint from intercepting and exploiting communications.  |
| Counterespionage    | Used here as the detection of espionage, not for passive defensive measures designed to make it more difficult.   |
| Counterintelligence | Humint professionals use the term to denote the targeting of opponents' Humint agencies and attempts to penetrate them by Humint means. Some US usage equates it with information security of all kinds. The term is used here (atypically) to denote intelligence on <i>any</i> foreign intelligence agency, obtained by <i>any</i> means. |
| Cryptanalysis       | Sigint attempts to break codes and ciphers.   |
| CSBMs               | Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.   |
| C <sup>3</sup> I    | Command, control, communications and intelligence/information. Now also C <sup>4</sup> I, including computers.  |
| DCI                 | Director of Central Intelligence.   |
| DEA                 | Drug Enforcement Administration.  |
| DF                  | Radio direction finding to locate transmissions.  |
| DGI                 | Director-General of Intelligence. Now CDI.  |
| DIA                 | Defense Intelligence Agency.  |
| DIS                 | Defence Intelligence Staff.   |
| DMI                 | Director of Military Intelligence.  |
| DNI                 | Director of Naval Intelligence.   |
| DoD                 | Department of Defense.  |
| Electronic Warfare  | (1) The use of electronic interception directly, immediately and locally for threat detection, warning, avoidance, target acquisition and homing, and (2) jamming,  |

|                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
|                          | deception and other electronic means, used directly to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of radio and other electronic emissions. |
| Elint                    | Sigint on 'non-communications' emissions, such as radars, which do not convey messages.  |
| Estimate                 | US and military term for definitive all-source report. 'Assessment' usually preferred here.  |
| EW                       | See Electronic Warfare.  |
| FBI                      | Federal Bureau of Investigation.   |
| FCO                      | Foreign and Commonwealth Office (formerly Foreign Office).   |
| Finished intelligence    | Used here for all-source reports.  |
| Foreign intelligence     | On foreign targets, including external threats.  |
| GCHQ                     | Government Communications Headquarters.  |
| GRU                      | Soviet military intelligence organization.   |
| Hacking                  | Unauthorized access to computers.  |
| Humint                   | Intelligence from human sources.   |
| IAEA                     | International Atomic Energy Authority.   |
| Imagery                  | Intelligence from photographic and other images. Also sometimes Imint and Photint.   |
| Imint                    | Imagery.   |
| INR                      | Bureau of Intelligence and Research.   |
| Intelligence Coordinator | Senior member of JIC.  |
| IT                       | Information technology   |
| JARIC                    | Joint Air Reconnaissance Interpretation Centre.  |
| JCS                      | Joint Chiefs of Staff.   |
| JIB                      | Joint Intelligence Bureau.   |
| JIC                      | Joint Intelligence Committee (now also used for US Joint Intelligence Centers).  |
| JIS                      | Joint Intelligence Staff (serving JIC in war and up to 1968).  |
| KGB                      | Soviet intelligence and security organization.   |
| MoD                      | Ministry of Defence.   |
| National                 | Mainly used here for intelligence agencies serving all parts of government, not individual departments. Also used,                         |

|                       |  |
|-----------------------|--|
|                       | particularly in Sigint, for control at a central ('strategic') level rather than at lower ('tactical') levels.   |
| National Assessment   | Used here for important reports for top-level users.   |
| NFIP                  | National Foreign Intelligence Program; budget for 'strategic' intelligence.  |
| NHS                   | British National Health Service.   |
| NIC                   | National Intelligence Council.   |
| NIE                   | National Intelligence Estimate: formal interdepartmental report for top level.   |
| NIO                   | National Intelligence Officer.   |
| NPM                   | New Public Management. Term coined to cover the sweeping changes in Britain and many other countries in 1980s and 1990s.                                 |
| NRO                   | National Reconnaissance Office.  |
| NSA                   | National Security Agency.  |
| NTMs                  | National Technical Means of collection.  |
| Nucint                | Technical collection on nuclear targets.   |
| ONE                   | Office of National Estimates.  |
| OSS                   | Office of Strategic Services.  |
| Photint               | Imagery.   |
| POW                   | Prisoner of War. POW intelligence is gained by interrogation, bugging, and similar methods.  |
| PSIS                  | Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services.   |
| Radint                | The product of radars used for intelligence purposes; also information available for intelligence as a by-product of surveillance by operational radars. |
| Security              | Information security. Also national security; security intelligence; and security agencies.  |
| Security intelligence | Intelligence on 'internal' threats. Contrasted here with foreign intelligence.   |
| Sigint                | Signals intelligence; electronic interception and (all) cryptanalysis. Comprises Comint and Elint; see also Telint. For other interception for           |

|                        |  |
|------------------------|--|
|                        | immediate, local use see Electronic Warfare.   |
| Single-source reports  | Produced by one collection agency and based on its own kind of intelligence material.  |
| SIS                    | Secret Intelligence Service.   |
| SNIE                   | Special NIE.   |
| Strategic              | High-level intelligence control and budgeting (see also 'national'). Also used for a high level of users and decision-taking served by intelligence. (Note therefore that the level of control does not necessarily equate with the level of intelligence produced; 'strategic' collection can be tasked to produce 'tactical' intelligence.) 'Strategic' also used to denote intelligence of long-term rather than immediate value. |
| Sweeping               | Search for bugs and other eavesdropping devices.   |
| Tactical               | Compare with 'strategic'. Tactical collection is under devolved control and is normally geared to produce intelligence for use at the command level to which it is devolved. 'Tactical' intelligence also has general connotations of short-term rather than long-term use. It is used here, for example, in 'tactical support' for diplomatic negotiations.   |
| Technical base         | A body of knowledge that is not usable intelligence but is the basis for attacking and exploiting targets.   |
| Technical collection   | By Sigint, imagery and other non-human sources.  |
| Technical intelligence | Intelligence (irrespective of source) on technical subjects.   |
| Telemetry              | Radio transmissions carrying measurements from missiles under test; intercepted and analysed during the Cold War.  |
| Telint                 | US term for Sigint from interception and analysis of telemetry transmissions.  |

**TIARA**

**Tactical Intelligence and Related  
Activities budget.**

**Ultra**

**Wartime codeword for high-grade Sigint  
decrypts.**





## Introduction

---

Governments collect, process and use information. Part of statecraft is what a writer on war has called ‘the central importance of *knowing*, both in general and in particular’.<sup>1</sup> In Deutsch’s phrase, systems of knowing are part of the ‘nerves of government’.<sup>2</sup> Modern government has many such systems, most of them geared to routine functions: taxation, law-and-order, social security, vehicle licensing, and so on.

Other organizations also have their own information systems; and ‘intelligence’ is sometimes employed to describe them all, governmental and non-governmental, and the information they produce. ‘Business intelligence’ and ‘competitor intelligence’ are established parts of the private sector; ‘racing intelligence’ is designed to predict horse-racing results; other commercial information services have similar labels. Intelligence within large organizations has been called ‘the information – questions, insights, hypotheses, evidence – relevant to policy’.<sup>3</sup> Even more broadly it has been argued that ‘social intelligence . . . is the process whereby a society, organization or individual acquires information in the widest sense, processes and evaluates it, stores it and *uses* it for action’<sup>4</sup> (emphasis added).

But ‘intelligence’ in government usually has a more restricted meaning than just information and information services. It has particular associations with international relations, defence, national security and secrecy, and with specialized institutions labelled ‘intelligence’. Intelligence in this sense was described in 1949 by Sherman Kent – an American academic who had seen wartime intelligence service and was to become a leading member of CIA’s Office of National Estimates – as

<sup>1</sup> J. Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 325.

<sup>2</sup> K. W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press, 1963).

<sup>3</sup> H. L. Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence* (New York/London: Basic Books, 1967), preface p. ix.

<sup>4</sup> B. Cronin and E. Davenport, ‘The Compound Eye/I: an Introduction to Social Intelligence’, *Social Intelligence* vol. 1 no. 1 (1991), pp. 1–2. For the etymology of intelligence and its eight meanings see A. Durant, ‘“Intelligence”: Issues in a Word or in a Field?’, *Social Intelligence* vol. 1 no. 3 (1991), and P. Baumard, ‘Towards Less Deceptive Intelligence’, same issue.

'a kind of knowledge ("What intelligence have you turned up on the situation in Columbia?"); 'the type of organization which produces the knowledge ("Intelligence was able to give the operating people exactly what they wanted"); and 'the activity pursued by the intelligence organization ("The [intelligence] work behind that planning must have been intense").'<sup>5</sup> Although this threefold definition is often used, the key element is Kent's second, organizational one. 'Intelligence' in government is based on the particular set of organizations with that name: the 'intelligence services' or (sometimes) the 'intelligence communities'. Intelligence activity is what they do, and intelligence knowledge what they produce.

Organized intelligence of this kind has been a twentieth-century growth industry, and most governments now have it as a permanent institution. It is a significant part of the modern state and a factor in government's success and failure. It consumes sizeable if not massive resources; US expenditure on it at the end of the Cold War was about a tenth of the cost of defence, and the current British effort costs rather more than diplomacy. It has even had some direct economic effects, as in its influence on early computers and subsequently on the development of space satellites and miniaturized electronics. It constitutes its own particular kind of state power: *intelligence power*. This book is about this power and the institutions that provide it.<sup>6</sup>

Intelligence of this kind now has a serious literature which has developed over the last twenty years. It includes excellent historical writing, with particular emphasis on the Second World War, and a growing body of analytic work, mainly American. As a discrete subject 'intelligence studies' has become a recognized part of history and political science courses at universities and colleges in the United States and Canada; at the last count some 130 of them were identified at 107 institutions.<sup>7</sup> Britain has its modest counterpart in academic courses now approaching double figures.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> S. Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965 edition), introduction p. xxiii. All references are to this edition.

<sup>6</sup> The concept of intelligence power used here draws on Professor Freedman's definition of power as the 'capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than would otherwise have been the case' (L. Freedman, 'Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power' in Freedman, P. Hayes and R. O'Neill (eds.) *War, Strategy, and International Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 291). For discussion of its effects see chapters 8–12.

<sup>7</sup> J. M. Fontain, *Teaching Intelligence in the 1990s* (Washington D.C.: National Intelligence Study Center, 1989).

<sup>8</sup> British universities with intelligence courses and options in 1995 included King's College London, Cambridge, Salford, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Aberystwyth and St Andrew's.

Nevertheless the analytic part of this work still has the marks of a young subject. Reliable information is still shrouded in official secrecy. The literature is heavily weighted towards US intelligence seen through US eyes, with much less that draws on other national arrangements and perspectives.<sup>9</sup> The terminology is confused by transatlantic and military-civilian differences. Intelligence power has not yet received anything like the prolonged attention given to military power, or to the diplomacy with which intelligence is connected. Military men have long recognized the need, as put in 1994 by the then British Chief of Defence Staff, for military doctrine which teaches people 'not what to think but how to think about going to war and war fighting'.<sup>10</sup> Intelligence has still relatively little of this, either in government or outside it. An American academic has recently argued that it is 'the least understood and most undertheorized area of international relations'.<sup>11</sup> A leading intelligence historian has commented that the analytic literature on the subject 'is dominated (and thus distorted) by works of opposition or apology'.<sup>12</sup>

This book therefore seeks to add to the existing analysis. Most writing of this kind about intelligence has been centred on its output and its interaction with policy-making; here I move rather further back into it and start by examining it as a system and a set of processes, with special attention to the big, computer-based agencies which are an important part of the modern community. I go on to consider its purposes, the issues that arise over evaluating its performance, and its post-Cold War importance for the 1990s and beyond. I try to draw on other studies, particularly of organizations and the use of information, when these seem to illuminate intelligence.

The study falls into seven parts. Part I (chapters 1–3) describes how the modern system has evolved and provides an outline model of it and the subjects with which it deals. Part II (chapters 4–7) takes the model to pieces and looks in more detail at its components and their boundaries with each other and other government activity. Part III (chapters 8–12)

<sup>9</sup> For a statement of differences between the British and US 'schools' see K. Robertson, 'An Agenda for Intelligence Research', *Defense Analysis* vol. 3 no. 2 (1987). For other surveys and critiques of intelligence literature see S. Farson, 'Schools of Thought: National Perceptions of Intelligence', *Conflict Quarterly* vol. 9 no. 2 (spring 1989), and G. Hastedt, 'Towards a Comparative Study of Intelligence', *Conflict Quarterly* vol. 11 no. 3 (summer 1991).

<sup>10</sup> Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, 'The Capability Based Army', *RUSI Journal* vol. 139 no. 3 (June 1994), p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> J. Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 19.

<sup>12</sup> J. Ferris, 'The Historiography of American Intelligence Studies', *Diplomatic History* vol. 19 no. 1 (winter 1995), p. 92. This is a comprehensive and sympathetic critique of American intelligence studies.

outlines intelligence's effects. Part IV (chapters 13–15) deals with the problems of intelligence judgment, and suggests some principles for improving performance. Part V (chapters 16–18) deals in the same way with the search for efficiency. Part VI (chapters 19 and 20) tries to estimate intelligence's national and international importance in the post-Cold War world. Conclusions about intelligence as a whole are summarized as Part VII (chapter 21). Notes on terminology are included in the glossary.

Some explanation is needed here of the intelligence model set out in the first part of the book and used thereafter; whether it is intelligence worldwide, or the British or US national systems, or some kind of hybrid. I have a British viewpoint, and the descriptions are drawn mainly from the British and US examples. However the study is not intended to be narrowly focused on one or both of these two. Its basic assumption is that there are some regularities about intelligence organizations and operations which warrant generalizations about intelligence's nature, not limited to particular times and places, in the same way as it is possible to write on the principles of military operations or law enforcement or (on a wider canvas) about the 'nature' of the state.

But the regularities do not apply to all systems with equal force. The image behind the use of the model here is of a series of different national systems arranged in something like a set of concentric circles, whose contents have some things in common but differ increasingly as one moves from the centre to the periphery. At the centre is the UK–US model, most of whose characteristics are shared by the British Old Commonwealth countries. Some differences between British and US practices are noted as the book proceeds. But the predominant feature is of common dynamics and problems. The Second World War influence of the British example and the close contact subsequently between the two systems explain this closeness. For most purposes here it is unnecessary to distinguish between the different national elements of this UK–US (and Commonwealth) model. For convenience the term 'intelligence community' – found in Anglo-Saxon countries but not elsewhere – is used to refer specifically to it.

However there is also much in common between this community and a wider circle of systems embracing Western intelligence as a whole. ('Western' here means, loosely, Western Europe. Israeli intelligence resembles the Western pattern though with its own special priorities. It is probably still too early to say whether intelligence in Eastern Europe is yet 'Western' in this general sense.) The effects of similar origins, Second World War alliances, military relationships under NATO and other kinds of transnational cooperation have produced considerable

commonality. Most of the generalizations offered here apply in some degree to this 'Western' circle.

Lastly there is a much wider circle embracing intelligence everywhere else. Here these generalizations have much less force. Soviet intelligence had its own characteristics intimately bound up with the nature of the Soviet state; the forms of intelligence differ everywhere between despotisms and democracies. But some regularities still apply, at least where states have more than rudimentary arrangements. Military intelligence has some world-wide features common to other military thinking.<sup>13</sup> Equivalents of the Western intelligence building blocks can usually be discerned somewhere in intelligence systems elsewhere, rearranged in individual national ways. Some features and problems, like the complexities of intelligence-policy relationships, have a universality about them.

Nevertheless this work is not a comparative study of intelligence everywhere. The basis for its generalizations remains the UK-US model, itself an amalgam of the two separate ones. Descriptions and conclusions apply mainly to these two communities and the related Commonwealth ones, with some validity in 'the West' as a whole, and some more limited application elsewhere.

A final point to be established about the approach used here is whether it deals with how intelligence actually appears, warts and all, or is based on its role when doing its job properly. The conclusions draw on historical experience and give some attention to failures. But they are more normative than descriptive; the main concern is with intelligence's functions and how they should be carried out, rather than the variations in its actual performance. Military forces, police forces and states themselves may be incompetent or corrupt, but this does not invalidate generalizing about what they are *for*, and about the principles on which they should work.<sup>14</sup> Generalizations about intelligence are offered here in the same way.

<sup>13</sup> There was, for example, a strong resemblance between Soviet military doctrine on intelligence (or reconnaissance) and the Western equivalent; see D. A. Ivanov, V. P. Savel'yev and P. V. Shemanskij, *Fundamentals of Tactical Command and Control* (Moscow, 1977, translated and published by the US Air Force in the series 'Soviet Military Thought'), chapters 4 and 7. Types of reconnaissance are described at pp. 155-61.

<sup>14</sup> Compare for example Weber's use of 'ideal' types to understand organizations: 'In Weber's work the concept of "ideal type" is used as a methodological tool for understanding many aspects of society. He believed that in order to understand the social world it was necessary to develop clear-cut concepts against which one could compare empirical reality. All of the ideal types he developed were intended to serve this end . . . By using different ideal types to discern different forms of organization, he believed that one possessed a powerful method for understanding the social world' (G. Morgan, *Images of Organization* (London: Sage, 1986), p. 349).



*Part I*

Evolution and outline





# 1 Antecedents

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## Intelligence as news

Intelligence as a set of permanent institutions dates back only to the second half of the nineteenth century. But as information and news – in the dictionary meaning used in English since the middle of the fifteenth century, of ‘knowledge as to events, communicated by or obtained from another, especially military’ – it has always been collected as part of warfare. Roman armies had their information-gathering *speculatores* or scouts. Spies, informers, the interception of messages and the use of captured or surreptitiously copied documents can all be seen in early medieval warfare; ‘the political and military intelligence services of the Norman and Angevin kings were not run on the basis of gossip in the market-place or the camp.’<sup>1</sup> English armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had their ‘scoutmasters’, responsible for collecting intelligence in the field.<sup>2</sup> In eighteenth-century campaigns field intelligence of this kind was one of the many jobs of quartermasters general, while generals’ secretaries handled political and strategic intelligence.<sup>3</sup>

Collecting and using ‘intelligence’ in this same sense has always been equally important in peacetime. Rulers from the earliest times tapped the knowledge of merchants and other travellers, and specialist collectors or ‘intelligencers’ appeared under Elizabeth I in peace as well as war. Diplomacy evolved in Renaissance Italy for information gathering as well as for negotiation: ‘one of the chief functions of the resident ambassador came to be to keep a continuous stream of foreign political news flowing

<sup>1</sup> J. O. Prestwich, ‘Military Intelligence under the Norman and Angevin Kings’ in G. Garnett and J. Hudson (eds.), *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), quotation from p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> B. A. H. Parritt, *The Intelligencers: the Story of British Military Intelligence up to 1914* (Ashford, Kent: Intelligence Corps Association, 2nd edition 1983), pp. 1–12.

<sup>3</sup> M. Van Crevald, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 35–8.

to his home government.<sup>4</sup> The diplomatic system which became institutionalized in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was largely a response to nation states' need for information.<sup>5</sup>

States have always also had their systems for handling and recording the 'intelligence' thus collected. For foreign affairs they developed their chanceries in fits and starts, with variable results. 'Until about the middle of the seventeenth century, none of the three great Western powers [England, France and Spain] possessed diplomatic archives as orderly and usable as those of the Florentines and Venetians two hundred years before.'<sup>6</sup> England had one of these fits of enthusiasm for information handling after the Restoration. 'The most important function vested in the Secretaries of State in the seventeenth century was the management of "the intelligence"'. The term denoted not only the provision of extraordinary information concerning enemy countries or domestic plotters, but also a regular, settled supply of every kind of news from abroad.<sup>7</sup> The modern British Cabinet has origins in the 'Intelligence Committee' of the Privy Council which existed briefly after 1660.<sup>8</sup> The present-day *London Gazette* was founded in the same period to disseminate home and overseas news of every kind for government; this staid document now has some claim to be a precursor of the present-day British Joint Intelligence Committee's weekly summary of foreign intelligence, the so-called Red Book.<sup>9</sup>

### Secret intelligence

This mass of 'intelligence' has always contained some more than usually sensitive information, or 'secret (or covert) intelligence'. Spies and informers ('human intelligence' or *Humint* in modern US terminology)

<sup>4</sup> G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Cape, 1955), p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 242–4. There were of course many earlier diplomatic systems, to which Raymond Cohen is now drawing attention; see R. Cohen, *Diplomacy 2000 B.C.–2000 A.D.* (paper delivered to the British International Studies Association annual conference, 1995); *On Diplomacy in the Ancient Near East* (Leicester: Leicester University Centre for Diplomacy Discussion Papers, 1995); 'All in the Family: Ancient Near Eastern Diplomacy', *International Negotiation* vol. 1 no. 1 (1996, forthcoming).

<sup>6</sup> Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 229.

<sup>7</sup> P. Frazer, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State and their Monopolies of Licensed News 1660–1688* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> P. Hennessy, *Cabinet* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 1, quoting J. P. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet* (London: Stevens and Son, 1962 edition), p. 37.

<sup>9</sup> Frazer, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State*, pp. 1–5. The same claim can be made for the *Oxford Gazette*, now the official university news-sheet. The modern 'Red Book', like these predecessors, is not restricted to information from secret sources.

were part of the earliest kinds of government; as an English term spying or 'espial' goes back to Chaucer. Intercepting messages (nowadays part of 'Signals Intelligence' or *Sigint*)<sup>10</sup> is as old as governments' use of writing and their protection of it by 'secret writing' or cryptography. The first surviving document on cipher-breaking is said to be an Arabic one from the ninth century.<sup>11</sup> But it was the development of European diplomacy and mail services after the Renaissance that encouraged regular encipherment and the complementary art of cryptanalysis. By the eighteenth century most of the European powers – including Britain – had arrangements for clandestine mail-opening, with 'Black Chambers' to decipher the codes and ciphers encountered. Most diplomatic ciphers were regularly or occasionally readable by other powers,<sup>12</sup> a situation that recurred in the first half of the twentieth century.

Then as now, secret intelligence was never clearly separated from other kinds of government information. Before the emergence of private newspapers and press freedom, governments tended to see all information as their property, secret to some extent; the distinction between information 'in the public domain' and 'classified' official information is a modern one. Diplomats themselves made little distinction between overt and covert methods. By 1600 most embassies used secret agents, and in the century that followed ambassadors were regarded as licensed spies.<sup>13</sup> A French commentator wrote in 1790 that 'The ablest ambassador can do nothing without spies and he would achieve even less if he chose them from the gutter. Taken from the higher ranks of society they are necessarily more expensive. To fulfil his mission worthily, an ambassador must be ready to buy anyone from the secretary to the valet, from the serving-maid of the favourite mistress to the lady-in-waiting of the Queen.'<sup>14</sup> The much later separation of legitimate diplomacy from secret collection was never complete. As late as 1939 the French Ambassador in Berlin had secret funds for buying information.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Signals Intelligence* is also described as *Signal Intelligence*. Usage varies.

<sup>11</sup> It has been accepted that the earliest work was an Arab manual dated 1412. See D. Kahn, *The Codebreakers* (London: Sphere [Books], 1973), p. 80. But in 1992 it was claimed that similar Arab work could be identified to the ninth century (Ibrahim A. Al-Kadi, 'The Origins of Cryptology: the Arab Connection', *Cryptologia* vol. 16 no. 2 (April 1992)).

<sup>12</sup> History from Kahn, *The Codebreakers*, chapters 1–6.

<sup>13</sup> Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 267; for 'licensed spies' see D. Ogg, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Black, 1925), p. 29.

<sup>14</sup> A. Cobban, *Ambassadors and Secret Agents* (London: Cape, 1954), p. 117, quoting from *Coup d'Oeil Severe Mais Juste Sur Le Livre Rouge*.

<sup>15</sup> R. J. Young, 'French Military Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1938–1939' in E. R. May (ed.), *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 273–4.

Nevertheless in this pre-nineteenth-century period some kinds of intelligence were more connected than others with what the British called Secret Service. Well-placed spies were more secret than casual informants. Decipherment had its early suggestions of occult skills, and remained surrounded by special secrecy. Deciphered diplomatic dispatches in eighteenth-century Britain were referred to as 'The Secrets', and handled with much the same security precautions as are used today.<sup>16</sup>

### **Early organization**

Diplomacy evolved as governments' institution for gathering foreign intelligence, with its conduct, privileges and ceremonial recognized in the seventeenth century; and there were glimmerings of other 'intelligence' organizations and institutions. Diplomacy was supplemented by governments' networks of overseas correspondents, with varying degrees of clandestinity. In Britain Walsingham's network of agents and interception under Elizabeth I was followed by Thurloe's internal and external networks under the Protectorate. Their successors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed their continental coverage through espionage and postal interception and deciphering. The Admiralty covered the naval bases of France and Spain for early warning of naval preparations, through London-controlled agents, Embassy and consular networks, and the debriefing of merchant ship captains returning from abroad.<sup>17</sup> (This British system for reporting selected foreign movements survived, incidentally, late into the Cold War.) Of the period 1715–41 it has been said that 'perhaps at no other time in English history, save in wartime, was so much time and energy devoted to the securing of intelligence.'<sup>18</sup>

In particular the interception of foreign letters and dispatches needed slick organization. In the period 1736–52 the instructions from the King of Prussia to his ambassador at the court of the Elector of Saxony were abstracted for cipher-breaking there as follows:

<sup>16</sup> K. Ellis, *The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), appendix 7.

<sup>17</sup> F. P. Renault, *Le Secret Service de l'Admirauté Britannique 1776–83* (Paris: Editions Graouli, 1936), p. 30. For background see also J. Black, 'British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth Century Crisis', *Intelligence and National Security* vol. 2 no. 2 (April 1987).

<sup>18</sup> P. S. Fritz, 'The Anti-Jacobite System of the English Ministers 1715–1745', *Historical Journal* vol. 16 (1973), p. 280.

As soon as the postal courier from Berlin arrived on Saxon territory, at Grossenhain, his bag was picked during the changing of horses, the official letters abstracted and sent by swift horse-rider to Dresden, where the Black Cabinet unsealed, copied and resealed them, and returned them to the post, which delivered them at the same time as the rest of the mail, which had arrived in the interval.<sup>19</sup>

The equivalent British machinery showed similar sophistication over interception and copying, forging seals, solving codes and ciphers, forwarding results to kings and ministers and protecting secrecy.<sup>20</sup> There was professional liaison with Hanover, and a wide network of other continental 'interceptions'.<sup>21</sup> In the eighteenth century, British money was available to buy continental intelligence, in the same way as it bought political and military support in the way emphasized by Paul Kennedy in his account of 'the winning of wars' in this period.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless these arrangements differed from modern intelligence in two crucial respects. First, though diplomacy was well established, other information collection and handling was largely *ad hoc*, without permanent institutions; and, second, nowhere was the control of collection and the evaluation of results a specialized activity, separated from policy-making and action. For kings and ministers 'intelligence' in all its aspects was part of statecraft, inseparable from the exercise of power. Walsingham first established himself as an 'intelligencer', but his intelligence system became subsumed within his apparatus as Secretary of State. In the same way the responsibilities of his post-Restoration successors for 'the intelligence' soon became overlaid by executive responsibilities.

The same applied in military and naval operations. For centuries the rudimentary headquarters of generals sufficed for handling information in war, and the same applied even more to war at sea. Great captains like Marlborough used intelligence to the full, and Frederick the Great wrote about spies and even classified them (as common spies, double spies, spies of consequence, and forced spies).<sup>23</sup> But organizing and using intelligence was a very personal matter, like other aspects of generalship;

<sup>19</sup> A. Langie (trans. J. C. H. Macbeth), *Cryptography* (London: Constable, 1924), p. 24.

<sup>20</sup> For British postal interception and deciphering in the eighteenth century see Ellis, *The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century*, chapter 6.

<sup>21</sup> Ellis, *The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 74–5; Black, 'British Intelligence and the Mid-Eighteenth Century Crisis', p. 213.

<sup>22</sup> P. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Fontana, 1989), chapter 3.

<sup>23</sup> R. G. Rowan with R. G. Deindorfer, *Secret Service* (London: Kimber, 1969 edition), p. 91.

there was no standard wartime organization, and no perpetuation of wartime experience in peacetime. Eighteenth-century intelligence was still set in a military framework described by one writer as the 'stone age of command', slowly changing but still in transition through the Napoleonic Wars.<sup>24</sup> Despite the Roman precedent, battlefield reconnaissance did not become a full-time speciality until both the French and the British formed Corps of Guides during the Napoleonic Wars.<sup>25</sup> These wars did something to modify eighteenth-century intelligence. Napoleon's mobile headquarters included a Statistical Bureau which provided him with collated strategic intelligence, but Napoleon, like Wellington, interpreted the data himself.<sup>26</sup> The wars demonstrated the use of intelligence, but did little to institutionalize it.

The same applied to the element of secret intelligence. There were no permanent government espionage bureaus; Walpole as Prime Minister ran his own agents among his Jacobite enemies, meeting them in person in taverns.<sup>27</sup> The eighteenth-century Admiralty network was run personally by the Admiralty Secretary. The Black Chambers stand out as professional secret intelligence-providing organizations, but their scale was still quite small; the combined British Secret Office of the Post Office and Deciphering Branch at their height in the eighteenth century employed a total of nine people.<sup>28</sup>

### Changes

The forty years or so after the Napoleonic Wars saw some changes, but these did not greatly affect the earlier situation. There was some regular continental interest in peacetime military intelligence, and the development of printing and gradual liberalization of press and publication laws made books and newspapers increasingly available as sources of foreign information. Reports from military attachés became another; the first of them was appointed by Prussia in 1817, and British attachés' appointments began after the Crimean War.<sup>29</sup> 'By 1830, the Prussians and Russians were producing objective intelligence summaries containing strengths and dispositions, published openly.'<sup>30</sup> In Britain a Depot of

<sup>24</sup> Van Crevald, *Command in War*, pp. 38–9.

<sup>25</sup> Parritt, *The Intelligencers*, pp. 36–45.

<sup>26</sup> Van Crevald, *Command in War*, pp. 66–8.

<sup>27</sup> Fritz, 'The Anti-Jacobite Intelligence System', pp. 279–80.

<sup>28</sup> Ellis, *The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 66, 76, 129.

<sup>29</sup> P. Towle (ed.), 'Introduction', *Estimating Foreign Military Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 86.

<sup>30</sup> Towle, *Estimating Foreign Military Power*, p. 54.

Military Knowledge was created in 1803 and lingered on for half a century.<sup>31</sup>

But there was little fundamental change. In the Crimean War the contestants' intelligence was as improvised and abysmal as the rest of their command arrangements. Interception and deciphering remained among governments' weapons, but the increased use of government couriers rather than postal services had made the interception of diplomatic dispatches less rewarding. Postal interception was used mainly against internal revolutionary threats, and (except in Russia) fell foul of liberal sentiment; the British organization was closed down in 1844, and the French and Austrian ones after the revolutions of 1848.<sup>32</sup> Except for diplomacy, intelligence remained substantially uninstitutionalized.

Changes came from around the middle of the century onwards. 'Intelligence' still remained in one sense just a synonym for information, as it still does. Newspapers for a long time remained 'intelligencers', and diplomats continued to speak of 'political intelligence'. But the term also gradually came to be associated for the first time with government institutions established specifically for 'intelligence' purposes, separated from decision-taking and policy-making, and distinct from the machinery of embassies and foreign offices which continued (and continue) to combine information-gathering with these executive functions. Intelligence became for the first time a specialized lens for viewing parts of the world. This development is outlined in the next chapter.

### Summary

Intelligence as information is as old as government; so too is secret intelligence. But until the mid-nineteenth century there was little in the way of specialized, permanent intelligence institutions. Controlling collection and evaluating the results were integral parts of statecraft and military command. Intelligence as an institution was a Victorian innovation.

<sup>31</sup> Parritt, *The Intelligencers*, pp. 41–3.

<sup>32</sup> Kahn, *The Codebreakers*, p. 111.

## 2 Organizations

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### **Military intelligence**

The change in intelligence's status came from the new military technology of the second half of the nineteenth century and its effects on command. Armies acquired improved weapons and the use of railways and telegraph communications; navies came to have iron construction, steam propulsion, big guns, explosives and armour, and (much later) the introduction of radio. Warfare involved bigger armies over bigger areas, with more opportunities for strategic surprise and victory by rapid movement and concentration. Command had to adapt itself to this new scale and complexity.

The response was to create permanent military and (later) naval staffs, charged with mobilization, war planning and support to commanders' decision-taking and control. Their raw material in peace and war was information about their own and foreign forces, topography, the railways and other factors relevant to battle. They depended on regular reports, organized information and effective communications; in modern jargon, effective *C<sup>3</sup>I*, or command, control, communications, and intelligence/information.<sup>1</sup> The influential model was the Prussian General Staff, which had been slowly taking shape after 1815 and acquired great prestige after the victories over Austria and France in 1866 and 1870. By about the turn of the century most countries had adopted some version of it.<sup>2</sup>

Part of the staff's duty was the study of enemies and potential enemies, and the continental Statistical Bureaus evolved into the 'Foreign Armies' sections of the new staffs. In Britain a new War Office Topographical and Statistical Department was created after the Crimean War but did not have much impact. The decisive moves towards 'intelligence' in the staffs began when a new War Office Intelligence Branch was formed in 1873 and an Indian Intelligence Branch in 1878. The

<sup>1</sup> Now often expanded to *C<sup>4</sup>I*, to include computers.

<sup>2</sup> M. Van Crevald, *Command in War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 149.



Admiralty created its Foreign Intelligence Committee in 1882; and the first War Office and Admiralty Directors of Intelligence (DMI and DNI) were both appointed in 1887.<sup>3</sup> Around the same time a standard British army doctrine was evolved for field intelligence.<sup>4</sup> In the United States the Navy and Army Intelligence Departments were founded in 1882 and 1885.<sup>5</sup>

Initially this 'intelligence' was associated with a range of staff functions, not just the study of foreign forces. A British officer addressing the Royal United Services Institute in 1875 on 'The Intelligence Duties of the Staff Abroad and at Home' included information about British forces and territory when he described the need for 'the collection, sifting and arrangement of all information required by governments and military authorities to enable them to take such measures in peace as will insure the rapid commencement and vigorous prosecution of any war whether at home or abroad'.<sup>6</sup> A lecturer in the same forum some years later on naval intelligence and trade protection joined proposals for the surveillance of foreign warships with an ingenious scheme for information on the movements of the friendly merchant shipping that had to be protected.<sup>7</sup> When the British Intelligence Departments were introduced, their responsibilities included mobilization planning and matters of strategy; the absence of a British General Staff and Naval Staff meant that they were the nearest things to information-gathering and 'thinking' functions. 'The early DMIs and DNIs were powerful figures' with wide influence.<sup>8</sup> When a proper General Staff was created after the Boer War, the DMI post was amalgamated with the new Director of Military Operations, not to be restored until 1915.<sup>9</sup>

Continental thinking had initially been similar. The Prussian example discouraged rigid specialization; in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 the Prussian Headquarters 'was not so much a formal structure in which each member had his well-entrenched niche and sphere of responsibility

<sup>3</sup> F. H. H. Hinsley with E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, and R. C. Knight, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* vol. I (London: HMSO, 1979), p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> T. G. Fergusson, *British Military Intelligence 1870-1914* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984), chapter 3, especially pp. 129 and 139-41 for colonial wars.

<sup>5</sup> R. Jeffreys-Jones, *American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA* (London: Free Press, 1977), p. 24.

<sup>6</sup> Major C. B. Brackenbury, 'The Intelligence Duties of the Staff Abroad and at Home', *RUSI Journal* vol. 19 no. 80 (1875), p. 242.

<sup>7</sup> J. C. R. Colomb, 'Naval Intelligence and Protection of Commerce in War', *RUSI Journal* vol. 25 no. 112 (1881).

<sup>8</sup> Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* vol. I, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> P. Gudgin, *Military Intelligence: the British Story* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), pp. 37-8.

as an informal gathering of friends, meeting once a day and taking their meals together whenever possible'.<sup>10</sup> As late as September 1914 the famous car journeys by one of Moltke's staff around his Western Front armies, and the crucial assessments about pulling back the German right wing, were made by his intelligence officer, not his operations staff.<sup>11</sup>

Yet intelligence departments had come by then to concentrate overwhelmingly on foreign forces. This was partly just a result of staffs' growth and specialization, in armies if not navies. But it also reflected the increasing need before 1914 for knowledge about potential opponents and the development of their weaponry. Military and naval threats and balances were studied everywhere, with anxious guesses about others' plans for new forces and equipment. By 1914 foreign forces were recognized as intelligence's speciality.

It had by then received the permanent imprint of staff methods, by which the new commanders drew on their staffs instead of relying on their own first-hand assessments. Staff work had developed as part of the new idea of war by railway timetables, logistics and the telegraph rather than inspirational leadership amid the battle.<sup>12</sup> From the middle of the nineteenth century the commander's 'traditional *coup d'oeil* with its implications of immediate personal observation gave way to the German-derived "estimate of the situation," implying map study and written reports'.<sup>13</sup> Intelligence retained this 'scientific' character. Its method was not the *ad hoc* search for secrets, but the methodical collection and assimilation of all relevant information, and its presentation in military 'appreciations' for rational command decisions.

The pace of this development was patchy. The British doctrine for field intelligence evolved earlier than intelligence's separation from policy and planning at the top level.<sup>14</sup> Intelligence appreciations in the British Admiralty in the First World War continued to be mixed with

<sup>10</sup> Van Crevald, *Command in War*, p. 142.

<sup>11</sup> Van Crevald, *Command in War*, p. 155; Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, *Men of Intelligence: a Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day* (London: Cassell, 1970), pp. 13–18.

<sup>12</sup> Van Crevald, *Command in War*, pp. 103–47.

<sup>13</sup> Van Crevald, *Command in War*, p. 57.

<sup>14</sup> See for example Lt-Col. J. S. Rothwell (ed.) *Staff Studies: A Series of Lectures for the Use of Officers at the Staff College* (Staff College, Camberley, 1890), quoted by Fergusson, *British Military Intelligence 1870–1914*, p. 29: '[In the field] the Staff Officer for intelligence is the recipient of all information bearing on the force, positions and organisation of the enemy, as well as any changes in his *Ordre de Bataille*. All information collected by spies, and any journals and dispatches etc. captured from the enemy, are examined by him. He questions all prisoners. The department under his orders supplements by reconnaissance in the theatre of war the information gathered by the Intelligence Division of the War Office, and the maps prepared by it in time of peace.'

operational decisions, and signals intelligence was insulated from other information until after Jutland.<sup>15</sup> Even until Pearl Harbor the Operations Branch of the US Navy Department claimed that on important matters *it* should assess the Japanese Navy; intelligence existed just to supply the data.<sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless the army and navy intelligence departments provided by 1914 the pattern of modern armed forces' intelligence. Since then most countries have moved towards some amalgamation of the separate armed services' departments. Thus the United States created the all-service Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, though it left the powerful single-service agencies in place. Britain amalgamated the three service intelligence staffs and its Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) to become the central Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) in the defence reorganization of 1964. But the original military idea of analysing foreign targets by using all data about them, with a role of providing information rather than decision-taking, continues to be the basis not only of what is now often called *defence intelligence*, but also of other intelligence on foreign targets, or *foreign intelligence*.

### **Internal security and secret police**

Alongside this military study of foreign forces a more inward-looking intelligence specialism also developed, at varying rates over roughly the same period. This originated in the nineteenth-century 'secret policing' which appeared on the Continent in the first half of the century through the widespread fear of repetitions of the French Revolution. Police forces developed arrangements for surveillance, informers and mail interceptions.<sup>17</sup> The earliest separate institution for this purpose was the Russian Third Section of the Imperial Chancery founded in 1826, which was later succeeded by the Okhrana and its eventual communist descendant, the KGB.<sup>18</sup> After 1848 the fear of mass revolution declined, but communism and anarchism continued to present threats at a time when all policing was becoming more professional, with 'the emergence of the criminal investigation department, the application of scientific

<sup>15</sup> P. Beesly, *Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914–18* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1982), pp. 177–83.

<sup>16</sup> R. Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 317–19.

<sup>17</sup> R. J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 69–72.

<sup>18</sup> C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, *KGB: the Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), chapter 1.

techniques to the problems of the detection, apprehension, surveillance of and storage of information about criminal areas and populations'.<sup>19</sup> As part of this process secret policing became more institutionalized and more international; as early as 1870 the French force had sixty agents stationed abroad, and the Okhrana's Foreign Agency was established in Paris in 1882.<sup>20</sup> By the early years of this century some of these agencies overlapped with collectors of overseas intelligence: thus before 1914 the Okhrana and the French Sûreté both ran secret sources in foreign embassies in their capitals, and engaged in diplomatic codebreaking.<sup>21</sup>

Britain had no organized policing until 1829, and a structure of local forces thereafter. Central government maintained occasional informers and interceptions of private mail, even after the interception of diplomatic material had ceased in 1844. But there was no specialized policing over internal threats until the Metropolitan Police's Special [Irish] Branch was established in 1883 (and reformed in 1887) to counter Fenian bombings in Britain.<sup>22</sup> When the fear of foreign espionage after the turn of the century produced a demand for counterespionage, the separate Secret Service Bureau (also responsible for conducting espionage overseas) was formed in 1909. Initially an offshoot of military intelligence, the home (counterespionage) section eventually evolved into the independent Security Service.<sup>23</sup>

The First World War intensified the Europe-wide need for counterespionage and counter-sabotage, and Soviet activities and world communism after 1917 provided new threats of subversion and ideological espionage. After bureaucratic battles with the Metropolitan Police these internal intelligence functions in Britain were concentrated in the Security Service in 1931 (except for intelligence on the IRA threat to the mainland, which had to wait another sixty-two years before being given formal coordinating responsibility in 1992). The Second World War produced the British successes in detecting and 'turning' German agents. Countermeasures to Soviet espionage and other clandestine Soviet activities then became a major Western theme everywhere. The

<sup>19</sup> C. Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1990), p. 122. See his pp. 119–33 on general developments in nineteenth- and twentieth-century policing.

<sup>20</sup> Goldstein, *Political Repression in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, p. 72; Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup> C. Andrew, 'France and the German Menace' in E. R. May (ed.), *Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 130–1.

<sup>22</sup> C. Andrew, *Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London: Sceptre edition, 1986), pp. 42–7.

<sup>23</sup> Hinsley, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* vol. I, pp. 3–7.

British also had their prolonged experience of internal intelligence in decolonization campaigns, and their experience in Palestine and Malaya established counter-insurgency techniques which they then drew on elsewhere. Like most other nations they subsequently experienced prolonged terrorist campaigns against domestic targets.

Thus in the West these distinctive internal security institutions emerged alongside military intelligence. Currently the British Security Service, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the French Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and the Israeli Shin Beth exemplify the pattern. A less common alternative has been for internal security to remain a specialized part of national policing, as in the FBI's Intelligence Division. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police had similar powers in Canada before the formation of CSIS in 1984. Whatever the precise organizational form, Western countries now have this *security intelligence* as a complement to foreign intelligence. It should be added that most armed forces also have their own security units and staffs, for wartime as well as peacetime use; but these are separate from intelligence (though very close to it), and need not be discussed here.

### **'National' collection**

Military and security intelligence grew up conducting most of their own information collection. For mid-Victorian military intelligence the foreign targets were not deeply secretive; Europe was a relatively open continent, and Reuters and the telegraph increased the volume and speed of overseas news. Until towards the close of the century, intelligence departments could rely mainly on newspapers, books and attachés' reports, supplemented by officers' travelling.<sup>24</sup> As late as the Russo-Japanese War the European powers had observers with both sides, even with the Japanese fleet at sea.<sup>25</sup>

Of course there was some covert intelligence collection. There was the long-lasting British and Russian Great Game in Central Asia, though with little restriction on publishing the results.<sup>26</sup> The British Foreign

<sup>24</sup> For a brief summary of Victorian collection see A. Clayton, *Forearmed: a History of the Intelligence Corps* (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 6.

<sup>25</sup> For examples see D. and P. Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise: a History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905* (London: Angus and Robertson, 1975), pp. 184, 288.

<sup>26</sup> For details of the Indian Government's intelligence collection see J. Ferris, 'Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence, and British Policy toward Russia and Central Asia, 1874-1878' in K. Neilson and B. J. C. McKercher (eds.), *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History* (London: Praeger, 1992), pp. 121-3.