


FROM ARTISAN TO WORKER

GUILDS, THE FRENCH STATE, AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOR,
1776–1821

MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS



CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE

www.cambridge.org/9780521193764

This page intentionally left blank

From Artisan to Worker

From Artisan to Worker examines the largely overlooked debate on the potential reestablishment of guilds that occurred both inside and outside the French government from 1776 to 1821. The abolition of guilds in 1791 overturned a system of labor that had been in place for centuries. The disorder that ensued – from concerns about the safety of the food supply to a general decline in the quality of goods – raised strong doubts about their abolition and sparked a debate that continued for decades. The issue of the reestablishment of guilds, however, subsequently became intertwined with the growing mechanization of production. Under the Napoleonic regime, the government considered several projects to restore guilds in a large-scale fashion, but the counterargument that guilds could impede mechanization prevailed. After Bonaparte's fall, the restored Bourbon dynasty was expected to reestablish guilds, but its sponsorship of an industrial exhibition in 1819 signaled its endorsement of mechanization, and after 1821 there were no further efforts to reestablish guilds during the Restoration.

Michael P. Fitzsimmons is Professor of History at Auburn University Montgomery. His previous works include *The Parisian Order of Barristers and the French Revolution*, *The Remaking of France*, and *The Night the Old Regime Ended*, in addition to multiple articles published in scholarly journals.

From Artisan to Worker

*Guilds, the French State, and the Organization
of Labor, 1776–1821*

MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS

Auburn University Montgomery, Alabama



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521193764

© Michael P. Fitzsimmons 2010

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published in print format 2010

ISBN-13 978-0-511-74078-7 eBook (Adobe Reader)

ISBN-13 978-0-521-19376-4 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

*To my colleagues in the Department of History at Auburn University
Montgomery*

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	page ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xi
Introduction	i
1 The Decline and Demise of Guilds, 1776–1791	7
2 The New Regime Begins, 1792–1799	58
3 The Reemergence of Guilds as a Policy Issue, 1800–1811	121
4 The Triumph of Mechanization, 1812–1821	189
Conclusion	256
<i>Bibliography</i>	265
<i>Index</i>	281

Acknowledgments

Before mentioning specific acknowledgments, I would like to express once again my warm appreciation for the collegiality of my colleagues in the field of the French Revolution. Perhaps it is the same in other areas – I hope so – but, as the beneficiary of extraordinary generosity of spirit on the part of fellow scholars, my passion for the subject is strengthened. Whatever differences of interpretation we may have, the spirit of *fraternité* remains strong.

Indeed, my debts of gratitude have expanded with this study, and the acknowledgments that follow cannot possibly convey the gratitude that I feel. Daniel Heimmermann, Kenneth Margerison, Michael Broers, and Robert Alexander read chapters, and James Livesey and Michael Sibalis read a complete draft of the work. All of them challenged me to refine my thinking and saved me from errors, and I thank them all for making this study better. Any deficiencies that remain are of course of my own making. Jeff Horn and Rafe Blaufarb kindly shared with me documents that they uncovered during the course of their own research. Jeff in particular unhesitatingly helped me to address a critical void and salvage what had been a frustrating trip to Rouen. Alan Forrest, William Doyle, and Isser Woloch supported this project, and I am deeply grateful for their encouragement and many years of friendship. Regrettably, geography has mandated that these friendships be nurtured from afar, but they are no less deep or warm as a result.

The Research Council of Auburn University Montgomery unwaveringly assisted this project with three Research Grants-in-Aid. It would not have been possible without the council's confidence and support. John Veres, the Chancellor of Auburn University Montgomery, made provision for me to receive a professional improvement leave that was critical to this work's completion. The study also benefited from a Newberry Library Short-Term Fellowship for Individual Research that allowed me to utilize its extraordinary French Revolution collection in a systematic manner, and I thank the Newberry Library for its support. As always, the entire staff of the Newberry was exceedingly helpful and went well beyond the norms of scholarly courtesy in dealing with my requests.

The staffs of the Archives Nationales, Archives de la Préfecture de Police, and the Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris were all unfailingly helpful in facilitating my research, particularly the first, which seems like a second home to me in Paris. Beyond Paris, I would like to thank the staffs of departmental and municipal archives and libraries for their assistance and courtesy, and beyond France, the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam provided extraordinary hospitality.

I am equally grateful to my colleagues in the Department of History at Auburn University Montgomery. We have created a congenial and supportive environment that we value, and I want Jan Bulman, Lee Farrow, Steve Gish, Tim Henderson, Keith Krawczynski, Ben Severance, Michael Simmons, Wyatt Wells, and Qiang Zhai to know the high regard and personal affection in which I hold them. I did not anticipate that my career would be spent at Auburn University Montgomery, but I could not have asked for better colleagues. Janice Willis, our administrative associate, was endlessly patient with my technical backwardness and cheerfully converted material from my antiquated computer, with which I have a high comfort level, to a more modern format. She, too, has been a part of our cordial work atmosphere.

It has been a pleasure to work with the staff of Cambridge University Press. I would especially like to thank Eric Crahan, Jason Przybylski, Bindu Vinod, and the team at Newgen Imaging Systems for their careful attention in seeing this work through to publication. I deeply appreciate their courtesy and professionalism.

Lastly, others have provided various forms of support along the way – commiseration, editing, encouragement, friendship, goodwill, logistical support, and, usually unsuccessfully, but through no fault of their own, solace. In this regard, I would like to thank Robert Allen, William Cormack, Steven Daniell, Kelly Fitzsimmons, Theresa Fitzsimmons, Julian Jackson, Ralph Kingston, Pia Knigge and Anika Knigge Hutton, Pamela Long, Susie Paul, and Rochelle Ziskin.

Abbreviations

ACCIP	Archives de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Paris
AD	Archives Départementales
AM	Archives Municipales
AN	Archives Nationales (Paris)
APP	Archives de la Préfecture de Police (Paris)
BHVP	Bibliothèque Historique de la Ville de Paris
BM	Bibliothèque Municipale
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris)
BNU	Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg
Strasbourg	
IISH	International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam)

Introduction

Some of the work that has long been recognized as among the most innovative scholarship on the French Revolution centered on workers, particularly their politicization.¹ Paradoxically, however, as Haim Burstin noted some years ago, there is a lack of a history of work during the French Revolution.² Although Burstin himself has done as much as anyone to address this void, his observation is as valid now as it was then.³

The subject of work during the Revolution, of course, is large and multifaceted, but this study has as its focal point the organization of labor – more specifically, the issue of guilds and the Revolution. Guilds, or corporations, as they were also known, and the terms will be used synonymously, were abolished in 1791, destroying a structure of work that had been in place for centuries. Although they were never brought back in any comprehensive fashion, they remained the object of a vigorous and prolonged debate, with the advantages and disadvantages of their reestablishment considered. Their abolition was perceived by many as misguided, a view shared in some cases by deputies and administrators; others argued, more strongly, that their destruction had been a mistake and advocated for their restoration.

One reason that the debate on whether or not to restore guilds, which continued for decades, has attracted little attention may be due to the thematic focal points utilized by historians of French labor for the centuries flanking the Revolution and Empire. For understandable reasons, analyses of the

¹ Chief among these would be Albert Soboul, *Les Sans-culottes parisiens en l'an II: Mouvement populaire et gouvernement révolutionnaire, 2 juin 1793–9 thermidor an II* (Paris: Librairie Clavreuil, 1958); George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); Kåre D. Tønnesson, *La Défaite des sans-culottes: Mouvement populaire et réaction bourgeoise de l'an III* (Oslo: Presses universitaires d'Oslo, 1959).

² Haim Burstin, "Problems of Work during the Terror," in *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture: The Terror*, Keith Michael Baker, ed., (Oxford: Pergamon, 1994), p. 271.

³ Haim Burstin, *Le Faubourg Saint-Marcel à l'époque révolutionnaire: Structure économique et composition sociale* (Paris: Société des Etudes Robespierriistes, 1983); Haim Burstin, *Une Révolution à l'oeuvre: Le faubourg Saint-Marcel (1789–1794)* (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2005).

eighteenth century concentrate on guilds, abolished in 1791 – the title of the most recent examination of the topic, *La Fin des corporations*, exemplifies this approach.⁴ The issues that these studies engage end with the early period of the Revolution.

By the time of the Restoration, Paris had hundreds of thousands of workers; although no reliable number is available, a scholar of the period believed that an early 1823 figure of 244,000 workers, out of a total population of approximately 730,000–750,000, was credible.⁵ This large, undifferentiated mass of workers forms the basis for most explorations of French labor history during the first half of the nineteenth century, focusing on what Louis Chevalier termed “the laboring and dangerous classes,” a volatile element whose frustrations erupted during the June days in 1848.⁶ Again, for equally understandable reasons, for studies with a nineteenth-century focus, the Restoration period, when concentrations of workers beyond such traditional locales as the *faubourg* Saint-Antoine or *faubourg* Saint-Marcel became more pronounced, is generally the point of departure.⁷ In sum, for one important span of French labor history, the beginning of the Revolution marks the end, whereas for another significant period, the end of the Napoleonic Empire has generally marked the beginning. As yet, there is not, as Burstin broadly noted, any bridge between them.⁸

⁴ Steven L. Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations* (Paris: Fayard, 2001). Some earlier examples, listed chronologically, include Etienne Martin Saint-Léon, *Histoire des corporations de métiers, depuis leurs origines jusqu'à leur suppression en 1791*, 3rd edition, (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1922); François Olivier-Martin, *L'Organisation corporative de la France d'ancien régime* (Paris: Sirey, 1938); Emile Coornaert, *Les Corporations en France avant 1789* (Paris: Les Editions ouvrières, 1941); Michael Sonenscher, *The Hatters of Eighteenth-Century France* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Bernard Gallinato, *Les Corporations à Bordeaux à la fin de l'Ancien Régime: Vie et mort d'un mode d'organisation du travail* (Bordeaux: Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 1992).

⁵ Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, “Les Ouvriers d'industrie à Paris sous la Restauration,” *Bulletin de la Société d'histoire moderne* 14 (1976), p. 26.

⁶ Louis Chevalier, *Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses à Paris pendant la première moitié du XIX^e siècle* (Paris: Plon, 1958).

⁷ Katherine A. Lynch, *Family, Class, and Ideology in Early Industrial France: Social Policy and the Working Class Family, 1825–1848* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); outside of Paris, the Restoration starting point is equally apparent in Elinor Accampo, *Industrialization, Family Life, and Class Relations: Saint-Chamond, 1815–1914* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).

⁸ There is the fine study of Raymonde Monnier, *Le Faubourg Saint-Antoine (1789–1815)* (Paris: Société des Etudes Robespierriistes, 1981), but only two chapters are devoted to the organization of work and the scope of the book is limited to one neighborhood – albeit an important one – of Paris. In addition, there are classic studies of French workers during the first years of the Revolution, but they are devoted primarily to the political activities of workers rather than to the structure of work itself. These include Soboul, *Les Sans-culottes parisiens en l'an II*; Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution*; Tonnesson, *La Défaite des sans-culottes*. In addition, there is an admirable work that, from its title, appears to be an exception, but it leaps from 1794 to the Restoration. William A. Sewall, *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

By the eighteenth century guilds had been a prominent feature of urban life for centuries, providing a structure to labor and, although the degree of success is open to debate, a measure of control over journeymen and apprentices – corporations were, in fact, regarded as an extension of the police. Although they were abolished during 1776, they were restored after only a few months because of unrest among journeymen. Consequently, by May 1789, as the Estates-General opened, with memories of 1776 still relatively fresh, the position of guilds seemed secure.

Just two months later, however, on August 4, 1789, the National Assembly – the body into which the Estates-General had evolved after a prolonged stalemate – unexpectedly launched a comprehensive attack on privilege, during the course of which it pronounced the dissolution of guilds, which were perceived as repositories of privilege. Even among the cascade of renunciations made during the meeting, which astonished both deputies and observers, the suppression of corporations seemed extraordinary. Indeed, their abolition was so stunning that the National Assembly appears to have had doubts about what it had done because it temporized – in the drafting of the August decrees summarizing the renunciations made during the session, the Assembly announced the reform of guilds rather than their abolition. Ultimately, however, the National Assembly did eliminate corporations, although relatively late in its tenure; their abolition came only after the destruction of provinces, the *parlements* and the nobility, and a fundamental reorganization of the Church. The dilatory approach by the Assembly testifies to the uncertainty and even apprehensiveness felt by deputies, but they honored the compact they had forged on August 4 and dissolved guilds.

In place of corporations and in the cause of liberty, the National Assembly enacted an occupational license (*patente*) that allowed its holder to practice any trade he wished. Problems quickly arose, so much so that for contemporaries the dissolution of corporations and the introduction of the occupational license became indelibly associated with a sharp decline in standards in both production and commerce.

As that descent continued, France declared war on Austria, initiating what would become nearly a quarter of a century of almost continuous war. Within a few months, serious reverses led to the overthrow and execution of Louis XVI, which in turn widened the conflict and placed France on the defensive. In response, the government, primarily the Committee of Public Safety acting on behalf of the National Convention, placed the country on a war footing. Among many measures, it enacted mass conscription, and supplying the hundreds of thousands of men taken into the armies required levels of production far beyond that of the traditional artisanal mode, leading the Convention to launch a large-scale manufacturing program.

1980). A notable exception, which addresses the effort to restore guilds in the context of French industrialization, is Jeff Horn, *The Path Not Taken: French Industrialization in the Age of Revolution 1750–1830* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 262–266.

In terms of manufacturing capacity, the efforts undertaken by the Committee of Public Safety succeeded, especially in arms – Paris became the largest producer of muskets in the world. Ultimately, however, the government shut down the arms workshops, largely due to unrest among workers. Nevertheless, the endeavor essentially defined the issues that would frame the debate on the reestablishment of guilds that ensued.

On the one hand, the Convention's effort had revealed the possibilities of mass production, which would subsequently become attached to mechanization of production – the arms program had been driven mainly by a regimentation of labor, rather than mechanization. In the view of advocates of mechanization, any restoration of corporations would offer workers a platform from which they might impede mechanization.

On the other hand, the government had ended the system because of worker unrest, and proponents of guilds asserted that their reestablishment would bring an end to “insubordination.” They also argued that it would restore quality and trust to manufacturing and commerce.

Moreover, guilds under the Old Regime had performed a number of functions, such as overseeing apprenticeships, conducting quality control and ensuring the safety of the food supply. After it abolished corporations, the National Assembly failed to provide for any of these responsibilities, and its successor bodies did not address these issues either. As skill, quality, and food safety declined precipitously, the issue for legislators, officials, and police was whether they should address abuses or problems with laws and regulations on an individual basis or seek a more comprehensive solution by reestablishing guilds, albeit in a reformed fashion.

As France emerged from the Terror, disaffection with the unregulated market and workplace was widespread, particularly in Paris. In a clear indication that sentiment favoring a return to corporations was more than idle longing, the commission appointed by the National Convention in 1795 to draft a new constitution believed it necessary to include an article maintaining the proscription of guilds. Two deputies from different parts of the political spectrum opposed the measure, but the Convention approved it and it became article 355 of the Constitution of the Year III that established the Directory.

Article 355 reinforced the abolition of corporations – it bolstered the statutory law of 1791 with constitutional status. Whereas a statutory measure could be repealed or overturned by the passage of a new law, to amend the constitution required a minimum of six years. The extraordinarily difficult winter of 1795–1796, the first after the installation of the Directory, provided additional impetus to the favorable recollection of guilds. Amidst dearth and severe hardship, most contemporaries associated the era of corporations with adequate supply, market stability, and good quality. Indeed, approximately a year after it was adopted, the deputy who claimed to have written and put forward article 355 expressed regret at having done so.

The easing of conditions diminished somewhat the positive outlook toward a restoration of guilds. Furthermore, in 1798 the Directory sponsored an

Exhibition of Products of French Industry, the first industrial exposition held in the Western world. The exhibition was successful, drawing large crowds despite inclement weather, and contributed to the creation of a favorable image of industry among the public.

The next year, in 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the Directory, terminating the Constitution of the Year III and effectively reopening the possibility of more quickly restoring guilds. If, in fact, there was a moment during the revolutionary and Napoleonic epoch when corporations might have been reestablished, it was during Bonaparte's rule. The Council of State debated the question on several occasions until 1810, and under the Consulate the central government reorganized bakers and butchers of Paris into bodies strongly reminiscent of guilds. Furthermore, a secret counselor of Bonaparte repeatedly urged him to reestablish guilds.

Guilds were known and familiar, and it was recognized that they had provided services that were socially and economically beneficial. Their reestablishment seemed to some to be preferable to the partial solutions that had been attempted, the most notable of which was the law of 22 germinal year XI, with which there was dissatisfaction. The question that presented itself, then, was whether to accept limited results and continuing deficiencies or take the final step of restoring guilds.⁹ Those who argued for their restoration emphasized the greater order and discipline that would result – values strongly embraced by the Napoleonic regime.

At the same time, manpower shortages resulting from conscription virtually mandated mechanization of production. Those who opposed any reestablishment of guilds asserted that they could become a platform from which opposition to mechanization could be mounted. For more than a decade, Bonaparte did not make a clear choice between the reestablishment of corporations and mechanized production, but a resolution occurred when the government undertook a major reorganization of the Ministry of the Interior in January 1812. A portion of the ministry's responsibilities were transferred to an entirely new entity, the Ministry of Manufacturing and Commerce. The restructuring signaled the triumph of mechanized, industrial production under the Napoleonic regime, but the formation of the new ministry coincided with a severe economic crisis that continued until the fall of Napoleon.

Bonaparte's defeat brought back the Bourbon monarchy, which was widely expected to undo the work of the Revolution. Only weeks after its return, the restored monarchy abolished the Ministry of Manufacturing and Commerce and reintegrated its functions into the Ministry of the Interior. This action, along with the expectation that it would reverse most reforms of the Revolution, fed a perception that the government of Louis XVIII would reestablish guilds. Both the Crown and the Ministry of the Interior received a number of requests to this end, and a lively debate, both in public and within

⁹ Indeed, in contrast to the law of 22 germinal year XI, the reorganization of bakers and butchers was generally judged to have been successful.

the government, took place on the issue. A determination ultimately came in a somewhat indirect fashion – in 1819 the royal government sponsored an industrial exhibition in Paris, signaling a preference for industry and mechanization over a restoration of corporations.

The contradistinction between the reestablishment of guilds and mechanization reflects the terms of the arguments waged by contemporaries, particularly within the government but also in public. The oft-used phrase “freedom of industry” used in opposition to any reestablishment of guilds meant above all the freedom to innovate, and the primary connotation of innovation was mechanization of production. Although both proponents and opponents of the reestablishment of guilds may have had other objectives or motives,¹⁰ the debate revolved principally around these issues, especially until 1819.

Through an examination of the debate on the reestablishment of guilds, this study seeks to demonstrate that the passage from the eighteenth-century regime of guilds to the working classes of the nineteenth century was neither irreversible nor automatic. Indeed, the decision to abolish guilds was questioned during succeeding years and at times maintained in the face of public discontent. The maintenance of the dissolution of corporations should in no way be taken for granted – their reestablishment was advocated and considered many times over the next thirty years. The proscription of guilds held, however, and in the end the change in the organization of labor altered its nature as well. After the abolition of corporations work would be regarded more as a commodity offered by independent workers than as a skill developed and ratified by artisans within a hierarchical, regulated system. The continued proscription of corporations also served to help set France on the path of industrialization that it would follow during the nineteenth century, with all of the consequences that would arise from this.

¹⁰ Later in the nineteenth century, for example, some artisans viewed corporatism as a means to stem the development of capitalist production or marketing practices in their trade or as a vehicle for social reform. Christopher H. Johnson, “Economic Change and Artisan Discontent: The Tailors History, 1800–48,” in *Revolution and Reaction: 1848 and the Second French Republic*, Roger Price, ed., (London: Croom Helm, 1975): pp. 87–114, especially pp. 108–110; Michael David Sibalis, “Shoemakers and Fourierism in Nineteenth-Century Paris: The Société Laborieuse des Cordonniers-Bottiers,” *Social History/Histoire Sociale* 20 (1987): 24–49.

The Decline and Demise of Guilds, 1776–1791

Your committee believed that it should link the existence of this tax to a great benefit done for industry and commerce, the suppression of masterships and guilds that your good sense should abolish for the sole reason that they are exclusive privileges.

– d’Allarde, spokesman for the Committee on Taxation,
to the National Assembly, February 15, 1791

During the eighteenth century many guilds became increasingly enfeebled because of external competition, internal divisions and other developments, but the decisive event in their decline was their dissolution in 1776, after which they fell away precipitously until their final suppression in early 1791. Although the Crown, after only a few months, retracted the edict of Controller-General Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot that had abolished corporations, the reorganized bodies were left weakened and ill prepared to meet the challenges posed by the French Revolution, which brought about their final abolition.

GUILDS UNDER THE OLD REGIME

By the latter part of the eighteenth century, guilds had long been a prominent feature of urban life. Many of them had been in existence for centuries – in Paris the corporation of linen makers claimed to have statutes dating from 1278 and that of vinegar makers from 1294. The guild of bakers in Paris had statutes from 1290, but claimed foundations in the Gallo-Roman period.¹ Not all corporations could claim such venerable lineage, of course, but the entire system of guilds was deeply woven into the fabric of urban life, from large cities to smaller towns. In Lyon, even omitting workers in the silk industry,

¹ *Guide des corps des marchands et les communautés des arts et métiers, tant de la ville et faubourgs de Paris, que du royaume* (Paris: Veuve Duchesne, 1766), p. 295 (linen makers); p. 484 (vinegar makers); Steven Laurence Kaplan, *The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question 1700–1775* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 155.

which gave the city its unique character, the guild system encompassed tens of thousands of men.² In Grenoble, with a population of approximately 24,000 in 1776, there were 1,141 masters in forty-one guilds.³ Including journeymen apprentices, who were not enumerated, the number of men associated with guilds probably approached 2,500, meaning that perhaps 25 percent of the active male population was connected to the guild structure.⁴

The scale of their presence gave guilds a substantial role in urban life, from municipal politics to policing, and was reinforced by the requirement of many corporations that members had to be born in the city in which the guild was located. Guilds served to oversee and regulate the behavior of masters and journeymen; indeed, during an age in which police structures were not well formed, they played a significant role as an auxiliary to the police.⁵ In the final analysis, the primary function of each guild was to promote stability, both economic and social.

For this reason, workers outside of the guild system were often an object of suspicion and even fear.⁶ In Nîmes, for example, unemployed silk workers threatened to riot and set fire to the town, leading the intendant to seek to employ them in a public works project tearing down the city walls.⁷

So prestigious was the corporate paradigm that in Paris and elsewhere non-skilled laborers sought to emulate it – even in the world of unskilled work, claims of a monopoly on certain tasks existed, although the basis of such assertions was “unformalized custom.” As Haim Burstin noted, “these rights assumed the status of property. Even the water-carriers, upon retiring from

² Maurice Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais au XVIII^e siècle* (Grenoble: Allier, 1970), pp. 315–320.

³ AD Isère 2 C 88, documents 47–92; the population figure is from *Histoire de Grenoble*, Vital Chomel, ed., (Toulouse: Privat, 1976), p. 150.

⁴ In the same vein, Edwin J. Shephard, Jr., “Social and Geographic Mobility of the Eighteenth-Century Guild Artisans: An Analysis of Guild Receptions in Dijon, 1700–1790,” in *Work and Revolution in France: Representation, Meaning, Organization and Practice*, Steven Laurence Kaplan and Cynthia Koepp, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 97–130, presents a portrait of the importance and pervasiveness of the guild structure in the similarly sized city of Dijon. For a profile of a stratum of guilds in a city, see Daniel Joseph Heimmermann, “Work and Corporate Life in Old Regime France: The Leather Artisans of Bordeaux (1740–1791),” (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1994). On corporations in Caen, Jean-Claude Perrot, *Genèse d’une ville moderne: Caen au XVIII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), I: 320–327. For a wider perspective on a single trade, Michael Sonenscher, *The Hatters of Eighteenth-Century France* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

⁵ BM Orléans Ms. 1422, section 7, (Commerce); Alan Williams, *The Police of Paris 1718–1789* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), pp. 118–119; Steven Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail, 1700–1815,” *Revue historique* 256 (1979): 26–27; Bernard Gallinato, *Les Corporations à Bordeaux*, pp. 197–200.

⁶ William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 24; Dean T. Ferguson, “The Body, the Corporate Idiom, and the Police of the Unincorporated Worker in Early Modern Lyons,” *French Historical Studies* 23 (2000): 545–576, especially p. 553.

⁷ AN H¹ 1023, documents 27, 30.

their occupation, would sell their business to a comrade.”⁸ In part, the adoption of the corporate model was a survival strategy in the extraordinarily difficult conditions of Paris for unskilled workers, but it also testified to the preeminent place of the guild structure. In Grenoble, horse-renters formed themselves into a corporation, but it had no statutes or regulations.⁹ Similarly, in Bordeaux, shoemakers outside of the guild sustained a commitment to the corporate system of labor until the end of the Old Regime.¹⁰

The forming by unskilled laborers of a corporate configuration underscores a fundamental aspect of the guild system: It was not merely an economic institution, perhaps not even primarily an economic institution, but a social taxonomy that clearly demarcated one’s place in the social hierarchy. Each guild also had a strong moral dimension that ranged from religious devotion to charitable relief.¹¹

Guilds were vested with an array of privileges, the most important of which was a monopoly on production, and the privileges of each corporation were enforced by municipal authorities, who for example often accompanied representatives of a guild as they searched for those who were practicing its trade outside of the corporation. Such searches could sometimes become fearsome in nature.¹² Known as “false workers,” *chambrellans* or other designations, non-guild workers were ubiquitous, and their products, despite the efforts of guilds to enforce their monopoly, substantially undermined that monopoly.

An important source of such goods were the suburbs or neighborhoods of most major cities that were nominally outside of the guild or municipal jurisdiction – the *faubourg* Saint-Antoine in Paris is the best known, but others included the *sauvetats* of Saint-André and Saint-Seurin in Bordeaux.¹³

⁸ Haim Burstin, “Unskilled Labor in Paris at the End of the Eighteenth Century,” in *The Workplace before the Factory: Artisans and Proletarians, 1500–1800*, Thomas Max Safley and Leonard N. Rosenband, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 70–72, with the quotation from p. 71.

⁹ AD Isère 2 C 88, document 90.

¹⁰ Daniel Heimmermann, “The Guilds of Bordeaux, les métiers libres, and the *sauvetats* of Saint-Seurin and Saint-André,” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History* 25 (1998): 30.

¹¹ Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, pp. 552–555; Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*, pp. 34–35; Heimmermann, “Work and Corporate Life in Old Regime France,” pp. 73–85; Sydney Watts, *Meat Matters: Butchers, Politics, and Market Culture in Eighteenth-Century Paris* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006), pp. 98–100.

¹² AN T 1373, dossier Martin (Philibert), *Mémoire au Roi concernant la communauté des maîtres perruquiers...*, which related the physical violence associated with seizures against unauthorized practitioners. For more on the violence associated with guilds, see Leonard Rosenband, “Jean-Baptiste Réveillon: A Man on the Make in Old Regime France,” *French Historical Studies* 20 (1997): 481–510. See also Judith Coffin, *The Politics of Women’s Work: The Paris Garment Trades, 1750–1915* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 24–25.

¹³ Raymonde Monnier, *Le Faubourg Saint-Antoine*; Steven L. Kaplan, “Les corporations, les ‘faux ouvriers,’ et le Faubourg Saint-Antoine au XVIII^e siècle,” *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* (1988): 353–378; Heimmermann, “The Guilds of Bordeaux.”

Indeed, it appears that consumer goods, particularly shoes, produced by artisans in Saint-André and Saint-Seurin – outside the jurisdiction of guilds – dominated the Bordeaux market.¹⁴ The legal existence of a monopoly on production, then, should not necessarily be taken to represent the actual situation.¹⁵

Another feature of the monopoly on production, and an aspect of guild privilege that did have a broader effect, was that each guild determined both the method and volume of production, so, for example, the confection process was closely guarded by the corporation and was one of the “mysteries” of the trade.¹⁶ The ability to govern fabrication and determine the quantity of a product to be officially manufactured – designed to assure stability within the guild – served to discourage innovation. In fact, during the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, the period of guilds was pejoratively referred to as one of “routine.” What Robert Darnton observed of Montpellier – that during the eighteenth century the city produced the same items that it had fabricated since the late Middle Ages and on the same scale¹⁷ – would have been true of many other cities and towns of France and accounts, at least in part, for the centrality of guilds in most urban areas.

Despite, or perhaps because of, their commanding position, during the eighteenth century corporations became an object of criticism by liberal economic theorists, who assailed in particular the regulatory apparatus at the heart of the guild system.¹⁸ A key figure – the first in France to suggest the abolition of guilds – was Jacques Vincent de Gournay, who emerged during the 1750s. He believed that human labor formed the basis of national wealth and that it should be encouraged by the deregulation of work and production, including the abolition of guilds, freedom in fabrication, shorter apprenticeships and facilitating artisanal innovations.¹⁹ Gournay died in 1759, but his doctrines gained adherents in France. Ultimately, however, although critiques of guilds had become more pointed by the mid-eighteenth century, and despite divisions within and among guilds, there was little to indicate the devastation that lay immediately ahead.²⁰ Rather, guilds appeared to be a permanent fixture in French society.

¹⁴ Heimmermann, “The Guilds of Bordeaux,” pp. 25–27.

¹⁵ James R. Farr, *Artisans in Europe, 1300–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 81–82.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

¹⁷ Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 114.

¹⁸ Simone Meysonnier, *La Balance et l’horloge: La genèse de la pensée libérale en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris: Editions de la Passion, 1989), pp. 66–70; Catherine Larrère, *L’Invention de l’économie au XVIII^e siècle: Du droit naturel à la physiocratie* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 100–101.

¹⁹ Meysonnier, *La Balance et l’horloge*, pp. 200–202. See also Steven L. Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, pp. 7–49, especially pp. 24–26.

²⁰ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 79.

TURGOT AND THE SIX EDICTS

During the eighteenth century corporations were weakened both internally and externally. Internally, masters who violated paternalistic guild regulations in pursuit of their own interests or challenges to the authority of senior officials by junior officers threatened the fraternal ethos of guild solidarity. Externally, financial difficulties – whether as a result of the costs of litigation or the expenses incurred when corporations sought to repurchase offices that the Crown had sold – further debilitated guilds.²¹

Although guilds were in a weakened state, the catalyst for their enfeeblement came in February 1776 when Turgot, a disciple of Gournay and Controller-General of Finances, as part of an ambitious program of reform known as the Six Edicts, issued a proclamation suppressing guilds. The edict was registered during a *lit de justice* – a special session to override magistrates' objections – at the *parlement* of Paris on March 12.²² The decree denounced the privilege accorded to artisans of assembling into a single body and justified the abolition of guilds as an act that would allow the king's subjects to enjoy their rights. Turgot also cited the stifling effect of guilds on industry. These two issues, in fact, would frame the debate on guilds for the next fifty years – the conflict between corporate privilege and industrial development would dominate during the Revolution, whereas the restrictions that guilds could place on industry were predominant during the Napoleonic and Restoration eras.

The edict abolishing guilds was the longest of the Six Edicts; in the words of an early scholar of the subject, “the reforms to be effected were so radical and far-reaching that it was imperative to make them clearly defined and specific.”²³ Indeed, a modern scholar characterized the contemporary perception of the abolition of guilds by Turgot as “a sort of carnivalization of social relations, an invitation to taxonomic chaos, social disarray, and political mutiny.”²⁴

Although a wave of disorder followed the guilds' abolition, the scope and intensity of the unrest are difficult to ascertain. Whatever its scale, however, it unnerved contemporaries accustomed to a hierarchical, ordered society.²⁵ Furthermore, the measures that the Lieutenant-General of Police in Paris took in response to the agitation left workers and journeymen disillusioned, although they were the putative beneficiaries of the edict.²⁶

²¹ Steven L. Kaplan, “The Character and Implications of Strife among the Masters Inside the Guilds of Eighteenth-Century Paris,” *Journal of Social History* 19 (1986): 631–647; Daniel Heimmermann, “The Bordeaux Shoemaker’s Guild and the End of the Old Regime,” *Selected Papers of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750–1850* (2001): 211–219.

²² On the abolition of guilds through the Six Edicts, Robert Perry Shepherd, *Turgot and the Six Edicts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1903); Douglas Dakin, *Turgot and the Ancien Régime in France*, reprint ed. (New York: Octagon Books, 1972), pp. 231–251; Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*, pp. 72–77; Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, pp. 79–85.

²³ Shepherd, *Turgot and the Six Edicts*, p. 126.

²⁴ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 78.

²⁵ On problems of perception and the disorders themselves, Kaplan, *ibid.*, pp. 95–97.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 97–101.

As a result, amidst intrigues at court and with public confidence shaken by the unrest the edicts had generated, Turgot's position quickly became tenuous, and in early May Louis XVI dismissed him.²⁷ If the Six Edicts had denoted the success of liberal critiques of guilds by Gournay and his successors, the fall of Turgot signaled their failure, and the brevity of the reforms made that failure appear monumental. Indeed, to the degree that economic arguments against corporations were never again as prominent, the debate surrounding guilds all but ended – after 1776, guilds were not a major object of public discussion or debate. The issue was revived only during the Revolution, and then not for economic reasons but as a result of the revolutionary process itself.

By June there were rumors in Paris that guilds would be restored, albeit in modified form.²⁸ On August 28 the Crown did, in fact, reestablish guilds.²⁹ As Steven Kaplan noted, the reorganization of guilds “signified the reaffirmation of the traditional model of social classification and representation” – a concern articulated by the *parlement* of Paris in its remonstrance against the edict of March 12. Furthermore, Kaplan correctly observed that even as the Crown reinstated the old social order, it did not emphasize any commitment to that order. Rather, seeking not to be perceived as reactionary or beholden to special interests, the Crown focused on reform.³⁰

The claim of reform advanced by the Crown was not without foundation, because the reestablishment of guilds was not a simple reversion to the *status quo ante*. In Caen, when the Crown reestablished corporations, accessibility to trades was made easier.³¹ The guild of butchers in Paris was likewise opened somewhat more to outsiders.³² Among other changes enacted were the opening of many trades to women, although they could not take part in the governance of a guild, as well as the right of individuals to practice more than one profession and a ban on all litigation between corporations.³³

Most significantly, however, the reorganization substantially reduced the number of guilds, both through consolidation and suppression. Although the number of guilds in Paris before 1776 is difficult to ascertain with certainty,

²⁷ Edgar Faure, *12 Mai 1776: La Disgrâce de Turgot* (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), especially pp. 480–517.

²⁸ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 105.

²⁹ On the unrest and the reestablishment of guilds, Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail,” pp. 27–30.

³⁰ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 109. This echoes the earlier judgment of Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*, pp. 76–77.

³¹ Perrot, *Genèse d'une ville moderne*, I: 338.

³² Watts, *Meat Matters*, p. 102.

³³ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 109; Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*, p. 77; Claire Crowston, *Fabricating Women: The Seamstresses of Old Regime France, 1675–1791* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 211–212. See also AN F¹² 786, edict of king concerning arts and trades of cities under jurisdiction of parlement of Rouen, April 1779. The reforms enacted may also have served to stifle the debate on guilds after 1776.

it was clearly well over a hundred.³⁴ Whatever the precise number was, it was reduced considerably, to fifty.

Furthermore, guilds were not automatically reconstituted – in the reorganization there were three categories of membership and former masters had to pay new fees to be admitted to a reorganized guild, a stipulation that made the reestablishment of guilds unpopular.³⁵ In addition, the property of many of the abolished corporations had been sold,³⁶ and each guild had to receive new statutes in order to reestablish itself. All this put guilds in a provisional state – one that extended for many years – and left them weak and divided.³⁷

Outside of Paris, regulations for reestablishing corporations were promulgated later,³⁸ and detailed records on the reorganization of guilds in Lyon provide insight into the manner in which the reconstruction led to a state of fragility in many of the new corporations. During January 1777, the Crown issued an edict authorizing the creation of forty-one guilds in Lyon, and the reorganization consolidated many formerly separate guilds into new entities. The formerly discrete corporations of leather workers, tanners, leather dressers, skin dressers and glovemakers, belt makers and parchment makers, for example, were fused into a single guild. Likewise, the formerly separate corporations of hatmakers, nap cutters, furriers, and feather dealers were combined into a single body, and bricklayers, plasterers, stonecutters, marble workers, and pavers were also forged into a sole entity. The extent of amalgamation is evident in the fact that the forty-one guilds encompassed 132 trades, a circumstance that would have been unthinkable before the issuance of the Six Edicts.³⁹

Although the consolidations through “parity of functions,” as the officers of a restored corporation characterized it,⁴⁰ may have appeared more efficient from an administrative point of view – civil authorities, for example, would have fewer bodies with which to deal – the reorganization generated enormous practical problems. In many instances, the trades that were unified had formerly been bitter rivals, often quarrelling over work rights or responsibilities at job sites, in workshops, or in the streets.⁴¹ Their awkward fusion made for a disconcerting situation, and the new corporations were not nearly as cohesive as the separate guilds had been.

³⁴ Shepherd, *Turgot and the Six Edicts*, p. 123, uses the number of 113 guilds in Paris; Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 642, through a contemporary description of Paris, offers a figure of 124, whereas Crowston, *Fabricating Women*, p. 210, states “over 120.” A contemporary guide to guilds published in 1766 lists a total of 112 guilds. *Guide des corps des marchands et les communautés des arts et métiers*.

³⁵ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, pp. 111–112.

³⁶ AN Y 9509, undated list of premises of *corps et communautés*, which lists many buildings as sold; Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, p. 102.

³⁷ Kaplan, *La Fin des corporations*, pp. 252–261.

³⁸ Crowston, *Fabricating Women*, p. 212.

³⁹ AN F¹² 763, edict of king for communities of arts and trades of city of Lyon, January 1777.

⁴⁰ AN F¹² 763, letter of syndics of corporation of haberdashers of Lyon to Tolozan, July 24, 1784.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

The masters of the newly formed corporations were charged with drawing up the statutes of the new bodies. Ultimately, then, masters of dissolved guilds were forced to work together to draft new rules, and, not surprisingly, the process was hindered by the adhesion of many masters to “old customs” and an inability “to reconcile themselves with the provisions” of the new edict.⁴²

Furthermore, because of the commingling of trades, some of the new guilds were large and unwieldy. The new guild of hatmakers had 300 masters and 1,500 journeymen or workers, and the officers of the guild had to be apportioned among the formerly separate occupations.⁴³ Grocers, wax makers, and candle makers were formed into a corporation that had 400 masters, and its officers had to be apportioned among the occupations as well.⁴⁴ It would take years for many of these new bodies to begin to coalesce and to assume a new sense of identity, which left them ill prepared to meet fresh challenges.

Indeed, during September 1779 the *intendant* in Lyon wrote to Jacques Necker, the Director-General of Finances, to ask for an extension until April 1, 1780, citing the uncertainty that prevailed in the formation of the new guilds, along with the slowness of decision-making that prevented masters from becoming members of them.⁴⁵ The Crown granted the extension, but during December 1781, nearly five years after the edict reestablishing guilds had been promulgated, the *intendant* complained about the efforts of the masters of the reestablished guilds to reconstitute the corporations. The *intendant* had convened a committee of magistrates and others to assist him in examining the statutes presented to the municipal government by the new bodies. From the outset, however, the process had been largely ineffectual, with many useless or inconsequential articles among the statutes submitted. Furthermore, many of the proffered rules were overly long, threatening to “recreate the spirit of the old regulations” and thereby, among a host of other difficulties, breed confusion and disorder. The proposed regulations advanced by the corporations, the *intendant* asserted, offered little for the common good or to advance commerce and manufacturing.⁴⁶

The reorganization of guilds also moved only gradually in lesser cities. In the medium-sized cities under the jurisdiction of the *parlement* of Rouen, including Caen, Alençon, Bayeux, and smaller cities such as Dieppe, Evreux and Le Havre, the Crown proclaimed the reestablishment of guilds only in April 1779. The edict stated that the Crown sought to achieve a balance between the number of corporations and charges for rights of admission to them and the size of the cities and towns in which they were situated. Consequently, the edict established thirty-four guilds in Caen, and twenty-

⁴² AN F¹² 763, undated draft of royal edict concerning royal edict of April 1777.

⁴³ AN F¹² 763, list of communities of arts and trades of city of Lyon.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ AN F¹² 763, letter of intendant to Necker, September 5, 1779.

⁴⁶ AN F¹² 763, letter of intendant to Villevault, December 22, 1781.

three guilds in Alençon, Bayeux, and the smaller towns, although the smaller towns had lower admission charges.⁴⁷ At the same time, in smaller towns also there were difficulties in reestablishing corporations. In Langres, reorganization did not occur until late February 1781, nearly four years after the promulgation of the edict.⁴⁸

Although guilds were slow to reorganize and were reduced in number, they once again became a ubiquitous and prominent feature of urban life, particularly in the enforcement of their privileges. During 1781, shortly after the reorganization of their guild, shoemakers in Issoudin sought enforcement of their monopoly on the production of shoes against merchants and street vendors who were selling shoes not turned out by the guild.⁴⁹

In Paris, the reorganization of guilds proceeded slowly, even in the critical area of food supply. The corporation of butchers had its statutes approved only on December 10, 1782, and those of the guild of bakers were not promulgated until April 1, 1783.⁵⁰ The guild of lace makers–embroiderers, merged into that of ribbon weavers and ribbon makers, was reestablished only in August, 1784.⁵¹ Some of these consolidations, including that of lace makers and embroiderers, were explicitly intended to end seizures and contestations that had arisen when the trades were separately organized.⁵²

Despite the delays, guild members reverted to conflicts over privilege, including resort to seizures. During 1784 and 1785, for example, members of the vinegar and lemonade sellers' guild came into conflict with the corporation of fruit and cream sellers over the right to sell mustard. Members of the vinegar and lemonade sellers' guild had seized merchandise from the fruit sellers, which resulted in the arrest of members of the vinegar and lemonade sellers' corporation. Although they were acquitted on all charges after arguing that their seizures had been cleared by the police, their arrest signaled a lower threshold of tolerance for extralegal measures.⁵³

The Crown continued to dispense privileges through the guild system. During February 1788, for example, the Lieutenant-General of Police of Paris

⁴⁷ AN F¹² 786, edict of king concerning communities of arts and trades of cities under jurisdiction of parlement of Rouen, April, 1779.

⁴⁸ AN F¹² 761, dossier 22, letters of lieutenant-general of police to Villevault, December 19, 1780; February 22, 1781.

⁴⁹ AN F¹² 761, dossier 18.

⁵⁰ AN AD XI 13, letters-patent of king, supplying statutes and regulations of guild of ... butchers for city and outskirts of Paris, June 1, 1782, registered in parlement December 10, 1782; AN AD XI 14, letters-patent of king conveying statutes and regulations for guild of ... bakers for city of Paris, given at Versailles, April 1, 1783.

⁵¹ AN AD XI 14, letters-patent of king, conveying suppression of guild of master lace makers and embroiderers and their joining with corporation of merchant ribbon makers and ribbon weavers of Paris, given at Versailles August 5, 1784 and registered in parlement August 20, 1784.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ AN Y 9530, interrogation and judgement of Lallemand, Rigny, Beauvais, Boron, and others, April 21, 1785.

reviewed and endorsed letters-patent of the king establishing a privilege for four butcher stalls.⁵⁴ By the late 1780s, then, corporations throughout France were once again functioning and participating in the system of privilege in which they were a major component, even if most guilds were not as united or cohesive as they had been before 1776.

THE ADVENT OF MECHANIZATION

At the same time, however, the 1780s saw the acceleration of a development that would ultimately become the inverse of the guild system of artisans – mechanization of production. On the French side, one of the motives in negotiating the Eden–Vergennes Treaty of 1786 to promote trade between Great Britain and France had been to hasten modernization among French manufacturers by compelling them to improve technology and manufacturing processes, and there is evidence that it succeeded in that goal.⁵⁵ In fact, it was the French who had been the driving force in concluding the treaty in the face of British reluctance.⁵⁶

As Jeff Horn observed, the signing of the treaty was not an act of fatuousness or arrogance.⁵⁷ Rather, it was a carefully considered policy with diplomatic and economic objectives. The French Crown hoped that a commercial treaty would improve Anglo-French relations and increase the industrial and commercial position of France.⁵⁸ Furthermore, there was an expectation in France that government would take the lead in bringing about mechanization of production, particularly through the dissemination of machines.⁵⁹

Unfortunately, the conclusion of the treaty coincided with a sharp recession, and many contemporaries conflated the two, attributing the economic difficulties to the treaty. In fact, the economic downturn was well underway in 1786, whereas the treaty did not take effect until May 1787.⁶⁰ Even if it did not cause the economic crisis, however, the treaty ultimately exacerbated

⁵⁴ AN Y 9500, opinion of police for establishment of privilege of four butcher stalls, February 22, 1788.

⁵⁵ Orville T. Murphy, *The Diplomatic Retreat of France and Public Opinion on the Eve of the French Revolution, 1783–1789* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998), p. 67; on the success of the effort Alain Becchia, *La Draperie d'Elbeuf (des origines à 1870)* (Rouen: Publications de l'Université de Rouen, 2000), p. 441. Indeed, Becchia cites the treaty as a dividing line in the history of French manufacturing, *Ibid.*, p. 332.

⁵⁶ Orville T. Murphy, "DuPont de Nemours and the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786," *The Economic History Review* (New Series), 19 (1966), pp. 574–575; Marie Donaghay, "Calonne and the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786," *The Journal of Modern History* 50 (on-demand supplement) (1978), D 1166.

⁵⁷ Jeff Horn, *The Path Not Taken: French Industrialization in the Age of Revolution 1750–1830* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 66–69.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 65–67.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58, 71, 79.

⁶⁰ On the lack of causality between the treaty and the economic crisis, *ibid.*, pp. 64–70.

it and led to great hardship, particularly in textile-producing areas. During December 1787, for example, the royal drapers convened to discuss the putative destruction resulting from the treaty as well as to ameliorate conditions for the unemployed.⁶¹ Indeed, mechanization emerged especially, though not exclusively, in the textile and textile-related sectors.

In Rouen, garters, braids, edging, and lace had been woven by artisans, but during the 1780s these trades were threatened by mechanical production. The Chamber of Commerce of Rouen, among others, denounced the treaty, but also recognized that new methods of production were necessary to counter British economic dominance.⁶²

Indeed, French producers, particularly in Normandy, but also elsewhere, sought to meet British competition with vigorous programs of their own. In 1786 a cotton manufacturer in Louviers, Alexandre de Fontenay, became one of the first French manufacturers to mechanize production.⁶³ In 1788, the provincial assembly of Normandy established a “Bureau of Encouragement for Agriculture, Commerce and the Public Good” and the Chamber of Commerce of Rouen allotted considerable funds for the purchase and dissemination of machines.⁶⁴ The Crown also allocated funds and donated machines, again demonstrating the manner in which government was expected to take the lead in modernization.⁶⁵

Similarly, in Dauphiné, mechanization had begun in the cotton industry by late 1787, but Swiss cotton, even with a tariff on its entry into France, hindered its development. One manufacturer, however, believed that by procuring machines and placing a substantially higher tariff on Swiss cotton, Dauphiné could become a major center for cotton spinning.⁶⁶ Clearly, French producers sought to respond to the challenge of mechanization.

For their part, artisans did not remain passive as mechanization of production advanced. During the eighteenth century French workers resorted to destroying machines far less frequently than their English counterparts, but episodes of machine-breaking became more widespread during the 1780s. In Saint-Etienne, Falaise, Rouen, and Troyes, workers attacked machines to protest mechanization.⁶⁷

⁶¹ Murphy, *The Diplomatic Retreat of France*, p. 74.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 75; Marc Bouloiseau, *Cahiers de doléances du tiers état du bailliage de Rouen*, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1957), I: xlix-l; Horn, *The Path Not Taken*, pp. 72–74.

⁶³ Robert Legrand, *Révolution et Empire en Picardie: Economie et finances* (Abbeville: F. Paillart, 1985), p. 19.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; William M. Reddy, *The Rise of Market Culture: The Textile Trade and French Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 54–57.

⁶⁵ Horn, *The Path Not Taken*, p. 82; Margaret C. Jacob, *Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 167–168, 177.

⁶⁶ AD Isère 2 C 90, state of different industries in Dauphiné 1787.

⁶⁷ Jeff Horn, “Machine-Breaking in England and France during the Age of Revolution. (Controversy/Controverse),” *Labour/Le Travail* 55 (2005): 143–166, especially pp. 154–166; Horn, *The Path Not Taken*, pp. 109–110, 114–115.