The Cambridge Companion to SCHOPENHAUER

EDITED BY
CHRISTOPHER JANAWAY

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THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO

SCHOPENHAUER

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Christopher Janaway is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London.

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Edited by Christopher Janaway
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CONTRIBUTORS

DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT is Director of the North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society and a member of the *wissenschaftliche Leitung* of the *Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft*. In addition to editing Schopenhauer's *On the Will in Nature* and *On Vision and Colors*, he has published a number of articles on Kant, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and ethics. He is currently Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Whitewater.

CHERYL FOSTER is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rhode Island, where she teaches and writes on topics in aesthetics, ethics, the environment, and existentialism. She currently sits on the board of directors of the North American Nature Photography Association and is at work on a book about nature photography.

SEBASTIAN GARDNER was for several years a member of the Department of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, London, and is presently Lecturer in Philosophy at University College, London. He is the author of *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (1993), *Kant and the 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (1999), and articles on the philosophy of mind and psychoanalysis.

HANS-JOHANN GLOCK is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Reading. He has been Visiting Professor at Queen's University, Ontario, and is currently a Research Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. He is the author of *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (1996) and of several articles on Wittgenstein, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and the history of analytic philosophy. He has edited *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy* (1997) and coedited (together with Robert Arrington) *Wittgenstein's Philosophical*

Investigations (1991) and *Wittgenstein and Quine* (1996). He is currently working on a book on Quine and Davidson and is editing *Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader* (forthcoming).

PAUL GUYER is the Florence R. C. Murray Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, where he has been a member of the Philosophy Department since 1982. His books include *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (1979, second edition 1997), *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (1987), and *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* (1993). He has edited *The Cambridge Companion to Kant* (1992) and other anthologies. He is general co-editor of *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, in which he has translated the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998) with Allen Wood, and is currently translating the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.

DAVID HAMLYN is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London, where he was Head of Department for many years, and latterly Vice-Master, until his retirement in 1988. He is the author of twelve books, including one on Schopenhauer in Routledge's Arguments of the Philosophers series (1980). He has also written many articles and contributions to books, of which six are explicitly on Schopenhauer, while many others allude to aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophy, especially its emphasis on will, which he sees as important for the philosophy of mind.

DALE JACQUETTE is Professor of Philosophy at The Pennsylvania State University. He has received research fellowships from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and the National Endowment for the Humanities, and in 1996 held the J. William Fulbright Distinguished Lecture Chair in Contemporary Philosophy of Language at the University of Venice. He has recently published *Philosophy of Mind* (1994), *Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence* (1996), and *Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition* (1998). He has also edited a collection of essays on *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts* (1996). His articles, primarily on philosophical logic and metaphysics, have appeared in numerous philosophical journals.

CHRISTOPHER JANAWAY is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London. He is the author of *Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (1989), *Schopenhauer* (1994), and *Images*

of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts (1995), and editor of *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator* (1998). He has published numerous articles on aesthetics and the history of philosophy.

MOIRA NICHOLLS is a former lecturer in philosophy at the University of Tasmania. Her Ph.D. is on Schopenhauer's metaphysics, and she has published papers in *Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch* (1991, 1995) and *Kant-Studien* (1994).

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM is Ernst Freund Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, where she holds appointments in the Philosophy Department, the Law School, and the Divinity School and is an Associate Member of the Classics Department. Her most recent book is *Sex and Social Justice* (1998).

F. C. WHITE is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania. His works include *Plato's Theory of Particulars* (1981), *Knowledge and Relativism* (1982), *On Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1991), *Kant's First Critique and the Transcendental Deduction* (1996), and *Schopenhauer's Early Fourfold Root* (1997). He is soon to publish *A Defence of Plato's Platonism*.

GÜNTER ZÖLLER is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Munich. He is the author of *Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant* (Objective Reference in Kant) (1984) and *Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy* (1998), editor of Schopenhauer's *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (forthcoming), Kant's *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (forthcoming), and *The Cambridge Companion to Fichte* (forthcoming), and co-editor of *Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays on the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy* (1993) and *Figuring the Self: Subject, Individual, and Others in Classical German Philosophy* (1997).

REFERENCES TO SCHOPENHAUER'S WORKS

The following abbreviations are used for Schopenhauer's writings:

BM	*On the Basis of Morality*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Providence and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995).
FR	*On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Press, 1974).
FR^{1}	*Schopenhauer's Early Fourfold Root* [1813 edition], trans. F. C. White (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997).
FW	*On the Freedom of the Will*, trans. Konstantin Kolenda (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
MR	*Manuscript Remains*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Berg, 1988), 4 vols.
P1,P2	*Parerga and Paralipomena*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), vols. 1 and 2.
W1,W2	*The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), vols. 1 and 2.
W1^{1}	*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Faksimiledruck der ersten Auflage 1819 1818* (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1987).
WN	*On the Will in Nature*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York and Oxford: Berg, 1992).

Unless otherwise specified, the number immediately following the work's abbreviation gives a page reference to the translation or edition listed here. After an oblique stroke, corresponding passages from the standard German editions are cited.

H.	*Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (3rd edn., Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1972; 4th edn., 1988), 7 vols.

Hn. *Der handschriftliche Nachlass*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Frankfurt: Waldemar Kramer, 1966–75; repr. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 5 vols.

Z. *Werke in zehn Bänden*, ed. Arthur Hübscher (Zurich: Diogenes Verlag, 1977), 10 vols.

For example, *W1* 272/H. 2, 320 refers to page 272 of Payne's translation of *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 1, and to the corresponding passage on page 320 of Hübscher's *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 2. Note that in volumes of H. which contain more than one of Schopenhauer's works, each work has its own pagination.

CHRISTOPHER JANAWAY

Introduction

Arthur Schopenhauer lived from 1788 to 1860. His thought took shape early in his life, in the decade from 1810 to 1820, yet until the 1850s he was virtually unknown, and the period in which he became a powerful influence began only in the second half of the nineteenth century. He admired Rossini and Bellini but inspired Wagner, knew Goethe, and met Hegel, but was an influence after his death on Thomas Mann, Nietzsche, and the young Wittgenstein. His vision of the world is in some respects more bleak and cynical than we might expect for its period, more akin to that of existentialism or even of Samuel Beckett. Schopenhauer's world is neither rational nor good, but rather is an absurd, polymorphous, hungry thing that lacerates itself without end and suffers in each of its parts. None of us is in control even of our own nature; instead, we are at the mercy of the blind urge to exist and propagate that stupefies us into accepting the illusion that to be a human individual is worthwhile. In truth it would have been better had nothing existed. Although this philosophy originated in a pre-Darwinian and pre-Freudian age, it has a prescient cutting edge that can make the later time of evolutionary theory, psychoanalysis, and the 'Great' War seem the more truly Schopenhauerian era. 'By what mere blind propulsion did all these thousands of human creatures keep on mechanically living?' wrote Edith Wharton in a war novel of 1923,[1] sounding, perhaps unknowingly, a Schopenhauerian note.

Yet Adorno's irresistible description of Schopenhauer as 'peevish ancestor of existential philosophy and malicious heir of the great speculators'[2] has some justice to it. If Schopenhauer can appear antiquated, it is at least in part because his philosophy aspires to give a unitary metaphysics of the whole world, in something of the old

spirit of Spinoza or Leibniz, albeit with reversed value polarity. In his day and ours he has always had the air of an outsider among philosophers, and it is safe to say that little twentieth-century philosophy has arisen from close engagement with his work. It is hard for analytical philosophy to claim him as a forerunner. One reason for this, conventionally, is that he is too literary and rhetorical a writer, too much prone to metaphorical effusion and dogmatism, too little exercised by rigour and argument. In fact Schopenhauer argues constantly, debates with all the major and some minor figures in philosophy's past, and is as committed as any thinker has been to the goal of truth. A more profound reason for his appearing alien to analytical philosophers may lie in his assumption about the role and prime subject matter of philosophy. Analytical philosophy has tended to claim as its own those who give some priority to questions about scientific enquiry and the philosophy of logic. If a thinker places art and aesthetic experience at the pinnacle of human achievement, assigning them a higher cognitive value than the sciences, and has as his driving pre-occupation the struggle for significance in a life riven by suffering, he is less amenable to co-option. And the grand metaphysical aspiration makes him an unsympathetic figure to the likes of scientific naturalists and logical positivists.

The German philosophical tradition in which Hegel has a central place is also unlikely to look favourably on Schopenhauer. This is not just because of his contempt for the career academics, Hegel and Fichte, whose tedious vocabulary and, as he thought, wrongheadedness and intellectual dishonesty prevented him from serious argumentative engagement with the idealist mainstream of his early years. The rift is deeper than that: to anyone brought up in a more or less Hegelian way, the brazenly ahistorical and apolitical cast of Schopenhauer's thought must also place him beyond the pale. Schopenhauer's deepest concerns are with what it is to be a human individual anywhere at any time, how one relates to one's body, what suffering is, what happiness is and is not, whether one is free, how life can become bearable, how to regard one's own death, what in the individual is unconscious and uncontrollable, and what it is for the individual to make and experience art. History is quite literally an irrelevance for him. This made him, as Nietzsche said, 'un-German to the point of genius'.[3] And for the so-called continental philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century Schopenhauer's place at

or beyond the margins of sight is probably over-determined by his metaphysical conservatism and commitment to timeless truths, his anti-Hegelianism, his neglect by formative figures such as Heidegger or Levinas, and the apparent readiness of today's readers to take at face value (wrongly, I would argue)[4] the rude and dismissive remarks made about him by the later Nietzsche.

Yet there are reasons to think that twentieth-century philosophy has more in common with Schopenhauer than it realizes. As the history of modern philosophy becomes more intensively and more responsibly studied by philosophers, the fact that Schopenhauer – widely read, scholarly, and fiercely argumentative – locates himself in continuity with Hume, claims to solve problems initiated by Descartes, debates the relation of Kant to Berkeley, criticizes the Leibnizian tradition, and appropriates some ideas from Spinoza should alert us to the extent of the common inheritance we share with him. He belongs in any narrative of how modern philosophy developed from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. One feature uniting many kinds of recent philosophy is an increasing recognition that we are working within the legacy of Kant, and interest in retrieving what happened in the intellectual world immediately after Kant is steadily growing. Schopenhauer is a comparatively early and unique inhabitant of this post-Kantian landscape, relating to his admired predecessor both as critic and as revisionary follower. Then again, looking forward, if Schopenhauer was an influence on Wittgenstein, Freud, and Nietzsche, he may have played a significant, if concealed, part in the development of twentieth-century philosophy itself.

Sometimes Schopenhauer is treated piecemeal by contemporary philosophy. In aesthetics we might recognize him as the prototypical 'aesthetic attitude' theorist (one who believes that aesthetic value attaches to objects when we experience them in detachment from desire and conceptualization) and as a proponent of one of the most striking theories of musical expression. In ethics we find him claimed as an early anti-Kantian virtue ethicist. In feminist studies he is the arch-misogynist. In the philosophy of psychoanalysis he is an adumbrator of the conception of the unconscious, in Nietzsche studies the old enemy to be exorcised and castigated, and in studies of Kant's epistemology the sharp critic who takes Kant to task over his conception of causality and much besides.

All these angles reveal genuine facets of Schopenhauer, but in summing up his own philosophy, as presented in his major work, *The World as Will and Representation*, he himself attributes to it a peculiar and extreme unity. It is, he says, the expression of a 'single thought' and should be approached as such:

> *A single thought*, however comprehensive, must preserve the most perfect unity. If, all the same, it can be split up into parts for the purpose of being communicated, then the connexion of these parts must . . . be organic, i.e. of such a kind that every part supports the whole just as much as it is supported by the whole; a connexion in which no part is first and no part last, in which the whole gains in clearness from every part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood until the whole has first been understood. But a book must have a first and a last line, and to this extent will always remain very unlike an organism. . . . Consequently, form and matter will here be in contradiction. (*W1* xii–xiii/H. 2, viii)

So the best advice to the reader is to read his book through twice so that the beginning can be illuminated by the middle and the end. This organic conception should warn us not to make too premature a judgement about the nature of Schopenhauer's philosophy. The would-be Kantian line presented in the first quarter of the book, a transcendental idealist account of the world of objective experience, will gain its proper (and quite un-Kantian) significance only when we have learned how limited this objective experience is for Schopenhauer, how he hopes it may be supplemented by philosophical reflection and finally revoked in favour of certain superior modes of consciousness.

But what is *der einzige Gedanke*, the single thought? Schopenhauer does not explicitly tell us. But unless literally the whole book is needed for any expression of the thought, we should be able to state it in abbreviated, provisional form. Rudolf Malter has proposed that the thought is 'the world is the self-knowledge of the will',[5] and Schopenhauer himself says in the *Manuscript Remains* that this expression summarizes his whole philosophy.[6] The world is what is represented in experience by the subject – it is the world as representation – but the subject itself is in and of the world it represents, and the 'inner essence' of this subject is will. The self that knows is given to itself in self-consciousness as identical with the self that wills, and this allows the will, via its manifestation in a representing intellect,

to become conscious of itself as will, and from there conscious of the whole world of representation as will.[7] Such a summary is correct as far as it goes, though its drawback for the purposes of exposition is that before one has read Schopenhauer, it is fairly opaque. A further problem is that, while the First Book of *The World as Will and Representation* presents the world as representation and the Second Book the world as will, there remain two substantial books concerning aesthetics, ethics, and salvation, books which Schopenhauer labels respectively the 'Second Aspect' of the world as representation and the 'Second Aspect' of the world as will. If we are to take the talk of a 'single thought' seriously, we must be able to incorporate the Third and Fourth Books in it – indeed, they should supply its culmination.

A more sophisticated answer is offered by John Atwell, who finds for the single thought a formulation that does justice to more of the components of Schopenhauer's unfolding presentation and gives the first-time reader a slightly better sense of what to expect. For Atwell, the single thought of *The World as Will and Representation* is as follows:

> The double-sided world [i.e., the world as will and as representation] is the striving of the will to become conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self-divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach salvation.[8]

This single, if complex, thought stands in need of much interrogation. But its most important and most authentically Schopenhauerian feature is its idea that knowledge culminates in a kind of abnegation. Cognitive self-realization leads to conative self-cancellation. Let us approach this distinctive and difficult idea by rehearsing the stages of Schopenhauer's presentation more slowly.

First, then, the world as representation. This is the world as present to ordinary perceptual experience, a world of individual material objects which can also be investigated scientifically. Schopenhauer follows Kant's general line that in order to make a priori discoveries about the nature of this world of objects, we must renounce the attempt to know what they are in themselves. Objects are representations for the subject. We can have knowledge of empirical objects and we can know the a priori forms – space, time, and causality – contributed by the subject to the experiencing of objects. The intellect or understanding of the subject shapes experience to the extent

that there can be no objects without a subject whose representations they are. In addition to this representation of individual objects, or intuitive (*anschaulich*) representation, there is a more indirect and derivative kind of representation which distinguishes human minds from others, and that is the concept. Schopenhauer calls concepts 'representations of representations'. They are what enable human beings to reason and to have language, but it is part of Schopenhauer's aim to show that these capacities are by no means the most basic features of the human mind.

The demotion of concepts and conceptual thinking from pride of place in the description of humanity is a theme running through the whole of Schopenhauer's philosophy. He takes the capacity for reasoning to be instrumental, concerned with working out means to ends that are antecedently desired rather then being provided by reason itself. He argues that rationality confers on us no higher moral status than that of other sentient beings, that conceptual thought never makes anyone morally better, and that the concept is likewise 'unfruitful in art'; it is only from an immediate vision of the universal in the particular object of perception that genuine art can spring. Some philosophy too, according to Schopenhauer (and he has his immediate contemporaries in mind), is worthless because it wanders around in mere concepts – 'the absolute' and such like – without ever being grounded in firsthand experience of the world.[9]

The world as representation is an orderly world because the subject of experience must always connect any representation with other representations, according to a fixed set of principles. This idea provided the topic of Schopenhauer's first work, his doctoral thesis entitled *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813). The principle of sufficient reason, a mainstay of the Leibnizian philosophy on which the academic tradition of the German Enlightenment had been founded, says, in its simplest form, that nothing is without a reason or ground (*Grund*) for its being rather than not being. The young Schopenhauer observed quite rightly that there were different species of 'grounding' which were not always properly distinguished by the tradition. For example, a cause is the ground of its effect, but this is distinct from the way in which a conclusion has its ground in a premise or a geometrical truth has its ground in the nature of space. He claims that there are four basic modes in which the principle can be interpreted (the fourth is the

grounding of an action in its motive, which is, however, a variant of the grounding of an effect in its cause). When he published *The World as Will and Representation* in 1818,[10] Schopenhauer stated that *The Fourfold Root* was an essential prelude to it. Nor did he change his mind on that score: in 1847, following publication of the revised and greatly extended edition of *The World as Will and Representation* three years earlier, he undertook a considerable re-write of *The Fourfold Root*. This shows that he had not left it behind as a juvenile work, but saw it as integral to his mature philosophy – though it may be said that he lost much of the lightness and incisiveness of the 1813 version in making his revisions. Since he refers to the principle of sufficient reason frequently in *The World as Will and Representation* without repeating the detailed exposition of *The Fourfold Root*, it is sensible to study the latter as if it were a component of the larger work, where it belongs naturally with the First Book on the world as representation.

The Second Book announces that the world is will. This is not supposed to be a negation of the claim that the world is representation, but rather a presentation of another aspect of the same world. Schopenhauer is not satisfied with comprehending the orderly manner in which the world of objects of experience must present itself to the experiencing subject. He asks what the essence of this world is: or, as he puts it in Kantian vocabulary, what the world is in itself. His answer, patently, is that the world in itself is will. But it is not immediately obvious what this means or even what kind of claim Schopenhauer intends to make when he says it. Will is a general principle of striving or being directed towards ends, but it does not presuppose the rationality associated traditionally with the human (and the divine) will. For Schopenhauer, creatures do not will something because they believe it to be good; rather, something is called good because it is something that some creature wills. Willing is thus more basic than rationality. Nor is will necessarily accompanied by consciousness or even by a mind. Everything in the world – humans, animals, plants, water, and stones – manifests will in Schopenhauer's new sense: no individual thing remains perpetually in a state of self-sufficiency, but everything is always – as it were – trying to be somewhere and in some state. Perhaps we should regard talk of 'willing', 'wanting', or 'trying' as ineliminable metaphors in this global picture. Schopenhauer says that 'everything presses and pushes towards

existence, if possible towards *organic existence*, i.e. *life*, and then to the highest possible degree thereof' (*W2* 350/H. 3, 399). His fundamental belief is that we can make sense of our own existence and behaviour by understanding our own inner essence as will, and that there is an imperative to understand or 'decipher' the world in the same way. This reveals an underlying assumption that my inner essence must be the same as that of the world at large, a thought he sometimes expresses as the identity of the microcosm and the macrocosm (see *W1* 162/H. 2, 193).

This goal of incorporating the self in the world – not only making it something bodily, but finding for it an essence shared by every part of the world – cuts across the Kantian programme that was initiated with the account of the world as representation. It does so because of the role of the subject in the latter account. In the account of the world of representation there is, necessarily, a subject that represents objects. But this subject is 'an eye that cannot see itself'. It never occurs as its own object, and so it cannot be located anywhere in space, time, and the causal order. It is (though Schopenhauer does not use this term) the transcendental self – the self required purely as an a priori condition of the possibility of experience. The pivotal section in the whole of *The World as Will and Representation* is §18, where Schopenhauer confronts this transcendental self, the pure subject of cognition, with the fact that each individual human subject is rooted in material reality via intimate knowledge of his or her body in action. I know myself immediately as embodied will, and were I not to do so, I would remain a detached and ghostly pure subject that comprehended the inner significance of nothing at all in the world of its experience.

From this notion of the will as the individual's inner essence cognized in bodily action, Schopenhauer travels a great distance, stretching the concept of will as he goes. The whole body is will in that it manifests the means of securing ends for the organism. The body, and each part and function within it, is an expression of the 'will to life', *Wille zum Leben*. Often this term is translated as 'will to live' (or 'will-to-live', as E. F. J. Payne has it). But that translation is misleading (a) because it implicitly excludes the drive to reproduce life, and hence towards sexual behaviour, to which Schopenhauer gives great prominence and (b) because it lets in the wrong assumption that Schopenhauer is talking about a conscious *desire* to live,

whereas *Wille zum Leben* primarily operates to originate and shape the organism prior to any question of its having desires. (Sometimes contributors to this volume use 'will to life', even to the extent of altering the wording when quoting from Payne's translation.)

Schopenhauer finally suggests that the whole world in itself is will. There are serious questions concerning the status of this theory. If the thing in itself is supposed to be unknowable, how can Schopenhauer claim to know what it is? If 'will' need not connote rationality, consciousness, or even mentality, what does it connote? What does it mean to say that every object is the phenomenal manifestation (or 'objectification') of will? However, the chief importance of the theory of will as essence is its impact upon the human self-image. We have to regard ourselves as driven by something at our core which presses us to prolong our lives and to have sexual intercourse, and to pursue myriad goals that arise from our nature as living creatures, often for purposes that are hidden from our conscious view. The individual's idealization of a singular object of sexual desire, for instance, masks the fact that he or she is being 'used' by the will to life in order to perpetuate itself. And in general, the individual's willed actions are not free. His or her willing is fixed not only by the general human character, will to life, but also by an individual unchangeable character which Schopenhauer calls the individual's essence or individual will.

Schopenhauer's pessimism is closely linked with his account of the will. There is no absolute good because good exists only relative to some particular strand of willing manifest somewhere in the world of phenomena. Willing can never cease in the universe and can never be satiated. It has no ultimate point or purpose. And it opens each individual to suffering which is not redeemed by any positive benefit. Schopenhauer appears to believe that the sheer existence of suffering shows everything to be invalid: because of it 'we have not to be pleased but rather sorry about the existence of the world' (*W*2 576/H. 3, 661). By the end of the Second Book, following the initial clue that we cannot be merely the transcendental self which represents objects, and that our essence is will, we have descended into a disturbing picture of a world that is will, manifesting itself in millions of individuals, and through them inflicting on itself pointless and unredeemed suffering, a 'world of constantly needy creatures who continue for a time merely by devouring one another, pass their

existence in anxiety and want, and often endure terrible afflictions, until they fall at last into the arms of death' (*W2* 349/H. 3, 398). The notions of a benevolent creator and a world of perfection so prevalent in the Judaeo-Christian tradition and in philosophical rationalism would never have occurred, claims Schopenhauer, to anyone who had looked at the evidence.

The tide turns with the Third Book of *The World as Will and Representation*, where Schopenhauer presents a theory of art and aesthetic experience that gives them an almost unparalleled positive value. In aesthetic experience, willing temporarily ceases and the subject is blissfully free from striving and the suffering associated with it. If ordinary existence is restless torment, aesthetic experience is repose and release. But in addition to this palliative dimension, it has high value as a species of cognition. Throwing off the a priori subjective forms of experience the intellect uses when it is an 'instrument' of the will and abandoning the principle of sufficient reason, the subject of aesthetic experience can perceive more objectively 'what really is' – a series of Ideas (*Ideen*) or Forms that constitute a timeless aspect of reality. The producer of genuine art is a genius, whose defining characteristic is the propensity to let the intellect work at perceiving objects independently of the underlying will. This vision of a timeless objectivity achieved in art by leaving behind ordinary consciousness was one of the earliest parts of Schopenhauer's philosophy to develop, as his early *Manuscript Remains* testify. Having begun philosophy by reading Plato as well as Kant, he conceived the notion of a 'higher consciousness'[11] that elevated the subject above the mundane, ephemeral, and painful reality presented in ordinary empirical consciousness. He retained ever after the thought that the subject in intense aesthetic contemplation loses its sense of bodily individuation and attains the status of a 'pure subject of knowing', while its object is transformed from the spatio-temporally individuated empirical thing into an Idea or, as he often says, a '(Platonic) Idea'. Art gains its unusually high value as temporary escape into timeless purity, away from an ordinary existence to which Schopenhauer has assigned an exceptional lack of worth.

Schopenhauer's final Fourth Book contains some of his most moving and profound writing. It concerns ethics, in both a broad and a narrow sense. The latter comprises issues such as right and wrong, moral motivation, egoism and justice, the virtues and moral judgement,

the former issues such as the significance of human sexuality, our attitudes towards death, the philosophy of religion, the meaning (if any) of life, and the possibility of what Schopenhauer calls 'salvation' from it. Although *The World as Will and Representation* deals to some extent with ethics in the narrower sense, Schopenhauer's best treatment of these issues occurs in two self-contained essays, *On the Basis of Morality* and *On the Freedom of the Will*, which he published together in 1841 under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. The former essay contrasts Schopenhauer's account of ethics with Kant's, of which he is mercilessly critical. Kant's ethics is founded upon the notion of an autonomous rational agent and an absolute imperative – issued by whom, asks Schopenhauer, unless by a presupposed absolute being? Schopenhauer opposes to this an ethics founded upon the incentive of compassion, a basic feature of human beings which gives rise to acts of justice and philanthropy (or love of humankind, *Menschenliebe*). His moral psychology of the virtues claims to be an empirical theory that accounts for the virtues and vices which motivate human action in practice. In *On the Freedom of the Will* he argues that the individual's actions are determined by a combination of his or her unalterable character and the motives, contingently occurring mental states, that cause his or her actions. It is a strong defence of determinism – yet Schopenhauer is aware that the argument will not disperse the sense we have of being responsible for our deeds. He proposes to solve this problem by invoking the idea of our intelligible character, the will which is our kernel, our essence.

The broader ethical concerns of life and death show Schopenhauer at his most challenging. Life is dominated by the fact that it ends in death, yet this is strangely at odds, he comments, with the way people normally live – as if they will never die. But what value does life really have for the living anyway? Schopenhauer deepens his pessimistic vision, arguing that the only real hope for a human being is to reach the insight that existing as an individual is worthless. Although in his metaphysics Schopenhauer is an uncompromising atheist, he finds in three of the major world religions – Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism – the correct degree of disdain for ordinary human existence. The ascetic practices associated with these religions point in the right direction: towards a denial of one's will, a stilling of desires and needs which can be a step towards complete

self-renunciation, a cessation of willing which Schopenhauer conceives to resemble a prolongation of the blissful will-lessness of aesthetic experience. Salvation ultimately consists in the will within oneself turning and denying itself. One can then abandon one's allegiance to the desires one has as an individual and attain a viewpoint on the world which does not fundamentally differentiate oneself as subject from the whole.

Hinduism played an important role in shaping these culminating thoughts. Schopenhauer's favourite book was said to be a translation of the *Upanishads* which he acquired as a young man while writing *The World as Will and Representation*. He was one of the first Western thinkers to make extensive efforts to align his thought with that of India, and we should not underestimate this distinctive influence upon him. He repeatedly ranks Hinduism with Plato and Kant, saying of his philosophy that it could not have occurred until all three shone their rays into one mind[12] and saying of the prospective reader of his main work that 'if . . . [he] has also already received and assimilated the divine inspiration of ancient Indian wisdom, then he is best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him' (*W1* xv/H. 2, xii). Later on he became a serious and engaged student of Buddhism, finding a deep affinity with some of its central doctrines, which influenced at least the presentation of his broader ethical insights, if not also some of the content.

Now let us return to the 'single thought' and Atwell's formulation of it: 'The double-sided world is the striving of the will to become conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self-divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach salvation.' If the will is to become self-conscious, it must first objectify itself as a being that has consciousness at all. It does this in the human being, whose body, with its advanced nervous system capable of consciousness, exists as an instrument of the will to life. But in some individuals, cognition of the world reaches a point where its subject can see through the veil of empirical objects in space and time, and realize that the subject itself has its nature in common with the whole world, that all the objective individuals that compete against one another belong equally to the whole. This essentially mystical vision that sees beyond individuality is what 'quiets' the will, or annuls its expression within the individual who has the mystical vision. Thus far Atwell's formulation makes

considerable sense. Possibly more contentious is his implication that for Schopenhauer the world is working towards a single *purpose* that consists in such self-annulment. Schopenhauer does say that 'nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it would be better for us not to exist' (*W2* 605/H. 3, 695), but does the world as a whole strive in order to reach its own non-existence? It seems rather that there is no determinate content to will as such, and that the question of *what* is willed can be asked only in respect of its particular phenomenal manifestations. As Schopenhauer says, 'absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself, which is an endless striving' (*W1* 164/H. 2, 195). Also, the will as such could not literally annul itself since it is indestructible (see *W2* 486/H. 3, 556). It seems that ultimate reality endlessly strives simply to be, to which end it must appear in individual empirical manifestations of itself, and that when it reaches its highest manifestation in an individual who is self-conscious and can reflect on his or her own nature as a manifestation of will, it can cancel itself out in that particular individual.

Although Schopenhauer's relationship to Kant is clearly of the first importance, it should be apparent even from the quick summary given here how un-Kantian a philosopher he is. He uses Kant's vocabulary pervasively, but the shape and motivation of his philosophy are very different. The influences of Plato and Hinduism should immediately alert us to this fact. Schopenhauer sets out from the start to show that the existence of every human individual is worthless, and that it must be set aside in favour of the higher consciousness of timeless entities not subordinate to the forms of space, time, and causality. He also sets out to demote rationality from its centrality in the description of humanity, to show that the concept is unfruitful in ethics, to argue that the will of the individual cannot be free, and to decry the use of the idea of God in legitimating morality.

In aesthetics, where commentators customarily find continuity between Schopenhauer's 'pure will-less subject' and Kant's notion of 'disinterestedness', the motivations of the two theories are also quite different. Schopenhauer's vision of art pits it against the remainder of life in a way that would be alien to Kant, and his idea that art is cognitively superior to (or more objective than) both empirical perception and the sciences is something Kant could never support. Even the 'will-lessness' of aesthetic experience is arguably

at odds with what Kant's theory of aesthetic judgement requires. Kant is concerned with a pleasure whose basis is not in one's desire for the existence of the object one contemplates, but he does not posit a higher state of consciousness cleansed of all desire and conceptualization. It is Schopenhauer rather than Kant who pre-figures the 'aesthetic attitude'.[13]

Finally, there is room for debate about the relationship between Schopenhauer's conception of transcendental idealism and Kant's. Schopenhauer begins his presentation with a theory of knowledge which appears to owe a great deal to Kant, but he finishes *The World as Will and Representation* with a substantial Appendix entitled 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy'. This should prepare us for both continuity and opposition. But it is not clear how much continuity there really is if one looks at the basic motivations of Schopenhauer's theoretical philosophy. Schopenhauer not only contradicts Kant's own views in interpreting Kant's idealism as akin to Berkeley's, but also seems never to accept the implication that transcendental idealism must systematically reject the question of ontology. In finding Kant's philosophy incomplete for not giving an account of what the self 'really is' or what the objects of experience 'really are', and in saying that the world as representation amounts to an insubstantial dream, Schopenhauer arguably reveals a fundamental commitment to metaphysical realism that is alien to the transcendental project.

After writing *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer never renounced the philosophy that it contained. His subsequent writings are predominantly explorations of new areas of application for his thought and elaborations of it in the light of copious readings in philosophy, science, literature, and comparative religion. In 1836 he published *On the Will in Nature*, which took stock of a large body of scientific writings, arguing that they confirmed his central claims concerning the will. Around 1840, as we have mentioned, he wrote his two essays on ethical subjects, entering them in competitions set by the Norwegian and Danish Scientific Societies, respectively. Having amassed a wealth of further observations and having arrived at some adjustments to his theory, Schopenhauer then undertook a major revision of *The World as Will and Representation*, which was published in 1844. He wrote a long second volume consisting of essays paralleling, book by book, the presentation of the original work. Some of these essays are scholarly ruminations that add little

to the force of the original work. But in some cases, Schopenhauer achieves his most powerful writing, augmenting the energy of his youthful style with a gravity few philosophical writers can match. One might mention here especially the passages on the relation of the will to the intellect (chapter 19), the metaphysics of sexual love (chapter 44), and the 'vanity and suffering of life' (chapter 45).

With the added essays, the original *World as Will and Representation* now became Volume 1 of a two-volume set. But Schopenhauer did not leave it untouched. The text of Volume 1 that we commonly read, whether in German or in translation, incorporates many changes made in 1844, including interpolations of literary and philosophical parallels to his ideas and bitter diatribes against Fichte and Hegel, whose success, though now well in the past, he still could not stomach. The 'Critique of the Kantian Philosophy' was heavily altered, principally to accommodate Schopenhauer's recent discovery of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in its first edition of 1781, which we nowadays call the A edition and are used to reading alongside the 1787 B version. Schopenhauer also revised *The Fourfold Root* in 1847. In 1851 a large new work appeared in two volumes, entitled *Parerga and Paralipomena*. It ranges widely over Schopenhauer's many intellectual interests, containing popular essays, re-presentations of his central philosophical views, and reflections on the history of philosophy. *Parerga* also contains a piece for which Schopenhauer is notorious, his essay 'On Women' (*P2* ch. 27), a nasty, gratuitous piece of misogyny, whose only conceivable merit is that it is written with his characteristic vigour. His generalized view of women appears to be drawn solely from jaundiced personal experience and has, I believe, no very interesting connection with his philosophy. (There is little evidence of Schopenhauer's having been a nice person to know, but anyone who has any doubts should perhaps read this essay.) The publication of these 'works on the side and left-overs' (as we might translate *Parerga and Paralipomena*) first made their author well known to a wider audience. By the end of his life Schopenhauer received visits and correspondence from many who had read his work, he began to be studied in the universities, and in the last decade of his life there were new editions of *On the Will in Nature*, *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, and a third edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, incorporating more changes into the text.

Schopenhauer's philosophical thought is both idiosyncratic and very tightly organized around his central conceptions of will, representation, subject, object, intellect, individuation, and the principle of sufficient reason. Hence it can be difficult to consider his views in one philosophical area without re-stating much of what he thinks overall, and the reader of the present volume should be prepared for some overlap between its different essays. Two of the essays range across all four books of *The World as Will and Representation*, Günter Zöller's piece looking at the self, and in particular the relation of will and intellect, and David Hamlyn's at the different conceptions of knowledge Schopenhauer appears to presuppose at different stages of his argument.

The essay by F. C. White concentrates on the important doctrines of *The Fourfold Root*, looking at both the first and second editions of that work. *On the Basis of the Morality* forms the chief material for David Cartwright's essay on Schopenhauer's ethics, though he also discusses a number of other works. *On the Freedom of the Will* is summarized in the first of two pieces by Christopher Janaway, which concerns Schopenhauer's conception of the will in human action and in nature as a whole, drawing chiefly on the Second Book of *The World as Will and Representation*. The Third Book's aesthetic theory and philosophy of art and genius are discussed fully in the essay by Cheryl Foster and play a part also in Martha C. Nussbaum's essay, which explores Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche with particular reference to the theme of tragedy.

Two other contributions are specifically concerned with aspects of Schopenhauer's influence on later thinkers. Sebastian Gardner examines Schopenhauer as a precursor of the Freudian theory of the unconscious against the background of the history of philosophy since Kant. Hans-Johann Glock makes an assessment of the different spheres – such as logic, metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of action – in which an influence on Wittgenstein has been claimed for Schopenhauer. As regards influences on Schopenhauer, Paul Guyer looks at his relationship to Kant's epistemology, emphasizing both his differences from Kant and his criticisms of his predecessor. Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's ethics is examined in the piece by Cartwright mentioned earlier. Moira Nicholls contributes an account of Schopenhauer's knowledge of Indian thought, and of the role that Hinduism and Buddhism played in the development of his metaphysics, especially his conception of the thing in itself.

The culminating Fourth Book of *The World as Will and Representation*, though reflected in a number of the other pieces, is given most attention by Dale Jacquette in his piece on the central Schopenhauerian theme of death and our attitudes to it, and by Christopher Janaway in his essay on Schopenhauer's pessimism, which also contains some material on religion and Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche.

NOTES

1 Edith Wharton, *A Son at the Front* (1923, repr. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995), 216.
2 Theodor Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978), 153.
3 *Beyond Good and Evil*, sect. 204.
4 See Christopher Janaway (ed.), *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
5 See Rudolf Malter, *Der Eine Gedanke. Hinführung zur Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988).
6 *MR* 1 512/Hn. 1, 462.
7 As John Atwell puts it, 'the will–intellect union knows, in virtue of the intellect component, what it as will wills, that is, what its nature is, only by knowing the world of appearance. Or . . . the world of appearance reveals to the will–intellect union, or specifically to the intellect component, the nature of the will.' (*Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995], 28).
8 Ibid., 31.
9 See *W2* 82–3, 643–4; *W1* 273, 483–4, 521/H. 3, 90, 739–41; H. 2, 321, 574, 618.
10 The work came out in December 1818 but had 1819 on its title page.
11 See *MR* 1, 44, 48–57, 86, 113–14, 120, 132, 162–4, 191/Hn. 1, 41–4, 45–53, 79, 104–5, 110–11, 122–3, 149–51, 175 – all notes written by Schopenhauer in 1813–14.
12 *MR* 1, 467/Hn. 1, 421–2.
13 See Christopher Janaway, 'Kant's Aesthetics and the "Empty Cognitive Stock"', *Philosophical Quarterly* 47 (1997), 459–63.

GÜNTER ZÖLLER

1 Schopenhauer on the Self[1]

I THE SELF AS WILL AND INTELLECT

In the German language, as in English, the pronoun or pronominal adjective *selbst*, or 'self,' lends emphasis to something or someone previously named. In its nominalized form, *das Selbst*, or 'the self,' the pronoun serves chiefly to identify a human being or person. A specifically philosophical usage of the nominalized form came into currency in England, chiefly through the work of John Locke, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, from where it seems to have made its way into German philosophical terminology a few decades later. A main function of the philosophical term has been to identify the core or essence of a human being, as opposed to what might be accidental or contingent about him or her. In particular, the self has been identified with a human being's soul or mind as opposed to his or her body. In a secondary usage, the term has been employed to distinguish between constituent parts or aspects of one and the same being, in particular to articulate the special status of someone's or one's own 'better self.'

In German philosophy the term and concept of the self plays a systematically foundational role in the works of Kant and several of his idealist successors. In Kantian and post-Kantian thinking, the self is no longer a being alongside other beings but rather is that due to which all beings and the world that encompasses them first come into view.[2]

The development of the term and concept of the self in Schopenhauer occurs against the background of the general discourse on the self in modern philosophy and the particular significance accorded to the self in the recent German tradition. Schopenhauer continues

the usage of the term 'self' to designate the core or essence of the human being; he employs the term to distinguish between different, and differently valued, levels of human existence; and he partakes in the post-Kantian elevation of the self to the rank of the nonworldly necessary correlate of the world.

Yet, while Schopenhauer takes over the key functions of the term 'self' from the philosophical tradition, he has a radically different understanding of what is the core of the human being designated by the word self, of what constitutes the form of human existence referred to as the better self, and of what it means for the self to underlie the world and everything in it. The basic disagreement between Schopenhauer and the philosophical tradition on the self concerns the standard identification of the self, as the core of the human being, with the intellect (understanding, reason) or the faculty of cognition. On Schopenhauer's account, the intellect is neither the sole nor necessarily the main factor of the self. In addition to the rational side or aspect of the self, Schopenhauer countenances an altogether different essential feature of the self, which he designates as *will*.

Unlike earlier accounts of the self, which subordinate the human will to reason by construing the will as applied or practical reason, Schopenhauer insists on the will's original independence from reason and understanding. The will in the human self is seen as arational, 'blind' striving. Moreover, the will for Schopenhauer not only supplements the intellect in the constitution of the human self. The will underlies that self, including its intellectual side, as the source of the self's very being. Finally, in stressing the centrality of the will in the self, Schopenhauer radically revises the status of the human body by rethinking the traditional mind–body relation as a will–body identity.

Yet, rather than simply replacing the earlier primacy and monopoly of the intellect with that of the will, Schopenhauer provides a subtle and detailed account of the complex relations between the intellectual and volitional sides or aspects of the human self. Moreover, Schopenhauer stresses the dynamic interaction between intellect and will in the self. He distinguishes two alternative but complementary conceptions of selfhood: one in which the will forms the core of the human being and one in which the human being achieves selfhood through the cultivation of the intellect.

The two contrasting conceptions of selfhood in Schopenhauer are linked through the notion of the self's possible or ideal development from a will-centered to an intellect-centered self. According to Schopenhauer, the agency behind the development of the self away from the will is none other than the will itself. The self-realization of the will may take the form of the will's radical self-negation. The psycho-machia of the self in Schopenhauer is rendered more dramatic yet through the role that the self plays in relation to the world. More specifically, the cosmo-machia involving self and world turns on the twofold role of the self as intelligence and as will. As intelligence, the self is the ineliminable and indispensable formal condition of objects of all kinds. As will, the self is the most articulate manifestation of the blindly striving drive that underlies all reality.

Thus the account of the self is not a clearly demarcated, specialized topic in Schopenhauer's overall philosophy but, in essence, is coextensive with his portrayal of 'the world as will and representation'. Accordingly, an account of Schopenhauer on the self best orients itself after the overall organization of *The World as Will and Representation* (1818; second edition 1844; third edition 1859) – more specifically that of the first, one-volume edition and of the corresponding first volume of the subsequent two-volume editions – by moving from the role of the intellect in the epistemology of Book One, through the function of the self in the manifestations of the will in the philosophy of nature of Book Two, to the role of the pure intellect in the contemplation of the Ideas in the aesthetics of Book Three and the self-recognition and self-denial of the will in the ethics of Book Four. This order of presentation also captures the developmental nature of Schopenhauer's thinking, which he himself portrays as the successive unfolding of a 'single thought' (*der eine Gedanke*), which, however, can only be stated through the system in its entirety.[3]

The selective reading of the main work will be preceded by a discussion of pertinent aspects of Schopenhauer's relation to Kant and a more detailed consideration of the systematic basis of *The World as Will and Representation* in general and its theory of the self in particular in Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813; second edition 1847). Further writings of Schopenhauer that supplement the account of selfhood in the main work and the dissertation include *On the Will*

in Nature (1836; second edition 1854) and the *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (1841; second edition 1860).[4]

II FROM KANT TO SCHOPENHAUER

The starting point for the post-Kantian discussion in general and post-Kantian theories of the self in particular is Kant's 'critical distinction'[5] between things as they appear (appearances [*Erscheinungen*]) and things as they are in themselves (things in themselves [*Dinge an sich*, also *Sachen an sich*]). On Kant's view, the basic formal features of experience and of its objects, such as space, time, and causality, do not pertain to the things themselves but only to our human ways of cognitively encountering things. On Kant's view, it is exactly the restriction of all humanly possible cognition of objects to appearances that guarantees the latter's reference to actual or possible empirical objects.[6] Kant's doctrinal term for the inapplicability of the human cognitive forms to the things in themselves is 'transcendental idealism'; his term for the correlated doctrine of the applicability, indeed the necessary application, of the cognitive forms to appearances is 'empirical realism'. For Kant transcendental idealism ensures empirical realism, while any doctrine ignoring the distinction between the things in themselves and the appearances ('transcendental realism') results in skepticism about the knowability of objects ('empirical idealism').[7]

Kant's doctrinal dualism poses some difficulties when it comes to determining the status of the self. The role of the self as the bearer and contributor of the a priori forms of cognition seems to elude the distinction between the self as empirically known appearance and the self as unknowable thing in itself. In addition to the empirical self, whose study Kant assigns to empirical psychology and anthropology, and the non-empirical self traditionally entertained by the metaphysical study of the soul (rational psychology), there is a third self, or third sense of self, that is neither empirical nor metaphysical but transcendental or 'pertaining to the conditions of the possibility of experience.'[8]

Schopenhauer takes over the Kantian distinction between things in themselves and appearances with two modifications, one of them more a matter of emphasis, the other one quite substantial. More consistently and explicitly than Kant,[9] Schopenhauer argues that the

appearances are nothing but 'representations' (*Vorstellungen*) in the human mind with no independent extramental existence. In a radical departure from Kant's agnosticism regarding the things in themselves, he identifies the latter with the will as revealed to the human mind in conative and affective self-experience and subsequently recognized as the essence of all reality, human as well as non-human.

Such purported intimate knowledge of the ultimate reality behind or beneath the appearances seems to transgress the critical interdiction against seeking knowledge of the unknowable things in themselves and therefore to constitute a relapse into pre-Kantian dogmatism or transcendental realism, thus turning Schopenhauer's work into a puzzling conjunction of transcendental philosophy and transcendent metaphysics of the will.[10] But what might appear as the uncritical reestablishment of a previously destroyed metaphysics is actually yet another step in the direction taken by Kant himself – that of limiting all our knowledge in general and philosophical knowledge in particular to the realm of experience and the sum total of the latter's pure forms or conditions. With his restriction of reason to the faculty of cognition (theoretical reason) and his vehement rejection of a rational metaphysics of morals and its associated practico-dogmatic postulates of an immortal soul and a personal God,[11] Schopenhauer is even less of a metaphysician than Kant himself, who had sought to compensate for the metaphysical poverty of pure theoretical ('speculative') reason with the otherworldly riches of pure practical ('moral') reason.

Accordingly, Schopenhauer's immanent metaphysics of the will should be seen as part and parcel of his transcendental philosophy rather than as a heterogeneous and oversized appendix.[12] Schopenhauer expands the scope of the transcendental project by including non-theoretical, conative self-consciousness and its affects and emotions in the evidential basis for the reflection on experience in general that is philosophy.[13] The subjectivism and idealism that inform the view of the world of cognition as one of representation ('world as representation') are matched by the view of the world of feeling as one of will ('world as will'). Both cases involve the world *as experienced*. Schopenhauer's work is as much about the self that experiences the world in either of those two forms as it is about the world or worlds so experienced.

Schopenhauer's radical reworking of crucial Kantian positions is also evident in his reconceptualization of the two key ingredients of

the self, viz., the intellect and the will.[14] The will in Schopenhauer is radically dissociated from reason and a power sui generis, thus marking Schopenhauer's radical departure from the Kantian conception of will as practical reason.[15] In his account of the faculty of cognition, Schopenhauer emphasizes the difference between understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*), which he explains as the difference between the capacity for preconceptual, intuitive knowledge and the capacity to form and employ concepts based on the prior intuitive grasp of things.[16] Unlike Kant, who had severed the tie between intuition and intellection by declaring all humanly possible intuition to be sensible, Schopenhauer argues that our intuition of objects (including the intuition of ourselves taken as object) is informed not only by the forms of intuition (space and time) but also by the prereflective employment of the category of causality, which conditions a priori the mind's spontaneous transition from sensible affection to the positing of a corresponding affecting object in space. [17] Schopenhauer holds that the causally informed intuition of spatial objects pertains in principle to all animal life. Only the formation and use of concepts in rational knowledge, and its associated capabilities of deliberative thought, language, and science, set human mentation apart from the mental life of our prerational fellow creatures.[18]

In addition to the intellect, Schopenhauer countenances the will as the second of the two key ingredients in the constitution of the human self. 'Will' is here used as a covering term for the entire affective and volitional side of the self, effectively grouping together what Kant had distinguished as the faculty of desire and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.[19] Schopenhauer provides a negative characterization of the acts of the will by stressing the non-representational nature of all such 'feelings'.[20] Unlike the intellect, which generates images and thoughts of things (representations), the will is not about anything else and outside of itself but is the domain of our affective self-experience – something that is felt or lived rather than being by nature something representing or something represented.

III THE SUBJECT OF COGNITION AND THE SUBJECT OF WILLING

As the two structuring forms underlying the self's cognitive and conative life, the intellect and the will in Schopenhauer have the

status of the 'subject of cognition' (*Subjekt des Erkennens*) and the 'subject of willing' (*Subjekt des Wollens*), respectively.[21] Every cognition is had by the intellect qua subject, and every conation is had by the will qua subject. Moreover, neither the subject of cognition nor the subject of willing is given *as such*.[22] The subject of cognition is the knower in everything known and is never itself known, except in the attenuated sense that the states of the subject of cognition may be known through reflection. Analogously, the subject of willing is that which feels in all feeling (wills in all willing) but is never itself felt, except in the attenuated sense that the states of the subject of willing may be felt internally. The cognitive and conative subject functions of the self have the status of non-empirical conditions of all experience, inner as well as outer, cognitive as well as affective.

In addressing the unity of the self amidst its composition out of two radically different constituent subjects, Schopenhauer maintains that the subject of willing functions as the internal, 'immediate' object of the subject of cognition.[23] In the original, internal, subjective subject–object relation there are united a subject of cognition, which is itself empty and without any object to be known, and a subject of willing, which is itself blind and without any awareness of itself. Only the conjunction of the will's content and the intellect's vision permits the proper functioning of each of the two constituent parts of the self. Citing a fable by the eighteenth-century Swiss writer J. F. Gellert, Schopenhauer likens the compensatory co-operation between will and intellect to the strong, blind one carrying the lame, seeing one on his shoulders.[24]

The particulars of the subject–object relation between intellect and will in the self belong to the wider context of Schopenhauer's account of the overall structure of consciousness and its objects under the 'principle of sufficient reason' (*Satz vom zureichenden Grund*).[25] In its four manifestations as the principle of becoming, of being, of knowing, and of acting, this supreme transcendental principle governs the relations of ground and consequent (of *ratio* and *rationatum*) between objects of all kinds (physical, mathematical, logical, and psychological objects), always in correlation to the subject of cognition in one of its capacities as understanding, pure intuition, reason, and inner sense or empirical self-consciousness, respectively. Accordingly, the principle specifies the real, mathematical, logical, or psychological connections among objects as so many instances

of the principle's general point that nothing is without a reason or ground.

The principle of sufficient reason, which governs the relations among objects, is borne and applied by the subject, more specifically the subject of cognition. Accordingly, the subject itself, from which issues this basic law, does not stand under the principle in question. For Schopenhauer the relation between the subject and any and all of the objects which are subject to the principle is not a relationship of one-sided dependence but a *correlation* in which none of the members can be what it is without the other ones. This also holds for the special case of the self's internal subject–object relation between the subject of cognition and the subject of willing.[26]

In the case of the principle of sufficient reason of acting, also called the 'law of motivation,' the subject–object correlation obtains between the subject of cognition under the form of empirical self-consciousness or inner sense, on the one hand, and the will or faculty of volition in its manifestations as particular acts of willing, on the other hand. According to Schopenhauer, the cause of an act of willing is in each case a cognition which necessarily moves the will to the respective act of willing – hence the very term 'motive' (*Motiv*). The causal connection between a given cognition that functions as motive and the resultant act of volition is experienced internally, through empirical self-consciousness or inner sense.

In locating the intellect–will relation of the self in the context of Schopenhauer's theory of motivational causation, it is imperative to realize that the relation of ground and consequent holds only among the different kinds of objects correlated to the subject of cognition in any one of its capacities (as understanding, pure intuition, reason, and inner sense) – and not between the relata of the basic subject–object correlation itself, which underlies all objects and their sufficiently grounded relations among each other. Specifically, the intellect qua subject of cognition does not ground the will qua subject of willing. Rather, the two subjects are the inseparable poles of an original complex unity on the basis of which all intellection and volition comes to pass. In motivation the relation of grounding obtains between some cognition and the particular act of the will which that cognition motivates. Hence it is not the will as such but the particular act of willing that is grounded or psychologically caused. The will itself, as well as the intellect, are not subject to the principle of sufficient reason.

For Schopenhauer the non-causal structural correlativity that holds between the subject of cognition and the subject of willing ultimately amounts to their identity.[27] This claim can be taken to convey the thought that in the original subject–object relation between the subject of cognition and the subject of willing, the knower (subject of cognition) and the known (subject of willing) are one and the same being. It is not some being other than the one exercising the function of the subject of cognition that is being known as the subject of willing but that very same being, only in a different though correlated function.[28] Hence the ultimate identity of the subject of cognition and the subject of willing in the basic subject–object relation is constitutive of the very unity of the self, which is not the unity of a whole encompassing constituent parts but a unity established by the identical bearer of mutually supplementary basic functions.

Schopenhauer does not claim any further insight into the identity underlying the self. He contents himself with declaring this identity to be the 'miracle "par excellence"'[29] and to represent nothing less than the 'knot of the world,'[30] suggesting that in it, self and world are deeply intertwined and inseparable. The metaphor of the world knot further indicates the wider significance that the miraculous identity underlying the human self takes on in Schopenhauer's transcendental theory of the world in its relation to the self.

IV THE IDENTITY OF BODY AND WILL

The wider cosmological perspective of Schopenhauer's theory of the self is further informed by a second identity claim involving intellect and will, this one specifically directed at the twofold nature of the self as intelligence and will. Schopenhauer maintains that in the case of the human self, the double perspective on the world as will and representation takes the form of a twofold experience of ourselves, one as object given to the intellect operating under the principle of sufficient reason, the other as will and its affective life, and hence largely independent of the forms and functions of the intellect.[31] The self as object of our own and others' cognitive relation to ourselves is the 'living body' (*Leib*).

Schopenhauer holds that for each of us our own body is the intellect's 'immediate object'.[32] Any knowledge of other objects is mediated by our bodily self-experience and is a result of the (typically

unconscious) inference from given bodily sensations to their causal origin in some object or objects other than ourselves or our own body. In Schopenhauer, one's own body taken as object of one's own cognition thus occupies a peculiar position. It is the original object of all our knowledge and is known in a most immediate manner, but it is still an object and as such is subject to the formative rules of the intellect. In principle, the knowledge that we each have of our own body is not different from the knowledge that we have of other bodies or the knowledge that others have of our own body.

Yet according to Schopenhauer, our own body is not only an object of knowledge for our and others' intellect but also something that we each *are*, and that moreover belongs to the very core of our existence. The account of our body's relation to our intellect is to be supplemented by the account of our body's relation to our will and the latter's acts or volitions. We each relate to our own body not only cognitively and intellectually but also practically and affectively. A given movement of our body is not only an object of knowledge to us (and others) but also an act of ours which we experience *from within* as relating to our own act of volition. Schopenhauer rejects a causal account of the relation between volitional act and bodily act. Instead he considers the two acts to be the different sides of one and the same underlying reality that precedes the overt distinction between the mental and the physical.[33]

It should be stressed that, on Schopenhauer's understanding, the aspect duality of the self, as innerly felt will and outerly observed body, is not the product of some artificial, specifically philosophical reflection but occurs naturally in each and every one of us. For Schopenhauer the self is not just *regarded* or *considered* in alternative ways but *shows itself*, prereflectively, in this twofold manner and with these two sides. The 'lived' character of the self's two aspects in Schopenhauer marks a crucial difference from the philosophical reflection that goes into drawing the 'critical distinction' between things in themselves and appearances in Kant. While Kant's is a distinction between two ways of philosophically considering the same things,[34] Schopenhauer's is a distinction between two ways of experiencing oneself and, by extension, the world. In standard philosophical terminology, Schopenhauer's dual-aspect account of the self is concerned with the relation between the mental and the physical, and provides an identity theory for their relation: the body is the

mind (will) experienced externally, and the mind (will) is the body experienced internally.[35]

V THE PRIMACY OF THE WILL OVER THE INTELLECT

Yet the philosopher's distinction between things in themselves and appearances is not altogether lost in Schopenhauer's dual account of the self as will and body or volition and action. For in addition to the twofold experiential perspective on the self, there is the level of philosophical reflection on this self-experience, which results in the recognition that the two kinds of experience, while phenomenologically distinct, are about one and the same human being. More important, there is the further recognition on the part of the self reflecting upon itself that the two sides or aspects of the self are not of equal rank. The phenomenological dualism of the self as will and body is supplemented by a monistic doctrine regarding the deep structure of the self that underlies the latter's overt division into will and body.

According to Schopenhauer, the reality underlying the dual appearance of the self is not some indeterminate and indeterminable generic stratum; it is none other than the root of one of the two phenomenological constituents of the self, viz., the will. In a move that follows the idealist privileging of the inner or mental over the outer and physical, Schopenhauer traces the duality of will and body to its origin in the will, thereby granting the will primacy over the body. Ultimately, the self is will – will that manifests itself internally as particular acts of will (*Willensakt*) and externally as particular bodily acts (*Aktion des Leibes*). The duality of will and body in the self forms part of a three-tiered structure of will, act of will, and bodily action.

When Schopenhauer sums up the complex relation between our will and our body by maintaining that the two are the same or identical,[36] this points further to the 'ultimate identity' of that which appears (our acts of willing) and that as which it appears (our voluntary bodily acts), with the will as the self's kernel out of which everything else grows and develops. More specifically, Schopenhauer maintains that what underlies our mental and physical existence is the immutable nature of our *individual* will or our *character*, which

informs all of our activity as the underlying force. Schopenhauer here builds on Kant's notion of the intelligible character of a human being as the thing in itself underlying all the person's deeds.[37] For Schopenhauer the core of the self or its character constitutes our individuality, as well as our personal identity over time. Moreover, he considers an individual's character to be established from the beginning ('innate') and unchanging ('constant') and to be known by ourselves as well as by others only over the course of time ('empirical').[38]

The plural manifestations of the will's unitary character are not to be regarded as so many effects of an underlying unitary cause or so many consequents of a given ground. The absolute, non–representational nature of the will's intelligible character eludes the principle of sufficient reason and any of its ground–consequent relations. Schopenhauer seeks to ban any notion of grounding from the relation between the thing in itself (the will qua intelligible character) and its temporal appearances (acts of will available to the subject's immediate experience) or its spatio-temporal appearances (overt bodily acts). In his alternative conception of the relation between the will and its manifestations, the latter is the objectivity (*Objektität*) in general or the specific objectification (*Objektivation*) of the will.[39] The appearances (acts of will, voluntary bodily motions) are the thing in itself (will qua intelligible character) *as objectified*, as rendered object for a subject through the a priori cognitive functions of the intellect. Thus Schopenhauer affirms the constitutive role of the intellect in the spatiotemporal realization of the will. Even our own will is not known to us as it is 'in itself' but only as it appears to us under the intuitional form of the multiple successive states that we undergo internally and observe in their outward manifestations.[40]

Yet while the necessary correlation between intellect and will in inner as well as outer experience suggests a radical *equiprimordiality* between the constitutive poles of the self, Schopenhauer also insists on the *primacy* of the will over the intellect. The intellect is supposed to be secondary or derivative, and derived from the will at that. The details of the subordination of the intellect to the will are part of Schopenhauer's more comprehensive account of the subordination of the world of the intellect (world as representation) to the metaphysically conceived will. In that account the ultimate nature of the human self as will serves Schopenhauer as the key to unlocking the

secret nature of the world as a whole, viz., that – in addition to being of the nature of representation – it is will through and through.[41] The world is here understood on the model of the human self: the role of the intellect in the illumination of the human will is likened to the role of intelligent and rational life forms in providing self-knowledge to the otherwise blind cosmic will.[42] As in the case of the human self, the dual nature of the world–self in Schopenhauer goes together with the primacy of the will over the intellect. The will can be said to bring forth the intellect, initially to better guide the will's blind striving[43] – but with the eventual result that the intellect breaks loose from its origin in the will, first supplanting the tyranny of the will with the free realm of disinterested cognition through artistic production and enjoyment[44] and ultimately attempting the very negation of the will – a self-negation in which the very distinction between self and world collapses.[45]

VI THE SELF IN THE WORLD

The internal, radically immediate perspective on the essence of the self afforded by the latter's self-experience as will serves a crucial function that further extends the scope of selfhood in Schopenhauer. In turning to the consideration of the external, physical world, as it appears under the causal version of the principle of sufficient reason, Schopenhauer notes the limits of an externalist understanding of the causal relations among empirical objects, including the causal interactions involving one's own body. In particular, he stresses that the externally observed lawful relations between causes and effects disclose nothing about the actual causal nexus involved. No matter how accurate and predictive of the future course of events the knowledge of external causal relations may be, such knowledge remains forever at the surface of things and cannot explain how some cause brings about an effect.[46]

There is only one case, according to Schopenhauer, in which we have deeper insight into the causal connections involved. This is the case of the causation involved in human volition. To be sure, the causality of the will is not a matter of some willing causing some acting. For in the self the willing does not cause the acting but the two are identical, the acting being nothing but the will as viewed externally, mediated through the operations of the understanding or

intellect. The causality peculiar to the will concerns not the relation between a given act of willing or volition and the respective acting but the very coming about of the particular volition (along with its bodily manifestation) in the first place. In the case of willing, the causal relation obtains between some cognition functioning as motive or motivational cause and some act of willing together with the corresponding bodily activity as its effect.

Considered from the outside, motivational causation between cognition and willing qua acting is not different from a causal relation that does not involve human volition. In each case, the merely external lawful sequence of causing and effected events leaves the actual generation of the effect entirely unexplained. But, as Schopenhauer points out, one's internal experience of volitional causation is entirely different and outright revelatory about the dynamics of causation. In the process of willing we *feel* the cause qua motive solicit the respective manifestation of our will. We experience internally and immediately the interaction of motive and will: the will is all ability and potential waiting to be called forth and realized through the approach of the motive. What remains a 'secret' or 'mystery'[47] from the external perspective – how the effect comes out of the cause – is disclosed in the inner experience of the self's willing: the causes (motives) do not actually generate the effect but call it forth, bring it out, produce it from the underlying will qua character. The motive as cause merely provides the occasion for the specific manifestation of the will.

In his philosophy of nature Schopenhauer generalizes the occasionalist account of motivational causation by introducing the notion of *force* as the generic term corresponding to the specific role of the will qua character in the willing self. According to Schopenhauer, force is that in nature which manifests itself in predetermined and lawfully governed ways when subject to the influence of corresponding 'occasional causes'.[48] More specifically, Schopenhauer distinguishes three main kinds of forces and associated types of causes: the physicochemical forces of inorganic nature that operate through cause in the narrow sense; the forces of plant life that operate through stimulus; and the forces of animal life, including human life, that function through motivating cognition (motives).[49]

But the self's self-experience as willing provides not only the decisive 'clue'[50] about the generic structure of causation involving

occasioning causes and underlying forces. Schopenhauer goes on to claim that the otherwise unknown forces in nature are essentially akin to the human will *as such*, that is, the human will considered in separation from the intellect which always accompanies the will in the dual unity of the human self. The notion of will that is thereby attributed to each and every force in nature is that of sheer drive or striving, without any consciousness and a fortiori without the cognition of some end to strive for.

The radical use of the inner experience of one's own willing to capture the inside or inner essence of the world outside the self may seem to further extend the foundational role that the self plays in the constitution of the world. Previously Schopenhauer had worked out the function of the self qua subject of cognition as the necessary condition for the consciousness of objects of all kinds. Now he might be seen as supplementing or consolidating the centrality of the self in epistemological matters with the self's centrality *in ontologicis*. But the apparent parallelism of cognitive and volitional idealism does not quite hold. Rather than promoting the subject qua will to the status of the world's inner being or essence, Schopenhauer's conception of the 'world as will' in effect demotes the self from the epistemic centrality occupied by the subject of cognition to the complete integration of the subject of willing into the dynamic totality of nature. After all, the specific notion of the will supposedly shared by the human will and the 'will in nature' is that of a force that is essentially 'blind' or operating without consciousness either of itself or of any other object. The cosmic expansion of the self's will leads to the conception of a will without self.

The integration of the self qua will into the world as will also affects the self qua intellect. Schopenhauer shows in great detail how the human intellect, which on his own previous view functioned as the necessary correlate of the world as representation, is entirely part of the world as will as one of the many and varied manifestations of the will in nature. Adopting an explicitly evolutionary perspective, he places the emergence of intelligence in animals at the top of a scale of increasingly complex organization of natural life. More specifically, he notes the appearance of cognition as the medium of causal efficacy in animals; animals are motivated, and their bodies are moved accordingly, under the causal influence of perceiving relevant objects in their environment.[51]

In human animals, cognition and its ensuing volition-cum-motion are no longer limited to the *perception* of actually present objects but can also operate through the mere *conception* of things, by means of thought and its recording in speech and writing, and without those objects being sensorily given. Still, the human perceptual and conceptual abilities have an entirely natural origin and serve the biological purpose of providing a highly complex organism with the detailed grasp of the environment required for the maintenance of its life. Accordingly, the human cognitive abilities, including the exclusively human ability of conceptual thought, are best suited to practical, that is, biological tasks and ill-equipped for the merely theoretical usage, including the philosophical one, to which those abilities have eventually and occasionally been put in the history of the human animal.[52]

Schopenhauer's naturalization of the human self, especially the unprecedented frankness with which he discusses the sexual manifestations of the will,[53] have been compared to other major displacements of the human being from the central position in the universe that it was thought to occupy, such as its astronomical decentralization through the work of Copernicus.[54] But within the overall account of the self in Schopenhauer, the integration of the human will into the cosmic will and the subordination of the self to the world as will is neither the starting point nor the end point of the inquiry.

Still, even limiting the scope of the naturalized self in Schopenhauer to that of a phase or moment in a more comprehensive account leaves open the question of how the self qua intellect can be both the a priori condition of the world and part of the world as one of its evolutionary products. There seems to be a vicious circle here: the world rests on the self qua intellect, and the intellect in turn rests on the world. The circle seems especially problematic for the relation between the self's intellect and the self's own worldly part or aspect, viz., the body: the intellect conditions the body and the body conditions the intellect. Pointing out that the world is regarded differently in each case – once as world of representation, once as world of will – will not suffice. Either of those worlds is supposed to involve the intellect, in one case as the world's ultimate condition, in the other case as one of its entities. It is not the duality of worlds that creates the circle but the dual occurrence of the same intellect in regard to both worlds.

The apparent circularity between self and world in Schopenhauer has long been noted and has typically been attributed to Schopenhauer's oscillating between a post-Kantian transcendental idealism and a materialist realism.[55] Yet the alleged materialism in Schopenhauer's account of the world and the self as will does not hold up to closer scrutiny. Schopenhauer clearly distances himself from a materialist explanation of world and self and traces apparently independently existing physical objects to the will, which he considers 'something spirit-like' or 'mind-like' (*ein Geistiges*).[56] There is a close structural similarity between the cognitivist reduction of the world *as representation* to the intellect and the conative reduction of the world *as will* to some originally arational mind or spirit. In both cases, what appears to exist on its own (world) is shown to exist only in relation to something that is first and foremost given as or in some subject (intellect and will, respectively). Moreover, both basic forms of subjectivity and the corresponding worlds have a common origin in the absolute reality of the will itself.

The apparent problem of the circle between the intellect conditioning the world, including the body, and the world, including the body, conditioning the intellect can be solved by recognizing that the body and the intellect each are to be taken in two senses and can therefore pertain differently to each of the two worlds: the body that conditions the intellect pertains to the world as will, which *as such* is not subject to representation and its forms, while the body that is conditioned by the intellect belongs to the world as representation. Analogously, the intellect as manifestation of the will belongs to a reality outside and independent of the order of representation, while the intellect objectively considered, as brain, belongs to the world as representation.[57] To be sure, the identity of the self amidst the twofold occurrence of its intellect as well as body remains unexplained in Schopenhauer. It is considered an inexplicable basic fact.

VII THE SELF BY ITSELF

The dual membership of the intellect in the world as representation (as physical object) and the world as will (as metaphysical force) is rendered more complex yet by the role that the intellect plays in the possible gradual emancipation of the self from the world, from the will, and from itself. In addition to arguing for the dependence