

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INDIAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY

Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India

William Gould



CAMBRIDGE

www.cambridge.org/9780521830614

This page intentionally left blank

Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India

William Gould explores what is arguably one of the most important and controversial themes in twentieth-century Indian history and politics: the nature of Hindu nationalism as an ideology and political language. Rather than concentrating on the main institutions of the Hindu right in India as other studies have done, the author uses a variety of historical sources to analyse how Hindu nationalism affected the supposedly secularist Congress in the key state of Uttar Pradesh. In this way, the author offers an alternative assessment of how these languages and ideologies transformed the relationship between Congress and north Indian Muslims. The book makes a major contribution to historical analyses of the last two critical decades before Partition and Independence in 1947, which will be of value to scholars interested in historical and contemporary Hindu nationalism, and to students researching the final stages of colonial power in India.

WILLIAM GOULD is a Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of Leeds.

Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society 11

Editorial board

C. A. BAYLY

Vere Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of St Catharine's College

RAJNARAYAN CHANDAVARKAR

Fellow of Trinity College and Lecturer in History, University of Cambridge

GORDON JOHNSON

President of Wolfson College, and Director, Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge

Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society publishes monographs on the history and anthropology of modern India. In addition to its primary scholarly focus, the series also includes work of an interdisciplinary nature which contributes to contemporary social and cultural debates about Indian history and society. In this way, the series furthers the general development of historical and anthropological knowledge to attract a wider readership than that concerned with India alone.

A list of titles which have been published in the series can be found at the end of the book

Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India

William Gould

University of Leeds



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521830614

© William Gould 2004

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published in print format 2004

ISBN-13 978-0-511-19242-5 eBook (Adobe Reader)

ISBN-10 0-511-19242-8 eBook (Adobe Reader)

ISBN-13 978-0-521-83061-4 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-83061-3 hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Olivia and my parents

Contents

| | |
|---|---------|
| <i>Acknowledgements</i> | page ix |
| <i>Glossary</i> | xi |
| <i>List of abbreviations</i> | xv |
| 1 Introduction | 1 |
| 2 Congress and the Hindu nation: symbols, rhetoric and action | 35 |
| 3 Muslims, mass movements and untouchable uplift | 87 |
| 4 The Aryan Congress: history, youth and the 'Hindu race' | 131 |
| 5 Congress radicals and Hindu militancy | 160 |
| 6 Congress 'Raj', riots and Muslim mass contacts | 201 |
| 7 Congress, Pakistan and volunteer militarism | 234 |
| 8 Conclusion | 265 |
| <i>Bibliography</i> | 276 |
| <i>Index</i> | 287 |

Acknowledgements

This book is based on my research and teaching as a postgraduate student and Smuts Research Fellowship in Cambridge and India. In both parts of the world, I managed to be associated with quite a number of institutions, all of which gave me crucial support in planning, research and writing. In this connection, I would like to thank the staff and Fellows of Pembroke College, Trinity College and Selwyn College, Cambridge; Delhi University; Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi; the Cambridge History Faculty; and, most of all, the Centre of South Asian Studies. It was here that as a research Fellow I was able to spend time reworking the manuscript and for support in this I am grateful to the managers of the Smuts Fund.

Special thanks are due to Raj Chandavarkar for his constructive criticisms, patience and generosity with his time. For their useful comments and advice I would especially like to thank Chris Bayly, Ornit Shani and Subho Basu. For support in my research I would like to thank Chris Carnaghan, Harald Fischer-Tine, Nandini Gondhalekar, Nandini Gooptu, Jo Goulbourne, Thomas Blom Hansen, Mushirul Hasan, Riho Isaka, Gordon Johnson, Sudipta Kaviraj, Jane Knight, John Morrill, Norbert Peabody, Francis Robinson, Sumit Sarkar, Ulrike Stark, David Washbrook and Carey Watt. For help with my Hindi I am indebted to Francesca Orsini and Satyendra Srivastava. For their assistance, I am very grateful to the staff of the Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge; the University Library, Cambridge; the Oriental and India Office Collections, London; the National Archives of India, Delhi; the Nehru Memorial Library, Delhi; the Uttar Pradesh State Archives, Lucknow; the CID Record Room Gokhale Marg, Lucknow; Bharatiy Bhavan, Allahabad; and the Gyan Prasad Library, Kanpur. For financial support I must thank the British Academy, the Smuts Travel Fund and the Trinity College Rouse Ball Research Fund and Eddington Fund.

For their overwhelming hospitality in India I would like to thank Rajesh Kumar Jha and Ritu and John Ko in Delhi, and Ram Advani in Lucknow, for their translation help and lavish welcome, Deepak Singh and family

in Lucknow, Rahul Srivastava and family in Allahabad and S. P. Mehra in Kanpur. For checking the typescript and for support and encouragement in Cambridge I am especially grateful to the staff of the Centre of South Asian Studies, who kept me dosed up on coffee. Throughout, Kevin Greenbank, Rachel Rowe, Barbara Roe, Jan Thulbourn and Magnus Marsden have been there to help me maintain my sanity. For helping me manoeuvre the college–university relationship my thanks go to Lizzie Collingham, Tariq Sadiq, David Smith and Mike Sewell. Finally I would like to thank Pat Goodyer and Peter Dowsett for keeping my mind on the bigger picture and, most importantly, my wife Olivia and my parents, Richard and Elizabeth Gould, for their tireless support and encouragement.

Glossary

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| acchutuddhar | uplift of ‘untouchables’ |
| ahimsa | non-violence |
| Ahir | Hindu agricultural caste associated with cattle-rearing; see also Yadav |
| akhara | gymnasium |
| anjuman | an organisation |
| arti | ceremony or form of worship |
| Arya Samaj | Arya Society – Hindu reform organisation |
| ‘Aryavarta’ | land of the ‘Aryans’ |
| badmash | hooligan, villain |
| Bakr-Id | Islamic festival involving sacrifice |
| ‘Bande Mataram’ | Bengali hymn, adopted as a national song |
| Bania | trader, moneylender |
| Barawafat | Islamic festival |
| bhadralok | gentlefolk. Refers mostly to high-caste groups in Bengal |
| bhang | drug, often prepared in drinks and sweets |
| <i>Bhagavad Gita</i> | ‘The Song of God’: poem incorporated into the <i>Mahabharata</i> |
| bhakti | Hindu devotionalism |
| Bharat | India |
| Bhuinhar | landholding caste |
| brahmacharya | religious student, values of a religious student |
| charkha | spinning wheel |
| Chamar | low caste, often associated with leather work and tanning |
| Chehlum | Islamic festival |
| dal | party, corps |
| Dalit | ‘untouchable’ caste group |
| darshan | worship |
| dharma | religious duty |

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| dhobi | washerman |
| Diwali | Hindu festival of light |
| Dom | 'untouchable' caste group |
| durbar | royal or imperial audience |
| ganja | cannabis |
| ghat | a flight of steps, landing place or bank next to a river |
| goonda | hooligan, thug, lout |
| Gujar | agricultural caste |
| gurukul | college system founded by the Arya Samaj, on the lines of ancient Indian institutions |
| harijan | term used in reference to 'untouchables' |
| hartal | strike |
| havan | brahmanical fire sacrifice |
| Holi | Hindu festival |
| Id | Islamic festival |
| Idul-fitr | first day of the Muslim month Shawwal |
| jamiat | council |
| Janmastami | Hindu festival |
| Jat | agricultural caste mainly from western UP, Punjab and Rajasthan |
| jati | community, family or tribe, fixed by birth (cf. Jat) |
| Julaha | Muslim caste of weavers |
| Kalwar | caste of alcohol distillers |
| kapra | cloth |
| katha | reading and exposition of religious texts |
| Kayastha | caste of scribes |
| khadi/khaddar | coarse, home-spun cloth |
| Khattri | administrative and commercial caste |
| kirpan | ceremonial sword |
| kirtan | devotional song |
| kisan | cultivator, farmer |
| Kumbh Mela | Hindu bathing festival |
| Kurmi | agricultural caste |
| Kshatriya | Hindu upper caste of martial or royal status |
| lathi | stick, bludgeon |
| Lodhi | agricultural caste |
| <i>Madhe Sahaba</i> | Sunni verses in praise of the first four Khalifas |
| Magh Mela | Hindu bathing festival |
| <i>Mahabharata</i> | Hindu epic |
| Mahasabha | conference or meeting; organisation or association |
| majlis | Islamic religious meeting or gathering |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| mandir | temple |
| mantra | hymn, poem |
| masjid | mosque |
| mazbur | labourer |
| maulvi | Muslim priest or learned man |
| mela | festival, company of dancers taking part in a festival |
| mohalla | neighbourhood |
| Moharram | Islamic festival |
| nautanki | folk play or popular theatre |
| nawab | regional ruler under Mughal dynasties |
| panchayat | caste council or council of elders |
| pandal | pavilion |
| prabhat pheries | Congress morning processions |
| Puranas | a corpus of eighteen sacred Sanskrit Legends |
| qasbah | small town |
| <i>Ramayana</i> | Hindu epic describing the lives of Sita and Ram and his battle with the demon Ravan |
| Ramlila | Hindu festival |
| 'Ramrajya' | rule of Ram |
| raksha | protection |
| sabha | association; society; council; assembly |
| sadhu | Hindu ascetic or mendicant |
| sangam | confluence two or more rivers |
| sangathan | movement for organisation or consolidation, usually of a community |
| sangh | association, organisation |
| sanyasis | ascetics |
| satyagraha | 'truth force', non-violent passive resistance |
| seva/sewa | service |
| Shab-barat | 'Night of Record', when the destinies of men are recorded for the coming year |
| sharbat | a sweet drink |
| shariat, sharia, | |
| shari'ah | Islamic law |
| shuddhi | 'purification' and Hindu reconversion movement |
| swadeshi | home industry |
| swaraj | self-rule, independence; purna swaraj: perfect freedom |
| tabarra | Shia curses of the four Khalifas for their treatment of the descendants of the Prophet |
| taluqdar | landowner |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| Tanzeem | religious movement for the unity and organisation of Muslims |
| taziadar | model of the tomb of Hussein used in the Mohurram procession |
| Thakur | landholding caste |
| ulama | Islamic learned man |
| Vedanta | system of beliefs based on the philosophy of Sankara |
| Vedas | Early religious texts |
| Vaishya | upper caste, usually traders and commercial groups |
| vakil | lawyer, representative |
| vidyapith | university |
| virat | ruler, splendid one |
| Yadav | Hindu agricultural caste associated with cattle rearing; see also Ahir |
| zamindar | landlord, landowner |

Abbreviations

| | |
|-------------|--|
| AICC | All-India Congress Committee |
| APS | Weekly Appreciation of the Political Situation |
| BJP | Bharatiya Janata Party |
| CSP | Congress Socialist Party |
| GAD | General Administration Department |
| Home Poll. | Home Political Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi |
| IOR | Oriental and India Office Collections, London |
| L/PJ | Public and Judicial Department |
| MSS.EUR | European Manuscripts, Oriental and India Office Collections |
| NAI | National Archives of India, Delhi |
| NMML | Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi |
| PAI | Police Abstracts of Intelligence |
| PIB/PP.Hin. | Proscribed Publications, Oriental and India Office Collections |
| PRO | Public Record Office, London |
| RSS | Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh |
| SAS | Centre for South Asian Studies, Cambridge |
| UPNNR | United Provinces Native Newspaper Reports |
| UPPCC | United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee |
| UPSA | United Provinces State Archives |

1 Introduction

The Indian National Congress was the most prominent and successful movement of anti-colonial nationalism in the twentieth century. It claimed to represent the Indian nation, irrespective of social, occupational, class, religious or caste differences. This position was in contrast to colonial discourses that often saw India's religious differences as irreconcilable. In claiming to transcend religious difference, the Congress represented itself as the only truly 'national' political movement and appeared to espouse secular nationalism. Yet, in the 1930s and 1940s, many of its agents continued to identify with forms of 'Hindu' politics and ideas of the 'Hindu' nation. This book explores how and why this paradox appeared in one of the most politically important provinces of India – the United Provinces or Uttar Pradesh (UP).

Remarkably, some of the most significant forms of communal politics manifested themselves within the Congress movement in UP. This is not to argue that the Congress was exclusively a 'Hindu' party or movement or even that Hindus existed as a homogeneous community. The terms 'Hindu' and 'Hinduism' had fluid descriptive and representational meanings in this period. Precisely for this reason, some individual Congressmen were able to evoke symbolism with a 'Hindu' meaning whilst subscribing to a general stance of secular nationalism. Such politicians sometimes appeared to be deaf to the possible contradictions in their political language. Rather than promoting the secular, they were in fact often party to communal politics.

Historians have usually explained such contradictions by reference to factors outside the control of the Congress as an institution. In these analyses, communalism was a problem created by the colonial state, or generated by the response to that state of other 'communal' parties and agents. The Congress as a 'party' failed to overcome this largely external threat. Most writing on communalism in India has highlighted one or more of three such external factors: the adoption of 'separatist' politics by Muslims from the late nineteenth century, the appearance of institutions of 'Hindu nationalism' such as the Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha,

and, thirdly, the actions of the colonial state in representing the Indian polity on the basis of divided communities.

Explanations of communalism have rarely taken sufficient account of the heterogeneity of the Congress, and how this heterogeneity played upon religious difference. In the late colonial period, the Congress was not a party but a broad-based movement. Even in a single province like UP, it seldom had a single set of coherent and well-defined agendas, or a structure of party discipline, apart from the broadest anti-colonial goal of political freedom. It was defined less by a concrete party manifesto than by the words and actions of those acting in its name. Within it there was room for a range of political voices. The nature of the political languages and ideologies of different Congress agents, then, is central to understanding what the Congress represented politically. This book is concerned with how and why this array of political languages within the UP Congress repeatedly made recourse to religious, particularly self-consciously 'Hindu', subjects and forms of symbolism. It was also of the utmost importance that these political languages and styles acted upon Muslims and Muslim politicians in UP.

The nature of Congress's political languages will be examined in relation to India's most politically dominant province in this period. The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (Awadh) had the second largest provincial population after Bengal. It occupied about one-sixteenth of India but contained nearly one-seventh of the total population and had a greater population than either the British Isles or France in this period.¹ Most importantly, it was the homeland of a nationally significant Urdu-speaking Muslim elite, instrumental in setting up educational and political institutions which fostered a distinctively Indian Muslim politics. The presence of this significant Muslim minority had its impact on the growth of different types of settlement in the nineteenth century – the predominantly Muslim 'qasbah' and the 'Hindu corporate town'.² This area of India was also 'Aryavarta', the heartland of the Hindi movement from the late nineteenth century, and the location of perhaps the most significant sites of Hindu pilgrimage and melas. From the early twentieth century, Agra and Oudh (Awadh) became the crucible of the Congress movement, displacing the dominance of elites from the presidency capitals. This process was accelerated in the late 1910s and early 1920s when, through the experience of Muslim and Hindu mobilisation in the Khilafat agitations, the UP bazaar towns grew in political significance. This was

¹ A. C. Turner, *Census of India, 1931: United Provinces of Agra and Awadh Part 1 – Report* (Allahabad, 1932), p. 7.

² C. A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770–1870* (Delhi, 1983), p. 456.

a province which by the 1930s, as in contemporary India, helped to define national politics. Consequently, by the 1930s at least, the working out of communal relations in UP had a huge impact on other parts of the subcontinent.

Nationalism and religious difference

The key to understanding how and why Congress agents made recourse to 'Hindu' symbolism in this part of the subcontinent is to look at the complex nature of Hindu nationalism and secularism in north India. Hindu nationalist ideologies and political languages that evoked the 'Hindu', like the Congress itself, were linguistically and socially varied. Since Hinduism did not represent an identifiable religious community, the terms 'Hindu nationalism', Hindu, or Hinduism are therefore highly problematic. As historians have recently observed, 'the conventional intellectual identification of "India" with the terms "Hindu" or "Hinduism" is deeply mistaken' since there is no original collective classification as such.³ Nevertheless, a set of discourses about a Hindu political community, however mistaken in its sociological premises, did evolve in the late colonial period, through both colonial agency and Indian debate.⁴ Institutions developed with the project of discussing the idea of the 'Hindu' – described as 'revivalist' because of their selection and rejuvenation of collective traditions. In some cases this revivalism involved a celebration of 'Hindu-ness' or the Hindu community. At other times it was a space for religious or social reform. The way Indians then represented communities and defined constituencies often mirrored the state's distribution of political powers⁵ according to religious, ethnic and caste cleavages.⁶

³ David Ludden, ed., *Contesting the Nation: Religion, Community and the Politics of Democracy in India* (Philadelphia, 1996), p. 6. See also Heinrich von Stietencron, 'Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism', in Vasudha Dalmia and Heinrich von Stietencron, eds., *Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity* (New Delhi, 1995) p. 51. Romilla Thapar, 'Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity', *Modern Asian Studies* 23, 2 (May 1989).

⁴ Susan Bayly, *Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 144–86.

⁵ See Amiya P. Sen, *Hindu Revivalism in Bengal 1872–1905: Some Essays in Interpretation* (Delhi, 1993), pp. 12–19; Vasudha Dalmia, *The Nationalisation of Hindu Traditions: Bharatendu Harisandra and Nineteenth Century Banaras* (Delhi, 1997), pp. 1–15.

⁶ T. N. Madan, *Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India* (Delhi, 1997), pp. 252–3. This is supported by evidence from the census report of 1931: 'the leaders of the various communities eventually realised that as their shares of representation in the legislatures . . . would be determined mainly by the numerical strength of those communities, it would have been suicidal for any community to run the risk of under enumeration'. *Census of India, 1931, Part I. Report*, p. 6.

For the purposes of this book it is more important that a *sense* of 'Hindu-ness' or 'Hindu politics' was possessed by a range of Congress agents, than that 'Hindu' or 'Hinduism' could be identified as an entity, with fixed physical and theoretical boundaries. Moreover, the Congress did not aim, as an institution, to promote the interests of an imagined Hindu community. But because the Congress itself was by no means a homogeneous institution, individuals acting in its name could and did produce political ideas that evoked religious community. The existence of these languages did not, however, demonstrate that secularism and secular nationalism were intrinsically flawed within the Congress organisation. Conceptions of secularism, like Hinduism and Hindu nationalism, varied in north India and could easily exist as an institutional ideal alongside other ideologies, many of them religious in inspiration and fitted to local circumstances. Curiously, these separate ideologies, even though divergent, could clearly co-exist.

This co-existence has often proved difficult for historians to reconcile. In establishing the limits of Congress secularism in the 1930s and 1940s, some writers have briskly concluded that secularism must be incompatible with Indian culture.⁷ The clearest idea to have emerged about Indian secularism has been the notion of the state maintaining an equal distance from all religions, which nevertheless are equally tolerated and respected. But, as early as the 1960s, disagreements arose about the applicability of western notions of secularism (implying separation of church from state or the idealisation of a non-religious political realm) to India. Some writers argued that secularism was applicable to the subcontinent, with a qualification that state secularism would inevitably be challenged by a largely non-secularised Indian society.⁸ Others considered that an orthodox, western-style secular state was not feasible in India, arguing rather for a 'jurisdictionalist' state which concentrated on guaranteeing freedom of worship and conscience.⁹ As many scholars have pointed out, the idea that secularism should take a different form in India when compared with Europe was inevitable, given the lack of an established church. Interpretations of secularism, like interpretations of Hinduism in India, have consequently been fluid and open.

Later theorisations of secularism by historians and political scientists have often replicated Congress's ambiguity over religious politics in the 1930s rather than simply explained it. Two alternative conceptions of

⁷ Although secularism and ideas about the secular state are discussed by historians looking at the 1930s and 1940s, there are very few references to the word 'secular' or 'secularism' until the 1950s.

⁸ Donald Eugene Smith, *India as a Secular State* (Princeton, N.J., 1963), pp. 493–501.

⁹ Ved Prakash Luthera, *The Concept of the Secular State and India* (Calcutta, 1964), pp. 21–3.

secularism in India have emerged – the second of which will be discussed further below. It has become increasingly common for historians to theorise the inapplicability of secularism to the Indian context. Secularism, in this view, could only be accommodated to Indian social conditions if adapted beyond recognition. T. N. Madan, for instance, emphasises the rootedness of secularism in the dialectic of Protestant Christianity and the Enlightenment and thereby its incompatibility with India's religious traditions.¹⁰ For Ashish Nandy, Indian religious traditions offer a solution to the problem of secularism itself since they contain within them a notion of a more catholic attitude of respect for all religions.¹¹ And for Partha Chatterjee it is doubtful whether secularism as an ideology will ever combat the problem of majoritarian communalism.¹² However, Amartya Sen has pointed out the implication of this 'anti-modernist' critique, which suggests that, as a Hindu nation, India can never be truly secular.¹³ As will be seen in following chapters, advocates of the anti-modernist critique, even in its post-colonial garb, have held similar assumptions about India's religious traditions to those made by Congressmen in the 1930s and 1940s.

The historian still needs to account for the ambiguities of Congress secularism in the 1930s and 1940s, and why unambiguous forms of secularism were so weak. An approach to this question is to ask how far a single dominant form of secularism actually ever emerged within the Congress. It is difficult to argue that orthodox secularism as set out by Madan and Nandy should necessarily have failed for societal reasons, since it was never seriously tested in India in the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, the notion of secularism as a form of 'tolerance', which related to Indian traditions, was more prevalent. This was a multifaceted idea of the secular, and could be interpreted in ways that allowed differing notions of the space of religion in political life. There were wide variants in interpretations

¹⁰ T. N. Madan, 'Secularism in its Place', *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, 4 (1987), pp. 747–59. For Madan, secularism 'fails to recognise the immense importance of religion in the lives of the peoples of South Asia'.

¹¹ Ashish Nandy, 'The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance', *Alternatives* 13, 2 (1990), pp. 177–94. Nandy emphasises the importance of societal organisation over state formation to argue that secularism, being hegemonic, narrows the domain of significant choice-making.

¹² Partha Chatterjee, 'Secularism and Toleration', *Economic and Political Weekly* 29, 28 (1994), pp. 1768–77. Prakash Chandra Upadhyaya, 'The Politics of Indian Secularism', *Modern Asian Studies* 26, 4 (1992), pp. 815–53. Upadhyaya also discusses the problem of secularism in India, pointing out that majoritarian Congress secularism is not in fact true secularism.

¹³ Amartya Sen, 'Secularism and its Discontents', in K. Basu and S. Subrahmanyam, *Unravelling the Nation: Sectarian Conflict and India's Secular Identity* (Delhi, 1996) pp. 17–18.

of secularism amongst UP Congressmen. Purushottam Das Tandon and Jawaharlal Nehru conceived of secularism as an entire divorce of state from religion (if not divorce of politics from religion, as in the case of Tandon). However, Tandon still possessed an idea of a nation of 'Hindus' and made reference to Hindu traditions and religion in descriptions of the nation. Even Nehru shared this approach of celebrating India's Hindu culture, although in a very different and lapsed form. As Madan has pointed out, Gandhi's 'secularism' was of a different kind, using religiosity to assert the basic equality of all religions.¹⁴ This does not mean that secularism as an ideology was bound to fail in India, or that it was inapplicable to Indian conditions. Rather, secularism in India might better be described as containing a conglomeration of different ideologies, some of them adapted to political and social circumstances. The existence of variable forms of secularism in the UP Congress is explained by the equally variable engagement of Congressmen with religious symbolism in their political activity.

Alongside the mild Nehruvian celebration of India's Hindu culture, some UP Congressmen held that secularism could be actually contained within Indic traditions. This idea persists amongst spokespersons of the Hindu right: locating secularism within Indian ideas of 'sarva-dharma-sambhava' (all dharmas or religious beliefs being equal to or harmonious with each other); asserting that secularism 'has a long philosophical tradition going back to ancient times'; or highlighting the concept of 'dharma' as proof of India's essential religious toleration and propensity for secularism, is the second major stream of ideas on secularism.¹⁵ These interpretations tend to single out the Muslim community as being ultimately responsible for communal antagonism.¹⁶ They also accept uncritically the overlap between ancient Indian ideas of toleration and secularism or secularisation. This tendency to locate 'secularism' within Indian traditions is

¹⁴ Madan, *Modern Myths*, pp. 235–8.

¹⁵ M. M. Sankhdher, 'Understanding Secularism', in M. M. Sankhdher, ed., *Secularism in India: Dilemmas and Challenges* (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 4–7; L. M. Singhvi, 'Secularism: Indigenous and Alien', in *ibid.*, pp. 35–87. Amartya Sen would relate this tendency in Indian secularism to the 'prior identity critique' – the idea that religious identities are prior to national ones and that, therefore, as India is a Hindu country, secularism must be located within Hinduism. This logically leads into the 'favouritism critique' which suggests that the Indian state has in reality favoured the Muslim community. Sen, 'Secularism and its Discontents', pp. 15–17.

¹⁶ Contributors to the Sankhdher volume cited above include Balraj Madhok, president of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, and H. V. Seshadari, general secretary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Madhok claims that the ideas of 'nationalist Muslims' such as Azad actually damaged 'Hindu secularism'. Sankhdher, *Secularism in India*, pp. 119–21. Seshadari asserts that 'Muslim communalism has now acquired a constitutional dignity by the term "minority rights"': Sankhdher, *Secularism in India*, p. 146.

particularly pertinent to this book, as it was shared by a range of 'Hindu', institutions as well as by the UP Congress.

This idea of the secular state being contained within Indian tradition was critical to the various nationalist expositions of Hinduism and the Hindu nation in the 1930s. As will be explained below, it was in the interests of Congress agents, when discussing the notion of 'Hindu', to make its meaning and provenance as wide as possible. The attractions of an ancient, essentially 'Hindu', traditional Indian secularism were clear: its flexible conceptual frameworks allowed a whole range of anti-colonial messages to be conveyed. Because the notion of 'Hindu' could be flexible and catholic, a diverse range of political languages, manipulating often very different traditions, were considered by observers to be essentially 'Hindu'. These languages and ideologies were part of a national project, and so Congress agents were party to a process whereby complex and differentiated voices were homogenised into an overriding concept of 'Hindu' tradition.

This is why, despite the diversity of Congress's political languages, this book has chosen to investigate that pertaining to the 'Hindu'. Throughout, these languages have been related to the term 'Hindu nationalism', because it was the *national* project of Congress which encouraged agents to select the homogenising notion of 'Hindu', encompassing, among other things, a concept of the secular state. This Hindu nationalism was, however, of a very different character to that of Savarkar and other Hindu ideologues, despite sharing some important basic premises. This book therefore gives Hindu nationalism a broad meaning for a particular reason but does not suggest that it is necessary to confuse and conflate the UP Congress with the harder exclusivist Hindu nationalism of the Sangh Parivar.

The looser forms of Hindu nationalism, which were more evident in Congress activity, are more problematic to define but more significant. Here there was very little, if any, advocacy of nationhood being the exclusive preserve of Hindus, as appeared in the thinking of Savarkar and RSS ideologues. Yet the activities of Congress spokespersons, through deliberate and public uses of religious symbolism, were accommodated into understandings of 'Hindu' traditions. In explaining this process, the concept of a dialogue through a mixture of political languages, ideologies and contextual meanings is central. Different social groups and sects would respond to these ideologies and languages of politics in variable ways – demonstrating that the UP Congressmen's relationship with Hindu nationalism was multifaceted.

On a practical level, association with public religious rituals enabled UP Congressmen in the locality to mobilise and legitimise themselves

in a mass movement. Religion rarely figured in discussions about party organisation at the provincial level.¹⁷ But at local levels the nation was presented in propaganda using popular notions of Hinduism and folk culture. To achieve this, Congressmen and women drew illustrations and analogies from the great epics – the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*.¹⁸ As Congressmen moved and operated in different towns and districts of UP, rhetoric was often adapted to local religious and folk traditions but fitted within a homogenising framework. Hinduism could be theorised as a universal system, creating political legitimacy by integrating the sensibilities of other faiths and understandings about the nation and the wider world.¹⁹ Congressmen might have maintained a sense of the ‘communal’, but this notion of the ‘Hindu’ was not considered to be a part of that realm.

These methods of theorising Hinduism were of course inherited from the revivalism of the late nineteenth century and older Tilakite and extremist influences.²⁰ Attempts to adapt Indian traditions to western organisation within the broad scope of a ‘rationalised’ Hinduism were also an even older preoccupation of institutions like the Brahma Samaj.²¹ Like late nineteenth-century revivalists, Congress nationalists in UP repeatedly illustrated the tension between an emulation of western political forms and an assertion of Indic supremacy.²² Yet what was new about UP Congress formulations of the ‘Hindu’ was the holistic way in which key publicists incorporated Hinduism into overall conceptions of the Indian nation. This process cannot be described simply as a strategy. Its content and motive related to a complicated set of political relationships which will be explored throughout this book. Its forms emerged through a dialogic relationship between Congress and its constituencies, individual agents and the wider political sphere.

¹⁷ Gyanendra Pandey, *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh: A Study in Imperfect Mobilization*, (Oxford, 1978) p. 71.

¹⁸ Marriott McKim, ‘Cultural Policy in the New States’, in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York, 1963), pp. 31–41.

¹⁹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (Oxford, 1939), p. 313. A more recent explanation for this use of Hinduism is provided by Dawa Norbu who notes that ‘modern ideology and rational techniques . . . tended to make what had been implicit in tradition more explicit’. Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism* (London, 1992), p. 222.

²⁰ Dalmia, *The Nationalisation of Hindu Traditions*, pp. 21–7. When Bharatendu Harischandra addressed a meeting of the Arya Deshopakarini Sabha in 1889, he stated that the political welfare of the country should not be separated from matters of religion and that the abandonment of different beliefs by Hindus was urgent. Language, literature, religion and territorial allegiance were all aspects of being Hindu. Even Muslims were described as Hindus.

²¹ Amiya Sen, *Hindu Revivalism in Bengal*, pp. 31–46. ²² *Ibid.*, pp. 4–29.

Just as the UP Congress acted as a forum for diverse political agencies, then, so these forms of Hindu nationalism appeared in different guises. They were reinforced by the curious interplay of politics at different levels of the colonial state. In order to build patronage networks and assert political authority in a district after 1920, access to political influence at the provincial level was also necessary. This process was strengthened as Congress institutions at village, town, district and provincial levels came to reflect the structures of the colonial state and administration. It is well known that what a Congress spokesperson did or said in a town or village could be very different from PCC (Provincial Congress Committee) activity. However, local activity impinged upon the province during elections.²³ Religious or caste politics at local levels, which often took forms reflecting the specific local context, could therefore acquire a provincial significance, albeit in a distorted fashion. Local political activity in turn often militated against the interests of provincial party organisations and tarnished the image of individual leaders. This is broadly illustrated in political transformations between the 1920s and 1930s in UP. It is clear that, for the whole of the 1920s, the Congress maintained direct, sometimes formal, associations with Hindu organisations at local levels. During the early and mid-1920s the Congress was closely allied with local Hindu Sabhas. Both organisations provided the financial and professional backing to sustain organised political activity.²⁴ However, these associations with Hindu communalism persisted in more informal forms into the 1930s despite the official all-India Congress's explicit rejection of 'communal' parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha.

So how did the Hindu idiom persist in the Congress at local levels and impact on the province? This book argues that Congress's close association with forms of secularism that were based on the attractive and adaptable notion of a 'Hindu' civilisation and culture broke down any possible taboo surrounding religious mobilisation in the locality. By the late 1930s this situation made it difficult for the Congress in power to contain and control religious conflicts. Neither could Congress be in a

²³ Likewise, provincial power bases also relied on networks of support in the districts. This makes the dichotomy between local and provincial-level political style even more interesting. Harold A. Gould, 'The Rise of the Congress System in a District Political Culture: The Case of Faizabad District in Eastern Uttar Pradesh', in Paul R. Brass and Francis Robinson, eds., *Indian National Congress and Indian Society, 1885–1985: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Dominance* (Delhi, 1987), pp. 242–309. See also Anil Seal, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in India', in John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal, eds., *Locality, Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870–1940* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 26.

²⁴ Richard Gordon, 'The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915–1926', *Modern Asian Studies* 9, 2 (April 1975), pp. 182–95.

position to act with a heavy hand after 1937, whilst the Muslim League accused it of being part of a 'Hindu conspiracy'. The importance of political language was perhaps nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the Congress ministry period from 1937 to 1939, when an accumulation of grievances surrounding Congress's political image allowed the party to be condemned for its 'Hindu' bias. This tension, then, between a striving for secularism and the attraction of particular forms of political language, was a part of the UP Congress as 'government' as well as 'agitator'. It was to affect the UP Congress well into the following decade, by which time a rejuvenated, strident identity politics had appeared in the form of the Muslim League.

Ideology, symbolism and language

Because political activity in the locality affected the Congress at the province and the centre, it is important to study political languages in their more localised manifestations: print journalism, the theatre of political processions and meetings and stump oratory, as well as political writings and manifestos. This necessarily contextual study of political language and symbolism is most usefully conceptualised at a broader level as 'ideology' at certain moments, and 'political language' at others. The distinction between these two phenomena is a difficult one. Ideology is arguably contained in all manner of languages, but is dependent upon a certain level of articulation. Hence, a collection of writings on politics are formulated ideologies, whilst the text of a speech, or the symbolism of a festival, within its historical context might be more appropriately accorded a looser description as a kind of political language. There have been sophisticated studies in other contexts of political ideas and action which employ the idea of interacting political languages. Some of the best examples of this look at the operation of *mentalité*, the overlapping of cultural languages and how they relate to national identity.²⁵ These approaches highlight the complementarity of political ideas espoused by individuals and groups, which are most effectively studied as something hybrid, or as a form of dialogue.²⁶ This book will argue that ideology relates closely to this looser definition of political language. This is because ideological transmission is the result of a multilinear

²⁵ See Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (London, 1984), especially pp. 62–5 and pp. 257–63.

²⁶ This has been discussed by D. A. Washbrook, 'Orient and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the British Empire', in Robin W. Winks, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. V: *Historiography* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 596–611.

communication between individuals and social groups. It is therefore best described as a dialogue or group of dialogues between different political languages.²⁷

Looking at historical events as a product of intersecting languages and dialogues is pertinent to our understanding of any complex historical movement. It is particularly so for the analysis of Congress nationalism, and indeed for public discourse about the Hindu community. Both were open to varied and diverse representations. Political languages and ideologies in UP were not necessarily closely related to social or 'class' interests. The provenance of symbols and forms of language and the meaning of political messages for those using them were perhaps more central.²⁸ Languages and ideologies introduce complexity and contradiction. Hence, as will be seen in the following pages, Congress secularists engaged in religious rhetoric; socialists at certain moments identified with positions more akin to the Hindu right and Muslim artisans involved themselves in Hindu festivals.

This book is particularly concerned with national languages and languages about the nation. It aims to demonstrate that such languages were stratified internally through different social dialects, the influences of group behaviour, professional jargons, and generic language. This analysis of intersecting dialects, jargons and languages has been a preoccupation of theorists concerned with literature, in particular the novel. One theorist has described such collections of languages as 'heteroglossia'.²⁹ Although this book deals with historical processes, it takes up the notion of heteroglossia as a methodology for understanding the social dynamics of political language.

For Bakhtin, the key to political language as 'heteroglossia' is the idea of the 'dialogue' – an intersection of two or more possibly contradictory languages or tendencies. Through their dialogic relationship, a meaning

²⁷ Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (Austin, 1981).

²⁸ See Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (London, 1993), p. 203. For Geertz, where a stress is placed on strategy or the 'interests' of social configurations, the individual psychological effects of ideology as a 'symbolic outlet' for emotional disturbance are ignored. To get to the bottom of this 'symbolic outlet', the student of ideology must get to grips with processes of symbolic formulation, to uncover 'systems of interacting symbols . . . [and] patterns of interworking meanings'.

²⁹ M. H. Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel', in Holquist, *The Dialogic Imagination*, pp. 262–71. Bakhtin goes into detail about the internal dialogism of single words – of the relationships of heteroglossia within them – but also makes the point that 'the living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specified environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to participate in social dialogue'.

quite different from the sum of their parts might result: the speaker's 'orientation towards the listener is an orientation towards a specific conceptual horizon, towards the specific world of the listener; it introduces totally new elements into his discourse'.³⁰ As will be seen in chapter 2, throughout the early 1930s UP Congress leaders organised meetings during religious festivals and bathing fairs. The symbolism for the nation which appeared in speeches and other forms of political imagery on these occasions naturally drew upon religious themes. But those themes acquired a different meaning through the audience response and environmental context of the religious festival. The result can be seen as a set of dialogic relationships between Congress agent, audience and the significance of the environment.

But there is more to an ideological utterance than the social space between speaker and listener. That social space can be distorted, changed or refracted by the internal heteroglossia of the meanings of the utterance itself. For Bakhtin, 'at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth'.³¹ Speech and writing in the name of the Congress in UP regularly employed comparisons between the British colonial state and the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb. But the image of Aurangzeb as oriental despot was largely derived from European scholarship, which compared Aurangzeb to English rulers. As an idea, then, the evocation of the Mughal past was one set of symbols with a range of internal dialogic dynamics.

Nevertheless, critical writing on post-colonial theory has suggested that a purely Bakhtinian contemplation of fragmentary or carnivalesque voices, seen in a dialogue, potentially leads to an intellectual cul-de-sac.³² Heteroglossia is a useful tool. But to study political language in relation to political action it is important to consider and re-emphasise two further dimensions: firstly, historical time and change and, secondly, institutional, political and social context. Here, it is useful to combine a dialogistic approach to political language with Quentin Skinner's ideas about intentionality and illocutionary force. Skinner's writings on 'meaning and understanding' help the historian to combine questions of intention and context when thinking about single utterances

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 282. ³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

³² Rosalind O'Hanlon and David Washbrook, 'After Orientalism: Culture, Criticism and Politics in the Third World', in Vinayak Chaturvedi, ed., *Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial* (London, 2000), pp. 209–19.

or collections of writings. As Skinner put it, it is necessary ‘to trace the relations between the given utterance and . . . [a] wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer’. Historical as well as linguistic context, then, is crucial. Moreover, an author’s meaning will often diverge from his or her intention, suggesting that it is important to look at the illocutionary force – *the act in the utterance* – rather than simply the utterance itself.³³ The problem, then, is not simply the relationships of meanings that manifest themselves within political languages, but, more importantly, how these meanings relate to political action. This book looks at how, for instance, the utterances of the Congress leader Sampurnanand on language and education issues related to forms of political action that could not have been guessed from language itself. Sampurnanand promoted the broader use of Sanskrit words in Hindi, which in itself was a matter of intellectual curiosity. But in the context of the late 1930s Congress ministries and the range of Sampurnanand’s other political activities, his comments on Hindi acquired a ‘communal’ meaning.

It seems clear that this approach offers a departure from assumptions that particular discourses are baldly tied to particular dynamics of social power. If instead discourses are the result of a more fluid overlapping of political languages, then it becomes difficult to talk of the specific ‘consciousness’ or political realms of discrete social groups. For example, it cannot be assumed that the realm of violent and communal political action is necessarily that of the ‘subaltern’. Of course, political power is *linked* to the languages that discourses produce. But this does not necessarily help us with political ideology. For the latter, it is more illuminating to look at the points where languages intersect rather than exclude each other. Such an approach allows the historian to make a more realistic assessment of the relationship between political ideas and action: it looks simultaneously at the external, contextual circumstances surrounding political language, alongside the particular social circumstances of the individual speaker. It does not put an *emphasis* on the power relationship between different forms of language, although it accepts that such a relationship might exist. If a study of political language helps the historian to study the effects of ideas on action, then there are new possibilities here for work on religious violence. As will be explained below and throughout the book, the phenomenon of ‘communalism’ was another site where different languages concerning the ‘Hindu’ elided at some moments and came into competition at others.

³³ Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in James Tully, ed., *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Oxford, 1988), p. 55.

Historiographical context, Congress and communalism

The assumption that communalism is a problem relating to institutions and agencies largely outside the Congress, as argued at the beginning of this introduction, has been the leitmotiv of nearly all writing on late colonial Uttar Pradesh. So far, there have been two broad trends in this historiography of communalism and nationalism. Firstly, a great deal of work has represented 'true' and modernising Indian nationalism as essentially battling against a communal other.³⁴ In these analyses, 'communalism' is a definite product of particular political circumstances in the colonial context. Secondly, and in contrast, other historians have found it difficult to argue that the 'problem' of communalism relates to specific moments, events and circumstances of the late colonial period. Instead, for these writers there are long-term social and regional bases for Hindu–Muslim estrangement, which make the more immediate activities of late colonial nationalist politicians less relevant. In the following pages it will be suggested that both of these interpretations encourage particular assumptions about UP Congress nationalism which are difficult to sustain in the light of Congress agents' diverse political languages.

The first historiographical tendency as introduced above, then, has viewed communalism and nationalism as 'emerging' phenomena. In this work, the UP Congress becomes an organisation with the fixed purpose of 'mass mobilisation', which is constrained in its nationalist development by becoming gradually aware of the divisiveness of communalism.³⁵ This book, in contrast, does not view nationalism as a predominantly 'modernising' force. Rather than charting nationalism's linear development, it will be suggested that Hindu ideologies and languages of politics related to discrete circumstances, and fluctuated rather than developed within the political context. Congress's relationship with Hindu nationalism was intermittent and changeable right up to the 1940s. Its use of religious symbolism was not easily explained on the level of a developing discourse and awareness of communalism, or through phases of public sphere and national activity.³⁶

³⁴ Gyanendra Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (Delhi, 1990), pp. 235–7.

³⁵ Pandey, *The Congress in Uttar Pradesh*.

³⁶ In contrast, Sandria Freitag has described nationalism in UP as the linking of two 'emerging' ideologies of nationalism and communalism within the 'public sphere'. Sandria B. Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 292–7. Gyanendra Pandey highlights the development of a discourse of 'pure' nationalism which gradually becomes more aware of the divisiveness of communal identity. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, pp. 235–7. As the 1930s progressed, communalism came

The second historiographical trend contrasts with this view of a linear, developing sense of communal identity and nationalism. In this second literature, there is the suggestion that it is possible to locate a long-term social basis for Hindu–Muslim estrangement in India. This estrangement is linked to the decline of the ‘qasbah’ Muslim gentry in one account, which focuses more on the early part of the nineteenth century,³⁷ and to the history of later-century Muslim separatism in another.³⁸ Congress’s failure to co-opt Muslims is connected in such arguments with social and economic competition and the appearance of political elites in north India that sponsored Hindi, Hindu revivalism and cow protection between the 1880s and 1920s. These elites have been linked to alliances between Hindu commercial groups, such as the Tandon family in Allahabad, and high-caste patrons of religious institutions, such as Madan Mohan Malaviya.³⁹ Patronage remained important into the 1930s and 1940s. But alongside this continuity very new kinds of political operators were involved by the 1930s. These changes and differing Congress personnel are explained by the more developed nature of Congress institutions, which complicated systems of political patronage by the 1930s.

There are other limitations to the long-term Hindu–Muslim estrangement argument. Emphasising historic social divisions between Hindus and Muslim elites in northern India does not fully explain the alienation of Muslims from Congress and the perpetuation of religious rhetoric at a more popular level. This is particularly the case after 1937 when the widened franchise gave this rhetoric a new political significance.

to be regarded, in Pandey’s analysis, ‘as a distorted and distorting tendency’. ‘Indian Nationalism as we know it – a nationalism that stood *above* (or outside) the different religious communities and took as its unit the individual Indian citizen, a ‘pure’ nationalism unsullied, in theory, by the ‘primordial’ pulls of caste, religious community, etc. – was, I suggest, rigorously conceptualised only in opposition to this notion of communalism.’

³⁷ See Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, pp. 335–45. The decline of the ‘qasbah’ Muslim gentry is described in comparison with Hindu commercial groups in north India. In a more recent work it has been suggested that Hindu–Muslim communal divergence, although rare in occurrence, can be recognised in an even earlier period. C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 27–9.

³⁸ Francis Robinson, ‘The Congress and the Muslims’, in Brass and Robinson, *Indian National Congress and Indian Society*, pp. 162–5. Robinson identifies four strands in theories about Hindu–Muslim estrangement – the idea of Muslim decline; the impact of an imperial system which sought partners and collaborators in government (which defined channels of patronage along lines of religious community); the argument that Congress was heavily influenced by Hindu symbolism; and, finally, the arguments about Muslim separatism. The vigorous Muslim revivalist movement in the early nineteenth century is described as being entangled with a Perso-Islamic tradition which always had its eyes turned away from India. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

³⁹ Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars*, pp. 455–6; See also C. A. Bayly, *The Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad 1880–1920* (Oxford, 1975), p. 217.