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

THE POLITICS OF EXILE IN RENAISSANCE ITALY

CHRISTINE SHAW

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Political exiles were a prominent feature of political life in Renaissance Italy, often a source of intense concern to the states from which they were banished, and a ready instrument for governments wishing to intervene in the affairs of their rivals and enemies. This book provides the first systematic analysis of the role of exiles in the political life of fifteenth-century Italy.

The main focus in on the experiences and reactions of the exiles, and on how Italian states dealt with their own exiles and those of other powers. Siena, notorious in the 1480s for the numbers of her citizens in exile, is used as the model to which other cities are compared. Such a detailed study of the phenomenon of exile also provides fresh perspectives on the nature and power of governments in fifteenth-century Italy, and on ideas about the legitimacy of political authority and political action.

CHRISTINE SHAW is Senior Research Fellow in the Department of History, University of Warwick.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Archival sources

ASF	Florence, Archivio di Stato, Archivio della Repubblica Otto di Guardia (repubblica) Otto di Pratica, Carteggi, Responsive Otto di Pratica, Missive interne Dieci di Balìa, Carteggi, Responsive Dieci di Balìa, Legazioni e Commissarie Signori, Carteggi, Responsive Signori, Missive, Minutari Signori, Dieci di Balìa, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, Missive e Responsive Medici avanti il Principato (MAP)
ASMa, AGonzaga	Mantua, Archivio di Stato, Archivio Gonzaga, Serie E, xxv
ASMi, ASforzesco	Milan, Archivio di Stato, Archivio Sforzesco, Potenze Estere
ASMo	Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale, Carteggio Ambasciatori
ACapitolino	Rome, Archivio Capitolino, Archivio Orsini, Serie I
ASS	Siena, Archivio di Stato Balìa Concistoro Consiglio Generale Notarile ante Cosimiano Particolari Famiglie Senesi Archivio Sergardi-Biringucci

ASTodi	Todi, Archivio Comunale, Archivio Secreto di San Fortunato, 55 (Lettere al Comune)
ASV	Venice, Archivio di Stato Consiglio dei Dieci Senato, Deliberazioni segrete (Senatus Secreta)

Manuscript diaries and histories

'Diario senese'	'Diario senese dal 1479 al 1500, scritto da uno contemporaneo', Archivio di Stato di Siena, MS D58
'Frammento di diario senese'	'Frammento di diario sanese d'incerto autore', Biblioteca Comunale degl'Intronati, Siena, MS B.III.2, 'Storie di Siena di vari', ff. 215r–225r
Tizio, 'Historiarum senensium'	Sigismondo Tizio, 'Historiarum senensium', vol. VI, Biblioteca Comunale degl'Intronati, Siena, MS B.III.11
Tommasi, 'Istorie'	Giugurta Tommasi, 'Istorie di Siena, Parte II', Biblioteca Comunale degl'Intronati, Siena, MS A.X.74

Printed sources

AMSPPR	*Atti e memorie della R. Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Provincie di Romagna*
ASI	*Archivio storico italiano*
ASL	*Archivio storico lombardo*
ASLSP	*Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria*
ASPN	*Archivio storico per le province napoletane*
ASRSP	*Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria*
BSPU	*Bollettino della Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per l'Umbria*
BSSP	*Bullettino senese di storia patria*
Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*	Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, ed. Riccardo Fubini (vols. I–II), Nicolai Rubinstein (vols. II–IV), Michael Mallett (vols. V–VI) (Florence, 1977-90)
RIS	Rerum italicarum scriptores, ed. L. Muratori (Milan, 1723–51)
RRIISS	Rerum italicarum scriptores, new edn (Bologna and Città di Castello, 1900–)

INTRODUCTION: THE WHEEL OF FORTUNE

> Every day these exiles seem to me to be in worse condition – they flock together like starlings, and they are discontented, and they have spread many rumours, as those who have been turned out do, which are not very pleasing to your friends.[1]

Much of the experience of political exiles in Renaissance Italy is encapsulated in this quotation from a report by a Sienese ambassador in Rome in March 1485 – their clustering together with other exiles from their home to seek support, and comfort; their financial difficulties and their periods of discouragement; their efforts to undermine the regime back home that had driven them away; the close surveillance by the agents and friends of their political enemies, a token of the threat they were considered to be; and the hostility and disparagement with which those enemies spoke of them and treated them. Another common aspect of the experience of exiles is also exemplified by this report of the ambassador, Guidantonio Buoninsegni. Only a few years before he had himself been in exile in Rome, and the year after he spoke so scornfully of the opponents of the regime in Siena he fell foul of it himself, and was once again in Rome as an exile. Many an exile did return, sometimes to be reconciled to his opponents, sometimes to take his revenge on them. Many a member of the political elites of Italy knew what it was like to be bound to fortune's wheel.

Not all the political exiles of Renaissance Italy behaved like these discontented Sienese, intriguing in Rome in 1485. Some lived peacefully where they had been sent, trying to win the favour of the government back home, or building a new life for themselves elsewhere. Some were exiled princes, treated with honour, entertained at courts. The exile as solitary, disconsolate wanderer, pining for home, family and friends – one of the most universal of all literary topoi from ancient Rome to

[1] ASS, Concistoro 2457, 90: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 21 Mar. 1484(5), Rome.

modern Latin America, from the poetry of the Vikings to the writings of Dante – is perhaps the figure least frequently found in reality in Renaissance Italy. There the proverbial exiles of everyday political life were the 'starlings', banding together, doing all they could to return.

These starlings could be much more than a noisy nuisance: they could be a cause of disorder and political turmoil, not just in their place of origin but far beyond. Often they could turn to powerful friends in other states, or to factional allies, or simply to the enemies of their enemies, and find encouragement, diplomatic help, money, perhaps troops. Few conflicts between Italian states could not provide an opening for some group of exiles or other to pursue their own goals. Employing the exiles of a rival state to annoy or threaten its government was a common ploy in the diplomacy and warfare of Renaissance Italy, even in the period between the Peace of Lodi of 1454 and the beginning of the Italian Wars in 1494. Focusing this study of exiles on the second half of the fifteenth century provides an opportunity to see how they fared at times when there was general peace in Italy as well as during times of conflict, and to assess the impact of the disruption of the political system of Italy brought about by the French, with the conquest of Naples by Charles VIII in 1494, and of Milan by Louis XII in 1499–1500.

It is the practical realities of political exile, and the practical consequences for the states of Renaissance Italy of the ferment produced by political exiles, with which this book is concerned, not exile as a literary topos or a state of mind. The first chapter is intended to serve as both an examination of the circumstances that gave rise to political exile, and an introduction to the more important individuals and groups of exiles that figure in later chapters. In the rest of the book, the experiences of exiles from one state, Siena, are highlighted and compared with those of exiles from elsewhere in Italy. How were sentences determined, and by whom? What other penalties might be imposed on exiles? Where were they sent, and where did they actually go? How did they support themselves? What happened to their families? How far did governments try to track and control their exiles, and how successfully did they do this when they tried? What did exiles who did not reconcile themselves to their fate try to do about it? Where did they turn for help and with what success? In what circumstances did exiles return home?

At least partial answers to all of these questions can be found in the Sienese archives. Siena was chosen for particular scrutiny in this study not only because of the sheer numbers of Sienese exiles – running into thousands – during this period, and their significance in Sienese political life, but also because of the abundance of information on the exiles to

be found in the surviving records. Enough information has been found on 610 Sienese exiled for political reasons between 1456 and 1500, some of them exiled more than once and thus providing a total of 691 cases of exile, to make possible some statistical analysis. Until similar studies have been done on the exiles of other states, it is not possible to be sure how far the experiences of Sienese exiles were representative of other Italian political exiles. But there is enough information available in print, notably for Florence but for other states as well, to allow some comparisons to be made. It is regrettable that more information is not available on those exiled by princes who were not members of the prince's own families, so that it would be possible to make more systematic comparisons of the exiles from republics with those from principalities.

This is the first time such a comparative study has been made of political exiles in fifteenth-century Italy. Randolph Starn's *Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy* (1982) is principally concerned with the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries; the section on Renaissance Italy is largely concerned with Florentine exiles in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. For Starn, exiles in fifteenth-century Italy were not only less numerous than in the thirteenth, but were so closely supervised by the stronger and better organized Renaissance states that they were more inclined to accept their fate with resignation than to resist:

> There were still outlaws, bandits, and *fuorusciti* of course. But with the parceling out of Italy among something like territorial states the land-based and urban strategies of exiles during an earlier age could be more closely controlled. Internal consolidation extending watchful institutions and intensifying pressures for ideological conformity within each political unit left still less room for the brash maneuvers and clear consciences of exiles in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.[2]

Jacques Heers in his *L'exil, la vie politique et la société* (French edition first published in 1995) also deals with the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, and also concentrates on the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The examples he draws on for the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries come largely from Florence and Genoa. To a greater extent than Starn's, Heers's treatment of the subject of political exile touches on themes that are discussed here, but not in a way that facilitates comparisons between the later fifteenth century and the earlier periods. Heers treats the period as a whole, and does not consider how changes in the political life and the political structures of Italy from the early

[2] Randolph Starn, *Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy* (Berkeley, 1982), p. 87.

fourteenth to the later fifteenth century shaped the incidence and experience of political exile.

But political exile in the second half of the fifteenth century was a more widespread and more significant phenomenon than Starn argues or Heers implies. Most regimes, princely or republican, had opponents in exile. Many of the principal actors in Italian politics had at least one episode of exile in their career. All regimes were prepared to manipulate the exiles of others for their own advantage, if the opportunity arose. The political life of Renaissance Italy cannot be properly understood unless the practice and experience of exile is appreciated as one of its defining characteristics.

CHAPTER I

INTO EXILE

Italy was not the only region of Western Europe in which there were political exiles in the later fifteenth century. When Henry VI fled to Scotland after the defeat of his supporters at the battle of Towton in March 1461, he was not unusual among the English kings of the fifteenth century in having personal experience of exile. 'His grandfather [Henry IV] had won the kingdom from exile; Henry's successor [Edward IV] was to recover it from exile. Starting out from exile . . . his nephew, Henry Tudor, was likewise to secure a kingdom for himself in 1485.'[1] The future Louis XI of France took refuge at the court of the Duke of Burgundy in 1456, and he did not return to France until he came to take possession of the French throne in 1461 after his father's death. But if the highest in the land knew exile in England and France, as some members of Italian ruling families did, there do not seem to have been the equivalents there of the exiles from civic strife that were so common in Italy. Towns in England, France and Spain, even the great cities of the Low Countries, did not have the degree or type of political independence that gave rise to the kind of contest for power that resulted in the exile of political opponents. The Imperial cities of the Holy Roman Empire had greater autonomy and powers of self-government. Although only a few had their own territories, like the *contado* so jealously guarded by Italian towns and cities, some could appear familiar political entities to Italian travellers. The city of Ulm, for instance, was described by one traveller from Italy as 'a big town, governed as a free republic, rich and full of merchants'.[2] Civic strife and contests for power in such cities could result in the exile of the vanquished. One such exile was the pioneer printer Johann Gutenberg,

[1] Bertram Wolffe, *Henry VI* (London, 1983), p. 333.
[2] F. R. H. Du Boulay, *Germany in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 1983), p. 118.

who was banished twice, for long periods, from his native city of Mainz.

Nevertheless, nowhere else in Western Europe could rival Italy for the sheer numbers of political exiles. In Italy, it was not just men wielding power in large, rich cities governing extensive territories, independent republics such as Florence or Venice, who considered that they had the right to exile their political rivals. Men in towns subject to such cities, or to a prince, men in backwoods communities that had little to fight over but the meagre fruits of office or the exploitation of communal property, might also consider that they had the legal power to expel their rivals. The fragmentation of political authority in mediaeval Italy had meant that many towns, not just the great merchant cities, had come to see themselves as autonomous political entities, and the patterns of thought and behaviour that had developed in the turbulence of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries persisted, even when such towns had fallen under the domination of a larger neighbour or of a prince. The tradition that those who held power in a commune had the right to exclude and expel their rivals was widespread and firmly rooted (even if it might be contested, in the case of subject towns, by their superiors). If political differences appeared irreconcilable, not amenable to compromise, the exile of those worsted in the contest was the usual way of removing them from the scene. Long-term imprisonment was rare in Renaissance Italy. Locking up large numbers of political opponents for lengthy periods was not an option, though small groups might be incarcerated by a confident regime with secure prisons at its disposal. Political executions of those found guilty of political crimes were infrequent too, and regarded as shocking, unless it was for an act such as an assassination attempt. Political executions for which there was less obvious justification were regarded as vindictive, and harmed the reputation of a regime at home and abroad. Exiling political opponents might be regarded as injudicious, or even in some cases unjust, but would not attract anything like the same adverse comment.

There were exiles from independent republics and from subject towns, from the kingdom of Naples and from other *signorie*, large and small. There were disgraced courtiers, members of ruling families, the leaders and the foot-soldiers of urban factions, sober professional men who had been defeated in political disputes, men who had contravened the rules governing elections to political office in their city, men who had tried to assassinate their rivals. Within this varied multitude, four broad categories of exiles can be distinguished. The first comprised the members of ruling or at least dominant families, who were the losers in dynastic quarrels. Some were expelled by their rivals, some by other

powers – intervention by Italian states in the dynastic disputes of their neighbours was a frequent occurrence, and required little excuse other than self-interest. Opponents of such dynasties, who rebelled against them or challenged their rule, formed the second category; those who contested the policies or structure of republican government the third. The fourth, the most numerous, was those who had been defeated in struggles between political factions. Not all exiles fall neatly into one or other of these categories, as we shall see, but they do provide some help in understanding the circumstances in which so many fifteenth-century Italians were forced into political exile.

Exiles who fell into the first category included some of the most prominent individuals who found themselves in that predicament in fifteenth-century Italy. A future Duke of Milan, more than one King of Naples, several past or future Doges of Genoa, members of several signorial families, all spent some time in exile. The uncertain legitimacy of the position of many ruling families, the lack of fixed rules of succession, a disposition to regard states as a kind of family property which could be divided up among family members, all contributed to the stock of banished aspiring or deposed *signori*, of various degrees of power and rank. The French invasions of Italy in 1494 and 1499–1500 were the cause, direct or indirect, of the exile of many more.

The reluctance by younger brothers to accept the right of the eldest to be sole ruler of the state was the root of the disputes that wracked the Sforza dynasty in Milan in the late 1470s and early 1480s, and led to the exile of several of its members. Galeazzo Maria, the eldest legitimate son, who succeeded his father Francesco as duke in 1466, relished his role as prince of one of the most powerful states of Italy. Two of his brothers, Sforza Maria and Lodovico, may have conspired to kill him. In November 1476, a few months after this plot was supposed to have been hatched, they were sent to France. Galeazzo Maria claimed that they were going of their own accord, because they wanted to 'see the world', but it was clear that they were, in effect, going into exile.[3]

Within days of their arrival at the French court, on 26 December 1476, Galeazzo Maria was assassinated by a group of young Milanese patricians. Sforza Maria and Lodovico immediately returned to Milan. There Galeazzo Maria's widow Bona had assumed the regency for her young son Giangaleazzo Maria, and she was supported by Cicco Simonetta, the powerful ducal secretary. Even before the Sforza brothers returned from France, a conspiracy was brewing in Milan to make

[3] A. Dina, 'Lodovico il Moro prima della sua venuta al governo', *ASL* 13 (1886), 764, 766; Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. II, p. 534.

Sforza Maria head of the government, if not duke; but the arrest of one of the leading conspirators, Ettore da Vimercate, put an end to that design. The Sforza brothers claimed that Francesco had never intended that Galeazzo Maria should rule alone, but that they all should have had a share in the government. They came to terms with Bona, promising to live in Milan, although she really wanted them to leave and tried to arrange this by asking Milan's allies to give them *condotte*.[4]

It was Cicco Simonetta who brought matters to a head by ordering the arrest of a veteran *condottiere* of the Sforza, Donato del Conte, who was alleged to know all about the conspiracy against him and the duchess. The brothers Sforza Maria, Lodovico, Ottaviano and Ascanio, together with their cousin Roberto da Sanseverino, mustered what forces they could and tried to arouse the people, but met with little response. Sforza Maria, Lodovico and Ascanio submitted, while Ottaviano, the youngest brother, panicked and fled, drowning as he tried to ford the River Adda. Roberto, whom Bona treated as the main conspirator, a disloyal ingrate who had suborned her brothers-in-law, also fled. He was condemned as a rebel; the three surviving Sforza brothers who had taken part in the rising were ordered into exile. They returned home in 1479: a combination of Roberto da Sanseverino's military skills and support for the brothers in Milan and elsewhere in the duchy brought about the submission of several towns to them, and induced Bona to negotiate. Sforza Maria had died suddenly during the campaign, but Lodovico and Roberto were back in Milan in September 1479, and Ascanio joined them the following month.[5]

Three days after Lodovico came back, Cicco Simonetta was arrested; he was executed a year later. The power struggle at the Milanese court is difficult to decipher, but Lodovico was the undoubted victor. Ascanio, who also aspired to a role in the government, was sent into exile again in early March 1480, accused of intriguing with the leaders of the Ghibellines in Milan and with the Neapolitan ambassador. In October, Lodovico was involved in manoeuvres that separated the young duke from his mother, and forced her to agree to the immediate exile of her favourite, Antonio Tassini, and his father from the duchy

[4] Ibid., pp. 523–35; Riccardo Fubini, 'Osservazioni e documenti sulla crisi del Ducato di Milano nel 1477' in Sergio Bertelli and Gloria Ramakus (eds.), *Essays Presented to Myron P. Gilmore*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1978), vol. I, pp. 47–103; Carlo de' Rosmini, *Dell' istoria di Milano*, 4 vols. (Milan, 1820), vol. IV, pp. 158–62.

[5] Carlo de' Rosmini, *Dell'istoria intorno alle militari imprese e alla vita di Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio detto il Magno*, 2 vols. (Milan, 1885), vol. I, pp. 61–77, vol. II, pp. 16–19, 20–4, 41–62; Rosmini, *Dell' istoria di Milano*, vol. IV, pp. 163–5; Bernardino Corio, *Storia di Milano*, 3 vols. (Milan, 1857, 1975), vol. III, pp. 319–22; Franco Catalano, *Lodovico il Moro* (Milan, 1985), pp. 26–8; Caterina Santoro, *Gli Sforza* (n.p., 1968), pp. 206–14.

for ten years. The departure of Tassini and the loss of custody of her son left Bona desperate. She declared her intention of leaving Milan: she had thought of returning to her family in Savoy, but she was compelled to go to the castle of Abbiategrasso and to stay there.[6]

Lodovico was now the dominant member of the government in Milan, but he was still not the undisputed master. Roberto da Sanseverino, for one, was an influential figure, but he became increasingly estranged from Lodovico. He felt slighted and sidelined, but the last straw seems to have been when his pay as a *condottiere* began to fall into arrears. In October 1481 he left Milan for his castle at Castelnuovo. In January 1482 he was given an ultimatum: either he came to Milan within two days, or he must leave the duchy. When he did not come, troops were sent against him, and in early February he escaped into exile.[7] Ascanio Sforza came back to Milan in September 1482. He was given an honourable role in the government, but one clearly subordinate to that of Lodovico. The diplomatic pressure Lodovico brought to bear on the pope, which finally procured a cardinal's hat for Ascanio in March 1484, had a dual motive. It secured a position of honour and influence for his brother, and it provided a good reason to send him away from Milan.[8]

The d'Este of Ferrara had been established as a ruling family for much longer than the Sforza, but no rules of succession had become fixed. Niccolò d'Este, just before his death in 1441, ordered that he should be succeeded by his natural sons Lionello and Borso, with his much younger legitimate son, Ercole, being placed only third in line. On Lionello's death in 1450, he was duly succeeded by Borso, but Lionello's young son Niccolò grew up believing that he, not Ercole, should be Borso's heir. As Borso lay gravely ill in the summer of 1471, Ercole and Niccolò squared up to dispute the succession. Ercole had the support of Venice, Niccolò of his mother's family, the Gonzaga of Mantua. When Borso died, Ercole waited until Venetian ships had reached Ferrara along the Po before proclaiming the death of the duke and his own succession. Niccolò and his Gonzaga relatives could do nothing, and he

[6] Santoro, *Gli Sforza*, pp. 216–26; Rosmini, *Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio*, vol. I, pp. 78–90, vol. II, pp. 62–75; Rosmini, *Dell' istoria di Milano*, vol. IV, pp. 178–221; Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. V, pp. 41–2, 93; Marco Pellegrini, 'Ascanio Maria Sforza: la creazione di un cardinale "di famiglia"' in Giorgio Chittolini (ed.), *Gli Sforza, la Chiesa lombarda, la corte di Roma. Strutture e pratiche beneficiarie nel ducato di Milano (1450–1535)* (Naples, 1989), pp. 258–62; Zelmira Arici, *Bona di Savoia, Duchessa di Milano (1449–1503)* (Turin, 1935), pp. 146–63.

[7] Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. VI, pp. 64–5, 101, 153–4, 172, 194–5, 209, 229–30, 258, 269.

[8] Pellegrini, 'Ascanio Maria Sforza', pp. 262–8.

had to stay in exile in Mantua, where he had been sent by Borso. He tried to depose Ercole in September 1476 but found little support in the city, and was captured and executed. Another member of his family to cause Ercole concern was his half-brother Alfonso. Alfonso had supported Ercole when he took power in 1471, and his only offence may have been his personal popularity in Ferrara. Nevertheless, Ercole sent him into exile in 1474, and despite further proofs of his loyalty, Alberto was kept away from Ferrara for a decade.[9]

In the case of two old-established families of Romagnol *signori*, the Ordelaffi and Manfredi, family quarrels and succession disputes not only led to exile for some members of the families, but also provided openings for an ambitious papal *nipote*, Girolamo Riario, to take over their states.

It was another will stipulating the succession of one brother to another that was at the root of the dispute among the Manfredi of Faenza in the 1470s. By the terms of their father's will, Galeotto Manfredi was to succeed his brother Carlo as *signore* of Faenza, but they quarrelled and Galeotto and another brother, Lanzalotto, were sent away from Faenza in 1476. By late 1477 Carlo was very ill, and on 2 October a fourth brother, Federico, who was Bishop of Faenza and had been acting as Carlo's lieutenant, made the Faentini swear fealty to Ottaviano, Carlo's young son, as his heir. A first attempt by Galeotto to return failed in October, but a second attempt on 16 November, the day after a popular uprising against grain speculation by Federico, was successful, and Galeotto was greeted rapturously by the Faentini. He also had troops from Girolamo Riario, Pino Ordelaffi of Forlì, Bologna and Venice to back him up. Carlo and Federico, who had retreated to the fortress in the city, sent to Naples for help. King Ferrante sent 40 squadrons to Fano, and tried to negotiate an agreement to keep Carlo in power. As Florence and Milan also decided to back Galeotto, Ferrante had to yield. When no help arrived from Ferrante, Carlo surrendered on 9 December, and left for Ferrara and then for Naples; Federico had already fled.[10]

Exploitation by Galeazzo Maria Sforza of a family dispute among another branch of the Manfredi resulted in their exile and the loss of

[9] Antonio Capelli, 'Niccolò di Leonello d'Este', *Atti e memorie delle RR. Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Province Modenesi e Parmensi* 5 (1870), 413–38; Thomas Tuohy, *Herculean Ferrara: Ercole d'Este, 1471–1505, and the Invention of a Ducal Capital* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 42.

[10] Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. II, pp. 411–14, 438–43, 448–9; Anonimo Veronese, *Cronaca 1466–88*, ed. G. Soranzo (Venice, 1915), pp. 331–2; *Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium*, ed. A. Sorbelli, RRIISS, 18, i (Città di Castello, 1906–Bologna, 1940) pp. 446–7; Andrea Bernardi, *Cronache forlivesi dal 1476 al 1517*, ed. Giuseppe Mazzatinti, 3 vols. (Bologna, 1895–7), vol. I, pp. 16–20.

their state, Imola. Galeazzo Maria won over Guidaccio, the son of the lord of Imola, Taddeo Manfredi, by the promise of the hand of his illegitimate daughter Caterina. When Taddeo was suspected of intriguing to sell Imola to Venice, Guidaccio asked the duke to send a Milanese garrison. Galeazzo Maria did so, and then came to terms with Taddeo, who ceded Imola to him on 31 December 1471. Taddeo Manfredi agreed to leave Imola in May 1473, in return for the promise of a fief in the duchy of Milan; his sons had to join him in exile. In October of that year Galeazzo Maria agreed to sell Imola, for 40,000 ducats, to Girolamo Riario. It became, in effect, part of the dowry of Caterina Sforza, to whom Riario had been betrothed in January. Taddeo did not get the promised fief, but was instead given a pension by Galeazzo Maria, on condition that he did not return to Imola, while Guidaccio was married off to a distant relative of the duke.[11]

Forlì came into the hands of Girolamo Riario because of a family quarrel among the Ordelaffi. In 1468 Cecco Ordelaffi had been ousted, imprisoned and murdered by his brother Pino, with whom he had shared the lordship of Forlì. Cecco's wife and children managed to escape from prison into exile after his death. Pino died in 1480, leaving a natural son, Sinibaldo, who was only about twelve years old, to succeed him. Cecco's sons, Antonio Maria and Francesco, were invited by the people of Forlì to come to take over the *signoria*. They arrived in Forlì on 8 July and immediately took possession of the town, but the citadel was held by Sinibaldo and his stepmother. The brothers' success brought them covert encouragement and the prospect of help from Florence and Milan, but neither power was willing to commit itself too openly to them for fear of offending Pope Sixtus IV, Girolamo Riario's uncle. Riario wanted Forlì for himself; Ferrante of Naples and, more reluctantly, Milan and Florence agreed to this as part of the complex series of negotiations being carried on among the Italian powers that summer. When the Duke of Urbino arrived with troops on behalf of the pope in early August, sent reinforcements into the fortress and called on the citizens to choose whom they would support, they decided they had, perforce, to submit to the pope. The Ordelaffi brothers left, and a week later Sinibaldo Ordelaffi died, apparently from natural causes, although there were inevitable rumours of foul play. The way was clear for Girolamo Riario to be invested with the *signoria* of Forlì.[12]

[11] Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. I, pp. 443–5; Anonimo Veronese, *Cronaca*, p. 290; Ernst Breisach, *Caterina Sforza: A Renaissance Virago* (Chicago, 1967), pp. 17–18, 21, 268, 271; Santoro, *Gli Sforza*, pp. 140–1.

[12] Breisach, *Caterina Sforza*, pp. 43–6, 277–8; Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. V, pp. 28–33, 47–9, 68; Anonimo Veronese, *Cronaca*, p. 355; ASMi, ASforzesco,

Elsewhere in the Papal States, Niccolò Vitelli's attempt to establish himself as the unofficial *signore* of Città di Castello cost him years in exile, not least because his ousted rivals found favour in Rome. In April 1468, while the papal governor was absent, Niccolò secretly brought two hundred peasants into Città di Castello and attacked the houses of his rivals the Fucci and Giustini, several of whom were killed. Those who escaped the slaughter took their complaints to Rome, where Amadeo Giustini and his son Lorenzo had the ear of Pope Paul II. The pope sent a legate to order Niccolò either to appear before him or to leave Città di Castello and stay at least fifty miles away. Niccolò refused to do either. Finally, an embassy from the city, which included Niccolò's son Giovanni, went to the pope in February 1470, and came to terms with him.[13]

Lorenzo Giustini continued to find favour under the new pope, Sixtus IV, and soon became attached to Girolamo Riario. Sixtus declared his intention of ensuring that Niccolò lived as a citizen and not as a *signore*. In late June 1474 a papal army led by another *nipote* of Sixtus, Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, arrived before Città di Castello. After a siege lasting two months, Niccolò agreed to leave Città di Castello with his family, and stay at least fifteen miles away; he departed on 31 August. According to the terms of his surrender, Lorenzo Giustini and his father Amedeo were not to be allowed to stay in Città di Castello either, although the other exiles would be.[14]

Niccolò enjoyed the protection of Florence, where his friends and contacts included the Medici. In June 1482, when Florence and the pope were at war, a substantial force of Florentine troops was sent to restore the Vitelli to Città di Castello. Even before they arrived, Niccolò had appeared at the gates of the city with a large number of partisans and infantry and had been welcomed in. When negotiations opened between the pope and the league of Florence, Milan and Naples in late 1482, the fate of the Vitelli and Città di Castello was one of the more difficult issues under debate. It was rendered more difficult by the fact that the envoy negotiating for the pope in Naples, where the talks were taking place, was Lorenzo Giustini. In February 1483, the Florentines were forced to concede that Niccolò Vitelli and his family should leave. A campaign against Città di Castello was launched by papal troops in June, with Lorenzo Giustini as one of the commanders. The

b. 300: Antonio da Ghiacato to Signoria of Florence, 8 Aug. 1480, Castrocaro; ibid., Captain of Castrocaro to Otto di Pratica of Florence, 9 Aug. 1480.

[13] G. Nicasi, 'La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la repubblica fiorentina fino al 1504', *BSPU* 15 (1909), 138–40.

[14] Ibid., 142–3; Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. II, pp. 31–2.

capture of Niccolò's son Camillo in January 1484 at last induced him to think of surrendering, and in early April he left for Rome to come to terms with the pope. He had to agree to go into exile where the pope ordered, and that Sixtus should make provision for the safety of Lorenzo Giustini. But Niccolò himself was given an appointment as papal governor of the Campagna and Marittima, and his four sons were given papal *condotte*.[15]

In August 1485, there was a formal peace-making between the factions in Città di Castello, and in September Niccolò was allowed to return there. After his death in January 1486, his sons succeeded to his position of superiority in the city. One of them, Paolo, took revenge on Lorenzo Giustini, who had remained in Rome, by murdering him in October 1487. Paolo was condemned to death, but then Innocent VIII commuted the sentence to ten years' exile – meaning exile from Rome, not from Città di Castello.[16]

In Genoa the office of Doge, head of the republic, was disputed by members of one family, the Campofregoso, both among themselves and with their rivals, the Adorno. In theory, Doges (who had to be *popolari*, not nobles) were elected for life; in practice, Doges came to power after faction-fighting or as the outcome of (often obscure) power-broking. Members of both the Adorno and the Campofregoso, the defeated or the disgruntled, spent many years in exile, and rarely stayed in office more than a few years.

In the middle of the fifteenth century it was the Campofregoso who were dominant in Genoa. In September 1450, Pietro Campofregoso was elected Doge to succeed another member of the family, Lodovico, who had been deposed. Pietro managed to survive as Doge for eight years – which was no mean achievement – but his dictatorial ways soon made him unpopular. Among the enemies he made were several of his relatives. One, Niccolò, he assassinated himself in May 1452, with the help of Niccolò's brother Spinetta, only to lose the support of Spinetta 18 months later. Spinetta left Genoa to join the exiles, as Niccolò's sons had done after their father's death.[17]

The Doge also had an enemy in King Alfonso of Naples, who was

[15] Nicasi, 'La famiglia Vitelli', 149–53, 157–8, 161–8, 222–33, 237–8.

[16] Ibid., 168–71.

[17] ASMi, ASforzesco, bb. 407–9; for accounts of Genoese politics and the activities of the exiles using this material see Adriana Sambati, 'I carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi relativi alla serie Genova (1450–1454)', *ASL* 98–100 (1971–3), 159–207; Chiara Prandini, 'I carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi relativi alla serie Genova (1450–1454)', ibid., 208–46, and Giovanna Balbi, 'Uomini d'arme e di cultura nel Quattrocento genovese: Biagio Assereto', *ASLSP* 76 (1962), 97–206.

intent on making war on Genoa, and was ready to use the exiles. Rather than agree to Alfonso's insistence that the Adorno should return, in February 1458 the Doge and his council agreed to cede Genoa to the French; Pietro left for exile in May. He soon repented of his bargain, and died in September 1459 attempting to force his way back into the city. The French had already expelled some of his relatives, including his brothers, Tommasino and Paolo, Archbishop of Genoa.[18]

In March 1461, the people of Genoa revolted, the exiles returned, and immediately the Adorno and Campofregoso began a contest for the Dogeship. A peace was negotiated between Prospero Adorno and Archbishop Paolo Campofregoso, and on 12 March Prospero Adorno was elected Doge with the agreement of the archbishop. When Charles VII sent a fleet against Genoa in early July, among those who fought hard in the battle to defeat the French were several Campofregoso. As they arrived back at Genoa 'all bloody, sweaty and exhausted by such a cruel and fierce battle', Prospero Adorno sent to tell them not to enter the city. Naturally, the Campofregoso were not prepared to obey, and they were the victors in the ensuing street fight; Prospero Adorno hastily departed.[19] Dissension and competition among the Campofregoso continued, with Paolo and Lodovico alternating as Doge for the next three years.

Negotiating the peaceful submission of Genoa to Milanese rule after Louis XI had formally invested Francesco Sforza with Genoa as a fief of the French crown in December 1463 was a delicate matter, not least because the incumbent Doge, Paolo Campofregoso, was very reluctant to relinquish his office. As the Milanese occupied more of the Riviera, and the other Campofregoso refused to put aside their quarrels and unite behind him, he at last decided to go, leaving by sea on the night of 24–5 March 1464.[20] The Genoese seemed to settle down under the rule of Francesco Sforza and, when he died in March 1466, accepted Galeazzo Maria without hesitation.

By their standards, the Genoese proved remarkably patient under Galeazzo Maria's government. But after his assassination in December 1476 weakened the Milanese government, the Fieschi, the powerful noble family, gathered their forces and entered Genoa in March 1477,

[18] Emilio Nunziante, 'I primi anni di Ferdinando d'Aragona e l'invasione di Giovanni d'Angiò', *ASPN* 17 (1892), 353–6, 753–67, 19 (1894), 59–96, 300–14; Agostino Giustiniani, *Annali della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. G. B. Spotorno, 2 vols. (Genoa, 1854), vol. II, pp. 409–18.

[19] Franco Catalano, *Francesco Sforza* (Milan, 1984), pp. 229–33, 282–3; Giustiniani, *Annali*, vol. II, pp. 420–32.

[20] Ibid., pp. 439–43; Catalano, *Francesco Sforza*, pp. 306–8, 312–22.

routing the Milanese troops there. Other faction leaders, including Paolo Campofregoso, hurried to the city. Members of the Adorno faction offered their support to the Milanese if Prospero Adorno was released from the fortress of Cremona, where he had been imprisoned. Prospero was freed, and joined the Milanese troops being despatched to put down the rebellion. As he neared the city, two thousand partisans came to join him, and on 11 April marched on Genoa with him. After fierce fighting, he defeated Paolo Campofregoso and Obietto, the leader of the Fieschi, and entered Genoa in triumph, becoming not Doge, but governor on behalf of Milan.[21]

By early 1478 the Milanese wanted to dismiss him from the governorship, but Prospero forestalled this move, and with the backing of the *popolo* became the independent governor of Genoa. The Milanese tried to recover Genoa through the return of another exile, Battista Campofregoso, son of the former Doge Pietro, promising to recognize him as Doge if he could procure his own election. Battista returned to Genoa in October 1478; the Milanese troops still occupying the fortresses in Genoa surrendered them to him. When the Campofregoso brought their men out onto the streets on 25 November, Prospero Adorno abandoned the palace without a fight, and left for exile again. Three days later, Battista Campofregoso was elected Doge. While affirming his loyalty to Milan, Battista informed the Milanese of his determination to preserve the independence of Genoa. He seems to have shared his power with other Campofregoso; but in November 1483 he was deposed by his own family and faction. His deposition caused no trouble: it was regarded almost as a private matter of the Campofregoso. He was replaced as Doge by Paolo Campofregoso, who since 1480 had been a cardinal as well as Archbishop of Genoa.[22] Battista went into exile, nursing schemes to revenge himself.

Paolo Campofregoso was unable to hold on to power for more than a few years. In order to try to conserve his position, he was prepared to submit Genoa to Milan again; Lodovico Sforza was more than ready to accept and terms were agreed in July 1487. Obietto and Gianluigi Fieschi plotted against Paolo with Agostino and Giovanni Adorno (who, like the Fieschi, had been staying outside Genoa because of their

[21] Catalano, *Ludovico il Moro*, pp. 14–15, 33; Rosmini, *Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio*, vol. II, pp. 13–14; Antonio Gallo, *Commentarii rerum genuensium*, ed. E. Pandiani, RRIISS, 23, i (Città di Castello, 1911), pp. 39–48.

[22] Gallo, *Commentarii*, pp. 51, 61–2, 75–8; Rosmini, *Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio*, vol. II, pp. 37–8; Lorenzo de' Medici, *Lettere*, vol. III, pp. 318–19; Giustiniani, *Annali*, vol. II, pp. 536–7; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 993: Gianfrancesco Pasqualigi to Giovanni Mocenigo, Doge of Venice, 24 Nov. 1483, Genoa.

opposition to the cardinal) and with Battista Campofregoso, still hungry for revenge against his uncle. In early August 1488, Battista Campofregoso and the Fieschi came to the city with armed men, and the cardinal fled to the main fortress, the Castelletto, pursued by Battista. Agostino and Giovanni Adorno also returned, warmly welcomed by their supporters.[23] Some Genoese wanted to be under Milan, some under France; some wanted to be independent. At last it was agreed that Battista Campofregoso would have to return to exile, and that Genoa should once more be ruled by Milan, on the same terms as before. On 11 September, Agostino Adorno was appointed governor of Genoa for Milan. He and his brother Giovanni remained in power until the downfall of Lodovico Sforza in 1499 brought about their own, and the surrender of Genoa to the French. Cardinal Paolo Campofregoso had finally left for exile in Rome in October 1488, after some hard bargaining; he died in Rome in 1498.

The French invasions of Naples and Milan that began in 1494 brought a spate of exiles from ruling or dominant families, affecting four of the five major Italian states. The expulsions of the Sforza from Milan and of the Aragonese kings from Naples were the direct result – and aim – of French military action; in the case of King Federico, of Spanish military action as well. French troops assisted papal troops commanded by Cesare Borgia to drive the Riario from Imola and Forlì. Dominant families exiled as an indirect consequence of the French invasions were the Medici from Florence, and the barons and signori left exposed to the ambitions of the Borgia by the disruption wrought by the invasions on the systems of patronage and protection that had linked them to other Italian powers.

Two of the last three kings of the Neapolitan branch of the Aragonese dynasty, Alfonso II and his brother Federico, died in exile; the third, Alfonso's son Ferrandino, spent some of his short reign in exile too. As the long-threatened invasion by Charles VIII became a reality in late 1494, Alfonso, aware of his unpopularity with his subjects, lost his nerve. When he heard that Charles had crossed the border into his kingdom, he resigned the throne to his son Ferrandino on 23 January 1495. Ten days later he left for self-imposed exile, taking with him the treasure Ferrandino needed to confront the invaders.[24] He died in exile in Sicily in December 1495.

[23] Bartolomeo Senarega, *De rebus Genuensibus commentaria*, ed. Emilio Pandiani, RRIISS 24, viii (Bologna, 1929–32), pp. 6–7.

[24] Carlo de Frede, *L'impresa di Napoli di Carlo VIII. Commento ai primi due libri della Storia d'Italia del Guicciardini* (Naples, 1982), pp. 266–8.