

Thinking About
**INTERNATIONAL
ETHICS**

**Moral Theory and Cases from
American Foreign Policy**

FRANCES V. HARBOUR

Thinking About International Ethics



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Thinking About International Ethics

*Moral Theory and Cases
from American Foreign Policy*

Frances V. Harbour

George Mason University

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
New York London

First published 1999 by Westview Press

Published 2018 by Routledge

52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright © 1999 Taylor & Francis

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice:

Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Harbour, Frances Vryling.

Thinking about international ethics : moral theory and cases from
American foreign policy / Frances V. Harbour.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8133-2846-2 (hardcover). — ISBN 0-8133-2847-0 (pbk.)

1. United States—Foreign relations—Moral and ethical aspects—Case studies. 2. International relations—Moral and ethical aspects. I. Title.

JZ1480.H37 1999

172'.4—dc21

98-26744

CIP

ISBN 13: 978-0-8133-2847-8 (pbk)

*To my father, Jerry Harbour,
a realist*



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Contents

Acknowledgments xi

**Introduction: Ethics, International Affairs,
and American Foreign Policy** 1

A Philosophical Map, 2
Examining Cases Through Multiple Lenses, 4
The Plan of This Book, 5
Some Caveats, 6
Notes, 8
For Further Reading, 9

Part I What Role for Ethics in Foreign Policy?

1 Realism Versus Idealism in the Twentieth Century 13

Postwar Paradigm Shift or an Interwar Debate? 13
Order in an Anarchic World, 16
Shades of Realism, 17
Idealism in Exile, 20
Normative Analysis Reemerges, 21
The Study of International Ethics Since
the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 22
Notes, 25
For Further Reading, 27

2 A Closer Look at Realism in the Twentieth Century 29

Critique of Moralism, Not Morality, 30
The Realist Moral Vision, 31
Neorealism in the Late Twentieth Century, 34

	Notes, 37	
	For Further Reading, 38	
3	Realists, Idealists, and the Politics of Ratifying Chemical Arms Control Treaties in the United States, 1926–1997	41
	Failed Ratification: 1926, 42	
	Ratifying the Geneva Protocol of 1925: 1969–1975, 47	
	The Battle for the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, 51	
	Realism, Idealism, and Chemical Arms Control, 57	
	Notes, 59	
	For Further Reading, 63	
Part II		
Ethics, Intentions, and Consequences in Making Foreign Policy		
4	The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945: Events and Moral Questions	67
	Atomic Decisionmaking in World War II: A Summary of Events, 69	
	Was the Atomic Bombing Necessary to End the War? 71	
	Notes, 74	
	For Further Reading, 75	
5	Consequentialism: Ends Justify the Means	77
	Whose Ends? The State Versus the World, 78	
	Utilitarians: Cosmopolitan and Consequentialist, 81	
	Notes, 89	
	For Further Reading, 91	
6	Consequentialist Evaluations of the U.S. Decision to Use Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki	93
	Judging the Decision: A Realist Perspective, 95	
	The Decision to Use Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: An Act Utilitarian Perspective, 98	
	How Should an Act Utilitarian Have Made the Decision? 102	
	A Dangerous Precedent? 106	
	Notes, 107	
	For Further Reading, 110	

- 7 Deontological Approaches to International Ethics: Motives, Duties, Rules, and Means** 111
- Kant's Moral Theory, 112
 - Natural Law and the Just War Tradition, 119
 - Notes, 126
 - For Further Reading, 128
- 8 The Hiroshima Decision and the Just War Tradition** 131
- Discrimination, Proportionality, and Double Effect:
A Summary, 131
 - Intended Targets: Groves and the Committees, 132
 - The President's Position, 135
 - Stimson: Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Noncombatant
Immunity, 138
 - Intentions of the United States? 139
 - Protecting Noncombatants or Innocents? 141
 - Notes, 142
 - For Further Reading, 144

Part III
Human Rights, Cultural Relativism, and National Duties

- 9 The United States, China, and Most Favored Nation Trade Status** 147
- Chinese Human Rights Policy in the 1990s, 148
 - The Politics of MFN Trade Status in the United States, 150
 - Notes, 158
 - For Further Reading, 160
- 10 The Politics of Most Favored Nation Trade Status for China and the Basis of Rights** 161
- China and Cultural Relativism, 161
 - The Basis of Human Rights: Disagreement at
the Heart, 163
 - Cultural Relativism and MFN Trade Status for China, 167
 - Human Rights Policy Consistent with Tradition
and Culture, 168
 - Notes, 173
 - For Further Reading, 175

11	Moral Theories and the Debate in the U.S. Government on Most Favored Nation Trade Status for China	177
	Moral Theories and Human Rights Policy: A First Cut, 178	
	Human Rights, International Duties, and Effective Action, 179	
	The Presidents as Quasi Utilitarians, 179	
	The Congressional Cauldron, 184	
	MFN Trade Status for China: Moral Theories and Moral Arguments, 190	
	Notes, 191	
	For Further Reading, 192	
12	Conclusion: Moral Theory as a Tool for Analyzing and Evaluating Foreign Policy	195
	Analysis: What Role Do Moral Frameworks Play in Political Decisionmaking? 195	
	Advantages and Disadvantages of Realism as a Tool for Evaluating American Foreign Policy Decisions, 198	
	Advantages and Disadvantages of Utilitarian Thinking as a Tool for Evaluating American Foreign Policy Decisions, 199	
	Advantages and Disadvantages of Deontological Approaches as Tools for Evaluating American Foreign Policy Decisions, 201	
	<i>Index</i>	205

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank all those who have helped me with this project. Special thanks are due to Joel Rosenthal, Nicholas Fotion, Matthew Mattern, and Ming Wan, who gave generously of their time and expert advice in reading and making comments on all or parts of the manuscript. The research for Chapter 3 was originally supported by the Social Science Research Council's John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Peace and Security Studies. Chapter 3 includes material from my case study "Chemical Arms Control: The U.S. and the Geneva Protocol" (No. 4 in the Carnegie Council series, copyright © 1990 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs). And, of course, I want to thank my husband, John Mirone, and son, William Mirone, for their unfailing support and practical wisdom.

Frances V. Harbour



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>

Introduction: Ethics, International Affairs, and American Foreign Policy

In November 1989 the world was shocked by the image of students dancing on the Berlin Wall. Shards of the infamous Wall appeared in department stores in time for Christmas. First the Soviet empire and then the Soviet Union itself came falling down. The end of the colossal, world-threatening, forty-five-year Cold War came not as many had feared, in a hail of nuclear warheads, but peacefully, almost anticlimactically. In those heady months, international politics seemed to have taken on a whole new flavor. Anything seemed possible, even a new world order managed by newly freed moral norms.

In the United States in particular, more and more observers of international relations insisted that ethical and moral values do and should play a role in evaluating options in international politics and shaping foreign policy preferences for the future. Before World War II those who had placed ethics near the heart of foreign policy and international politics were called idealists. Charles Kegley recognized their legacy in dubbing the new approach “neoidealism” in a keynote speech as president of the International Studies Association in 1993.¹ The years since then have shown that the practical problems of applying ethical and moral values in today’s world are at least as difficult as they ever were. Nevertheless, many policymakers and scholars continue to emphasize the relevance of moral and ethical norms in making foreign policy and in understanding the complex international arena.

The history of concern for ethics in international politics is long and checkered. Writing near the end of the Second Peloponnesian War, the Greek historian Thucydides described a system in which smaller city-states were pawns in the battle between the great powers, Athens and Sparta. Although a system made up of city-states is quite different from one composed of modern nation-states, Thucydides’ world, like ours, seemed a place where all too often “the strong exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.” In such a world, the Athenians warned the leaders

of the tiny island of Melos, “Justice applies only between equals.”² When the Melians would not surrender, the Athenians massacred the men and sold the women and children into slavery. Thucydides regretted the behavior of his countrymen, however, and showed his readers that despite short-run benefits, such ruthlessness had not, in the long run, produced victory in the war against Sparta.³ In doing so, Thucydides formulated a problem that has echoed down through the ages. What role should moral and ethical values play in a complex world where participants may lose their virtue as well as their lives, and where outcomes depend on more than arms alone? Philosophers, historians, political leaders, and, in recent years, social scientists have been attempting to answer a host of related questions ever since.

Empirical questions abound of how the world has unfolded. Is a country’s ethical system part of what attracts or repels allies? What happens when two countries have very different ethical systems? When do leaders actually apply ethical values? What are the consequences of their actions? How mixed are leaders’ motives? Are all moral statements in international affairs simply window dressing and cloaked self-interest?

As we move from analyzing policy to evaluating choices in moral terms, other questions arise. How do we know the right when we see it? What are we to do about conflicting values? About conflicting value systems? Are we really doomed to choose the lesser among evils? Such questions are both timeless and difficult to answer.

A Philosophical Map

One way to analyze the study of ethics is to divide it into four broad categories: metaethics, descriptive ethics, normative ethical theory, and applied ethics.⁴ Much of the philosophical work done in the twentieth century has been in the area of metaethics. Metaethics asks questions about the very nature of ethics and morality, about our “starting principles.” What sorts of judgments belong to the category of morality? Is morality different from ethics? Why should people be ethical? Is morality objective or subjective? How do we know right from wrong? A metaethical issue of special interest to students of international history and politics is the question of whether morality stems from some universal source or is rooted in the life of a particular community.

Like metaethics, the field of descriptive ethics does not make judgments about the substance of right and wrong, good and bad. Descriptive ethics is a relatively straightforward account of what different peoples, communities, or individuals actually do and believe in the moral realm. Comparisons between Islamic and Christian conceptions of what a “just war” might look like, for example, would fall into this category, as well as analyses of the beliefs and behavior of particular decisionmakers at particular points in time.

When scholars of international relations provide a history of an event or issue and the ethical questions surrounding it, they are writing history, but from a philosophical perspective, they are also practicing a form of descriptive ethics. In such work, the scholar analyzes events but does not make ethical evaluations. Topics of recent books of this kind range from bombing strategies in World War II, to human rights policy, to accounts of changing global norms. These offer useful historical or political accounts of the role—or lack of a role—of norms in international relations.

The purpose of normative ethical theory is to give us tools to make our own moral and ethical judgments. Normative theory describes, analyzes, and evaluates philosophical theories or frameworks that tell us what is moral. Political theories or theories of international relations can also be analysed from a normative perspective.⁵

Different moral theories focus on different aspects of the decisionmaking process. Virtue ethics considers the character of decisionmakers on the basis of traits such as wisdom, moral courage, beneficence, and the like. Contemporary deconstructionist approaches such as postmodernism and feminism explain (“deconstruct”) moral judgments and values on the basis of prevailing patterns of social and economic power.

Consequentialist theories ask us to evaluate choices only on the basis of results or consequences of actions, including unintended effects. Some consequentialists analyze and evaluate the effects of each act separately. Others evaluate long-term costs and benefits of specific rules. Consequentialist theories of particular interest to social scientists include utilitarianism, Marxism, and political realism.

Deontologists do not ignore consequences but insist that doing right requires morally good motives as well as acceptable means. Thus, no matter how beneficial the effects we hope for, we have a moral duty to try to obtain our goals only by permitted means. (Indeed, the term *deontology* comes from the Greek *deon*, which means duty.) Many but not all deontological traditions have fairly explicit rules to specify and clarify positive and negative duties. Deontological traditions in the study of international relations include natural law, Kantian rationalism, social contract theory, and divine command theories.

The study of normative ethical theory helps readers to understand the nuances of the theoretical frameworks being examined but does not actually apply theory to cases, except by way of illustration. The field of applied ethics, in contrast, uses one or more theories to evaluate or explain a particular case or set of cases. Within the discipline of philosophy, applied ethics has become increasingly important in recent decades as philosophers have become more willing to consider the implications of ethical theory for medicine, law, business, and international politics. Scholars and practitioners outside philosophy have become increasingly interested in using philosoph-

ical tools to answer questions in their own fields as well.⁶ Recent books on international politics and foreign policy analyze justice, human rights, the use of force, and many other issues. These books significantly advance readers' understanding of the practical and philosophical subjects being explored but usually do not intend to cover differing normative perspectives in a systematic way.

Examining Cases Through Multiple Lenses

The goal of the present work is to offer in one place a book of descriptive ethics, normative theory, and applied ethics. These theoretical tasks are accomplished in the context of detailed examinations of three representative cases in American foreign policy. Thus, *Thinking About International Ethics* describes and analyzes important moral theories as they pertain to international politics and the study of international relations. These general observations and assumptions are then applied in examining the role that moral thinking actually played in specific cases in American foreign policy. To give readers a chance to see how different sets of theoretical assumptions may affect conclusions, each case offers alternative theoretical viewpoints from which to consider the problems the leaders faced. The moral theories explored in detail are political realism and idealism, utilitarianism, Kantian rationalism, and the Western just war tradition. The foreign policy cases are the ratification battles in the United States Senate over chemical arms control treaties in 1926, the early 1970s, and the period of 1993–1996; the U.S. decision to use atomic bombs in World War II; and the annual debate in the 1990s over whether the United States should grant Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status to China in light of China's human rights record.

The three cases were chosen because they offer quite different kinds of moral problems. Thus, together, they show how ethical considerations can play out in both high and low politics, in security issues as well as in international trade. Because they span nearly three-quarters of a century, they show ethical thinking in the United States in changing historical contexts.

Looking at three cases from more than one ethical perspective helps us to understand the workings of the theories better. We see how they play out in different settings and under different kinds of constraints. Applying several theories to one case illuminates the theories by showing the real-world implications of similarities and differences between them.

Applying each theory to more than one case allows us to see different facets of a theory and may affect our evaluation of the theory's "fit" with the real world. For example, seeing the chemical weapons ratification decision through a realist lens is very different from seeing it through idealist views. Using multiple perspectives helps us to evaluate for ourselves the

substantive arguments of actors in the case and of analysts working from the outside. For example, clarifying the arguments about whether communities are the sole source of rights makes it clearer why differences of opinion in the House of Representatives are so hard to reconcile in the case of MFN trade status for China.

Since different theories of right and wrong focus on different parts of the decisionmaking process, using more than one approach in connection with the same case also guides us to ask a variety of questions of the historical record. In the case of the Hiroshima decision, the realist asks about effects on the United States; the utilitarian includes effects on the Japanese people and the world. The just war theorist asks who the intended target was. We come to understand the complexities of the historical cases in a new way.

Choosing cases from U.S. foreign policy focuses attention on the sometimes elusive phenomenon of moral reasoning without also having to cope with a multitude of cultural frameworks. The theoretical approaches we are exploring originated in Western political thought, and thus it is appropriate in introducing them to focus on a leading Western political actor, the United States. Although there are important similarities between approaches to right and wrong around the world at the most basic level, there are enough differences in the specific practices and beliefs of different societies to make intercultural comparisons a tricky business. Not least, concentrating on the United States in all three cases reduces the amount of purely structural information that must be provided as background to a case study whose focus is on attitudes and beliefs rather than the effects of concrete institutions.

There is another reason for highlighting U.S. foreign policy. As I will discuss in more detail below in connection with Chinese and American views of human rights policy, Americans have a recurrent tendency to tell the world that they are a moral people and that their foreign policy is not simply grounded in practicality and self-interest. In choosing cases from U.S. foreign policy, we take these claims seriously, both by looking for traces of leaders' values and by exploring the cases from moral points of view other than the decisionmakers' own.

The Plan of This Book

In Part I, the central question is whether it makes sense to evaluate international politics and foreign policy on moral grounds—*any* moral grounds. Chapter 1 tells the story of the role of ethics in international relations theory. It focuses on the relationship between political realists, who have raised serious questions about the use of ethical norms in making foreign policy, and political idealists, who have placed right and wrong nearer to the center of their analyses and prescriptions. Chapter 2 explains how real-

ists have opposed idealists while not wholly rejecting ethical thinking. Chapter 3 is a case study of the extent and limits of the role of moral reasoning in chemical weapons arms control decisions from 1926 to 1997.

Part II looks at intentions versus effects in evaluating the morality of foreign policy decisions. Chapter 4 briefly describes the history of the U.S. decision to drop atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II and introduces the debate on whether the results of the bombing can morally justify the choice of cities as targets. Chapter 5 explores consequentialist ethical theory, which holds that to determine whether an act would be right or wrong, we weigh the good effects we expect against bad ones. In this chapter political realism, with its emphasis on results for the nation-state, is distinguished from utilitarianism, which considers the effects of actions on everyone touched by a decision. Chapter 6 uses realism and utilitarianism to evaluate the decision and decisionmaking process in the atomic bombing case. Chapter 7 takes another tack. It describes deontological approaches to international ethics, including Immanuel Kant's ethical and international writing and the Western just war tradition. Chapter 8 applies the just war tradition to the policy of targeting cities in the atomic bombing case.

Part III applies the theoretical frameworks from the earlier sections in a new context, tensions between universal and community-based accounts of ethical values. Chapter 9 is a brief account of Chinese human rights policy and the history of the battles in the U.S. House of Representatives over Most Favored Nation trade status for China. Chapter 10 examines historical and philosophical arguments about the roots of international human rights and briefly discusses the role of ethical norms in the process of defining national interests. Chapter 11 shows how realists, quasi utilitarians, and different kinds of deontologists have interacted in the United States in an annual debate over awarding MFN trade status to China. Chapter 12 draws general conclusions about ethical theories as tools for analyzing cases.

Some Caveats

As realists pointed out more than fifty years ago, good intentions are not enough to guarantee that policy will accomplish its declared purposes. Even when we do not apply a framework in all of its theoretical splendor, a better understanding of ethical and moral theory will at least help us to make decisions that are freer from internal inconsistencies and sloppy thinking. Emotion plays a key role in ethical judgment, but we can and should ask ourselves whether our feelings are appropriate, whether they can be defended to others. And when we begin to evaluate our judgments in such terms, it brings into play the requirements of critical thinking and rational justification.⁷

Varying the frameworks, as this book does, allows us to see the implications of different theories in action. Using different moral traditions to explore the same historical cases makes clear the differences among the theories, but it also shows areas of similarity. Not only does it allow us to test and strengthen our own intuitions, but it also helps us to understand and debate those with whom we disagree.

One of the important things to keep in mind about the application of theoretical paradigms in general and each of the ethical frameworks in this work in particular is that none of them captures all of the nuances of very complicated questions. The purpose of a moral framework is to tell us what, out of the buzzing chaos, the critical dimensions are and to give us criteria for making choices. An ethical framework, like any theory, is a model, a simplifying tool that allows our minds to grasp and arrange reality so that we can deal with it. But there are almost always pieces left over.

In real life, moral or ethical dilemmas do not present themselves as neat case studies with all the relevant facts arranged. They present themselves piece by piece, and bit by bit, hidden among other concerns and other issues. In a complex situation, merely identifying facts relevant to an issue can be a task of significant proportions. Indeed, many ethical and moral arguments can be settled by agreeing on which facts are relevant. Moral theory helps us to separate relevant facts from irrelevant ones.

But equally important, many ethical questions are hard to settle because they are *dilemmas*. Because dilemmas are complex, they contain elements that push us in different directions simultaneously. A person may react to such a situation with a smorgasbord of intuitions—intuitions that may well point to differing conclusions. In a case of mixed motives, do self-interested motives invalidate the more disinterested ones? What are leaders' duties to their *own* citizens at home and abroad? The answer to any of these questions is not obvious. Moral frameworks give us tools for working out an answer. But even the best framework may well leave us with a sense of issues still unresolved, intuitions that still nag. Thus this book is meant to illustrate how to go about applying ethical principles and frameworks. As such, it does not purport to give the final word.

For example, the Western just war tradition tells us that a just cause should be a key part of whether it is permissible for a country to go to war at all. But does the justice of the original cause affect what may be done in the course of battle? Western just war tradition says no: Both sides are equally constrained by the principles of discrimination and proportionality. In the case of the bombing of Hiroshima, are all Japanese civilians' lives to be protected before the lives of any Allied combatants? Even if we accept the arguments about innocents and consent that undergird the just war approach's requirement to refrain from targeting noncombatants, we may well be left with a feeling that there is something not quite fair about plac-

ing eighteen-year-old farm boys in military uniform in a completely different category from eighteen-year-old city dwellers in a munitions factory.

Yet we must decide, and we must act. Having a moral framework does not solve a “tragic dilemma”—a case in which, as Thomas Nagel puts it, “there is decisive support for two or more incompatible courses of action.”⁸ But having thought through a moral framework gives us useful tools for making the best decision of which we are capable. It provides us with a clearer and more internally consistent set of criteria on which to make choices and a road map that warns us of some of the pitfalls that are often encountered.

Policy makers will seldom consciously apply a pure version of any ethical theory—only an approximation, or even a combination of approximations. But applying naked, material self-interest as the sole motivator of policy will not produce decisions that would be approved by moral actors of any variety. And even in cases in which all the choices may seem morally undesirable, there may be varying degrees of wrongness. The lesser among evils may be the best policy choice available, so it makes sense to think in advance of what makes one choice preferable to another in ethical terms.

Analysts looking at policies after the fact apply theory more formally in an attempt to disentangle the legal, political, and moral aspects of a problem. Combining too many assumptions without careful forethought can result in an unintelligible tangle. Likewise, the internally consistent principles of a single framework will allow us to test, clarify, and strengthen our own intuitions.

Aristotle argued that doing right is largely a matter of habituation to virtues. Once we have learned virtues and they become second nature to us, we can act on them without stopping to “do the math” involved. To use another analogy, once we learn how, we dance instead of practicing steps. Vicarious experience in which we take the time to think carefully about our emotional and intellectual responses can be part of habituation to the virtues. Reading about actual cases gives readers practice in seeing and reacting to moral problems from a moral perspective, practice in evaluating and making moral choices. What I hope to do in this book is to help people interested in foreign policy decisions to develop further their own approach to international ethics and to understand better those with whom they disagree.

Notes

1. Charles W. Kegley, “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities,” *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37 (June 1993), p. 131.

2. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian Wars*, ed. Benjamin Jowett, revised and abridged with an Introduction by P. A. Brunt (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), p. 181.

3. Ibid., editor's note, pp. 186–187.

4. See, for example, Anthony Flew, *Dictionary of Ethics*, 2d ed. rev. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 112–114. Chris Brown, in *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), divides ethics into three areas, eschewing descriptive ethics (p. 85).

5. Two excellent but very different comprehensive surveys of international ethics are Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel, *Traditions of International Ethics*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, No. 17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Brown, *International Relations Theory*.

6. Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p. 84.

7. Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke, Allan Janik, *Introduction to Reasoning*, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 416.

8. Thomas Nagel, *Moral Questions* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 128.

For Further Reading

Brown, Chris. *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

Nardin, Terry, and David R. Mapel. *Traditions of International Ethics*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, No. 17. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992.



Taylor & Francis

Taylor & Francis Group

<http://taylorandfrancis.com>