DANIEL LAGACHE

THE WORK OF DANIEL LAGACHE

SELECTED WRITINGS

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THE WORKS
OF
DANIEL LAGACHE

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FOREWORD

Didier Anzieu

Daniel Lagache [1903–1972] enrolled at the Ecole Normale Supérieure de la rue d'Ulm (Arts section) in Paris in 1924. Among his fellow students were the future sociologist Raymond Aron, the future philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, and the future writer Paul Nizan. He qualified in philosophy in the highest examination for teachers in 1928, received a doctorate in medicine in 1934, and specialized in psychiatry in 1935. The philosophic impetus at that time came from Germany. Aron and Sartre, respectively, disseminated Husserl's philosophy of history and phenomenology. Lagache read German fluently. Scientifically, he sought a way at the cross-roads of phenomenological philosophy, dynamic psychiatry, and psychoanalysis, which was beginning to be practised in France. His medical thesis on *Verbal Hallucinations and Speech* was based on observations, made at the Hospital of St Anne, of patients who heard voices. He summarizes it thus: 'Under what conditions is the experience of "alienation of one's own speech" possible?' The phenomenology of verbal activity and internal speech provides an answer. Despite the reflexive illusion, speech is not, essentially, personalized, but is, on the contrary, impersonal and, strictly speaking, transcends the speaker, as Goldstein suggests in his notion of 'verbal external

knowing'. Depending on how a person exists concretely and presently in the world and in relation to others, this is what enables verbal activity either to remain detached, 'without person or origin', as Paul Valéry wrote, or to be 'attached to personal suitability or intentional objectivization'. So, well before the development of linguistic structuralism, Daniel Lagache was interested in the relationships of the conscious and unconscious to the spoken word. Language is spoken outside us; every human being makes it more or less his own; if he fails to recognize, as his own, internal words that convey forbidden fears or desires, those words, which nevertheless cannot be silenced, will continue to speak in him, and he will have the hallucinatory impression of 'being spoken'.

In 1937 Lagache abandoned a career in psychiatry in order to return to his original vocation, teaching 'philosophy' (which then included psychology). Appointed associate professor in psychology at the University of Strasbourg, he was one of the pioneers who, by devoting himself to the theoretical and practical training of future psychologists, contributed to the development of psychology in France as a discipline independent of philosophy and medicine.

In contrast to experimental psychology, which studies 'behaviours' in a laboratory and which seeks to 'explain' them, he developed the theory of clinical psychology, which observes the 'conduct' of human beings in dealing with particular situations and endeavours to 'understand' them. Lagache based clinical psychology on three fundamental notions: (1) psychic functioning is motivated by psychic conflicts; (2) the human person is a totality in the process of developing; (3) he is the product of his individual past history and the producer of future plans.

In 1946 Lagache submitted, for his doctorate, two theses on 'Amorous Jealousy—Descriptive Psychology and Psychoanalysis'. The first volume, 'States of Jealousy and the Problem of Morbid Awareness', presents 44 observations of pathological jealousy, with the conclusion that there is a multiplicity of states of jealousy. The second, 'The Experience of Jealousy', strives to understand the internal world of the jealous person and examines the mechanisms in the transition to the homicidal act. Lagache emphatically affirms the necessity for a method adapted to the gathering of psychic facts when these bring into play the relationship of the personality to the external world, to

others, and to itself. This is the phenomenological method or, more precisely, the method of phenomenological psychiatry as it emanated from Eugène Minkowski's *Time Experienced* (1933), from Jaspers' *General Psychopathology*, which was translated into French the same year, and the works of Binswanger, which were also beginning to be available in French.

From then on, Lagache devoted some of his work to the criminal mentality. The jealous person can, in fact, kill, and the crime of passion represents a particular form of criminality arising in so-called 'normal' individuals—that is, those whose early history is without criminal acts. In a situation that is exceptional and dramatic for them—betrayal or abandonment—they react with behaviour that is exceptionally serious—murder or an attempt at it—due to the sudden suspension of conscious control, to a psychic regression, and to a 'release' (in the Jacksonian sense) of a homicidal archaic impulse.

At the Second International Congress on Criminology (Paris, 1950), Lagache presented a paper of great impact, on 'Psycho-criminogenesis'. The fundamental problem was the formation of the criminal personality. The criminal is too often defined in negative terms: flaws in socialization, difficulties in identification, attacks on the rules and norms of the community. Criminal conduct represents an attempt at adjustment on the allo-plastic level, just as the psychopathological symptom is on the auto-plastic one. De Greef described one among the many moral feelings that motivate it in terms of a feeling of injustice, which goes back to early psychic conflicts. Melanie Klein's discoveries about the first stages of development of the psychic apparatus enabled Lagache to broaden the question, 'Are we to suppose, then, that it is the overwhelming severity and excessive cruelty of the superego, and not its feebleness or absence, as is ordinarily assumed, that are responsible for the conduct of asocial and criminal people?' When the disorders of criminal behaviour are linked to later conflicts, the criminogenetic process becomes more apparent, and it is clear how the specific function of the criminal act constitutes an 'acting outside' the conflict, often under cover of a 'heroic identification', as Lagache puts it. These attitudes, which psychiatrists sometimes describe as pseudo-manic or hypo-manic, have the dynamic meaning of a 'flight to reality'. Drawing on a theory of Eissler, Lagache shows how, at a first stage, early frustrations in interpersonal relationships can permanently deprive the subject of a satisfying contact

with a reality that, from then on, he will always misunderstand, being unable to free himself from aggressive projections that dominate his representations and identifications. At a second stage, he will try to modify this reality, being aware of himself as an aggressor, but in fact the distortion of his mode of relating to the environment is such that his conduct is inevitably maladjusted. He will often be led to find a 'chosen milieu' in which the criminal act becomes the rule and where he can find a sort of law on the fringe of society.

In 1947 Lagache was appointed professor at the Sorbonne, to the chair of general psychology. Subsequently he took the chair of psychopathology. He was responsible for the establishment in France of a degree in psychology, distinct from the philosophy degree and including certification in general, and social and child physiology. His courses, which were reported in the newly published *Bulletin of Psychology*, influenced a whole generation of students with their novelty, their attention to historical and theoretical classification, their methodological rigour, the breadth of subject matter treated, their mental inquisitiveness, and the intellectual stimulation they aroused. His inaugural lecture, on 28 November 1947, was further developed in a volume, *The Unity of Psychology*, which was generally considered a new psychology. Published in 1949 by Presses Universitaires de France, it studies the internal conflict in psychology between the experimental and clinical method. He was the first university professor in France to give a course on the theory of psychoanalysis.

Alongside his psychology teaching, Lagache pursued a psychoanalytic practice. As early as 1937, he presented his first paper on 'The Work of Mourning' to the Paris Psychoanalytic Society, and he was elected a full member of that Society. At the Fifteenth International Psychoanalytic Congress (Paris, 1–5 August 1938), he read a paper entitled 'A Contribution to the Study of Ideas of Homosexual Infidelity in Jealousy'. For him, psychology and psychoanalysis are two convergent and complementary approaches. I shall give three examples regarding notions of inter-subjectivity, power, and change.

In his 1951 paper, 'Psychology: Conduct, Personality, Group', Lagache said explicitly that

> Psychoanalysis places particular emphasis on interpersonal relationships, whether in its technique, centred on the doctor–patient relationship, or in its theories of conduct

> and personality, which confer so much importance on the relationship to others, on group participation, and on identification in the socialization of the human being. It has thus contributed significantly to the advent of, and preference for, a mode of approach that can be considered as a point of view rather than a method. It is the 'micro-sociological' approach, according to Georges Gurvitch's formula, characterized by the visualization of small groups whose members can in principle be perceived by and react to one another.

But the psychogenetic explanations of psychic problems are not, in Lagache's opinion, a matter for unilinear determinism. On the one hand, inter-individual and intra-psychic conflicts are in a relationship of circular causality. The individual psychic apparatus is built up by internalization of the group matrix in which the young child is immersed and, reciprocally, certain serious difficulties in the groups stem from the importance attached by people to pronounced psychopathology. On the other hand, the similarity of conflicts between people and between psychic systems does not convey their identity: Lagache has done a great deal to introduce the notion of intra-systemic conflicts. In 'The Psychoanalytic Model of the Personality' (1965), Lagache reminds us of the existence of an internal conflict both in the id (between life and death instincts) and in the ego (between the 'working-off' mechanisms and the unconscious defence mechanisms). Furthermore, he established the table of internal conflicts in the psychic system, which Freud called the superego but which includes the superego, the ego ideal, and the ideal ego. In mania, the ideal ego is in conflict with the ego ideal, over which it triumphs; it is the opposite in melancholia. On the other hand, the conflict between the superego (need for self-punishment) and the ideal ego (need for glorification of the damaged body) is fundamental in masochism. Finally, the conflict between the superego and the ego ideal is at the heart of the obsessional neurosis, depression, and feelings of guilt and inferiority. These psychic sub-systems of which the superego is composed are built up by the internalization of the child's relationships to his parents—more precisely, relationships of authority (superego), of esteem (ego ideal), and of participation in their assumed narcissistic omnipotence (ideal ego).

As far as the ego is concerned, Lagache always refused to minimize its importance, unlike Lacan, or to identify it with mental operations of control, adaptation, judgement, and

memory, as American ego psychology does. He makes of it an autonomous authority of choices and rejections, by which the individual can respond to the challenges of his environment and not simply try to adapt to it. But the ego is subject to the fascination of consciousness (cf. the myth of Psyche), and the awarenesses to which it has access are brought about by the increase in the level of anxiety: 'The human condition and an inter-human condition.' Inter-subjectivity enlarges the behaviourist idea of the interaction of the organism and the environment, integrating in it the unconscious meanings by which the subject is driven.

From his 1949 paper, 'From Psychoanalysis to the Analysis of Conduct', to his penultimate published article, 'Psychoanalysis as an Exact Science' (1966), Lagache did not cease to emphasize the scientific character of the psychoanalytic approach. Through the suspension of the subject's activity while he is lying down and through the rules of free association and abstinence, it is his unconscious fantasizing that will be revealed in what he says. The expressions of this individual fantasy are observed and classified, their latent structures are reconstructed, their dynamic interactions are grasped by the analyst. He establishes links between the experiences of the past and the fantasies of the present. But he can only accomplish this work through his own personal fantasizing, whence the necessity for frequent self-analysis, which, at the instigation of Lagache, I myself have studied in my work on self-analysis.

If the unconscious fantasy is the object of psychoanalytic investigation, the setting in which it is unfolded constitutes a dimension common to the majority of methods of psychological investigation. The transference is a result both of this general setting and of the specific object. A prime characteristic of this setting, the benevolent neutrality of the psychoanalyst, is considered by Lagache in his paper on 'The Problem of Transference', which was presented at the Fourteenth Conference of French-speaking Psychoanalysts (Paris, 1952). In it, the analyst's neutrality is compared with the democratic climate as it was defined in the experiment of Lewin, Lippitt, and White in 1939, measuring three artificially created group climates, of authority, democracy, and laissez-faire.

A second characteristic of this setting is the temporal one. There again, Lewin's influence is obvious: the transference is an exemplary case of manifestations of change and the resistance to

change. All psychological change obeys a double temporality: the one, immediate and continuous, puts the subject in a 'here and now' sequence and marks what the analysand says or the effects of learning in a laboratory; the other, discontinuous, articulates the effects of change or witnesses the force of the automatic functioning of repetition. So with transference. It is a repetition of unresolved, infantile conflicts, just as the Zeigarnik effect showed that interrupted tasks are better memorized. But, in the transference neurosis, the conflict that was expressed until then in the symptom is transformed and unfolded in a conflictual relationship with the analyst and with some important partners in the patient's circle. This change clarifies the conflict, making it more comprehensible and analytically manageable. Lagache has often quoted Brecht's words, which summarize psychoanalytic work well: 'Truth is the child of time.'

I shall end with a few remarks on aggressivity. It is well known that the development of Freud's thought on this subject still divides his followers. During the period in which the psychologists upheld the existence of an aggressive instinct, Freud objected that aggressivity characterizes every impulsive demand and that it is the frustration of the impulse that provokes the aggression. Then, when the psychologists, particularly those of Lewin's school, began to verify the frustration–aggression sequence experimentally, Freud affirmed the existence of a primary death instinct directed in the first place towards the subject. Lagache seeks an explanatory synthesis between the two camps. He broadens the definition of aggressivity: it is a real or *imaginary* act and an act aimed at *another*. More than a biological instinct, aggressivity seems to be an inter-subjective fact. It underlies the conflictual demands that characterize our relationships to others. The dialectic of demand and refusal in external reality runs into conflicts of power and, in psychic reality, into the institution of an internal conflict. Where does primary masochism come in, important as it is for the upholders of the death instinct? Lagache sees it not as an innate given, but as a consequence of primary narcissism, that is, of the prematurity of the infant, of its distress and its dependence on the family circle for its psychic survival. It is the need to put up with the person on whom one depends. An explanation in terms of inter-subjectivity is again preferable to ones in terms of biology or fantasy. At all stages of development, aggressiveness appears as a condition of humanization. For example, one such

structuring stems from identification with the aggressor, described by Anna Freud: it ensures the passage from passivity to activity. Thus the conquest of autonomy requires the internal experience of sadomasochism and the external experience of relationships of submission and domination.

There is still much to be said about Lagache the psychoanalyst. As early as 1947, he founded the *Library of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Psychology* at Presses Universitaires de France, and 42 volumes have appeared, by French and foreign authors, 9 of them works or reprints of articles by Freud. It was here, under the direction of Lagache, that Laplanche and Pontalis produced their precise and important *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (1968), which has been translated into many languages. At the same time, Lagache played a role of prime importance in the history of the psychoanalytic movement in France. He participated actively in the two main splits that mark the history of this movement and was president, at their inception, of both the French Psychoanalytic Society in 1952 and the Psychoanalytic Association of France in 1964.

Eva Rosenblum collated the texts of the *Works* of Daniel Lagache and published them in six volumes between 1977 and 1986 at the Presses Universitaires de France. It was an enormous research task, and we can be grateful to her for accomplishing it.

- *Volume 1*: *Verbal Hallucinations and Clinical Works* (1932–1946)
- *Volume 2*: *The Psychologist and the Criminal* (1947–1952)
- *Volume 3*: *The Transference and Other Psychoanalytic Works* (1952–1956)
- *Volume 4*: *Aggressivity, Personality Structure, and Other Works* (1956–1962)
- *Volume 5*: *From Fantasy to Sublimation* (1962–1964)
- *Volume 6*: *The Capricious Woman of the House*

The present English edition in one volume is a selection of those texts that are most representative of the psychoanalytic thinking of Daniel Lagache. It is thinking that is rich in epistemology, ensuring that psychoanalysis is set in relationship to behaviourism and clarifies its status as an 'exact science'. It deserves to provoke a lively response from the English-speaking public.

THE WORKS
OF
DANIEL LAGACHE

PART ONE

VERBAL HALLUCINATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

A contribution to the study of ideas of homosexual infidelity in jealousy

[1938]

In the usual form of jealousy, the love object is of one sex, the jealous person and the rival of the other. Less frequently, jealousies are observed where the jealous person is of one sex and the rival and the love object of another—viz. the same-sex. For example, a husband is jealous of his wife's woman friend; a wife is jealous of her husband's male friend. In such cases, there can be said to be an idea of *homosexual infidelity.* Only this form of jealousy will be considered, leaving aside jealousies that occur in a homosexual couple.

Psychoanalytic interest in the question is linked to the understanding of paranoia and jealousy. In a heterosexual couple, the usual jealousy results in part from the projection of homosexual interest in the rival. From there it is a short step to attributing the idea of homosexual infidelity to the projection of heterosexual interest in the rival. Or what role must projection play in unconscious homosexuality?

Presented at the Fifteenth International Psychoanalytic Congress, Paris, 1938.

Ideas of homosexual infidelity have not been the object of any special research. An extensive perusal of French literature brought two cases (Garnier & Marandon de Montyel, 1895; Imbert, 1897). My own research enabled me to observe six cases—one man and five women. All the cases belong under the heading of *paranoia* in the widest sense of the term. As for clinical type, four are persecutory, and two can be considered, respectively, as a paraphrenic and a schizophrenic. One of the jealousies in the first group has been the object of prolonged analytic investigations.

Clinical data

In the *man*, the idea of homosexual infidelity is expressed in the form of accusations of lesbianism (cunnilingus). Such is the case of a jealous murderer observed by Garnier and Marandon de Montyel (1895).

This chronic alcoholic presented as a paranoiac with persecution mania and jealousy. He had been interned following an attempt to assassinate his wife. It was his second marriage of some years' duration, and he was the manager of a hotel. He heard guests calling him 'cuckold' and saying that whoever wanted to could sleep with his wife. She, he claimed, was frigid and from the start had only had sexual satisfaction from clitoral masturbation. Then she had demanded cunnilingus and anal intercourse. For the one, the husband had felt insurmountable repugnance. He had gone along with the other but lost his erection at the thought of being in such a position. His wife had then proposed intercourse *more bestiarum*, and everything was all right until the day he realized that without his knowing she put his penis into her rectum. Then the husband became impotent.

The authors stress the elective quality of the jealousy and the querulous nature of the reactions. He lost his temper only with a friend of his wife's and threw her out. Furious, his wife had predicted that thenceforth he would be impotent, which he was. He attributed it not to alcohol, but to poison his wife had made him take in order to destroy his virility. The jealousy, therefore, was only shown towards a female rival as the greatest repugnance for a sick person. He attributed his sexual failure and

impotence to the perversity of, and ill treatment by, his wife. One could suppose that in the accusations of lesbianism and poisoning, he projected the guilt linked to his intemperance.

OBSERVATION 1

The only personal observation of a man concerns a subject, 36 years old, of weak character, violent and vindictive. Introduced to masturbation by his future brother-in-law shortly before marrying a sister four years older, he has long manifested a pronounced fear of women. In fact, in his first marriage, he was a victim of his wife and mother-in-law. The wife, pregnant by another man, only married him because of her pregnancy. This cynical consent made him leave after eight days, disgusted with women. Four years later, he married a woman with the same first name as the first wife. The ménage included the mother-in-law. After eight years of marriage, he was arrested and interned after domestic scenes, scandal, and threats of death. Several remarks from the two women led him to think that his wife was being unfaithful to him. On this point his conviction is weak. On the other hand it is positive regarding the lesbian practices between his mother-in-law and his wife. He saw them and knew his mother-in-law's tastes: both before and during the marriage she had intercourse and fellatio with him. He also accuses his mother-in-law of oral sex with her two-year-old grandson, whom she prevents from developing. At first he is very vindictive towards his mother-in-law, whom he criticizes for having conned his wife and put herself in place of her, but he soon seems more conciliatory, taking her part against his wife who threw her mother out. A neighbouring friend of the wife was used as a scapegoat; if they wanted to sleep together, all three of them, it is nothing to do with strangers. Without going into the grounds of his accusations, one could say that what characterizes his attitude to women is fear, resentment, passivity, and the feeling that they know how to swindle.

What these two, admittedly inadequate, cases show is an attitude of estrangement from, and mistrust of, female solidarity.

* * *

With the *woman*, it is in the charge of pederasty that the idea of homosexual infidelity takes shape.

A similar case is that of an observation by Regis, published by Imbert in his thesis (1897). A woman of tainted heredity accuses her husband of passive and then active pederasty, when the question of homosexuality is raised in divorce proceedings. Her surveillance centres on a reputedly passive friend. She convinces her daughter of her father's homosexuality.

The idea of homosexual infidelity can present itself episodically among other ideas of jealousy.

OBSERVATION 2

Such is the case of a querulous 50-year-old, who stuffs herself with hormones to combat the menopause. She presents as hypomanic, self-satisfied, vaunting her sexual ascendancy over her husband, denying a jealousy proved by numerous domestic scenes and scandals, and accusing others of being jealous. In conflict with her father since childhood, she had upset the cradle of a young sister and as an adolescent wanted to strangle her when she saw her sleeping. After a stormy, tomboyish life, marriage had been tempestuous. Jealous from the outset, she accused her husband of incest, just as she had accused her sister of it. She accused him of all possible forms of infidelity, with women and girls. She called him a 'satyr' and said he practised passive and active homosexuality. A pertinent remark of her sister can be applied to all these accusations: 'Everything she has, she puts on others; she is jealous, but it is the others who are jealous.' The patient's past was in fact full, not only of liaisons and prostitution, but perverse indulgences (mutual defecation and urination in the mouth). She had occasionally suggested anal intercourse to her husband. She had many anal character traits, among others marked greed and possessiveness.

In other cases, homosexual infidelity presents itself in the wake of ideas of heterosexual infidelity but becomes more the rule.

OBSERVATION 3

A woman of 56, more defective than paranoid, accuses her husband of infidelity, and particularly of pederasty with a young

man. From the start he had been extravagant, randy, 'lecherous', a 'boozer', and he had suggested unnatural relations that she had refused. The patient's interest in the anal region is manifested in the minutiae with which she 'examines' her spouse, inspecting his anus or noticing blemishes.

OBSERVATION 4

In a woman of 34, the idea of homosexual infidelity becomes even more the rule. It rests on interpretations, especially the interpretations of stains on her spouse's shirt. (He, a former cavalryman, often suffers anal pruritus and scratches himself.) The delusional idea is formulated in an earlier episode in which the rival also attacks her daughter. Some years later there is a second episode, similar to the first, in which the masculine rival no longer attacks her daughter, but the little boy that she has had in the meantime. In spite of opportunities that reality presents, the patient has no tendency at all to jealousy of women. In compensation for the conflict with an unsatisfying reality, an erotomanic theme is developed, through dreams and hallucinatory states, in which the main hero attacks her daughter. While she accuses her husband of pederasty, the whole erotomanic theme is organized around fellatio: she refuses it to her husband, who repels her, and accords it to erotomanic objects who initiate it.

The analytic understanding of this case (the Theresa case), which was presented in greater detail in 'Erotomanie et jalousie' (Lagache, 1938b), demonstrates the essential role of unconscious homosexuality and the oral fixation to the mother.

The difficulties only begin with the first marriage: jealousy, thoughts of infidelity, at that time heterosexual, bring it to an end after two-and-a-half months. Pregnant by a lover and jealous as well, she has great difficulty in keeping her lover and legalizing their union. Frigid and rather smug, she is dissatisfied emotionally, socially, and materially; she criticizes her husband for his crude manners and tastes while striving to be refined herself. The patient's dreams allow interpretation of her ideas of homosexual infidelity through rivalry with the man. The masculine rival is sometimes regarded as the sexual partner, but more often he and the husband try to rid themselves of her, to pass her off as mad.

In another dream, there is a serious car accident: the husband, by the side of a lorry, has a broken arm and is bleeding. The husband is not a good driver. He had cut in front of a lorry driver who swore vengeance on him.

She even sees herself in the role of her husband, taking his place at the car wheel. One night she dreams that, disguised as a man and wearing a peaked cap, she opens the door for him in order to play a trick on him.

Often she sees herself surrounded with bouquets. Once she picked a bouquet of cauliflowers and one of camomile and offered the former to the doctor. In fantasies, she sees herself as a dragonfly flitting from flower to flower.

She dreams that she has a ring on her finger with a pearl in it, a wedding ring. All day she is 'apprehensive' of finding such a ring on her finger.

During fellatio fantasies, the erotomanic object explains to her the feelings that a man experiences—a composite attitude, it seems, in which she participates on both sides of the situation.

One of the men by whom she imagines she is loved reproaches her in a dream 'for loving her daughter too much in place of her husband'. The husband, conversely, appears as refusing to kiss her and being interested only in his little boy. The infrastructure of her family relationships seems to be homosexual.

The biographical data confirm the role that dreams play in the rivalry with the man. From her first years, she was in conflict with a brother slightly older than herself. At the age of 4 she lost her mother, to whom she remains fixated. Memories of blood-soaked cotton wool and a coffin are attached to this death and to the birth of a little brother. Moved from pillar to post, she returned at puberty to live with her father, who married again and got into open conflict with his mother-in-law. From the age of 12, she suffered attempted seductions by men and brutal assaults, which she fended off but which left her with the penis as a monstrous image. The happiest time of her life was when, as a chambermaid, she experienced some level of intimacy with her mistresses. The misfortunes began at 25 with the marriage and her first heterosexual relationships.

OBSERVATION 5

A final clinical observation concerns a paranoid delusion in a schizophrenic woman aged 32. The delusion begins in 1931, at 28: at the workshop, when she is in the toilet, her friends look at her and say, 'She has a prick'. Later she criticizes her husband for chasing women with a friend, then of having homosexual relations with that same friend. In the street, she is followed by a blonde woman. She hears voices. In the toilet, while washing, someone says she is a man. During relations with her husband, lewd comments are made. That is why she ceases to have any sexual relationship. Afterwards she has sensations of genital contact and penetration. She feels, in the mattress, the movements of a strange object, a mortar. Someone says: 'I'll stick a mortar in you.' She is sent faecal smells. She is shown a nurse's badge. She sees herself in opposing roles. In short, what is noticeable in this is the coincidence of ideas of homosexual infidelity and ideas of a change of sex. She lost her mother when she was 18 months old, and she was abandoned by her father at 7. After this unhappy childhood, at 15 she lost her virginity with the son of her boss. After that she thought she was abnormal. When she was married, she began to have a terrible fear lest the details of her dissolute spinsterhood would be discovered.

The choice of a homosexual rival, therefore, is neither fortuitous nor without special significance. There is no doubt that the circumstances—the spouse's perversity, further the appearance of the idea of homosexual infidelity, but its systematization, the repetition of the same theme, the exclusivity of the jealousy—would demonstrate the intervention of individual factors. The accusation of pederasty allows her interest in the anal region and anal penetration to be expressed. Various facts highlight her fear of men's aggression and maternity, the wish to be a man and to have a penis, a homosexual choice, and the oral fixation to the mother (Observation 4), and finally the tendency to homosexual 'splitting', to the united stand between women against men.

* * *

SUMMARY: in the woman, the idea of homosexual infidelity seems above all a response to the fear of the man and to rivalry with him, to the desire to castrate the man and to be the man, perhaps even to penetrate him. In the man, the charge of homosexuality

would have its origin in the fear and disgust of the woman, the fear of being castrated by her, a passive attitude.

Psychoanalytic data

The psychoanalytic material is taken from a case, published in a work on amorous jealousy (Lagache 1947a). For the present purpose, I shall describe what is related to ideas of homosexual infidelity.

OBSERVATION 6

The patient is a jealous and querulous woman, who was 35 at the beginning of the analysis. She cohabited with a stranger four years younger and complained about this situation. She was extremely jealous of a female employee in the same place as her lover. The analysis lasted for two and a half years. Although it did not lead to fundamental change, it enabled the patient to live independently of her lover, who continued to come and see her, and to sublimate, in her professional activities, part of her masculine aspirations. Penis envy, in fact, was the nodal complex of the case. All her life had been dominated by a very ambivalent conflict with her mother, whom she criticized for having given her neither love nor a profession—in other words, for not having made a boy of her.

The very choice of lover helped in the understanding of the idea of homosexual infidelity. A weak character, he responded in his passivity and masochism to the patient's spirit of domination and aggressivity. As a child he had, for a long time, been dressed as a girl, while she, until the age of 8, had been dressed as a boy.

Well before the start of the analysis, the patient had had ideas of homosexual infidelity. During the course of an erotomanic episode, which came up at the beginning of treatment, she told how in their disputes he sometimes stopped her leaving: undoubtedly he was afraid that she would commit suicide, or that she would not return; perhaps at bottom he was jealous. Then she talks about a friend of her lover, who came several times to visit them: he was a painter, a communist, a misogynist. The

patient's attitude towards him was hostile because of his political and moral ideas and because he did her a disservice with her lover. She experienced him as a rival. She felt repugnance for him. At the same time, she was uncomfortable with his black look, which undressed her. She wondered if his lover were not jealous. This problem, the symptom of the jealousy ascribed to the partner, reveals the sexual interest in the rival. At the same time as her wish for infidelity, it is likely that she also projects her homosexuality. Women friends take her side against the young man and approve of a break-up: women's solidarity against men's solidarity. Some months later, when the analysis of the patient's masculine aspirations was beginning, she recounted the following dream:

'Her lover sends her away and takes a young man, who serves him as a woman. She sees the two men coupled like dogs. She is taken away by her sister, who has turned blonde and become young and strong again. She takes her bitch with her, which her lover threatens to take away if he meets it. The sister takes her into a car, which she drives. She gives the dog to a maid. Her sister does not know the way. She meets a policeman who consoles her for having lost her lover and comforts her because she is afraid of being pregnant. He kisses her on the mouth.'

If the lover is caught red-handed in homosexual infidelity, the patient's latent homosexuality is left easily explained. She leaves with her sister, who has assumed the classical sort of rival—a big, blonde woman, sporty and masculine (she drives the car), a type that the patient herself strives to become. The patient takes her dog of whom she is jealous. (She also identifies it with herself and finally kills it.) Beside her is a maid to whom she entrusts the dog. The separation of the sexes is complete. The solidarity of women is confirmed against the solidarity of men.

In fact, she expects from women, especially from her older sister and even from her rivals, a maternal attitude. The female friendships quickly lead to deception, followed by a break. More than once the friend becomes a rival.

Furthermore, in the dream, the role of the sister stops: she 'doesn't know the way'. As in the patient's life, she has only been an intermediary with the man represented by the policeman, a *deus ex machina* who arranges everything. Condensed in this person is the father, the analyst, an old doctor who with the help of the sister has already interrupted an unwished-for pregnancy. It is the deification of the strong man with whom she could be a

woman inasmuch as she participates in the power that dominates her.

This ending does not contradict the beginning of the dream. The strong man is in conflict with the weak ones from the beginning of the dream, but without excluding them. The analysis had already brought out the wish to have two men at once, the stronger serving to dominate the other. The heterosexual relationship thus becomes a means of dominating the man, and the idea of homosexual infidelity a fantasy in which she possesses the man through identification. The homosexual rival in the dream is, moreover, not very virile; he is associated with women, especially with the female rival whom he seems to want to separate from her. As for the lover, he, too, is denigrated. He could lend himself to an anal aggression of which, as a child, he was almost the victim. She, on the contrary, feels repugnance for anal coitus, a repugnance that extends to vaginal intercourse *more bestiarum*. Until 8, she had suffered from helminthiasis and sometimes thinks she is still suffering from it.

Some time afterwards, the patient tells of an intimate scene in which, in the context of ideas of homosexual infidelity, penis envy is quite manifest. She is walking naked around the apartment, in a bra that does not come off because of her withered breasts. She has always been ashamed of her thinness, the equivalent of the absence of a penis (her father and brother were fat). She notices that her lover follows her with his eyes. She assumes that he is comparing her with her rival, who is fatter and therefore more mannish. It is to go with her that morning that he refused to make love. She thinks he must deceive her with a man. She asks him why he is looking at her. Gallantly he replies that he would like to photograph her. Looking at herself in the mirror, she then says: 'I have a boy's body. Don't you find that I have?' A bit later she talks about new shoes, which he had refused her. If she worked, she would be able to buy them. But her lover does not want her to work. He made her leave her job, which provided for them. He wants to retain that superiority. He is jealous. In the milieu in which she worked there were women with certain tendencies.

At this point the analysis, then, finds the projection of wishes for hetero- and homosexual infidelity but makes them appear in a new guise. Indeed, there is a heterosexual interest and a wish for infidelity with the male rival. But the meaning of this infidelity is not to change lovers, nor to have two men at the same time; it

is to dominate the one by the other, to dominate him. The masculine friendship puts in check the desire to dominate the man; the woman is excluded from it. She is not loved because she herself is not a man, because she is not bedecked with a penis. It is not enough therefore to *have* a man, nor even two. She must *be* a man, incorporate a man. It is a theme of those fantasies in which the patient practises coitus with one man at the same time as practising fellatio with another.

Of course the analyst's impartiality was understood as bias towards the lover in the name of male solidarity: he would have understood the patient better and taken her part had he been a woman.

CONCLUSIONS

The idea of homosexual infidelity seems to occur more readily in the woman, which is in accordance with the greater frequency of jealousy that Freud attached to penis envy and with the intensity of the penis envy, which surpasses corresponding complexes in the man.

The difference in mode of expression between man and woman seems to depend on the idea that each sex commonly has of the homosexual relations of the other, representing, moreover, what it is impossible for the woman to accomplish. In both man and woman, the idea of homosexual infidelity is in accordance with the feeling of solidarity of the sexes and the intuition of its homosexual component.

The known facts about the ego have not enabled me to justify a precise interpretation of the idea of homosexual infidelity in men.

In women, the heterosexual interest for the male rival is not enough to account for it. It is even vague to talk about projection of the unconscious homosexuality. The basis of the idea of homosexual infidelity in the woman seems to be an exasperated penis envy, from which proceed fantasies of sexual aggression not only towards the woman but towards the man.

As to the idea of heterosexual infidelity, psychoanalysis expresses the man's rivalry with the woman through the woman's rivalry with the man. In the case of homosexual infidelity, there is

coincidence between the symptom and its interpretation. On two levels the woman is in rivalry with the man. It is logical to conclude that the idea of homosexual infidelity proceeds from a latent homosexuality that is more powerful and already nearer to consciousness.

CHAPTER TWO

The work of mourning: ethnology and psychoanalysis

[1938]

Mourning' calls to mind obligations imposed by society on the relatives of a dead person for a long or shorter period of time. One forgets that, through its origins and some surviving elements, 'mourning' refers to the psychological phenomenon of physical and mental pain.

The strange expression 'work of mourning' suggests an intense and laborious effort, aimed at obtaining a result. This is not the usual spectacle of death: is it not precisely that, a 'spectacle' that one 'attends', an event to which one is resigned? There is nothing that suggests an activity, or work. It is possible, however, that such ordinariness is 'humdrumizing', that the resignation is the result of an underground work of defence and adaptation. Indeed, it is in the pathological form of mourning that it becomes apparent that such work has not been done, or has been done badly. The existence of such work is also suggested by the rituals of mourning in primitive societies. The study of mourning, therefore, either in its psychological aspect or in the social practices that give it form, opens up some perspectives on the general problem of the function of pain.

The comparative method adopted may well raise some automatic objections. What relationships, one may ask, can exist between practices of mourning in primitive societies and the

facts revealed by the psychological exploration of mourning and its pathological forms? Undoubtedly, grief can accompany conformity; but there can be grief without conformity and conformity without grief; for instance, in the Trobriander Islands, the real and restrained grief of blood relatives contrasts with the noisy conformism of the in-laws (Malinowski, 1929, p. 153). One can go so far as to say that mourning accentuates the distinction between psychological reactions and social conformity.

There is an element of exaggeration in this. Social conformity has a meaning, an origin, a psychological effect. And there is no 'individual psychology' that is not a science of man in a world and in a social world. Psychological reaction and social conformity, rather than being opposite realities, seem to be two poles of the same reality.

Besides, 'mourning-pain' cannot be made an exclusively private affair. Mourning is experienced as grief only when death has broken a particularly intense social relationship. Even this relationship cannot easily be enclosed in an individual existence; it encounters the social criterion that the individual is 'affected' by his relationships with another, that the psychological phenomena that arise are not reducible to the—albeit hypothetical—ones of an isolated psychic existence. To dismiss 'private' relationships as being different from social ones because they are confined to a restricted number of people amounts to posing a soritic problem: how many men must there be for an inter-human relationship to become a social one? If we are not careful, the experience of solitude will make sense only in a society.

Recourse to depth psychology and to abnormal forms of mourning requires other justifications. These problems cannot be understood at all without the basic concept of an inter-human reality. Such a concept would seem to correspond well to that reality in primitive societies where emotional life, with its socializing function, prevails over the rational; psychic reactions are more readily projected into beliefs, expressed in rites and ceremonies. In our societies, the distinction between social and individual is much more strict. A sort of splitting permits an almost radical separation of me and you; positivism reduces death to a property of life. And even faced with the death of a loved person, descriptive psychology does not easily go further than the level of a conflict between presence and absence, hardly detecting more than the persistence of the dead person's image 'in' the consciousness of those remaining. This is perhaps

because the work of mourning prevents the further penetration of descriptive psychology, at least as far as normal mourning is concerned. This difficulty justifies the comparison, with the practices of mourning in primitive societies, of data from pathology and from the psychoanalysis of mourning. Such a study was sketched out by Freud in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13), though incompletely, because it was limited to emphasizing the role of ambivalence in the two sets of facts.

Let me point out the broad lines of the functional and structural meaning of the work of mourning—that is, of a general conception of the aim and means of mourning. The death of others makes us 'aware' of the 'inter-human reality' in that death is felt as a personal injury: the aim of mourning is the accomplishment of a split between the dead and the living. Its means consist of transposing the biological fact onto the human level, i.e. 'killing the dead'.

It is a strange solution for anyone not familiar with the problems involving the inter-psychology of the *ego* and the *alter ego*, so accustomed are we to considering their separation as a primitive and immediate fact of the intuition. It is strange, too, because the mechanisms involved are foreign to the functioning of rational thought, and yet it alone can pose and resolve the problem. Mourning is hidden from us because of the very work of mourning itself, which has enabled us to go beyond the mourning. A helpful notion is one of a pre-rational or primitive mentality, in the descriptive sense of the term—i.e. thought characterized mainly by syncretism and juxtaposition, by non-differentiation and ambivalence, and by ignorance of its own operations.

* * *

The death of an indifferent person may be an ordinary death that one 'attends'. But the death of someone to whom we have powerful ties, positive or negative, evokes tears or laughter. We 'understand' the grief that follows the death of a loved one, the isolation in which the mourner is held, losing all interest in the world, its people and its merits, focusing his thought only on the dead. Thus constituted, mourning evolves in a more or less prolonged fashion until the affliction fades away and outside interests revive.

A comparison between the beginning and end of mourning makes comprehensible the functional meaning of the work that is

accomplished. At first, there is 'non-realization' behaviour: while objectively the deceased has gone from co-presence and existence 'for oneself', which characterizes the 'you', to existence 'in itself', which characterizes the thing, the behaviour of the mourner rests midway between reactions to presence and reactions to absence; at the end, the reaction to absence takes over, and the deceased tends to become truly a 'missing person'. In the interval, as Pierre Janet said, 'liquidation behaviour' develops in relation to death, which has to be 'realized', to be 'bade farewell', so that the abnormal phenomenon can 'be borne' and 'life can continue'.

Morbid forms of mourning enable the structure to be penetrated more thoroughly by exaggerating certain phenomena that can normally arise in mourning.

Well-known phenomena are the illusion of life: the corpse and the negation of death giving rise to the symptom of 'systematic non-recognition of death', which Jacques Borel has studied clinically.

Various illusions, reverie, and the dream maintain, contrary to reality, the presence of the dead person. This presence is projected into visions and voices in some hallucinatory delusions. There is a partial identification with the dead, since it is the activity belonging to the deluded that is attributed to the dead. The deluded takes on the role of the deceased even more clearly in delusions of influence or possession, especially in the spiritualist form of mourning.

The death of another is an allusion to my own death. Death is as close to me as the dead one is. In the anxious and hypochondriacal form of mourning, the survivor is clearly identified with the deceased: he even experiences the symptoms of the same illness that brought about the deceased's death.

Often feelings of blame occur after the death: there is self-reproach for not having loved the deceased enough, for not missing him enough; if it was a suicide, there is further reproach for having failed to prevent the death. The dead are idealized and their virtues are extolled, forgetting, as Fontenelle remarked, that 'their principal virtue is being dead'. This obsessional form of mourning arouses a mixture of love and hostility, the ambivalence that weighed upon the relationship with the deceased.

These exaggerations of the phenomena of normal mourning facilitate the isolation of some mechanisms essential to the work of mourning: the unacceptability of death, ambivalence towards the deceased, and identification with the deceased. By penetrat-

ing their content more deeply, the analysis of melancholic and manic forms of mourning will better define the nature and relationships of mechanisms that have come to light.

Melancholic mourning derives its symptoms from mourning and from melancholia. A high level of moral pain and the loss of all worldly interest distinguish this type of mourning. To these symptoms are added the dramatic conflict of melancholia: loss or great diminution of the feeling of any personal value; self-accusations, especially regarding the death of the loved person; self-punishment. The subject immediately seeks a punishment that will put an end to his torment and remorse or, at other times, dreads it, awaits it with anxiety; he is anorexic, attempts suicide; often he refuses to satisfy his natural needs, remaining silent and immobile as if he himself were dead. Many stuporous melancholics can be compared to automatons, mummies. In psychoanalytic terms, the situation is typical of internal conflict between the ego and a particularly severe superego.

Freud clarified the paradox in such an attitude: the ego has lost a loved being but behaves as if it experienced a loss in the ego, as if it were not merely 'impoverished' but intrinsically 'diminished'. The ego is therefore identified with the lost object. Psychoanalysis distinguishes the structure of mourning as a conflict ambivalently directed against the ego modified 'by the shadow of the object'.

The functional interpretation of mourning will endeavour to show how this structure enables the work of mourning to be accomplished.

In order to understand the economy better, we must begin with the structural and functional meaning of the inter-human relationship that existed prior to the death.

In general, every attachment to another implies both ambivalence towards, and confusion with, the other. The ambivalence in the relationship enables the erotic component to bind the aggressive component, allowing love and benevolence to predominate. Confusion of the ego and the other corresponds to the constitution of an inter-human reality, of a communion; every relationship of the ego and the alter ego implies an ambivalence of similarity and otherness; the ego and alter ego are never completely distinct, just as they are never completely merged.

The non-differentiation of *ego* and *alter ego*, of love and hate, is much more pronounced in individuals predisposed to pathological forms of mourning. Already, in the predisposition to

obsessional neurosis, there is lacking that genital primacy which seems to be the instinctual basis of deliberate relationships between one person and another, of which the supreme form is love. The vital attitude remains strongly 'narcissistic', the attitude towards the other 'solicitous', the sado-oral impulses maintaining an important role. The same traits are found in the predisposition to melancholia, but in a still more regressive form. The choice of love object is a narcissistic one; the subject loves himself in the other and loves the other in himself. Deeply dependent on the other, he needs to participate in his activities and emotions. Oral impulses predominate, and the fixation to 'a delayed oral stage' is well understood as a stage of 'cannibalism'—as Abraham discovered—in which love for the other consists in devouring him, in identifying with him by 'introjection'. The aggressive component is therefore particularly strong, since its aim is the complete destruction of the other. Excessive dependence in relation to the other enables the mastery of aggression. The erotic and aggressive impulses are said to be 'fused'.

The situation being thus, it is understandable that loss of the loved one may well provoke melancholic mourning. The erotic component, which, as we have seen, was hardly detached from the ego, loses whatever it might have had by way of cathexis of the other. The aggressive component, being no longer bound, is 'defused', and the function of this freeing of aggression is easy to grasp: the ego is full of hatred and anger against the other who has abandoned him. The other must be destroyed, the ego liberated from the ties that united him with the other. But neither reality nor moral awareness allows the ego to consummate this destruction. Idealization of the dead one overcompensates the aggression that his departure provoked towards him. The aggression is turned back from the other onto the ego and practises on it all the self-critical, self-accusatory, and self-punitive harshness of the superego.

If love of the self (narcissism) is strong enough, the ego frees itself from the moral pressure of the superego at the same time as it gives up the other, and a benevolent attitude finally triumphs in its relation to the dead one. In terms of the work of mourning, the aggression that was defused by the death of the other is once again fused.

A case of melancholic mourning that I analysed will show how the facts correspond to the mechanisms explained in 'Deuil maniaque' (Lagache, 1938a).

A woman of 44, widowed, was sent to me because of her state of typical melancholia, which had begun eight months earlier, some days after the death of her only son in a car accident. Several characteristics should be pointed out: she was hardly sleeping at all, and the short spells of sleep were interrupted by nightmares in which she repeatedly saw the mutilated body of her son. Everything concerned with him—friends, objects, memories—having been sought after for some days, had now become 'taboo'. She obviously reproached herself over the death of her son—notably because she had not furthered his marriage, which could have prevented the accident—and she had made several suicide attempts.

The patient's childhood had been dominated by a conflict between a frigid mother and an unfaithful father and by strong feelings of social and moral inferiority. At puberty, despite an intense curiosity, she had remained sexually quite ignorant. At 18, she had suffered a serious trauma with the birth of a brother—a birth that was all the more resented as an intrusion because she had to take care of the baby. Soon afterwards, she married; in conflict with her husband, an egoist and dishonest, she returned to her parents. The birth of a son brought about a reconciliation that was short-lived, as the husband was killed in 1915, in the war.

From then on she began a life of working, quite fruitfully, between her parents and her son. The search for erotic and sexual satisfaction amounted to no more than almost vain attempts because of the double obstacle of her son and her parents, especially her mother, who was very rigid and uncomprehending.

On two occasions—a break with a man and the death of her father—she had a not very serious depressive reaction.

She became much happier as her interest was concentrated on her now grown-up son. There were many indications that her love for her son had an incestuous element in it. The narcissistic character of the relationship was the result of the son's achieving the physical, moral, and social ideal that she had been unable to attain; above all, he was a man. However, despite all the maternal love, the persistence of a resentment was revealed in dreams in which she rid herself of her burdensome child.

Analytic treatment enabled her to take up the work of mourning, which had been immobilized in the melancholic state.

From the first sessions, her sleep improved, and the nightmares disappeared and were replaced by dreams in which she left her child. Gradually she grew aware of her ambivalence towards her son: she had loved him, and she had not loved him; the loud manifestations of grief in which she indulged at the time of the funeral served only to attract the attention and pity of other people. The demonstration of the confusion between her and her son rested largely on the fact that she criticized in herself all the many faults that she discovered in him. At the same time the taboo that isolated her from everything concerning her son began to disappear.

The analytic situation offered her artificially the opportunity to relinquish her concentration on the dead son and to choose a new love object in the analyst. The transference was manifested especially in obsessions with a sexual content, the obsessional conflict expressing the conflict between fidelity to her dead son and love of the analyst. Obviously this new cathexis was full of ambivalence; she constantly deprecated the analyst, and she treated him as if he were a small child. One day she cried out: 'Do I have to love you, then, for being so horrid?'

Her hostility towards the analyst also expressed a defence against temptation. By his 'demoralizing' attitude, the analyst took a stand against the authority of the moralizing mother. A dream from the tenth session illustrates this conflict at the heart of the illness and life of the patient: she drank liqueur straight from the bottle; her mother explained to the brother that she allowed her to do so because she was ill. The patient's immediate associations were concerned with a similar action of her father's, which took place during a discussion with the mother at the time of one of his infidelities; she also talked for a long time about her mother's and her own breasts, about breast-feeding and fellatio. Thus, through her illness, the patient managed to weaken the severity of her mother, who accorded her the same licence as a man. The rival brother is ousted with care; the choice of drinking from the bottle as a symbol of freedom is typical of the oral fixation; the passage from breast to penis shows that in the depths of the unconscious the feeding and moralizing mother has remained the model for all other love objects. It is quite clear that the dream expresses, above all, a wish for the mother's permission for the patient to continue her relationship with the analyst.

Subsequent events gave this interpretation a tragic confirmation. The mother alone remained safe from the patient's aggressivity; too weak to shake off this yoke, she attacked her mother only indirectly in the care with which she was entrusted. The holidays arrived, and the impossibility of interrupting the treatment led me to advise my patient to go with me on holiday, which she accepted. But the deprived mother literally took her daughter away. Some weeks later, my patient, desperate at having interrupted the treatment, 'her only mainstay', burned herself to death.

* * *

The manic form of mourning is incomprehensible without the concept of an ambivalence that is already manifested in the laughter that death can provoke and in the comic value of the macabre. Manic mourning is based on the same complex as melancholic mourning, but whereas in melancholia the ego succumbs to this complex, in mania it frees itself from it. An intense resurgence of self-love, of 'the instinct of preservation' (ego instinct, narcissism), enables the ego to go beyond the painful past. The erotic and aggressive impulses are freed from the pressure of moral authority. Delusion is the psychology of 'despite all'. Physiopathological research has not yet resolved the problem of the melancholic or manic tone of these morbid psychological reactions. As a hypothesis, psychopathology can question the relative power of the ego in the face of instinctual impulses and moral occurrences.

I have already published (Lagache, 1938a) the observation of a 37-year-old woman with an unquestionable manic-depressive history in whom a manic state developed some days after the suicide of her father, who was found hanging in the cellar. A single clinical observation will highlight the meaning that I have just sketched out. After her father's death, instead of crying, the patient attacks him: 'He did to me what I would not have wanted to do to him. . . . I said enough to him about it when he was put in his coffin; if he had resorted to a razor or revolver, I would have despised him.' She protests against the weight of this dreadful past: 'I'm not the Pope, I've had enough of such a heredity.' She presents a frequent alternation between delusion and lucidity. In the manic state, she denies her father's death, she is rude, shameless, erotic, violent; in the intervals of lucidity, she is aware of his death and explains the rudeness and salacious-

ness of her manic state as being like her father. The mother seemed to represent the main source of sexual repression.

* * *

The psychology of manic and melancholic forms of mourning is the main theme of the interpretation of melancholia and mania: clinical and psychoanalytic exploration bring to the fore the same function, the same structure, the same predispositions. The most noticeable difference is that the manic and melancholic states often seem to arise spontaneously and incomprehensibly. But analytic investigation or a well-informed and detailed clinical examination highlights trivial facts that seem lacking in importance and yet have had an enormous impact. Their vivid and implicit content is a repetition of a past bereavement—more often than not the loss of a loved person. Organic dogma, leaving aside the possible temporary failure of the enormous amount of research that it has generated, is not an out-and-out unmitigated objection. An organic attack clearly produces a loss experienced in the ego: such was the patient observed by me some years ago whose manic excitement had followed a severe haemorrhage, without any traces of confusion.

To return to mourning in the strict sense, we can summarize our conception of it by defining mourning as a work by which the mourner splits himself off from the deceased and finally reestablishes the fusion of aggressive and erotic impulses that have been broken by the death of the loved person.

* * *

There is no lack of works on the function of mourning in primitive societies; I refer especially to Robert Hertz's (1907) synthesis: *Contribution à une étude de la représentation collective de la mort* [Contribution to a Study of the Group Representation of Death]. In it, the author explains, in a natural sequence, the data relating to the corpse, to the spirit, and to the mourners. He does his research exclusively on the Dayaks of Borneo and generalizes his results with the help of documents from other sources, referring in particular to totemic civilizations. What struck Robert Hertz was the fact of second funerals; at the end of his paper, he summarizes his ideas as follows:

> For the group consciousness, death under normal conditions is a temporary exclusion of the individual outside the human

> communion, the effect of which is to pass him from the visible society of the living to the invisible society of their ancestors. Mourning is at base the necessary participation of those surviving, at the funereal state of their relative; it lasts as long as that state itself. In the final analysis, death as a social phenomenon consists of a double and tedious work of mental disintegration and synthesis. It is only when this work has been accomplished that the society, restored to peace, can triumph over death.

In other passages, Hertz repeatedly emphasizes the idea that mourning is work, and it is so because of those cathexes of which the deceased was an object. The proof is that there is no state of mourning for people without social importance—young children, for example. From many more reports it is apparent that Hertz is not merely a sociologist and disciple of Durkheim but a born psychologist: his insistence, for example, on the idea that group representations relating to the vicissitudes of the mind are only projections of the feelings of those remaining. This has enormous methodological importance for us.

In my psychological study of the work of mourning, I have isolated three main sources of aggression: the aggression inherent in every inter-human relationship, the resentment provoked by the departure of the dead person, and the aggression inherent in the work of morning, which is to destroy the love object and eliminate the affective cathexes of him.

The aggression inherent in every inter-human relationship is what Freud brought to the fore in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–13). The dead person is regarded as an enemy, because we project onto him the aggressive component freed by his death, in order to defend against awareness of death wishes directed towards him. Westermarck (1907–9) emphasizes that for primitive man, no death is normal or natural; every death is suspect, attributable to bad behaviour, to magic. Hertz (1907) and Malinowski (1929) stress the same idea in a number of cases. This projection of aggression explains the transformation of death into an evil spirit, and to belief in devils.

The second source of aggression is the resentment against the dead person because of his death. Instead of blaming spirits, the deceased himself is blamed: 'What right have you, ingrate, to abandon me?' (Hertz, 1907).

This anger involves the aggression inherent in the destructive function of mourning. The deceased is thrown violently out of

society, taking with him his closest relatives; the body must be destroyed in order that the deceased can pass out of this world into the next (Hertz, 1907). Human art, various practices, including endocannibalism, hasten or impede the efficacy of the forces of nature. The phenomenon of second funerals consummates death on the human level: it is correlated with a second death, not natural any more, but social, being accomplished by the society. There are no second funerals for people lacking social importance. There even exist funerary rites, kinds of dramas or mysteries, in which the deceased is killed (Hertz, 1907). Lastly, it is well known how frequently mourning includes human sacrifices, often particularly cruel ones, especially during the final ceremony.

This freeing of aggressivity in the process of mourning is one of the factors that permit the final reconciliation of the deceased with those remaining. Having been a dangerous and evil demon, the dead person becomes a benevolent and protective ancestor (Hertz, 1907). It would therefore be right to say that the intermediate period between the death and the second funeral is distinguished by the defusing and projection of aggression.

These views are confirmed by the attitude towards enemies who have been killed: in many societies, the murder of enemies is followed by the whole display of mourning, and the customs of reconciliation make guardians and protectors of them (Freud 1912–13). The relationship towards enemies was consequently also an ambivalent one: there were feelings other than simply hostility, such as repentance, homage to the dead enemy, regret at having killed him.

If society excludes the deceased by an active piece of behaviour as an organism eliminates a mortified part, the fact that the dead person takes his closest relatives with him suggests an identification with the dead and those remaining who are contaminated by the death. Suddenly, because of their relationship to death, the nearest relatives feel affected in their own existence (Hertz, 1907). That is so true that in matriarchal societies the blood relatives alone are felt to be affected by the death; whence the important role of women in funerary practices (Malinowski, 1929). During the intermediate period, the deceased continues to be treated like a living person (Hertz, 1907). So a dead man retains rights over his widow, if she has not followed him to the tomb, rights over which the relatives watch jealously.

If the deceased is treated like a living person, conversely, those remaining are treated like the dead: these are the 'people of death' whose interdictions turn the living body into a corpse. Immobility and silence are frequent dictates in mourning (Hertz, 1907). Sometimes a single term designates the whole ensemble of corpse, the period of mourning, and the state of mourning. Identification is materially achieved by the carrying of relics of the deceased and ornamented bones, and by the practice of endocannibalism (Hertz, 1907).

The notion of projection, highlighted by Hertz, solves the question of relationships of ambivalence and identification; the aggression directed against the deceased by his relatives becomes the aggression of the deceased against the living; the interdictions and penitences are simulaneously obligations towards the deceased and cruelties that the living inflict on themselves in order to soothe the dead. What serves to prove this are the cases where the remains of the dead turn against those living who have infringed the prohibitions (Hertz, 1907).

The meaning of endocannibalism is related to this question of ambivalent and identificatory relationships. It is tempting to see in it a manoeuvre that is both destructive (aggressive) and identificatory, which could be compared with introjection, the pivot of the psychoanalytic theory of mourning. As to identification, there is no doubt that it is a matter of absorbing the dead person, giving him a decent burial, and assimilating his strength and virtues. But the relationship of endocannibalism with aggression is not as clear; Hertz (1907), for example, completely rejects the idea, as in ordinary cannibalism, of a 'refinement of cruelty or the satisfaction of a physical appetite'. In most cases, the living who accomplish this obligation of piety must overcome their repugnance and break off to go and vomit.

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Freud, in *Mourning and Melancholia* (1917 [1915]), remarks that no manic outburst occurs during the course of mourning—undoubtedly, he suggests, because the forces necessary to the work of mourning are progressively expended. That is definitely true of individual existence: manic mourning is as early a reaction as melancholic mourning, not a reaction that comes to conclude and crown it. But the ethnography of mourning describes phenomena comparable to mania. For instance, a period of anarchy, of veritable saturnalia, may follow immediately upon

the death of a chieftain or one of his relatives (Hertz, 1907), or the death of an old man. Contrary to these early outbursts, which happen quite infrequently, such reactions appear habitually in the final ceremony, which is often marked by banquets and orgies in which the mourners are freed from the taboos of their mourning and dispense with all that has been accumulated in them, sometimes for years, at the cost of painful sacrifices. In the funerary mysteries, it is a veritable triumph when the deceased is supposed to have reached the great beyond (Hertz, 1907). Here again, identification of the living and the dead is affirmed in the very ceremony, the final one, which separates them, since it simultaneously establishes the freedom of both.

One can apply to the final ceremony the same meaning that Freud gave to the Roman saturnalia and carnival, which he compared to mania: the instinctual impulses are freed from the pressure of moral authorities (Freud, 1912–13, 1921c). I have said of mania that it is a triumph over adversity, a psychology of 'despite all': this interpretation of the final ceremony is the same that Hertz gave in 1907, when he called it 'a victory over adversity', the triumph of society over the dead. (On the subject of the psychology of 'despite' [*obwohl*], as discussed by Schilder, see Lagache, 1938a.)

The ritual of the totemic feast brings together many convincing reconciliations: the ritual and group murder of the totem with which the participants are identified; the mourning that shields the clan from the responsibility of the murder; then the celebration and communal means in which identification with the totem is affirmed and renewed by all members of the clan (Freud, 1912–13).

Just as in the study of individual existence the notion of mourning was enlarged to encompass loss in general, so in group life notions of death and mourning are widened to include every transition such as birth, initiation, and marriage.

This double study, therefore, leads to the idea of a strong similarity between the processes of mourning in the individual and in the practices of primitive societies; in both cases, work is necessary to exclude the dead from inter-human reality, at the end of which the living are freed from their identification with the dead.

The death of a person is much more than biological fact. If this is so, the phenomenon of death is something other than a kind of repetition of death on the human level: to live the death of