

ROUTLEDGE REVIVALS

Local Government in European Overseas Empires, 1450-1800

Volume XXIII
Part II

Edited by
A.J.R. Russell-Wood



An Expanding World
Volume 23: Part II

Local Government in European
Overseas Empires, 1450–1800

AN EXPANDING WORLD
The European Impact on World History, 1450–1800

General Editor: A.J.R. Russell-Wood

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 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1999 in the Variorum Expanding World Series by Ashgate Publishing

Reissued 2018 by Routledge

2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN

52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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A Library of Congress record exists under LC control number:

ISBN 13: 978-1-138-36117-1 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978-0-429-43278-1 (ebk)

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De la Police

Moreau de Saint-Méry

DE LA POLICE DU CAP

Puisque j'ai proféré ce mot, je vais parler de la police du Cap. Les plus anciennes loix coloniales et principalement le règlement du roi du 4 Novembre 1671, a donné l'exécution de la police aux juges inférieurs. La vérité est néanmoins que dans le premier âge de la Colonie, les États-majors l'exerçaient presque exclusivement, à moins qu'il ne fût nécessaire de prononcer quelques amendes, pour lesquelles ils renvoyaient aux juges. MM. de Larnage et Maillart convaincus que cette forme était vicieuse, créèrent, le 13 Août 1739, un inspecteur de police du Cap qui fut chargé de la police sous le procureur du roi et auquel ils donnèrent un brigadier et quatre archers tirés de la maréchassée. Ils nommèrent M. Ferrary et l'assujettirent à prendre les ordres de l'État-major et du Conseil supérieur, et à remettre au ministère public, les procès-verbaux des contraventions. La part laissée à l'État-major fut un nouveau titre d'usurpation et la police lui fut presque totalement dévolue jusqu'en 1762, que les plaintes des colons déterminèrent MM. de Bory et Clugny à prendre de nouvelles mesures. Elles furent réunies dans leur ordonnance du 14 Juillet

qui établit deux inspecteurs et dix sergens de police, un voyer et un étalonneur-jaugeur, et qui leur distribue des fonctions, en les plaçant sous les ordres du sénéchal et du procureur du roi.

La police a divers objets que je vais parcourir rapidement. D'abord la propreté de la ville. Il serait difficile de trouver sur aucun sujet autant de réglemens des Administrateurs, du Conseil du Juge de police, qu'il y en a depuis le 9 Mars 1710, pour que la ville du Cap soit propre. *[L'ordonnance de 1710 exige que les immondices soient jetées sous le vent de la ville et que l'on fasse des latrines publiques. En 1722 on a voulu que ces immondices fussent portées sur la jetée sans doute dans le dessein d'augmenter le remblai, sans considérer que c'était placer un foyer d'infection au devant de la ville et donner une voirie pour espace aux mouvemens du commerce.]*

Le 7 décembre 1735, le Conseil du Cap ordonna que le nettoiemment de la ville serait affermé par les officiers de la sénéchaussée et que l'adjudicataire en ferait servir toutes les immondices à combler le marais qui forme aujourd'hui la place de Clugny et toute cette partie sud de la ville. A la création de l'Inspecteur de police en 1739 on contraignit les propriétaires à paver les ruisseaux au devant de leurs maisons à trois pieds de large de chaque côté et les égouts des maisons de deux pieds ; les eaux qui stagnaient partout commencèrent à avoir un cours réglé vers la mer. A la fin de 1750, on donna des noms aux rues qui n'en avaient point et des écriteaux mis sur des plaques indiquèrent ces noms.

Au mois de mars 1764, M. de Clugny, pour concourir à l'avantage de la maison de Providence, la chargea de fournir deux des quatre tombereaux de police qui, chaque jour, prenaient les ordures de la ville et les portaient sous le vent, c'est à dire vers la Fossette.] Le nettoiyement des rues n'a pas cessé d'être affermé, à partir de l'époque de 1735, et le dernier procès verbal d'adjudication, fait le 9 Septembre 1785 *[pour 5 ans,]* le fixe à 49,000 livres par an. *[Depuis longtemps, le nombre des tombereaux est porté à dix, chacun est attelé d'un mulet et garni d'un panier, d'une pelle de fer et d'un balai et conduit par deux nègres.]*

La police a ordonné de balayer le devant des maisons et les ruisseaux des rues, tous les jours avant sept heures du matin, et dans beaucoup d'endroits on ne le fait presque jamais. Elle a prescrit de jeter de l'eau deux fois par jour au-devant des maisons, afin de rafraichir l'air et de renouveler l'eau des ruisseaux, et ce n'est qu'un simple usage que quelques personnes employent dans les grandes chaleurs et seulement quand il leur plaît. On ne doit pas mettre d'immondices dans les rues, quand les tombereaux ont passé, ni les placer ailleurs qu'au coin et le long des maisons, et il n'est pas d'instant du jour qu'on n'en voye au bord des ruisseaux et surtout dans les carrefours ; dans les rues peu fréquentées, il y a des amas d'ordures. Si l'on bâtit, l'on gêne les rues, et la nuit rien n'indique le danger aux

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passans ; en un mot, nulle part la police n'est plus mal faite à cet égard ; les rues, les calles, les quais sont sales et infects ; quelquefois des cloaques répandent une odeur insupportable : on trouve par-tout des voitures et des chevaux dételés, qui gênent et salissent les rues.

La police doit empêcher le bruit, et chacun fait celui qu'il veut. Elle doit empêcher les jeux défendus, et nulle part on ne joue avec plus d'audace ; les esclaves eux-mêmes y font publiquement des parties très-chères, et dont la perte ou le gain est nécessairement un vol fait à un maître. La police doit veiller à la distribution de la viande, et cependant on excède à la boucherie le prix du tarif, ou bien l'on ne veut donner de la viande qu'aux domestiques des gens en place ; il est même reçu qu'on va prier quelqu'un de ces élus, de recommander son nègre à l'inspecteur de police qui est à la boucherie. On tolérerait autrefois que des archers de police prissent de la viande à la boucherie exclusive, et la revendissent à un taux double, et même plus fort.

La police doit veiller à ce que les boulangers ne vendent pas à faux poids, et par une singularité remarquable, il est des boulangers qui échappent constamment à la surveillance, quoique ce ne soit pas ceux dont le public se plaigne le moins.

Depuis le 2 Août 1780, une ordonnance des Administrateurs a réglé qu'il n'y aurait que trente cabarets au Cap, que quatre seulement pourraient vendre du tafia, mais pas en moindre quantité que de dix bouteilles, et néanmoins tout le monde voit, excepté la police, qu'il y a plus de trente cabarets, et que le tafia se vend à la plus petite mesure, pour sept sous et demi [*que les nègres viennent boire dans le cabaret.*]

Les cabarets doivent être fermés à des heures marquées, et cependant j'ai eu le voisinage d'un cabaret où les nègres m'empêchaient de dormir long-tems après et même lorsqu'un beau clair de lune ne permettrait pas, à tout autre qu'à la police, de ne les pas voir.

C'est la même bienveillance pour les billards, qui étaient, en 1786, aussi nombreux que les cabarets, et pour les cafés : et il a fallu que des officiers de l'état-major et même M. de Bellecombe, gouverneur-général, allassent, avec un détachement de troupes, pour y faire cesser un jeu désastreux.

On serait tenté de croire qu'il n'y a au Cap ni gens sans aveu, ni vagabonds, parce que la police [*qui ne les recherche pas*] n'en trouve point. Le métier d'aubergiste et de logeur, est celui de quiconque veut le prendre, et les règles ne sont pas mieux suivies sur ce point que sur les autres.

Quant aux esclaves, il semble que la police n'ait aucune fonction qui les regarde. Les nègres vont armés de gros bâtons ; ils tiennent des chambres à loyer, ils jouent, ils forment des assemblées, ils violent enfin tous les réglemens, et les hommes de police sont spectateurs tranquilles de leurs contraventions. Ils arrêtent cependant le dimanche

quelques nègres de la plaine, qu'ils accusent d'être sans billets ; parfois même ils conduisent à la geole des nègres de la ville, qu'ils ont arrêtés dans quelques patrouilles de nuit, mais ce sont des nègres qui n'ont pas le droit d'impunité, par le crédit de leurs maîtres ; car il y a tel esclave qui obtient les égards de la police, et souvent tel archer de police a, parmi les esclaves du sexe, une protectrice, qui a aussi ses créatures.

Quelles sont donc les causes de tant de désordres ? La principale est le trop petit nombre d'hommes formant la troupe de police ; la seconde, la médiocrité de leur traitement ; la troisième, le peu d'énergie et de surveillance de la part des officiers de police, je veux dire des officiers de la Sénéchaussée. Il n'y a, à présent que le Cap est doublé comparativement à 1764, que le même nombre d'agens de police ; deux inspecteurs, deux sergens et huit archers, au lieu de dix sergens. Parmi ces dix derniers, il y en a toujours un qui est toute la journée chez le sénéchal et l'autre chez le procureur du roi, pour exécuter leurs ordres en fait de police. Les inspecteurs, obligés de rendre des comptes journaliers au commandant, à l'ordonnateur, au sénéchal au procureur du roi, perdent une grande partie de leur tems dans ces courses auxquelles ils ajoutent des visites au président et au procureur-général du Conseil. Comment huit hommes qui restent, accompliraient-ils tous les devoirs qu'on leur impose ? comment feraient-ils des patrouilles de nuit, dans une ville qui a près d'une lieue d'enceinte dans sa forme irrégulière ? n'est-on pas certain, au moment où cette patrouille vient de passer, qu'on ne sera plus inquiété par elle ?

Le traitement est, depuis 1762, fixé à 2,400 livres pour les inspecteurs et à 900 livres pour chacun des autres ; ce qui fait en tout 13,800 livres par an, qui sont payées par la caisse des droits municipaux, c'est-à-dire, des droits suppliciés et de maréchaussée ; on leur fournit, en outre, un fusil, une bayonnette, un fourniment et une épée. Les inspecteurs sont obligés d'avoir un uniforme composé d'un habit, veste et culotte bleus, boutons d'argent, une aiguillette d'argent sur l'épaule, et de porter un bâton d'ébène garni d'ivoire en haut et en bas. La troupe est aussi en bleu avec les boutons blancs et on lui fournit une bandoulière bleue avec un bordé blanc, aux armes de France et le mot *Police*. Enfin ce n'est que depuis le mois de Novembre 1785, que le Conseil du Cap a loué une maison rue Espagnole pour y loger la troupe de police ; chaque archer était tenu de se loger, à ses frais, auparavant.

Est-il un individu, connaissant Saint-Domingue, qui croie possible qu'un archer de police y subsiste et s'habille, etc., avec 900 livres ; un inspecteur avec 2,400 ? Je sais qu'ils ont des profits de capture et de confiscation, mais lorsqu'ils sont aussi près du besoin, il est plus sûr encore pour eux de vendre leur indulgence que d'attendre des

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profits incertains. Aussi les exemples de prévarication sont-ils journaliers. D'ailleurs quand il y a un si petit nombre de complaisans à acheter, les sacrifices sont moins grands. Il faut donc augmenter la troupe, qu'on a encore obligé à mener les criminels aux exécutions qui ne sont pas suivies de mort ; il faut la payer de manière à engager des hommes qui s'estiment à remplir ces fonctions. Mais tout cela ne suffira pas si les officiers de la Sénéchaussée ne mettent pas un zèle sévère dans la manutention de la police, s'ils ne plient pas à la loi tous ceux qui se font un jeu de l'insulter par leur désobéissance.

Le voyer, qui a 3,000 d'appointemens depuis 1781, et les revenans bons de sa place, n'y met pas non plus une grande exactitude. Il est guidé dans sa principale fonction, qui est l'alignement des rues, par le plan-directeur qui est dressé, changé et corrigé par l'ingénieur en chef, d'après les ordres des Administrateurs, parce que les villes des Colonies sont considérées comme des places de guerre. Une copie de ce plan est déposée au greffe de la Sénéchaussée. La voirie, proprement dite, ne le regarde pas mais l'entrepreneur du nettoyage de la ville. Il inspecte les pavés, règle l'écoulement des ruisseaux, empêche les usurpations sur le local des rues, etc.

Il faut savoir qu'il existe un étalonneur-jaugeur juré, pour s'en douter. En nul lieu du monde, peut-être, on ne vend plus à faux poids et à fausse mesure qu'au Cap. Indolence de celui qui a cet emploi, défaut de protection dans ceux qui devraient assurer ses opérations, voilà les causes de ce nouveau vice de police.

Je dois pourtant convenir qu'il serait très-difficile que les officiers de la Sénéchaussée pussent remplir leurs obligations en fait de police avec l'exactitude, la juste sévérité, et la célérité qu'elles exigent. Le tribunal consomme tout leur tems pour les affaires civiles et criminelles ; d'ailleurs la police a encore d'autres parties pour eux. C'est, outre deux audiences de police le mardi et le vendredi de chaque semaine, l'après-midi, cette multitude de plaintes, de débats, de colloques, qu'il faut écouter, de la part d'esclaves qui se plaignent de libres, de libres qui se plaignent d'esclaves, de blancs qui imputent des faits à des affranchis ou qui sont l'objet des reproches de ces derniers. Il faut mander les uns et les autres, tenir en quelque sorte un tribunal domestique, accomoder, blâmer, menacer, punir et garder dans tous ces cas une mesure qui tienne tout à la fois de l'équité naturelle et de la justice légale ; employer l'autorité à maintenir la paix publique, sans en abuser, et ne pas la soumettre au crédit, à la faveur, à la crainte, peut-être. Tant de soins dans une ville coloniale, où les individus sont placés les uns à l'égard des autres dans des rapports politiques, exigent bien des qualités, et causent une grande perte de tems. Or le sénéchal, son lieutenant et le procureur du roi en ont à peine assez pour accomplir toutes leurs fonctions de judicature, et pour prononcer vingt

mille jugemens, au moins, par année. La police est donc le patrimoine des inspecteurs, et ils disposent, lorsqu'eux-mêmes auraient besoin d'être constamment surveillés.

Dès 1748, on a parlé de l'établissement d'un lieutenant de police au Cap, où le besoin qu'on en avait a prodigieusement augmenté. Il suffirait de connaître toutes les ordonnances et les réglemens de police, pour être convaincu qu'elle est très-impuissante, et qu'elle manque de moyens répressifs. Que faire du vagabond qui, arrêté et mis en prison, finit par en sortir pour reprendre sa vie errante et continuer à menacer la société des mêmes fléaux ? Il faut une personne qui ait le soin unique de la police de cette grande ville, et que le gouvernement manifeste d'une manière éclatante le dessein de la soutenir contre tous les abus d'autorité, et contre la ligue des hommes qui croient que leur dignité s'augmente, par l'impunité qu'ils accordent à leurs domestiques, à leurs esclaves. Il faut qu'avec tous les moyens d'assurer l'ordre, le chef de la police soit responsable du trouble qu'on y apportera. Alors, mais alors seulement, on remédiera aux divers monopôles qu'on croit nuls, parce qu'on ne les éprouve pas personnellement, et l'on ne craindra plus, comme à présent, de faire le bien, parce qu'il faudrait braver une rumeur insensée, qui réclame aveuglément en faveur d'anciens abus.

C'est encore le sénéchal qui censure les pièces de théâtre et qui donne des permissions aux baladins, à ceux qui montrent des optiques, des marionnettes, aux faiseurs de tours, à ceux qui font des courses à cheval, etc. Sans doute qu'on croit que cette permission est tacitement accordée, pour exposer et vendre des livres et des estampes obscènes ; car il n'est pas de jour de marché des Blancs où les yeux ne soient blessés par ces dernières, et où la jeunesse ne puisse trouver aussi à échanger sa précieuse innocence, contre la morale ordurière de livres dangereux où des dégoûtans tableaux souillent encore la vue. [*Je ne puis terminer sur la police sans lui reprocher encore son peu de vigilance sur la trop grande multiplication des chiens. Ils troublent continuellement le sommeil dans la ville et y font courir, sans utilité, les dangers de la rage dont les exemples très manifestés, depuis 1762, ne sont malheureusement pas rares.*]

Pour mieux faire juger de la nécessité d'une bonne police au Cap, il suffit d'en connaître l'importance et la population.

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DE LA POLICE DE PORT-AU-PRINCE

Elle est comme au Cap, entre les mains des officiers de la Sénéchaussée. Elle a pour agens immédiats la maréchaussée, et la troupe de police.

La maréchaussée qui a un prévôt-général pour les Parties de l'Ouest et du Sud, consiste particulièrement dans la ville du Port-au-Prince, en un prévôt, un exempt, deux brigadiers et huit cavaliers, à qui l'on a donné un logement particulier en vertu d'un arrêt du conseil du Port-au-Prince du 27 Octobre 1785. L'uniforme de la maréchaussée des Parties de l'Ouest et du Sud ne diffère de celui du Cap que par la veste et la culotte qui sont blanches et non chamois. La bandoulière est bleue, bordée de chaque côté d'un galon de fil blanc d'un pouce de largeur. Les brigadiers ont de plus un bordé de six lignes entre les deux autres. Sur le devant de la bandoulière est une simple fleur de lis sans couronne en galon d'argent, placée sur un fond écarlate qui lui sert de liséré. La maréchaussée est passée en revue par l'États-major de la place et cette revue est visée par le procureur du roi et le sénéchal qui y marquent les reproches, s'ils en ont à faire à la maréchaussée. L'ordonnance du conseiller, commissaire de la caisse municipale, au bas de l'état sert à recevoir les appointemens que compte le receveur de cette caisse. Dans les simples paroisses c'est le commandant pour le roi ou celui de cette paroisse qui fait la revue des détachemens et le substitut à résidence du procureur du roi qui les vise.

La troupe de police du Port-au-Prince, est celle qu'avait établi à Léogane l'ordonnance des Administrateurs du 10 Mars 1750, et qui a suivi la Sénéchaussée de Léogane au Port-au-Prince. Elle fut composée alors d'un inspecteur, pourvu d'une commission des Administrateurs, reçu et assermenté à la Sénéchaussée, avec 1,000 livres d'appointemens,; un exempt et quatre sergens commissionnés par le procureur du roi et ayant, le premier 36 liv. et les autres 24 liv. par mois.

Le 12 Mai 1758, le conseil du Port-au-Prince augmenta cette troupe de deux brigadiers et de deux sergens, et porta les appointemens de l'exempt à 900 livres par an. Puis, le 21 Novembre 1763, il y ajouta encore 4 archers.

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DESCRIPTION DE LA PARTIE FRANÇAISE

Enfin, depuis l'ordonnance des Administrateurs du 8 Février 1775, la troupe de police est composée d'un inspecteur, de deux exempts, cinq brigadiers, dont trois sont blancs, vingt archers et quelques nègres surnuméraires. L'inspecteur et les exempts ont habit et culottes bleus, veste blanche, boutons, épaulettes et éguillettes d'argent ; les brigadiers et les archers portent un habit bleu, collet et paremens rouges, et lorsqu'ils sont de service, une bandoulière rouge, bordée de chaque côté, d'un galon de fil aurore large d'un pouce. Les brigadiers ont un galon de 6 lignes entre les deux autres. Sur le devant de la bandoulière est un médaillon aux armes de France, fond bleu, couronné de fleurs de lis jaunes. Les fonctions de la troupe de police ne peuvent que s'étendre au delà de la banlieue de la ville, tandis que celles de la maréchaussée ont toute la paroisse.

La revue de la troupe de police est passée, tous les trois mois, successivement par le procureur du roi, le sénéchal et le procureur-général, qui visent l'état dressé par l'inspecteur et que l'on paye après l'ordonnance du conseiller-commissaire, comme pour la maréchaussée. Les brigadiers et les archers sont reçus seulement à la Sénéchaussée, sur la présentation de l'inspecteur et ils y prêtent serment.

La police a un corps-de-garde à chaque extrémité de la ville. Depuis l'ordonnance du 23 Mai 1772, elle ne met plus d'archers chez les Administrateurs, ni ailleurs, mais seulement au conseil supérieur pendant qu'il est en séance. L'inspecteur et l'exempt ne doivent des comptes qu'au commandant militaire de la place, au commissaire des classes, au procureur-général, au sénéchal et au substitut.

Les places et les rues sont le premier objet dont le soin est confié à la police, soit pour la sureté, soit pour la propreté.

L'ordonnance des Administrateurs du 10 Mars 1750, pour la police de la ville de Léogane, est devenue la première de ce genre pour le Port-au-Prince. Elle veut que les rues soient libres, nettes, applanies et disposées de manière à accélérer l'égout des eaux. Celles du 29 Novembre et du 28 Décembre 1757, que j'ai déjà citées, l'ont répétée à cet égard et ont voulu de plus un rang d'arbres. Par celle du 23 Mai 1772, il est dit que les maisons seront alignées ; elle permet les galeries, pourvu qu'elles soient rapportées aux maisons, alignées entr'elles, de 10 pieds de large et non closes, et elle enjoint d'avoir dans les emplacements des latrines de six pieds de profondeur, au moins, afin que les manières stercorales ne soient pas jettées dans les rues. Une ordonnance du 25 Novembre 1773, a voulu que les propriétaires des emplacements fissent dans le milieu de la rue un encaissement de tuf, de cailloux et de sable, et trois pieds de pavé de l'un et de l'autre côté, avec des fossés pavés pour égouter les eaux. Mais afin de rendre l'air plus salubre et les rues plus propres, elle a ordonné de couper les arbres des rues, excepté ceux des places publiques, ceux

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plantés depuis le magasin du roi jusqu'à la rue Sainte-Clair, de ces magasins au gouvernement et du gouvernement à l'intendance. Une autre ordonnance du 2 Avril 1774, a répété les dispositions de la précédente, attendu que toutes les maisons détruites par le tremblement de terre de 1770, étaient reconstruites, et a ordonné d'enclorre les emplacements vides ; et le 20 Décembre 1775, l'exécution de celle de 1774 a été recommandée. Enfin, les Administrateurs ont fait insérer dans la gazette du 2 Septembre 1789, une invitation de faire arroser le devant des maisons deux fois par jour, quant la brise d'Est souffle avec force, parce qu'elle produit une sécheresse très-préjudiciable à la santé.

Encore à l'époque du tremblement de terre de 1770, la ville du Port-au-Prince n'était qu'un vrai cloaque. Le premier qui donna l'apparence de rues aux grands chemins qui sont entre les maisons, fut M. le Grand de Campeaux, garde-magasin du roi, qui ayant plusieurs cabrouets, imagina de faire combler le terrain qui était au devant de son logement. Puis, arriva M. de Vallière, qui a tant désiré que le Port-au-Prince devint une ville.

Les galeries n'ont pas la largeur exigée, indépendamment de leur manque de nivellement. On y met des barriques, des planches, même des voitures ; il y a des emplacements mal ou point entourés, d'autres où sont des choses combustibles, presque livrées à l'audace des mal-fauteurs. On trouve vers la place Vallière et la rue Traversière des monceaux de paille qu'y laissent les cabrouets venus de la plaine avec des barriques de sucre, sous lesquelles on met des couches de paille.

Quant à la propreté des rues, comme il n'y a point de tombereaux publics pour enlever les immondices, elle ne peut être poussée loin. D'ailleurs, leur forme bombée au milieu, avec des fossés sur les côtés où l'on entend croasser les crapauds, n'est pas favorable. Les eaux pluviales qui courent de l'Est à l'Ouest avec un volume et une vitesse très-considérable, ne trouvant pour issue dans les rues du Nord au Sud que de petits fossés, couverts d'un madrier en façon de pont, sont arrêtées, refoulent et gâtent encore les rues. Celle d'Aunis est sujette à devenir un torrent dans les grandes pluies. Il faudrait au contraire un fossé au milieu avec une pente des deux côtés, prise sur une largeur de 15 ou 18 pieds. Les Administrateurs avaient convoqué les habitants à l'hôtel de la marine, le 4 Avril 1787, pour concourir à la dépense d'un fossé de couronnement au haut de la ville, pour la préserver de l'effet des pluies abondantes, suivant le plan de M. de la Fitte, ingénieur en chef ; on leur demandait les 21,500 liv. exigées pour la fouille, et l'administration publique se chargeait de l'indemnité due aux propriétaires des terrains où passerait ce fossé, des frais des aqueducs à faire pour les canaux qui transporteraient l'eau des

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fontaines et de l'entretien du tout ; mais il n'y eut que 19 délibérans et 10 refusèrent toute contribution.

On voyait des animaux dans les rues, mais l'ordonnance des Administrateurs du 16 Novembre 1788, veut qu'on les arrête tous, même ceux de la maréchaussée qui, comme ceux des courriers des postes, ne pouvaient pas être pris auparavant.

La police doit veiller aussi aux marchés, aux cabarets, à ce que les nègres esclaves ne troublent pas l'ordre public, à ce qu'ils ne soient pas armés ni errans dans les rues et à ce qu'on ne les y trouve pas sans permission par écrit de leur maître, lorsque le sacristain, à qui le conseil supérieur fait compter 200 livres sur la caisse municipale pour ce soin, les avertit de rentrer, par une cloche de la paroisse qui sonne pendant un quart d'heure, à commencer de neuf heures et demie ; les cabarets, dont le nombre est illimité, sont très-nombreux ainsi que les billards et les cafés, et rien n'est plus commun que les nègres qui se louent eux-mêmes et qui vivent d'une manière indépendante.

La police doit empêcher qu'on ne joue aux jeux défendus ; et elle est mal faite à cet égard ; à ce qu'on ne vende point de comestibles corrompus, à ce qu'on ne vende pas à faux poids et à fausses mesures, ce qui arrive cependant ; enfin, elle doit surveiller les auberges, les boulangeries et les boucheries.

Depuis l'ordonnance du mois d'Août 1787, qui a supprimé l'horrible ferme des boucheries, il y a 8 bouchers de bœuf à Port-au-Prince, dont 4 sont des gens de couleur. Un archer de police va s'assurer que les animaux qu'on veut tuer ne sont point malades. Les tueries sont vers le fort Saint-Joseph, à l'extrémité Nord de la rade Marchande. Elles exhalent une forte odeur, que les vents ordinaires ne portent heureusement pas sur la ville. Les ordonnances de police défendent d'avoir des parcs à bêtes dans la ville et d'y faire sécher des peaux.

La viande est moins bonne durant les mois de Mars, Avril, Mai et Juin, parce que c'est la saison des pluies. D'un autre côté, les bœufs tirés de la Partie Espagnole, étant pris plus loin du Port-au-Prince que du Cap, ils pâtissent davantage et il faut qu'ils soient débités presqu'en arrivant.

Il y a aussi un archer placé à chaque lavoir public, d'après l'ordonnance du 13 Février 1788, pour empêcher que les blanchisseuses n'y entrent avant le point du jour et pour les en faire sortir au coucher du soleil. Ils empêchent de s'y baigner, d'y abreuver des animaux ; ils en interdisent l'accès aux matelots et font retirer les nègres mâles, dès qu'ils y ont déposé les paquets de linge.

On ne peut pas dire que la police soit bien faite au Port-au-Prince, quoique la troupe de police soit plus nombreuse qu'au Cap ; mais il faut confesser qu'elle est plus difficile dans cette dernière ville.

D'abord, le Port-au-Prince est plus étendu ; il a beaucoup d'espaces vides ; chaque maison a un tour d'équerre ménagé pour les incendies, mais où l'on peut fuir et se cacher ; la population étant moins rassemblée, il n'y a pas cette espèce de surveillance, presque involontaire, que les individus exercent les uns à l'égard des autres ; enfin, le nombre considérable de petites chambres louées, jusqu'à une seule gourde par mois, dans de grandes cours, communes à beaucoup de locataires, empêchent que ces cours ne soient fermées la nuit et ceux que la police poursuit y trouvent un asile.

Cependant nul lieu de la Colonie n'a plus besoin d'une police active que la ville du Port-au-Prince, par la nature de ses bâtimens et par sa vaste enceinte, qui l'expose continuellement aux dangers des incendies.

Dans la crainte que l'impression de l'effroyable tremblement de terre de 1770, ne s'effaçât comme celle du tremblement de terre de 1751, après lequel on avait bâti plus de la moitié de la ville en maçonnerie, les Administrateurs défendirent, le 8 Août, de reconstruire autrement qu'en bois, soit poteaux en terre, soit poteaux sur solage de bois, avec des planches clouées sur les poteaux, sans maçonnerie, clissage, ni bousillage, excepté en dehors, lorsqu'il y aurait des planches en dedans. Nul solage de maçonnerie ne peut être de plus de deux pieds hors de terre. Les clôtures d'emplacements doivent être de haies vives, ou de pieux ou à claire-voies supportées par des murs qui ne peuvent excéder trois pieds ; à moins qu'ils ne soient assez isolés, pour que dans leur chute, ils ne puissent atteindre aucun bâtiment.

Quoique la même ordonnance ait engagé à se procurer des pompes et qu'elle ait recommandé plusieurs autres précautions contre le feu, il est difficile qu'une ville toute construite en bois n'y soit pas sujette.

Les Administrateurs qui en étaient convaincus, rendirent, le 5 Mai 1787, une ordonnance qui enjoit à chacun de se porter où est le feu dès qu'on entend la générale et le tocsin, et d'obéir aux ordres du Sénéchal et du procureur du roi ; aux gardes-magasins du roi de délivrer sur l'ordre du commandant de la place les trois pompes qui y sont, les seaux, les échelles, les haches, etc. ; aux particuliers qui ont des pompes, de les faire conduire au feu ; aux ouvriers, de s'y rendre avec les outils propres à arrêter l'incendie ; à la maréchaussée et à la troupe de police, de se réunir en armes, à cheval ou à pied, et de faire par escouade des patrouilles, sur tout à l'entrée des chemins qui conduisent à la campagne, pour arrêter quiconque voudrait y transporter des effets ; aux piqueurs des nègres de l'atelier du roi, d'y conduire ces nègres avec des haches, des échelles etc., et d'obéir aux officiers du génie ; enfin à chaque propriétaire d'avoir deux seaux de cuir marqués du numéro de la maison, où ils seront laissés.

Le lendemain, 6 Mai, M. de la Luzerne fit imprimer une consigne

pour le régiment du Port-au-Prince. A la générale, les grenadiers, les chasseurs et les 140 hommes prennent les armes ; 70 hommes vont sur la place de l'intendance, et 70 sur celle du gouvernement ; 30 de ces derniers marchent aux prisons, d'où les prisonniers sont conduits aux cazernes, si le feu gagne les prisons. Le surplus des piquets fait des patrouilles dans les rues. Le reste du régiment, sans armes, excepté les bas officiers qui ont leurs sabres, forment autant de détachemens qu'il y a d'officiers. Quelques-uns de ces détachemens traînent les pompes des cazernes au lieu de l'incendie on y portent les seaux, et les autres, précédés des grenadiers et des chasseurs, vont travailler à éteindre le feu, dont les grenadiers et les chasseurs ceignent le tour par un cordon qui empêche les inutiles d'y entrer et les hommes utiles d'en sortir. On forme des dépôts d'effets dans les places ou carrefours voisins, et l'on oblige à tout déposer pour n'être rendu qu'après le feu, sur l'ordre du commandant de la place et du juge de police.

La consigne de l'artillerie du même jour veut que trois hommes et un caporal se rendent au fort Saint-Joseph pour faire des signaux, qu'un caporal et quatre hommes restent à garder les cazernes d'artillerie, et que le reste, pourvu de haches et de crocs, aille au feu.

D'après la consigne de la rade et du port, de la même date, le fort Saint-Joseph tire deux coups de canon de gros calibre, coup sur coup et arbore un pavillon rouge, et si c'est la nuit, on met deux feux au bâton du pavillon. Alors les vaisseaux du roi envoient en hommes et en pompes, les secours dont ils peuvent disposer, et les marins qui sont à terre se rendent aux calles pour se réunir à eux ; tous obéissent au commandant de la place. Les navires marchands doivent mouiller avec du cable à filer et des croupières assez au large pour s'y tirer au moins d'une encablure, afin d'éviter la communication du feu entre la ville et eux. Le commandant de la rade fait aller trois ou quatre canots de ronde pour entretenir l'ordre et empêcher qu'on ne transporte des marchandises de terre en rade. Le capitaine de port prend au corps-de-garde voisin huit hommes et un caporal, et va faire éloigner tout ce qui est près des quais, même en coupant les amarres. Ce corps-de-garde a en dépôt deux corps-morts de 1,200 livres pesant chaque, avec des chaînes de 30 pieds de long, deux grapins avec des chaînes de 70 à 80 pieds de long, deux masses, six mains de fer, 25 livres de clous et six haches, et une embarcation) est toujours prête pour aller avec ces moyens, saisir et éloigner des autres, le bâtiment qui prend en feu dans la rade.

On eut dès la fin du mois de Juin, à se féliciter de ces mesures sages, car dans les trois nuits du 25, du 26 et du 27, on essaya de mettre le feu à la ville du Port-au-Prince, notamment en plaçant un panier où était un morceau d'allumette enveloppé d'un linge huilé et soufré sur le toit

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de l'une des maisons de la place de l'intendance. On y avait ajouté une pierre, sans doute afin que le vent ne renversât pas le panier. Les Administrateurs durent regretter alors de n'avoir pas pris pour la ville quatre superbes pompes provenues de la succession d'un fondateur nommé Héban, homme d'un talent réel qui était venu de Paris s'établir au Cap. Elles furent achetées au Port-au-Prince, où je les ai vu essayer au gouvernement, par quatre propriétaires du Cul-de-Sac pour leurs habitations.

Le 2 Juillet, les Administrateurs promirent 3,000 livres à tout libre, et la liberté et 1,000 liv. à tout esclave, fut-il même complice, qui ferait connaître les auteurs de ces entreprises.

Le 10 Août, une barrique de tafia fit brûler une maison. Le 15, le feu prit encore, mais le zèle de tous les individus, les secours très-prompts de M. Meunier, à la tête de ses nègres et ceux de la pompe à feu de M. Marchand qui était dans le voisinage, arrêterent l'incendie. Le 28 Août, le feu prit ; et dans la nuit du 30 au 31 Août, pour la septième fois de l'année, mais sans suites funestes, et ce dernier essai fit même condamner au gibet une jeune négresse le 24 Septembre.

Le 8 Décembre 1788, le feu se manifesta encore dans une cuisine située dans le quartier le plus peuplé de la ville, près d'une grande quantité de planches, de merrains, etc. ; mais des soins empressés et la pompe à feu de M. Cottineau, arrivée sur le champ, maîtrisèrent ses progrès.

Tout autorise à croire que si la surveillance ne se ralentit point, des accidens du feu seront désormais encore moins redoutables pour la ville du Port-au-Prince, grâces aux Administrateurs, qui lui ont donné une immense quantité d'eau, dont la jouissance est assez précieuse pour que je trace ici les détails qui la concernent.



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The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts

Jack S. Radabaugh

THE Godly, grave men of Massachusetts took pains, even while still thousands of miles from the American shore, to provide in principle for the contingencies which might arise to challenge their existence in the New World. When considering the problem of defense, the founding fathers, in the Charter of 1628, took note of chief commanders, captains, and governors, and their power to rule and punish.¹ After the Puritans had arrived in New England the General Court of Massachusetts was even more specific when it said, "as piety cannot be maintained without church ordinances and officers, nor justice without laws and magistracy, no more can our safety and peace be preserved without military orders and officers."²

The flowering of the militia was not all just a matter of thought.³ Immediate and practical requirements for public safety in 1631 moved the General Court temporarily to forbid unarmed persons to travel between Plymouth and Massachusetts.⁴ Guns were a requirement for all travelers except those in

and around Boston,⁵ and colonial law called for arms in every home.⁶ Indeed, the colony's legislative body observed that, "the well ordering of the militia is a matter of great concernment to the safety and welfare of this commonwealth. . . ."⁷

The Indians living in and adjacent to Massachusetts very frequently played havoc with the white man's peace, though in the revolt against Edmund Andros, the enemy of the militia was the governor himself. The Pequot Nation in eastern Connecticut was the first tribe to feel the ire of the citizen-soldiers, and after its destruction, it was replaced by the Narragansetts, the allies of King Philip and his Wampanoags, as the ranking antagonists. However, the Rhode Island tribes were never to match the fury of the Abenakis and the Penobscots to the north. These Canadian tribes, the allies of the French, at the conclusion of King Philip's War, became the principal enemies of the Massachusetts militia.

The shifting string of frontier villages served as the battle front for these Indian wars.⁸ All along the frontier the rocky and heavily forested terrain weighed in favor of the tribesmen. Nor did the dense swamps of Connecticut make easier the task of the soldier. The bitterness of winter cold increased the militiaman's suffering in the field, but since it was Indian custom to cease hostilities during cold weather and go into winter

¹Nathaniel B. Shurtleff (ed.), *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England*, I, 17. Hereafter cited as *Mass. Colony Records*.

²*Ibid.*

³The pedigree of the militia in America is contained in the history of the English militia from the time of the Anglo-Saxon fyrd through the Norman Conquest up to the Interregnum. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "County," VI, 597; "Lieutenant," XIV, 42; "Militia," XV, 483-487. J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, I, 12, 123, 194; II, 39, 294-295, 305, 307, 530; IV, 639-641, 888; V, 201, 229, 230, 239; VI, 38, 40, 180-183; VII, 34-35, 422-423. Of these references the article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* on the "Militia" presents the most concise picture of pre-colonial militia history.

⁴*Mass. Colony Records* I, 85.

⁵*Mass. Colony Record*, I, 85.

⁶*Ibid.*, II, 119.

⁷*The Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay*, p. 157. Hereafter cited as *Colony Records of Mass.* This collection is a codification of the *Mass. Colony Records*.

⁸Albert B. Hart (ed.), *Commonwealth History of*

quarters, the long marches through the snow provided the militia with some of its most spectacular victories.

Cultural differences lay between the two peoples. The Calvinistic convictions of the settlers caused them to view the Indians as heathens, even demons, if some of the Puritan divines were to be believed. The principles of common law so prized by the English mind made little impression on the tribes, and were regarded with bitter hostility when translated into hangings for murder. The Puritan attempts to enforce Indian allegiance to the English sovereign also met with scant enthusiasm. The unmilitary manner of the colonials caused the Indian, raised according to a warrior code, to regard the white people with little respect. And the ever expanding line of villages built by the new people menaced the Indian's land.

In view of their differences with the natives, the planters adopted the mode of military organization most proximate to their experience and resources. This was the company or trained band centered in the town. The company, usually bearing the town's name, was commanded by a captain who was assisted by a lieutenant, an ensign, three sergeants and three corporals. At first a company at full strength had sixty-four men,⁹ but later the figure was raised.¹⁰ The privates in a company were divided into two groups in which two-thirds bore muskets, and the rest carried pikes.¹¹

It was of importance to these privates that

their company be maintained at full strength. Only when the company was fully manned could the soldiers choose their commissioned officers. Otherwise the sergeant-major, the commander of the regiment, supervised the company, and company personnel could choose only their sergeants and corporals.¹²

For the older settlements at least, the matter of holding lists at full strength was no problem, since as early as 1635 the division of a company was felt to be necessary at Watertown and Charlestown.¹³ Later the General Court decreed that the company should be divided every time there were enough men to form a group of one hundred.¹⁴

Naturally this division of units raised disputes as to priority when several companies met at a regimental drill. In Boston the General Court appointed senior officers,¹⁵ but later it resorted to the unsatisfactory expedient of allowing priority in command to rotate.¹⁶ A more satisfactory solution to the problem was found in determining precedence according to priority of the commandant's commission.¹⁷

But fast blossoming trained bands were only one side of the coin. In the newly established villages on the frontier the opposite was true. It was necessary to combine the company at Rowley Village with Rowley, and Piscataqua with Kittery, in order to attain sufficient unit strength.¹⁸

Like any military institution the company needed money to operate. The common way to finance military needs at the town level was by fines. The coin collected by the company clerk went for a variety of items which included anything from wood for the guard to powder for the poor.¹⁹ In addition, rum

Massachusetts Colony, Province and State, I, 533; II, 74-75. Hereafter cited as A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*. Hart gives an excellent sketch of frontier conditions, and the type of people defending the more advanced regions. See also *Mass Colony Records*, III, 310; V, 48, 51, 79.

⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 267; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 158; Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1677-1680*, 138. Hereafter cited as *Cal. State Papers*.

¹⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 268; V, 16.

¹¹*Ibid.*, I, 328; II, 119.

¹²*Ibid.*, III, 267-268.

¹³*Ibid.*, I, 160.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, III, 268; V, 16.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, III, 285.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. I, 246.

¹⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 284-285.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, II, 42; IV, Pt. II, 554; V, 16.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, II, 119.

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THE MILITIA OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS

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and tobacco appeared along with the other staples needed to operate a frictionless war machine.²⁰

Though the musketeers constituted a majority of each company, the pikemen, numbering about one-third of company strength,²¹ and occupying position on the flank,²² were the more colorful. The General Court saw the pikeman gallantly clad in corselet, head piece, sword and knapsack, but since corselets and helmets were rare, a more practical quilt or bluff coat came to be recognized.²³

Service as a pikeman was very popular in the militia. This fact can be accounted for in part by the simplified manual of arms for the pike. There were only eleven operations required of the pikeman at drill while the musketeer was required to know fifty-six different motions.²⁴ But an even more cogent reason for the thrifty Puritan to appreciate the pikeman's art was the fact that it was inexpensive when compared to the cost of providing and maintaining a musket. Furthermore, the father of a large family was responsible for arming his sons till they were twenty-one.²⁵ For a really honest and soul-searching analysis of the wish to bear the pike one must lend ear to John Dunton.

I thought a pike was best for a young soldier, and so I carried a pike, and between you and I reader, there was another reason for it too, and that was, I knew not how to shoot off a musket. But 't'was the first time I ever was in arms; which tho' I tell thee, Reader, I had no need to tell my fellow soldiers, for they knew it well enough by my awkward handling of them.²⁶

²⁰*Ibid.*, V, 73.

²¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1677-1680, 138.

²²Ebenezer W. Peirce, *Indian History, Biography, and Genealogy Pertaining to the Good Sachem Massasoit of the Wampanoag Tribe and His Descendants*, p. 76. Hereafter cited as E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*.

²³*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 319; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 167-168. Corselet—A Small cuirass, or armor to cover and protect the body.

²⁴E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, pp. 77-80.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 76.

²⁶*Letters Written From New England A. D. 1681 by John Dunton*, p. 140. Hereafter cited as *Dunton Correspondence*.

The General Court did what it could to encourage service as a pikeman,²⁷ but with the evolution of warfare into a shooting affair even the pikemen were required to carry guns and ammunition.²⁸ Within a year after the outbreak of King Philip's War the pikeman disappeared from the militia scene.²⁹

In contrast to the disappearing pikeman the horse company, because of its capacity for rapid movement, developed into one of the most effective fighting organizations in the militia. The horse company developed out of horse units which operated as scouts with the foot companies.³⁰ At first the horse units were limited to thirty men,³¹ but later the number was increased to seventy.³² Often the cavalry units were organized by officers who wished to continue their activities while their regiments were not due for drill.³³

The troopers were under the command of the sergeant-majors and the general of the militia.³⁴ However, a company having forty horsemen could nominate its officers,³⁵ who were then subject to the approval of the County Court.³⁶ Later on, its own approval of cavalry personnel was required by the General Court, which was not bashful about using its power to prevent those not free men and those not taking the oath of fidelity from serving in the horse units.³⁷

To be a member of the cavalry several qualifications had to be met. First, a man or his parents must own a £100 estate.³⁸ Only the fluency of his command officer could dispense a man from this law.³⁹ The rider pro-

²⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 43.

²⁸*Ibid.*, V, 47.

²⁹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 465.

³⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. I, 379.

³¹*Ibid.*, III, 265.

³²*Ibid.*, III, 398.

³³*Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2nd Ser., VII, 56. Hereafter cite as *Coll. MHS*.

³⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 344.

³⁵*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 164.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 158.

³⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 264.

³⁸*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 97.

³⁹*Ibid.*, V, 438.

vided horse, saddle, bridle, holster, pistol or carbine, and sword; and the rider was to be fined 10s when he failed to supply himself with any one of these items.⁴⁰ However, in practice the horseman was more recognizable in his buff coat with a pistol, hanger, and corslet.⁴¹ He was required to drill six days a year, and occasionally was ordered to garrison duty.⁴²

There were soem advantages to serving in the cavalry. The horseman could not be drafted,⁴³ nor was he subject to head-rates on houses.⁴⁴ He did not have to pay for ferry service,⁴⁵ and for a time he enjoyed free pasturing on the common lands.⁴⁶ The Court, in time, rescinded some of these privileges,⁴⁷ but while in force they helped to build up the colony's cavalry.

After the horse units had been built up in the various counties it became popular for the towns to organize their own cavalry. The frontier towns of Concord, Chelmsford, Billirrikey, Lancaster, and Groton were especially encouraged.⁴⁸ However, the most effective cavalry continued to come from the groups in Middlesex, Essex, and Suffolk, and the unattached Three County Troop.

The growth of the cavalry was rapid, but not without its hour of crisis. In the war with King Philip the General Court found the cavalry quite as useless as the pikeman and ordered a draft for most riders.⁴⁹ However, subsequent performances by cavalry forced the Court to reverse this hasty decision.⁵⁰

⁴⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 265; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 164-165. Carbine—A short musket used more particularly by cavalry.

⁴¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221. Hanger—The girdle or belt from which the sword was suspended at the side.

⁴²*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 75.

⁴³*Ibid.*, V, 70-71.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, V, 49.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. I, 323.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, III, 398.

⁴⁷*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 164.

⁴⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 419; IV, Pt. II, 439; V, 254, 409-410.

⁴⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 47.

Both trained bands and horse troops combined in a geographical unit called a regiment under the command of a sergeant-major. The regiment corresponded to the county in its area of jurisdiction. The men in a regiment could not be ordered out of the county,⁵¹ except in time of war.⁵²

Within the regiment, the sergeant-major and his chief company officers determined policy, but command decisions, such as orders for mobilization, were made by the General Court.⁵³ The Court also determined quotas of men in the counties in time of stress.⁵⁴

In peace time the regiments were supposed to meet once in three years for drill, and for services received the county was to pay the sergeant-major £20.⁵⁵ Later a schedule was definitely fixed for meetings from 1649 to 1641,⁵⁶ and another schedule was established for the period 1671 to 1676 when new counties were added to the colony.⁵⁷

Requests from the county to drop training were answered by the Court with explicit instructions to drill.⁵⁸ Still some of the counties managed to avoid the meetings in one way or another. Sometimes the period set aside for regimental drills was devoted to some other activity.⁵⁹

By 1680 even the regiments had grown to the point where a division was necessary. In Essex nine towns with horse units combined to form one regiment, and the remaining eight towns formed another. A similar division took place in Middlesex County.⁶⁰

As in any organization, the efficient functioning of the militia depended on the officers. From the sergeant-major-general, the chain

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, V, 70-71.

⁵¹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 157.

⁵²*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 70.

⁵³*Ibid.*, V, 53.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, V, 85.

⁵⁵*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 158.

⁵⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 256.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 486.

⁵⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 73.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 276, 333.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, V, 295.

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of command rattled down through the echelons of sergeant-majors in the regiments to captains, lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants and corporals in the company. The horse unit also sported a cornet and a quartermaster, while regiments sometimes carried surgeons, commissary officers, and chaplains.

All the commissioned officers were nominated by their men and approved by their representatives in the County⁶¹ and General Courts. Those having the power to nominate included freemen and persons taking the oath of residents. Later this group was expanded to include householders and those taking the oath of fidelity. But this constituted not even a majority of the militiamen, for in 1672, of the 15,000 militiamen, only 6,000 could vote.⁶²

In the early days the regiments elected their commanding officers, and the town deputies presented them to the General Court. Towns nominated two or three men for the office of captain and lieutenant, and the Provincial Council then settled on one of them.⁶³ But in 1645 a sergeant-major was selected by votes which were sealed and delivered to the county seat. Here the votes were counted before the deputies and the winner was presented to the general for installation.⁶⁴

From 1641 to 1664 the General Court allowed the County Court to approve company nominees,⁶⁵ but after this date the General Court exercised directly its power to "nominate, choose and appoint" all commissioned officers except the general and admiral. And this passing of elected militia officers was felt in all ranks, for now the non-commissioned officers were appointed by the company com-

manders.⁶⁶ However, this situation was somewhat altered when the committee of militia sat as a recommending body when the need for officers arose.⁶⁷

Once elected or approved the protocol faced by the prospective officer was somewhat complex. To obtain for the officer a commission from the General Court, a freeman obtained a certificate of nomination from the county recorder. This was presented to the secretary of the General Court who drew up a commission. Then the eldest sergeant of the company involved delivered the commission to the governor for his seal. This accomplished, the sergeant then delivered the sealed document to the general, who gave it to the appropriate sergeant-major, who in turn gave it to the waiting winner.⁶⁸

Though the clergyman Edward Johnson claimed that the Massachusetts colonial was one who labored to avoid high titles,⁶⁹ a spectacular exception to this statement was the title of the highest officer in the militia, the sergeant-major-general. This elective position⁷⁰ was described by another contemporary, Edward Randolph, as being one of good profit and no danger because the general remained at home and shared the spoils while younger men commanded in the field.⁷¹ The office carried extensive powers. Among other things, the general could impress matériel of war. With the Council of War at Boston he could replace slain officers, and make rules for the death penalty. In war he had command of all forces in the field,⁷² and in peacetime he could call out his own regiment once a year without the Court's

⁶⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 368; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 168. *Cal. State Papers*, 1677-1680, 138.

⁶⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 30.

⁶⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 285-286.

⁶⁹*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 53.

⁷⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 49.

⁷¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 465.

⁷²*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 42, 76-78.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, II, 222; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 168.

⁶²*Cal. State Papers*, 1669-1674, 332.

⁶³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 187.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, II, 117; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 157-158.

⁶⁵A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, I, 116.

approval.⁷³ He also had the privilege of training his family,⁷⁴ which meant they were exempt from drill.

The other general officer rank in the militia was developed by gradual steps. In 1634 the Court provided for two men to check on existing supplies.⁷⁵ Two years later one of these men, John Samford, was appointed surveyor of arms.⁷⁶ In 1641, one John Johnson acted in the same capacity, and a year later was officially dubbed General Surveyor of Arms.⁷⁷ His principal duty was to account for arms and ammunition,⁷⁸ and he also could buy and sell arms.⁷⁹

The interests of the sergeant-major were more localized. At regimental drills he was cared for by £ 20 from the commonwealth treasury,⁸⁰ but later this entertainment bill was passed back to the county.⁸¹ His principal duty was to see to company drills and attend to matters of delinquency.⁸² In time of attack he was to attend to the relief of a distressed town,⁸³ and could impress goods.⁸⁴

The captain was the top commander in a town. Here, he looked after arms, and saw to it that people carried guns when they attended church.⁸⁵ At times the captain was paid by the General Court, but often his pay came from company fines.⁸⁶

In some cases it was not the captain, but the sergeant who commanded the town militia.⁸⁷ The sergeants were usually appointed to their positions,⁸⁸ though occasionally

the commissioned officers allowed the men to choose their sergeants.⁸⁹ Sometimes a sergeant would jump to the rank of lieutenant.⁹⁰

To collect money for the trained band the Court saw the need for a "discreet able man." Its understanding of the word discreet was made somewhat clearer by the 40s fine which accompanied a refusal to accept the elective honor of being company clerk. The office was not one which offered much promise of forming lasting friendships. It was the clerk who called roll at drill, and noted defects. It was the clerk who seized property in payment for overdue fines. And it was the clerk who added to the fine his traveling expenses for those who would flee his just assessments.⁹¹ But all was not gloom in a clerk's life, for he was permitted to keep for himself one-fourth of all fines collected.⁹² And on purchases made to equip those delinquent in providing themselves with knapsacks the clerk could retain any portion of the fine left over after buying the needed equipment.⁹³

Though not military officers, the selectmen held the crucial task of assessing taxes for the purpose of providing the companies with artillery,⁹⁴ powder, match and shot. To be indolent about their duty cost these civil officers £ 5 per missing item.⁹⁵

To examine the militia's officer personnel without mentioning their schooling would be to do an injustice to their best traditions. The organization for schooling officers most enshrined with tradition was the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company. This honorary group was best known for the sermons presented to it by outstanding Puritan clergymen on "Anniversary Day." The ancient and honorable group had some difficulty ob-

⁷³*Ibid.*, III, 236.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, II, 222.

⁷⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 120.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, I, 183.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, II, 26.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, III, 398; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 164.

⁷⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 31, 124, 222.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, II, 256.

⁸¹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 168.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 158; *Mass. Colony Records*, II, 118.

⁸³*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 162.

⁸⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 28.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, II, 38, 223.

⁸⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 99, 138, 160.

⁸⁷E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 74.

⁸⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 120; IV, Pt. 1, 322.

⁸⁹E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 118.

⁹⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 575-576; V, 75.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, III, 398.

⁹²*Ibid.*, II, 118-119; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 160.

⁹³*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 122.

⁹⁴*Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 162-163.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 164.

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taining a character in 1638 because some of its proposed members, such as John Underhill, were suspected of heretical religious beliefs. There was also the fear that a military clique might seize control of the colony.

Aside from instructional and social activities of the Artillery Company the training of officers placed them in one of two groups, American trained or European. John Mason had served under Sir Thomas Fairfax in the Netherlands, and under Cromwell.⁹⁶ Lion Gardiner, an engineer, was also a Fairfax graduate, and had served the Prince of Orange.⁹⁷ Major Robert Sedgwick had been a member of the London Military Gardens, but he also had fifteen years experience in New England operations.⁹⁸ Outstanding American trained officers included Edward Gibbons,⁹⁹ Josiah Winslow and William Bradford II.

Often the duties of these militia officers were of a diplomatic nature rather than strictly military. The range of activities varied from petty meddling in local Indian affairs¹⁰⁰ to bargaining for the release of white captives.¹⁰¹ Visiting Indian dignitaries were sometimes dispatched from Boston with a noisy salute from militia musketeers,¹⁰² and in pressing negotiations one officer was reputed to have seized a haggling chief by the locks and threatened him with a pistol as a means of pressing an argument.¹⁰³ Militia diplomacy was successful as long as it had force behind it, and troops were sent to keep

the Indians quiet.¹⁰⁴ But in time, over-familiarity with the Indians finally broke down this respect based on fear.¹⁰⁵

Nor was the diplomacy of Massachusetts officers limited strictly to Indian affairs. Intercolonial relations were handled by militia officers as in mutual aid discussions between Plymouth and Massachusetts, ammunition deliveries to Connecticut,¹⁰⁶ and the recommendations of Massachusetts officers to the New England Confederation.¹⁰⁷

The well-being of the militia depended primarily on the corps of officers; but these military leaders had three jealous masters. Within the colony, two sources of authority were discernible. The first was the General Court with its subordinate commissions, councils, and committees operating on a colony wide basis, and the committees of militia which functioned in the towns. A second important group which had limited authority to call on the Massachusetts militia was the Inter-Colonial New England Confederation. And the third group consisted of the representatives of the Crown with their directives from England.

The principal master of the militia, the General Court, seemed never to tire of issuing statements of supremacy. And those statements were given concrete form as regards new appointments,¹⁰⁸ determination of duties,¹⁰⁹ and orders for supplies.¹¹⁰ In some respects this was like giving orders to itself, for approximately one-third of all administrative officers and legislators held commissions. In spite of continuous attempts to legislate the details necessary to operate a militia the General Court sometimes left actual administration of certain aspects of the militia

⁹⁶*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 124.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 3rd Ser., III, 132. 136-137.

⁹⁸*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 54.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 24.

¹⁰¹*Edward Randolph: Including His Letters and Official Papers From the New England, Middle and Southern Colonies in America, with other Documents Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay*, VI, 279. Hereafter cited as the *Randolph Correspondence*.

¹⁰²*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., V, 253-254.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 464-465.

¹⁰⁴*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 318.

¹⁰⁵*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., V, 465.

¹⁰⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 160.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, II, 268.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, II, 124; V, 74.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, I, 117.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, V, 69.

to commissions, councils and committees.

As early as 1634 the General Court granted authority to the governor and three other men to manage any war which might befall the colony.¹¹¹ In other circumstances, and with a slightly larger membership, the men in this group were referred to as the commissioners for military affairs,¹¹² the committee on military affairs,¹¹³ and finally the commissioners for martial discipline.¹¹⁴ It is likely that the latter of these titles is the most accurate for the men were commissioned for a definite period of time, usually till the meeting of the next General Court, and they were required to take an oath before they could execute their commissions.¹¹⁵

This commission continued to manage militia affairs until 1636.¹¹⁶ At that time it was committed to the Provincial Council, the upper house of the General Court.¹¹⁷ Now for a short time the Provincial Council was in charge of militia affairs,¹¹⁸ but it was not long before military matters were again in the hands of a small group of three men referred to simply as the Council.¹¹⁹

The close of the Pequot War marked the end of the General Court's experiments with commissions. In 1643 an advisory group of six men, mostly militia captains, was appointed to advise the General Court on preparations for war.¹²⁰ That year, while reaffirming its authority to command military forces, the General Court mentioned that a council should be set up to act in emergencies.¹²¹ The General Court also mentioned the desirability of yearly meetings by the governor, council, lieutenants of shires, and sergeant-

majors for planning a system of defense.¹²² In a more definite vein was the General Court's pronouncement in 1645 that in emergencies an assembly of assistants, regardless of number, could call out troops and seize supplies.¹²³

After this date the General Court kept the power of regulating the militia to itself. But in 1661 it did grant extensive powers to the officers in the field who composed a battle-field Council of War.¹²⁴ Two years later a special committee was set up to codify militia law,¹²⁵ and in 1676 a committee was established to hear petitions of wounded soldiers.¹²⁶

If the upper levels of military government tended to be unstable and confused this situation was balanced somewhat by the genuine effectiveness of the operation of the committees of militia in the towns. Here any three of the town's civil magistrates and the chief militia officers had authority to deal with a variety of problems.¹²⁷ Committees of soldiers and civilians could order the militia companies into action during an emergency until some higher authority intervened.¹²⁸ They executed the Court's warrants for drafts,¹²⁹ and discharges.¹³⁰ Financially they could assess estates in time of war.¹³¹ They also made recommendations to the General Court for new officers.¹³²

Another jealous but less successful contender for militia obedience during the seventeenth century was the New England Confederation. As an advisory body the confederation recommended storing of arms

¹¹¹*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 135.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, I, 129.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, I, 138.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, I, 143.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, I, 143, 146-147.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, I, 161, 165, 168.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, I, 183, 192.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, 187, 192.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, I, 192, 197.

¹²⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 39.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, II, 42.

¹²²*Ibid.*, II, 43.

¹²³*Ibid.*, II, 125.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 28.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 74.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, V, 80.

¹²⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 268-269; IV, Pt. II, 120; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 161-163.

¹²⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 320.

¹²⁹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 162.

¹³⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, III, 359.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, V, 48-49.

¹³²*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 170.

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both by individuals and by towns.¹³³ As a command-giving body it claimed authority to declare war.¹³⁴ It dealt with repair and sale of arms, endeavoring to control these activities by demanding that the various legislature recall the licenses of those who dealt in arms with the Indians.¹³⁵ It also picked sides among the Indians in an effort to prevent inter-tribal outbreaks.¹³⁶

But the military relations between Massachusetts and the Confederation were at best only politely frigid. The differences between the two grew out of Confederation demands from 1645 to 1650 for troops from Massachusetts to fight the Narragansetts.¹³⁷ The matter came to a head in 1653 when Massachusetts challenged the right of the Confederation to wage offensive war on the basis of the articles of confederation.¹³⁸ In this particular case the Bay Colony refused to act,¹³⁹ but subsequently, in 1675, when Massachusetts felt the Narragansett wrath, the proud colony struck a more humble pose as militiamen from Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, and Middlesex¹⁴⁰ scurried to a rendezvous at Rehoboth at the command of the Confederation.¹⁴¹ Massachusetts also accepted Josiah Winslow of Plymouth as commander of all forces.¹⁴² But the commission issued to Winslow usurped practically all the powers which Massachusetts lawyers had been blustering about for years.¹⁴³

The third, and to the colonials perhaps

the most ominous contender for military control was mother England. That the home country was at times quite conscious of the military events in America is evident in the Lord Protector's order from Whitehall in 1655 directed to John Leveret, the occupation commander at newly conquered St. Johns, to write reports to England on the condition of the fort so that new instructions could be sent to him by Cromwell's government.¹⁴⁴ Later, after the return of Charles II to the throne, there were complaints that Leveret was subjugating the eastern parts of New England without any power from England.¹⁴⁵ And in 1664, in secret instructions to Crown Commissioners the King's choice for major-general of militia was indicated as being a Colonel Cartwright.¹⁴⁶

But along with this undercurrent of contention there was a veneer of flattery which in most cases involved sentiments of loyalty. His Majesty was pleased by New England military supplies sent to Barbados.¹⁴⁷ Nor were the colonials incapable of honeyed words. In 1677, Josiah Winslow, after writing an extremely obsequious letter to the king, accompanied the message with the gangling war trophies taken from the dead King Philip by Benjamin Church.¹⁴⁸

However, during the period of difficulties with the Dutch in 1673 Sir John Knight wanted commanders sent to America to raise colonial armies in Massachusetts.¹⁴⁹ And while the colonials were not happy to hear of English commanders, they were ready to urge aid from England at all times.¹⁵⁰ The hand of foreign advisors was felt more heavily in Massachusetts with the arrival of Edward Randolph, vitriolic agent for the Crown.

¹³³David Pulsifer (ed.), *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England. Acts of the Commissioners of the United Colonies of New England*, IX, 12. Hereafter cited as *Ply. Colony Records*.

¹³⁴*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VI, 473; *Ply. Colony Records*, IX, 22.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, IX, 105.

¹³⁶*Ply. Colony Records*, IX, 12, 45.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, IX, 168; *Mass. Colony Records*, III, 39.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, III, 311; *Ply. Colony Records*, V, 74-76.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, X, 101.

¹⁴⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 73.

¹⁴¹*Ply. Colony Records*, X, 357-358.

¹⁴²*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 69.

¹⁴³*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., I, 66-68.

¹⁴⁴*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., VII, 122.

¹⁴⁵*Cal. State Papers*, 1661-1668, 18.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 1661-1668, 200-201.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 1669-1674, 20.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 1677-1680, 109.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 1669-1674, 530.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 1675-1676, 319.

Randolph recommended that Josiah Winslow be placed in command of the Plantation's militia in 1679, and that a board consisting of Randolph nominees be set up to administer the militia and issue commissions.¹⁵¹ Later he recommended that the magistrates temporarily fulfill this office.¹⁵²

Randolph's recommendations commenced to be realities in 1685 when Joseph Dudley received his commission from James II to appoint officers and take charge of defense.¹⁵³ Sir Edmund Andros' commission gave him the additional powers of moving troops out of the colony, drafting needed personnel, and execution of martial law. This commission also had an unpleasant reference to the apprehension of "Rebells both at land and sea."¹⁵⁴ And in 1691 William Phips was pompously styled by William and Mary as "Our Lieutenant and Commander in Chief of the Militia."¹⁵⁵ Through the charter of this same year the power to appoint officers, to train and govern the militia, and to defend the colony passed from the General Court to the King's governor. However, to send troops out of the province the governor had to have Assembly approval,¹⁵⁶ and it was still the legislature who provided funds for military purposes.

As in any military institution the Massachusetts militia faced the problem of procuring men and supplies, and paying for them. The volunteer method, at one time or another, was tried in Massachusetts, but was a failure financially, and from a disciplinary point of view.¹⁵⁷ The General Court then

turned to the draft as a means of obtaining militia personnel.

Draftees generally included the men on the company lists.¹⁵⁸ But even more eligible were unemployed single males,¹⁵⁹ transients,¹⁶⁰ and smiths.¹⁶¹ In times of trouble all persons were likely candidates for duty in work gangs repairing forts.¹⁶² However, except in emergencies, the draft was a local affair, and men could not be ordered beyond the borders of the colony.¹⁶³

Nor was the art of draft dodging entirely unknown to the Massachusetts colonial. During King Philips war £ 4 and £ 6 fines were set for the evasive,¹⁶⁴ and to the town constables fell the delicate task of collecting the fines.¹⁶⁵ Yet it was not entirely impossible to defy the draft. In 1687 the men questioned the pay and the legality of the impressment with the result that few appeared for active duty.¹⁶⁶ But direct opposition was not the only means available to avoid the inconveniences of military duty. Draftees could hire substitutes,¹⁶⁷ and company drill could be avoided if a magistrate would accept 4 to 6d in lieu of marching time.¹⁶⁸ Special contributions such as firearms also tended to reduce a man's liability for service.¹⁶⁹

Edward Johnson was most optimistic in his estimate of the draft's all inclusive extent. Said he, "there are none exempt, unless it be a few timorous persons that are apt to plead infirmity, if the Church chuse them

¹⁵⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 575.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, V, 144-145.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, V, 123.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, II, 222.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, V, 48.

¹⁶³W. H. Whitmore (ed.), *The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts Reprinted from the Edition of 1660, with the Supplements to 1672. Containing also, the Body of Liberties of 1641*, p. 35. Hereafter cited as *Colonial Laws*; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, I, 201.

¹⁶⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 78-79.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, V, 79.

¹⁶⁶*Cal. State Papers*, 1689-1692, 111, 120.

¹⁶⁷*Pub. CSM*, XXX, 683.

¹⁶⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 212; III, 368.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, V, 48.

¹⁵¹*Cal. State Papers*, 1677-1680, 332.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, 1681-1685, 31-32.

¹⁵³*Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, II, 41-42. Hereafter cited as *Pub. CSM*.

¹⁵⁴*Pub. CSM*, II, 50.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, II, 71-75.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, II, 26-27; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 157.

¹⁵⁷*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 252; *Mass. Colony Records*, V, 71, 76; *Ply. Colony Records*, X, 360; E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 81.

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not for the Deacons, or they cannot get to serve some Magistrate or Minister.¹⁷⁰ But this view seems slightly exaggerated when one examines the exemption laws.

Generally speaking, one who suffered a "natural or personal impediment" such as "want of yeares, greatness of age, defect of minde, fayling of sences, or impotence of Lymbes"¹⁷¹ was exempt from military duty. Of these plying the profession of politician the following were exempt: magistrates, deputies, officers of the General Court, treasurers, the public notary, one servant for each magistrate and elder, the Surveyor-general, and the sons and servants of the Major-general. Among the religious, the elders and deacons stood exempt. Educators free of obligation included the president, fellows, students and officers of Harvard College, ten servants for Harvard,¹⁷² and professed school teachers. Among professional people physicians and surgeons were exempt, and among the tradesmen the following were not obligated by militia laws: masters of ships over twenty tons, fishermen employed all year, constant herdsmen, ship carpenters, millers,¹⁷³ and ferry men.¹⁷⁴ Property owners of twenty acres and twenty cattle could get one man exempted. Also free from call were dwellers on remote farms, those having a ferry to cross, and those living more than four miles from town.¹⁷⁵

The military status of certain of the trades varied over the years. For example, there was an increasing tendency to make fishermen liable for service,¹⁷⁶ especially in view of the seasonal nature of their trade.¹⁷⁷

When specific exemptions were made they

most often came from the County Court. Old age was frequently cited as the reason for exemption of the individual, but family sickness and certification from a captain were acceptable reasons as well.¹⁷⁸

Next in importance to the problem of obtaining the men was the problem of securing supplies. The commissary officer was usually in charge of procurement.¹⁷⁹ Items always in demand included bread, beef, fish, pork, corn, strong water, rum, wine, nad beer. Non-edibles included shoes, shirts, canvas, and hardware.¹⁸⁰ Contracts for arms usually went to private individuals. At first, body armor of various sorts was in great demand, but in time the requirements of war shifted the emphasis to firearms and building supplies.¹⁸¹ After the colony had accumulated some degree of capital wealth the procurement problem was eased somewhat by the expedient of impressment of goods.¹⁸² Usually an effort was made to obtain goods on six month terms, but when this failed the materials were seized.¹⁸³

Not quite as arbitrary, and under more direct regulation from England was the procurement of gun powder. The home government would issue licenses of warrants to private traders through the Council of State whose enforcement agency was the Committee of Admiralty.¹⁸⁴ From the demands for security¹⁸⁵ required by England it could be assumed that the home government felt suspicious that the powder might not reach its destination, or even in doing so it might be misused.¹⁸⁶

¹⁷⁰*Pub. CSM*, XXIX, 111, 145, 147, 188, 409; XXX, 579, 676.

¹⁷¹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 74, 85.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, II, 124; V, 74; *Cal. State Papers*, 1661-1668, 435.

¹⁷³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 31, 36; *Cal. State Papers*, 1661-1668, 189.

¹⁷⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 124.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, V, 123.

¹⁷⁶*Cal. State Papers*, 1574-1660, 335, 336, 341, 344, 348, 349, 377 400; 1689-1692, 273, 549.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 1574-1660, 336, 344, 348, 349.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 1574-1660, 335, 337.

¹⁷⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VII, 53.

¹⁷¹*Colonial Laws*, p. 135.

¹⁷²*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. I, 14; *Pub. CSM*, XV, 26, 27, 42, 43, 183, 184, 338; XXXI, 5.

¹⁷³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 258.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, V, 51.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, L210; II, 221-222; *Mass. Colony Records*, 160.

¹⁷⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 258; 119; III, 320.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. II, 552.

The establishment of powder mills at Neposet,¹⁸⁷ Dorchester, Milton,¹⁸⁸ and Rehoboth¹⁸⁹ reflected colonial efforts to ease the need for powder. Fines were one source of income for local powder purchases,¹⁹⁰ but a more dependable source of revenue was the powder tax levied against all foreign ships entering Boston harbor.¹⁹¹ This was most fitting for one of the principal strains on the powder supply was the common salute given to ships entering the harbors of Massachusetts.¹⁹²

Though fines bore a share of the financial burden,¹⁹³ it was necessary to find other means to pay for war activities. One obvious means was the establishment of rates¹⁹⁴ by the county governments.¹⁹⁵ This was usually done when the General Court needed money for specific campaigns.¹⁹⁶ It was possible to borrow money from merchants when land was offered as security.¹⁹⁷ Tariffs on rum, cider, and beer helped to fill a treasury depleted by wars,¹⁹⁸ and boycotts were used to conserve goods.¹⁹⁹ However, on the more cheerful side of the ledger in one instance a private contribution amounted to £ 1,000 for the purchase of artillery.²⁰⁰

To save money in time of war the economy-minded Court would indulge in price fixing to stabilize the charge for horses, billeting, and provisions.²⁰¹ Script was used to pay wages.²⁰² Massachusetts obtained money

from the New England Confederation,²⁰³ and there was a certain economy in requiring soldiers to provide their own arms.²⁰⁴

Even though the purchase of ammunitions, powder, guns, supplies, cannon, and food-stuffs all swelled the expense list, no item was so persistent in its demand for payment as the soldier for his wages. And from the very beginning the trend in wages was upward. The wage of the foot-soldier rose from a pound per month in 1637 to a pound and ten shillings in 1676. Sergeant's wages appreciated fourfold in value in sixteen years, while the pay of captains, curiously enough, dropped off by one-third. Perhaps this is explained by the fact that captains sometimes were paid by the campaign. The salary of a captain in a campaign could run anywhere from £ 5 to £ 170.²⁰⁵ But in spite of all the barrel scraping by the General Court an annual military budget for a peacetime year like 1665 amounted to £ 1,200.²⁰⁶

The arms of the militia, like so many aspects of colonial life, reflected the influence of European traditions. This was also true of the "fort psychology" cultivated by colonial military thinking. However, in either case both aspects of militia life were modified somewhat by American conditions which differed from the European scene.

In 1628 arms for one-hundred men included drums, ensigns, partizans for officers, halberds for sergeants, muskets, fowling pieces, rests, bandoleers, horn flasks, swords, belts, corselets, pikes, half-pikes, culverins, demiculverins, and sakers.²⁰⁷ The muskets were

¹⁸⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 73.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, V, 51.

¹⁸⁹*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 443.

¹⁹⁰*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 167.

¹⁹¹*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 331.

¹⁹²*Ibid.*, II, 150; III, 286.

¹⁹³*Ibid.*, I, 212.

¹⁹⁴*Randolph Correspondence*, IV, 297.

¹⁹⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 76; *Pub. CSM*, XXIX, 560.

¹⁹⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 124.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, V, 71.

¹⁹⁸*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., VIII, 338-339.

¹⁹⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 52.

²⁰⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., xxix.

²⁰¹*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 79, 137.

²⁰²*Ibid.*, II, 124.

²⁰³*Ply. Colony Records*, X, 367.

²⁰⁴*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221.

²⁰⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 192-193; II, 137; III, 321; IV, Pt. I, 217; V, 147; *Cal. State Papers*, 1576-1660, 424; 1661-1668, 196; 1675-1676, 465.

²⁰⁶*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 71-72.

²⁰⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 26. Ensigns—flags; Partizans kind of pike; Halberd—an axe; Fowling pieces—shotguns; Rests—forked sticks to support guns; Bandoleers—ammunition belts; Culverins—sixteenth century cannon; Demiculverins—heavy cannon; Sakers—small cannon.

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of two types, bastard muskets and full muskets. The former had a spring lock and the latter a flint lock. The law required that the individual militiaman who had a musket must also provide himself with a pound of powder, twenty bullets, and two fathoms of match.²⁰⁸ Later, swords, bandoleers, and rests were added to this list.²⁰⁹ The pikemen were required to have a good pike well headed, a corselet, headpiece, sword, and knapsack.²¹⁰ In practice, the men actually were able to obtain only muskets, rests, swords, corselets, and bandoleers.²¹¹ Providing the poor with this elaborate equipment posed a problem, so a law was framed to permit the poor to present corn instead of arms at the inspections. The corn was then sold to provide money to arm the unfortunate, but failing in this the poor people were put to work by the constable till they earned the value of the arms.²¹²

The effectiveness of this heavy European equipment was questionable, and the passage of time marked the evolution of certain new types of arms. The early Massachusetts soldier was practically a walking fortress and had little to fear from the primitive weapons of the Indians if he had the strength to wear all his armor.²¹³ The Indians had difficulty in figuring where to strike the heavily armored soldier, but the soldier was no match for the Indians when it came to pursuit.²¹⁴ Gradually the use of armor was discontinued and the musket, bandoleer, powder, and shot became the popular weapons of colonial warfare.²¹⁵ But Captain John Mason could still see some value in body armor when he observed that one of his officers was

saved great bodily pain from an Indian arrow simply because he carried lumps of cheese in his rear pockets.²¹⁶

A good deal of militia fighting was done from fortified positions, and the colonials seemed to have a profound respect for forts. The settlers felt, for example, that two hundred men could hold ten thousand at bay in a position such as Quebec.²¹⁷ Usually the committees of militia were in charge of fort building, and for this work they could use soldiers on training days.²¹⁸ And at times it was recommended that all country rates for a year be devoted to fortification of such strategic positions as Boston, Charlestown, and Salem.²¹⁹

Between Indian wars the operation of the militia in Massachusetts consisted mainly in drilling for the next conflict when it was possible to take time from business or husbandry.²²⁰ In 1631 enthusiasm for drill was sufficient for the law to require meetings once a week,²²¹ but before the year was out ardor had cooled to the point where the drill sessions had been reduced to once a month.²²² By 1637 drill was required eight days a year.²²³ In 1660 the period was cut to six days,²²⁴ and then ultimately to four days.²²⁵ Regimental drill was required once a year,²²⁶ but the time was deductible from the year's total requirement for practice. On occasion, however, there would be a sudden spurt of interest in drill. During King Philip's War drill sessions were held twice a week.²²⁷

²¹⁶*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VIII, 152.

²¹⁷*Cal. State Papers*, 1564-1660, 139.

²¹⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 332; V, 73.

²¹⁹*Mass. Colony Records*, IV, Pt. II, 510-511.

²²⁰*Ibid.*, I, 327.

²²¹*Ibid.*, I, 85; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, V, 570.

²²²*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 90, 102, 124.

²²³*Ibid.*, I, 210.

²²⁴*Ibid.*, IV, Pt. I, 420; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 159.

²²⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 211-212; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, V, 570.

²²⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 43, 118, 216.

²²⁷*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*, I, 85.

²⁰⁹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 159.

²¹⁰*Ibid.*

²¹¹*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., VI, 12.

²¹²*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 222; *Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 159-160.

²¹³*Pub. CSM*, XII, 38.

²¹⁴*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., IV, 44; *Pub. CSM*, XII, 38.

²¹⁵*Ibid.*, XII, 39.

The scene of practice was usually at a place in or near the town. Sometimes the drills were held near the Indian wigwams.²²⁸ Regimental drills at Boston took place at Fox Hill²²⁹ or on the Common.²³⁰ The soldiers were called into close order and a prayer was recited.²³¹ Then the men might commence their practicing at marching, skirmishing, retiring, ambuskado, and forming in battalia,²³² under the direction of captains who "shewed themselves very skillful in divers sorts of skirmishes, and other military actions."²³³ Ordinarily this display of military pageantry was performed to the accompaniment of a drum.²³⁴

One of the most remarkable aspects about the militia drill was the fifty-six count manual of arms required by a book called Elton's Tactics or "The Compleat Body of Art Military."²³⁵ Crucial item number forty-three read "Give fire breast high." Though the magnificent variety of motions found in this manual may have served as an exhaustive means of discipline for soldiers at drill, it is difficult to understand how the militiaman managed to avoid the scalping knife of some reasonably competent Indian while he struggled to reach number forty-three.

Usually the drill was concluded about three o'clock with another prayer. After the prayer a meal was sometimes served for the soldiers, and to this dinner the clergy was invited.²³⁶ At other times, to the disgust of the clergymen, the soldiers would retire for a mug of rum. Nor was the holiday spirit lacking among the non-combatants on train-

ing day. By 1679 the celebrating was getting out of hand so the General Court required licenses of those selling liquor at the drill field. To enforce this law the constable needed his own force of men.²³⁷

Another curious social aspect about militia life was legal provision for training of children, Negroes, Scotsmen, and Indians.²³⁸ However, this law was reversed and Indians and Negroes were forbidden to train or be armed.²³⁹

In combat the tactics employed by the militiamen generally failed to follow any particular pattern. When under attack the men formed a single file and the musketeers fired on the enemy while the pikemen stood ready to prevent the enemy from breaking into the file. Those without a gun also kept busy gathering up the arrows shot by the Indians.²⁴⁰ In surprise attacks on Indian camps the soldiers would surround the wigwams and fire their first shot toward the floor of the shelter because they knew the Indians slept on the ground.²⁴¹ Though great guns and dogs were a terror to the Indians,²⁴² the colonials were not without their own fears as they sniped at brush full of imaginary Indians, thus wasting ammunition and giving away their own position.²⁴³ But the militia knew the art of ambush as well as the Indians,²⁴⁴ and the location of Indian positions was obtained through the use of Indian spies.²⁴⁵ Intelligence on enemy whereabouts was also sent to what was called a "flying army" but actually consisted of fast moving cavalry units.²⁴⁶

The most extensive intelligence system developed by the colony was the watch. In

²²⁸*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 90.

²²⁹*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., I, xxiv.

²³⁰*Ibid.*, 1st Ser., III, 243.

²³¹*Dunton Correspondence*, p. 141.

²³²*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., III, 50. Battalia—Order of battle; troops arranged in their proper brigades, regiments, and battalions.

²³³*Ibid.*, 2nd Ser., I, xxiv.

²³⁴*Pub. CSM*, XII, 39.

²³⁵E. W. Peirce, *Indian History*, p. 79.

²³⁶*Dunton Correspondence*, p. 141.

²³⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 211.

²³⁸*Ibid.*, II, 99; III, 268.

²³⁹*Ibid.*, III, 397.

²⁴⁰*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., V, 252.

²⁴¹*Ibid.*, IV, 48.

²⁴²*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 253.

²⁴³*Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 442.

²⁴⁴*Ibid.*

²⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 1675-1676, 351.

²⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 1689-1692, 263.

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peace time the watch was a civil matter,²⁴⁷ but in time of emergency it became a military activity.²⁴⁸ Usually two men stood watch,²⁴⁹ a pikeman and a musketeer.²⁵⁰ The sentinels examined all persons who came within their watch or rounds, and had orders to fire on those who resisted investigation; but they were warned not to kill unnecessarily. If there was real danger they were to retire and give the alarm.²⁵¹

The system of alarms centered about a beacon at Boston which would signify a general alert.²⁵² Other methods of spreading a general alert were the discharge of guns or ordnance, the beating of drums,²⁵³ or the shout of a messenger "arm, arm."²⁵⁴ The messenger's shout or the shot of a musket was thought sufficient for local warnings.²⁵⁵ During those periods when military watches were maintained throughout the colony special groups of thirty men were held in readiness to go into action on a half-hour's notice.²⁵⁶

No particular system of medical treatment was maintained by the Massachusetts militia though physicians and surgeons accompanied regiments. Shelters were built for the wounded,²⁵⁷ and in the medicinal line sugar was recommended for the sick.²⁵⁸ However, the smell of an empty rum flask was recommended as a comfort for those who fainted along the way.²⁵⁹ Those who became seriously ill were sent home.²⁶⁰

Maintenance of discipline was based upon the punishment customary to the period.

The most likely place to incur a penalty was at drill or watch. Common offenses included disobedience, disorder, and contempt.²⁶¹ Other common offenses included delinquency in arms,²⁶² and firing guns after the watch was set, at drill without command, or without bullets.²⁶³ Most of these offenses were punished by fines of a few shillings,²⁶⁴ but during King Philip's War many offenses were punished with great severity. For example, to resist, lift arms against, or strike an officer, to desert, engage in sedition or mutiny, or to indulge in rape, unnatural abuses, adultery, or murder meant death. Blasphemy was punished by boring the tongue with a red hot iron, but the punishment for fornication was left to the discretion of the officers.²⁶⁵ Other brutal punishments included whippings, running the gauntlet, the stocks, brandings, and wearing shackles.²⁶⁶ Of lesser severity were admonition before the company, discharge from the commissioned ranks, and jail.²⁶⁷ However, the soldier could take an officer to court if he thought he had a case.²⁶⁸

One aspect of the operating militia which cannot be overlooked is its phenomenal inefficiency. In the United Colonies troops were supposed to be under the command of officers of the colony within whose borders they were serving.²⁶⁹ Also, troops from member colonies could not be called until all aspects of the war were considered by the commissioners of the New England Confederation.²⁷⁰

²⁴⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 151, 224.

²⁴⁸*Ibid.*, II, 121-123.

²⁴⁹*Ibid.*, I, 120.

²⁵⁰*Ibid.*, II, 120.

²⁵¹*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 163.

²⁵²*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 137.

²⁵³*Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 163.

²⁵⁴*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 242.

²⁵⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, II, 29, 223.

²⁵⁶*Ibid.*, II, 121-123.

²⁵⁷*Ibid.*, V, 75.

²⁵⁸*Ibid.*, II, 124.

²⁵⁹*Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser.*, VIII, 151-152.

²⁶⁰*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 93.

²⁶¹*Ibid.*, II, 223; *Colony Records of Mass.*, p. 159, 166.

²⁶²*Ibid.*, pp. 169-170.

²⁶³*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 85, 98, 125.

²⁶⁴*Ibid.*, V, 212, 243.

²⁶⁵*Mass. Colony Records*, V, 49-50; *Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 299-300.

²⁶⁶*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 85, 270; IV, Pt. II, 511; *Pub. CSM*, III, 56, 63.

²⁶⁷*Mass. Colony Records*, I, 165; II, 23; IV, Pt. II, 97.

²⁶⁸*Pub. CSM*, XXX, 1108-1109.

²⁶⁹*Ply. Colony Records*, I, 360; A. B. Hart, *Commonwealth History*, II, 74-75.

²⁷⁰*Ply. Colony Records*, IX, 27.

On the question of supply John Endicott spoke of the unfurnished state of the country,²⁷¹ and Edward Randolph used the same gloomy tone when he wrote of a possible French attack.²⁷² And on one occasion the second expedition against the Narragansetts in 1676 bogged down completely when Boston refused to send out supplies.²⁷³

On the frontier it was difficult to obtain officers,²⁷⁴ and even when present the officers had to do what they could by "persuasion and advice" because they had no authority.²⁷⁵ Also, the towns on the frontier were reluctant to help one another in times of distress.²⁷⁶

The officers were not always complimentary as regards the military talent of their charges. Lion Gardiner spoke of "twenty insufficient men,"²⁷⁷ and John Underhill mentioned "soldiers not accustomed to war," and "unexpert in the use of their arms."²⁷⁸ Men would go hunting while they were on duty,²⁷⁹ and casting away arms while in flight appeared common.²⁸⁰ And the insufficiency of training was never so evident as at the Black Point massacre where inexperienced troops attempted individual escapes when ambushed by Indians.²⁸¹ Nor was the blame all with the common soldier. William Phips, with profound hindsight, estimated that he would need one-thousand barrels of powder to carry a second assault against Quebec, after the French had repulsed his first seventy-barrel attack.²⁸²

The General Court was conscious of this

inefficiency and repeatedly sent orders to the sergeant-majors to tighten up the training.²⁸³ However, this protest by a legal body did little to influence the militiamen to change their ways. Still, in spite of its bungling and occasional heavy losses, the Machasetts militia won all the important wars undertaken during the colonial period.

The military mentality of the Massachusetts colonial can in great part be accounted for by his desire to survive the attacks of his enemies. And this aggressiveness was tempered by the annoyance engendered by the local war games. The delay and procrastination in falling out for drill lends constant testimony to this fact. But it was more than the crude requirements of physical and economic survival which shaped the colonial soldier into a passable fighting man. Part of the answer is to be found in the churches which served as a spiritual center for the growing villages.

At the time of the Puritan migration war was taken for granted like private property and the family.²⁸⁴ In fact, to deny war's legitimacy was heresy.²⁸⁵ According to Nathaniel Appleton there was no moral basis for a man contending that he was a conscientious objector, for war "is an Affair with the Prince and Councils of a Nation; and the Soldier is to presume that the Government have good Reasons to justify their proclaiming and engaging in a war."²⁸⁶ Only Cotton Mather sounded a sour note in holding that a man should bear suffering rather than serve in a conflict he knows to be unjust.

The General Court would justify fort repairs by holding that the strongholds should be ready for service "if God should

²⁷¹*Coll. MHS*, 4th Ser., VI, 150.

²⁷²*Randolph Correspondence*, VI, 300.

²⁷³*Pub. CSM*, XXVI, 257.

²⁷⁴*Randolph Correspondence*, VI, 281.

²⁷⁵*Cal. State Papers*, 1685-1688, 592.

²⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 1685-1688, 591-592.

²⁷⁷*Coll. MHS*, 3rd Ser., III, 149.

²⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 3rd Ser., VI, 3, 23.

²⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 2nd Ser., V, 253.

²⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 3rd Ser., III, 143-144; *Randolph Correspondence*, VI, 294.

²⁸¹*Coll. MHS*, 2nd Ser., VI, 634-635.

²⁸²*Cal. State Papers*, 1689-1692, 478.

²⁸³*Colony Records of Mass.*, pp. 166-167.

²⁸⁴*Pub. CSM*, XXVIII, 68. These citations concerning religion from the *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts* are taken from a very excellent article by Arthur H. Buffinton.

²⁸⁵*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 71; *Cal. State Papers*, 1675-1676, 221.

²⁸⁶*Pub. CSM*, XXVIII, 79.

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Call thereunto."²⁸⁷ And the New England Confederation, irked by lack of Massachusetts zeal for its expeditions, could piously barb its reluctant member with "We may comfortably Comit ourselves unto the Lord waighting upon Him in a posture of Defense and Reddiness for action as need shall Require hoping that the Lord will not suffer His people to loose by their tenderness of conscience in being slow to sheed blood."²⁸⁸ The sermons to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company on "Anniversary Day" reflected the Puritan attitude on justification for war,²⁸⁹ and it was the first minister of Boston who donated a substantial sum of money to the colony for purchase of artillery.²⁹⁰

The principle in theology which gave the Puritan the basis for his thinking was the fact that whatever is, is so by the permission or the ordinance of God. The disorder of war was thought to be a natural consequence of sin, and like all other human ills, was the result of the fall of man.²⁹¹

One curious and egotistic twist in the Puritan interpretation of original sin was the assumption that they were another chosen people transplanted to a new land miraculously preserved and cleared of its inhabitants.²⁹² Edward Johnson stated the position with precise if wordy clarity when he said:

These souldiers of Christ Jesus, having made a fair retreat from their Native Country hither, and now being come to a convenient station, resolved to stand it out (the Lord Assisting) against all such as should come to rob them of their privileges, which the Lord Christ had purchased for them at a very high rate, and now out of the riches of his grace was minded to give them, yet would he have them follow him into this Wilderness for it. Although the chieftest work of these select bands of Christ, was to mind their spiritual warfare, yet they knew right well the temple was

surrounded with walls and bulworks, and the people of God in re-edifying the same, did prepare to resist their enemies with weapons of war, even while they continued building.²⁹³

While the chosen people prepared themselves to be "expert and fitt for such services as by the providence of God they shall be called unto,"²⁹⁴ they had the feeling that divine providence was on their side. When supplies failed to arrive in support of infantry during the Phips assault on Quebec the explanation was that God prevented the troops from advancing against hopeless odds by withholding the needed items.²⁹⁵ On the other hand, Samuel Myles called the Quebec disaster a punishment sent by the Almighty.²⁹⁶

From a purely natural point of view Cotton Mather could argue that "Men have their Lives, Liberties, Properties, which the very light of nature teaches them to maintain by stronger arms against all Forreign Injuries. Christianity never instructed men to lay down that Natural Principle of Self-Preservation."²⁹⁷ Samuel Nowell listed self-defense, recovery of property, punishment for injuries, and helping allies as causes for war.²⁹⁸ This type of thinking was particularly common to Catholic kings, and especially the King of France.²⁹⁹ Perhaps Edward Johnson was giving expression to this sentiment when he said:

Thus are these people with great diligence provided for these daies of war, hoping the day is at hand wherein the Lord will give Antichrist the double of all her doings . . . and now woe be to you, when the same God that directed the stone to the forehead of the Philistine, guides every bullet that is shot at you, it matters not for the whole rabble of Antichrist on your side, the God of Armies is for us a refuge high. Chela.³⁰⁰

²⁸⁷Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser., VII, 52-53.

²⁸⁸Mass. Colony Records, IV, Pt. II, 27-28.

²⁸⁹Cal. State Papers, 1689-1692, 386.

²⁹⁰Ibid., 1689-1692, 368.

²⁹¹Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 75.

²⁹²Ibid., XXVIII, 76.

²⁹³Ibid., XXVIII, 74-75.

²⁹⁴Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser., VIII, 57-58.

²⁸⁷Colony Records of Mass., p. 169.

²⁸⁸Ply. Colony Records, X, 57.

²⁸⁹Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 72.

²⁹⁰Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser., I, xxix.

²⁹¹Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 73.

²⁹²Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 69-70.

Nor were moral considerations on the basis of natural law and scriptural theology the ultimate in the Puritan analysis of war. In weighing the factors of good and evil as regards war John Richardson write "War is an Ordinance appointyng by God for subduing and destroying the Churches Enemies upon Earth."³⁰¹ Cotton Mather also argued that God permits war to refine and purify His church,³⁰² and stated further that "there is no war for the most part, which has not some injustice on one side giving Rise unto it."³⁰³

Perhaps the ultimate in this self-confident religious attitude on war is an example of sermons which Edward Johnson claims were presented to militia troops. The "reverend Ministers" might speak as follows:

Fellow-Souldiers, Country-men, and Companions in this wilderness-worke, who are gathered together this day by the inevitable province of the Great Jehovah, not in a tumultuous manner hurried on by the floating fancy of every high hot headed braine, whose actions prove abortive, or if any fruit brought forth; it hath been rape, theft, murder, things inconsisting with natures light then much less with a Souldiers Valour; but you my deare hearts, purposely pickt out by the godly grave Fathers of this government that your prowess may carry on the work, where there Justice in her righteous cause is obstructed, you need not question your authority to execute those whom God, the righteous judge of all the world, hath condemned for blaspheming his sacred Majesty, and murdering his servants: every common Souldier among you is now installed a Magistrate.³⁰⁴

But the Puritan could bow his head as well as thunder his self-righteousness. On days of humiliation declared by the General Court the people would pray to God for a blessing on their military efforts. At such times men were "to humble or soules before God" in order to gain "a reconciliation with him, & his blessing on our forces."³⁰⁵ And the

commissioners of the New England Confederation would ask for prayers for "successe in our Indeavors for Repelling the Rage of the enemy."³⁰⁶ Apparently the prayers of the militia were answered. For although their dead were strewn along the New England trails the colonial Massachusetts militia on no occasion failed to achieve its ultimate objective.

Though it would not be correct to say that the militia was the most important single institution in the life of the early Massachusetts citizen, or that it was even as important as the Congregational Church, in view of available evidence it becomes quite apparent that the militia was a very deep rooted and organic part of colonial life in the Bay Colony. Since the need for organized military protection was genuine and immediate, the only remaining problem was to adopt the most convenient means. This was the militia system as the settlers had known it in England. Once established, the militia became important as an avenue to political and military prominence for the soldier-politician. Economically and financially the militia was annoying to most citizens who were burdened with the expense of providing themselves with arms. Socially, the militia provided a break in the otherwise grueling process of earning a living; and sometimes this break was gay and colorful. After drill a man could enjoy some rum with his fellow soldiers even though most of the ministers disapproved. But in the serious business of war the ministers could only nod their approval, for in Massachusetts the licitness of waging war was guaranteed by God as well as man. Delicately interwoven with other aspects of colonial life, the militia, as an institution, was extremely important in shaping the men who were to father the founders of a new nation.

³⁰¹Pub. CSM, XXVIII, 74.

³⁰²*Ibid.*

³⁰³*Ibid.*

³⁰⁴Coll. MHS, 2nd Ser., IV, 45-46.

³⁰⁵Mass. Colony Records, V, 69.

³⁰⁶Ply. Colony Records, X, 358.

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Freedmen and Slaves in the Barbados Militia

Jerome S. Handler

As is well known, Barbados was one of England's oldest colonies in the New World and its wealthiest during the last half of the seventeenth century. As a valuable colony and a small, albeit heavily populated, insular community in a region which witnessed almost incessant warfare among European powers. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Barbados's military strength was of major continuing importance, especially to the island's white propertied classes and their governmental apparatus.

Imperial troops were occasionally temporarily quartered in Barbados in times of war during the last half of the seventeenth century and at intervals throughout the eighteenth, usually for a month or two while preparing to attack other European-held Caribbean territories — primarily those of the French. For two years (1694-1696) during King William's war, a regiment of perhaps 200 men was stationed at Barbados for its protection, but during subsequent wars of the eighteenth century no forces were formally stationed on the island. It was not until February 1780 that the Imperial government established a permanent garrison (which was to endure for over a century thereafter).¹ In earlier years, Barbados's government or private individuals had sometimes requested or suggested such troops when they believed the island was threatened from within or without and its own defences were particularly weak; throughout most of its pre-emancipation history, however, Barbados largely depended on its own militia for its security.

In this paper I do not pretend to comprehensively treat the structure and organization of Barbados's militia. Nor do I attempt to evaluate its efficiency as a military force, or consider

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how it was integrated into the wider society. Rather, I focus on a little treated subject in Caribbean history, the position of non-whites, particularly the recruitment and arming of slaves, a practice which may have regularly occurred earlier in Barbados than in any other of Britain's Caribbean and continental colonies.

Slave participation in Britain's New World colonial militias during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries has received scant attention from scholars. Although Caribbean historians occasionally have mentioned such participation, their treatment is usually in passing and cursory. But the recruitment and arming of slaves in the militias of societies dependent on slavery poses a curious anomaly. As far as I am aware, this anomaly was first systematically addressed by Benjamin Quarles over twenty years ago when he examined free "Negroes" and slaves in the militias of Britain's continental colonies.² Nothing comparable to Quarles's study has yet appeared in the literature of British Caribbean history, and in this paper, within the limits of a relatively sparse and often sketchy body of source materials, I hope to make some contribution along these lines.

Deriving from a well-established English precedent that "every citizen may be required to assist in the defense of the state,"³ the directives issued by governors established some type of military organization in England's Caribbean and North American colonies, with the exception of Pennsylvania, not long after each was settled. Barbados conformed to this general pattern and, as the years progressed, on the island, as elsewhere, legislative actions codified and formalized the militia structure and the qualifications of those who were expected to serve and function in leadership positions. Shortly after colonization in 1627 Barbados established limited military fortifications and an apparently rudimentary militia organization, and by the mid-to-late 1630s, if not earlier, large planters held military titles and were the militia's chief officers.⁴ During the 1640s, the militia was reorganized; several acts pertaining to military defences were passed, a militia muster role existed, and militia training was apparently occurring with some regularity. By the late 1640s, a formally organized militia, codified in law and numbering in the thousands, was an important feature of Barbadian society as, indeed, were the militias in England's

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other New World colonies. In 1650 and 1651 additional legislation constructed an apparently more formal militia structure than had hitherto existed, and further reorganization took place in 1652 and again in 1656.⁵ Subsequent years saw additional structural modifications, but as a societal institution the militia was to persist for the duration of the slave period and into post-emancipation times.

Viewed over the span of Barbados's pre-emancipation history, the evidence clearly shows that, with varying degrees of intensity (depending on England's/Britain's international relations at any given period), the pre-eminent colonial interest in the militia's organization and the maintenance of its strength (as well as the strength and state of the island's fortifications) derived from a concern over external attack by foreign forces, particularly the French. However, especially during the last half of the seventeenth century, there was also a concern with the suppression of slave revolts and, in the earlier periods, revolts or other threats to the public order by white indentured servants, notably the Irish. When slave plots were suspected or discovered in the 1670s, 1680s, 1690s, and in 1701, militia units were rapidly alerted, and several militia units, in conjunction with regular British troops, were responsible for suppressing Barbados's one actual slave rising in 1816. As in other colonies, the militia functioned as a police force and, for example, it was sometimes used to patrol slave gatherings and dances when officials feared these activities had the potential for disrupting the public order; and militia units were also employed to capture runaway slaves (and indentured servants), especially the small bands of maroons which sought refuge in the island's forested interior prior to the 1660s.⁶

For most of the slave period, the militia normally included two or three mounted regiments, composed of about six troops each, one troop of life guards (a cavalry unit of about one hundred men, the governor's personal escort which was primarily used on ceremonial occasions), and from six to seven foot regiments, each including from eight to ten or twelve companies. The mounted units were disbanded in 1795 and the militia was reorganized into eleven parochial regiments, later defined as battalions or corps. Whatever its structure at any given period, each militia unit had its complement of non-commissioned and

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commissioned officers, the latter being drawn from among the wealthier members of the plantocracy. The rank and file consisted of small land-holders, landless freemen, and indentured servants. Free militia men were expected to provide their own uniforms, weapons, and ammunition, and their units were expected to train regularly, usually once a month.⁷

The size of particular units, as well as the total number in the militia, varied over the years as a result of population changes. Statistics on militia size are unavailable for most of the slave period, and existing ones are often of questionable reliability and precision. Moreover, the sources report the number of men "able to bear arms" or the number given in the militia rolls. The men actually "under arms" at any given period, who could be counted on for active military service, was usually quite less. Nonetheless, militia statistics show a general and consistent trend of a reduction in numbers from the middle of the seventeenth century to the early decades of the nineteenth. From the mid-1660s to the early 1680s, when Barbados's white population averaged about 20,720 (59 percent males), the militia averaged around 6,050 white men.⁸ From 1707 to 1787, it had about 4,500, while the general white population during this period averaged 17,240 (46 percent male).⁹ During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, there was an approximate average of 15,370 whites (46 percent male), and the militia averaged close to 3,300.¹⁰ However, by the very end of slavery the militia showed a significant increase: from 3,050 men in 1829, it jumped to around 4,260 in 1833, although during these years the general white population showed a slight decline.¹¹

This increase in militia size was undoubtedly due to the greater number of freedmen who were being enrolled in the parochial units. In 1773, 177 freedmen were in the militia, about 3.5 percent of the total; ten years later, about four percent of the militia was its 186 freedmen; and in 1802 the militia contained, at the most, 400 freedmen, about 12 percent of its strength. By 1833, however, about 25 percent of the militia's "effective force" of 4,260 were freedmen.¹²

Although freedmen were participating in the militia by the last half of the eighteenth century, if not earlier, it was probably only in the 1820s, when they came to average about one-

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fourth of the free (non-slave) population, that they were of any numerical significance. Because there were so few freedmen in the general population during the earlier periods, there were far fewer freedmen in the militia – for from the seventeenth century onward, Barbados's militia laws noted the service obligations of *all free* adult (usually specified between the ages of sixteen or seventeen and sixty) males without referring to racial origins.

The laws often implied or stated all "freemen able to bear arms," but under certain conditions militia acts occasionally exempted legislators, clergy, civil and judicial officers, and plantation managers. Similar exemptions existed in other Caribbean and North American colonies. Throughout the latter colonies, however, "Negroes," whether slave or free, "were excluded from the militia, save as non-combatants or in unusual emergencies."¹³ And when the United States Congress organized the post-colonial militia in 1792, it "restricted enrollment to able-bodied white male citizens"; various states also prevented freedmen from joining their militias.¹⁴ Freedmen in Barbados, observed an American visitor to the island in 1814, "possessed one privilege of citizenship which the same class of men do not have in the United States,"¹⁵ and it was not until July, 1833, with impending slave emancipation, that the Barbados legislature passed the first act in the island's history that was designed to limit the number of non-whites. It did so by establishing minimal property qualifications for service and was intended to exclude many non-whites "who may hereafter become free"; finding even these restriction insufficient, one year later the legislature raised the qualifications.¹⁶

By the 1833 act, persons ineligible for militia service because they lacked the minimal property qualifications were prohibited from keeping "any firearms or warlike weapons of any description." Although not legally excluding non-whites from possessing firearms, the law was clearly intended to do so and for the first time curtailed the possession of firearms among certain categories of free persons. But until the very end of the slave period, militia laws did not prohibit freedmen from bearing the firearms that were denied to slaves, nor did the laws confine freedmen to non-combatant roles. Yet, freedmen were discriminated against because of their racial backgrounds and could not, for example, become commissioned officers and were segregated into units of their own. Regardless of the