

Man the Measure

A New Approach to History

Erich Kahler



M A N T H E M E A S U R E

*And he said unto them, The sabbath was made for man,
and not man for the sabbath . . .*

MARK 2, 27

*Però, se il mondo presente disvia
In voi è la cagione, in voi si cheggia;
Ed io te ne sarò or vera spia.*

DANTE, PURGATORIO XVI

*Je combattrai pour la primauté de l'Homme sur l'individu—
comme de l'universel sur le particulier.
Je combattrai pour l'Homme. Contre ses ennemis.
Mais aussi contre moi-même.*

ANTOINE DE SAINT EXUPÉRY

ALBERT EINSTEIN
ON *MAN THE MEASURE*

THIS IS THE WORK OF A MAN who has searched passionately for the reasons of the current breakdown of values and ways of life. He has not taken his task lightly but has reflected intensely and has considered carefully what illuminated minds have thought and said before him. One of his chief goals is knowledge, but this is not his ultimate concern: knowledge is to provide a sign-post into a better future.

History in the essential meaning of the term has for Kahler exclusively to do with the conscious shaping of life and of human relationships. He does not categorically project tendencies and goals but seeks to derive them from what happened in the past.

The elucidation of human aspirations and actions of the past does not, in Kahler's book, degenerate into mere scholarship. He subordinates everything to a large plan which, considering the complexity of the facts of the matter, compels him to use the utmost economy of expression. It is this compulsion to economy that may well have contributed to the quality of his style which lends to the work the character of a fascinating report.

I do not feel justified in judging opinions in this area. But I know that I will not put this book aside until I have weighed every line of it.

"Albert Einstein on *Man the Measure*" was translated by Eleanor Wolff.

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MAN THE MEASURE



A New Approach to History

ERICH KAHLER

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A BIOGRAPHY OF ERICH KAHLER

Eva J. Engel

ERICH KAHLER WAS BORN IN Prague on October 14, 1885. After attending school there and in Vienna, he studied philosophy and literature at the universities of Berlin, Munich, and Heidelberg. His Vienna doctoral thesis *Recht und Moral* (Justice and Morality), 1908, contains the germs of Kahler's individualistic vision—an approach to which Kahler's friend, the novelist and philosopher Hermann Broch, applied the term *moral anthropology*.

Having rejected the offer of a university chair at Heidelberg, Kahler spent the years until 1933 near Munich, studying and writing within a wide circle of avant-garde intellectuals. Luckily Kahler was not at home when the Gestapo raided his house early in 1933 in a fruitless search for the completed manuscript of his analytical study "The German Character in the History of Europe." Kahler's flight, first to Austria, then to Czechoslovakia and Switzerland, delayed the publication of the first volume of this massive work until 1937; an English version appeared posthumously in 1974.

Exile in Switzerland brought Kahler and Thomas Mann together as friends, and it was at Thomas Mann's suggestion that Kahler and his family settled in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1938. Once again, Kahler's presence was magnetic: Albert Einstein, Wolfgang Pauli, Ernst Kantorowicz, Ben Shahn, and Roger Sessions were frequent visitors; from 1942 to 1949 Hermann Broch lived in Kahler's house at One Evelyn Place, Princeton.

The problems of world politics increasingly occupied Kahler's daily life, and as he mastered English as a literary language,

he addressed these issues in lectures and articles. Kahler taught at the New School for Social Research in New York (1939–1940, 1941–1942), Black Mountain College (1946/7), Princeton (Gauss Seminars, 1954; seminar on Thomas Mann, 1962; Faber Lectures, 1966), Cornell University (1947–1955), Manchester University (Lord Simon Fellow, 1955/6), Ohio State College (1957 and 1958/9 as first Mershon Lecturer for the Cultural History of Man), and Technische Universität, Munich (1963/4). Each of these lecture series gave rise to a major piece of writing: *Man the Measure* (1943), *The Tower and the Abyss* (1957), *The Inward Turn of Narrative* (1957, 1959, in German), *The Meaning of History* (1964), *Out of the Labyrinth* (1967), *The Orbit of Thomas Mann* (1969), and *Disintegration of Form in the Arts* (1968).

Numerous articles and Festschriften, as well as the *laudatio* preceding an honorary doctorate at Princeton (1969), give evidence of the stimulus of Kahler's thought and personality. The earliest comprehensive analysis of Kahler's ideas is Hermann Broch's "History as Moral Anthropology: Erich Kahler's *Scienza Nuova*" (1946 in German; 1951 in English). Kahler is seen as envisaging "time" in a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted way; indeed, Broch regarded Kahler's entire oeuvre as a steadily advancing process presenting the "kinetics" of history, a multi-history encompassing all disciplines, human knowledge, and perceptions.

In his doctoral thesis, Kahler discussed the theory and methodology of such a form of historiography. In subsequent publications he analyzed the problem of modern historical overspecialization, as in 1920 in *Beruf der Wissenschaft* (Knowledge, a Vocation), a spirited polemic against Max Weber's *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. To reverse the progressing disintegration of our world, Kahler sought to recover the "unity of knowledge" by a diachronic kind of cultural anthropology. In his historical works, he applied this "new science" first to one conspicuous family (*Dynasty of the Habsburgs*, 1919), then to an emerging state (*Israel Among the Nations*, 1936), to Europe (*Germany*

and the History of Europe, 1937), and finally to mankind at large (*Man the Measure*, 1943).

Two lines of interrelated argument are the premise to Kahler's thought on modern man. On the one hand, he argues, we face the disintegration of all that in the past constituted the world of the individual; on the other, man's essential characteristic can be brought into play—his ability to “transcend.” Specialization and mechanization have not only split the atom but have dislodged our values, our sense of form, our very selves. As we have witnessed an unprecedented scientific and technological expansion of our universe, our cognitive system has not kept step. It too must undergo revolution: To counteract alienation and disintegration, the human ability to transcend must be mobilized.

The need to make modern man aware of this ability was at the heart of the continuous discourse between Broch (who died in 1951) and Kahler. Broch's *Death of Vergil* (1945) and his *Sleepwalkers* (1931/2) cite man's potential to achieve heightened stages of self-awareness and self-consciousness as the only way of transforming the individual. For an articulation of such self-awareness, Kahler turned to philosophy, literature, art, and historiography.

At the time of Kahler's death on June 28, 1970, only essays and fragments (largely in German) leading toward a theory of consciousness and a theory of history existed. However, in books and lectures given after 1951, Kahler provided evidence and argument for the belief that doom was not inevitable, that recovery was feasible. He advocated a reconstituting of that scattered mosaic of disciplines, values, and perceptions that our twentieth-century world has produced (*The Meaning of History*, 1964; *Out of the Labyrinth*, 1967); he made his listeners and readers aware of the individual's need to transform (*The Tower and the Abyss: An Inquiry into the Transformation of Man*, 1957; *The Orbit of Thomas Mann*, 1969) and of the individual's ability to transcend (“The True, the Good and the Beautiful,” 1960; *The Rallying Idea*, 1965). The choice is clearly ours: We must

either face the annihilation of the universe and a relentless destruction of human values or return to an alert and critical way of living; we must insist on our responsibility toward the world as a whole and endeavour to strive toward that “dynamic unity” of pluralist knowledge that remained Kahler’s constant concern.

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PREFACE TO THE 1967 EDITION

MAN THE MEASURE WAS WRITTEN 25 years ago, and this new Meridian edition presents it in its original form. Much has happened since 1942 that has given rise to important changes in the condition of our world. Many new insights and discoveries have been gained by the work of scientists and scholars. So the book would have required much revision and amplification.

If I nevertheless have consented that, for technical reasons, it reappear unchanged in this new edition, it is because the general course of the historical process, as outlined in the original text, and many conclusions drawn from that picture, have not been contradicted, but rather confirmed by more recent developments; indeed dangers hinted at in the first edition have in the meantime manifested themselves in a frightening degree.

There is however one passage in the book (pages 632 foll.) which, viewed from our present circumstances, is likely to be misconstrued, and which I feel particularly impelled to clarify. It concerns the relation of "realistic" and "ideological" conduct of policies.

What I denounced in this passage was the selfish indifference and lack of foresight of the supposedly "realistic" governments of the West in the face of the patently criminal schemes of the Nazis. What I meant to urge was human solidarity and timely concerted action against lawlessness and injustice. It is important to note that—although the splitting of the atom was foreseeable and predicted in the original text of the book—no nuclear bomb, no "United Nations" existed at that time—the "League of Nations" was moribund.

The last 20 years of a Cold War and nuclear arms race

between two ideological solidarities taught us some lessons. We have learned that ideologies are not to be identified with "idealism," but can be identical with and used as a disguise of "national interests," to be defended 10,000 miles from the national homeland. We have learned that ideologies, be they of communism or of capitalism and free enterprise, harden to rigid orthodoxies, blinding their champions to the realities of life. Today indeed, following false analogies, "ideological crusades" are waged to a point of utter unrealism; and a great power, the United States, has assumed the role of "gendarme of the world," intervening in civil wars of foreign peoples and intent on putting down popular revolutions against a rotting and unbearable status quo. We are experiencing every day where all this leads to: a chain reaction of violence, devastations and atrocities, distortion of truth and corruption of values, breach of treaties and international law, and a life constantly on the brink of nuclear war and the ruin of human civilization.

To avoid any misreading of the passage in question I want to emphasize that even at the time when the book was written it was not this that was meant by its warnings, misleadingly phrased as they may have been. It is all too obvious today that no single nation, and least of all the most powerful ones, no ideologically partisan group is qualified and authorized to determine what is desirable for the good of humanity. The decision as to what measures and reforms have to be carried out to assure freedom and justice and to make revolutions unnecessary, and the implementation of such decisions should rest with a supranational and supra-ideological authority of which the United Nations is only a very imperfect, rudimentary form. A true world organization must be created in whose legislative, judicial, and executive bodies all broadly human concerns should be concentrated.

Unless the peoples of the world will be capable of realizing such an organ of human solidarity, no peace, no order, no security and prosperity, indeed hardly the bare survival of humanity will be achieved.

E. K.

INTRODUCTION



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THE BASIC PROBLEM OF OUR TIME

THIS BOOK IS AN ATTEMPT to write history as the biography of man and from it to gain a view of the future of man. To call this emphasis on man "a new approach to history" may require an explanation. After all, history is generally thought of as the history of mankind, and what have historians ever been concerned with but conditions and events relating to man? Then how can man constitute a new principle of historical survey?

The answer is this: Just because history has always, as a matter of course, been the history of human beings and their experiences, man as such has never been consciously considered a special subject for historical survey; anthropologists have traced man's physical development, but historians have written of men, not of man. To be sure, throughout Christian civilization it was basically understood that all men form a huge family, that is, mankind, and history has been assumed to be the story of the development of this human family. Mankind, however, the body of all members of this human family, is not identical with man, or human nature, which is to be the subject of this book.

The great crisis that began in the nineteenth, and came to a head in the twentieth century, has undermined the concept of mankind as a coherent body, together with the concept of history as the consistent evolution of mankind. Both the coherence of mankind and the consistency, indeed the fact, of historical evolution have been challenged, and so for the first time they have become the focus of conscious attention. This challenge confronts us with the funda-

mental question on which the destiny of our civilization hinges: Is there a human quality common to men and distinguishing man from the animal? Does history give evidence of the evolution of this human quality? It is the necessity to find an answer to these questions that makes man, for the first time, the specific and explicit subject of history.

The idea of the coherence of humanity and the idea of the consistency of history were linked together from the outset, they are linked together today; whether we consider the old Christian concept, mankind, or our present concept of a human quality, both imply a history in the sense of consistent evolution. Mankind as an intrinsic community had to have a common destiny, and if there is a common and specific human quality, it must have had an evolution. Unless there is a continuous whole, either of mankind or of human nature, there is no such thing as human history, just as there could be no individual biography without the continuous identity of personality. History implies a continuity of something more than time; only if history can be seen as a one and consistent human evolution, only then has it a meaning. Otherwise it would be nothing but an incoherent mass of rising and falling powers, growing and dying peoples and individuals. Eternity has no history, and neither has chaos.

Both ideas, then, the unity of humanity and the unity of history, stand and fall together; both originate in the Christian world religion. Before the emergence of world religion, there were only histories of isolated tribes, and even these histories were not history in the sense of consistent development. Events were pictured against a background of eternal rest, of eternal divine order, which man could desert or pervert, but in which development would have been synonymous with blasphemy. The inner movement of human events, in so far as it was considered at all, was seen as a rising, falling, wavelike or circular motion within changeless eternity, as a regular recurrence of the same processes. All ancient cultures, including the Greek, were governed by this idea of the cyclic nature of human happenings and thus they were essentially unhistorical. What we call history begins with the Jewish-Christian concept of

man as the image of God, the creator of the universe. This concept involves the idea of the common origin of all men from the same ancestor, and of a common God-given destiny of all men. The history of man was seen as his progress from fall to salvation. The subject-matter of history, however, was not exactly man as a secular entity, but the spiritual welfare of the human soul, the purification of the soul and its approach to God.

Beginning with the Renaissance, when man freed himself of the tutelage of religion, the idea of human evolution was transferred to profane ideology. Man's joy in the unfettered development of his intellectual and technical faculties gave rise to belief in the limitless, straight-line progress of mankind, in the boundless power of human reason. Salvation came to mean a self-salvation of man through growing enlightenment. Through increasing enlightenment, or through an improvement of material conditions, men were supposed to become better and happier. Thus, in this epoch too, the subject-matter of history was not man, it was human reason, or the economic condition of man.

The rapid developments of the nineteenth century, however, proved that men became neither better nor happier. Problems increased, and the naive optimism of the first centuries of secularized life began to change into profound pessimism. The sufferings and crises men had prepared for themselves through their proudest conquests made all human development appear a failure. And since the idea of human development, that is, the very idea of history, is inseparably bound up with the idea of the unity and community of mankind, the doubt of the one shook the belief in the other. Those modern thinkers who denied development in mankind, who split human history up into isolated cultures rising senselessly and fading away into nothingness, those thinkers, Nietzsche and Spengler, were the same who attacked the fundamental values of our civilization: love and brotherhood among men.

At the same time that the disappointments of the period were undermining belief in the unity of history, historical investigation was snowing it under with an immense and ever-increasing mass of facts. History had broken up into histories of the various pursuits

of man that had, in the course of human development, become elaborate and autonomous fields: politics, economics, sociology, law, language, literature, art, science, technology. These fields proceeded to claim attention for their endless contents and concepts to such a degree that their common human origin and inner connection were almost ignored. The fact that they were functions of man, subordinate to man, was lost sight of. History, accordingly, consisted either of a series of developments of peoples or of developments in those specialized fields. What goes under the name of world history today is a combination of these two points of view, but not the history of man and his development as such. As a matter of fact, the breakdown of the unity of history is so complete that modern historians do not dare to assume that there is such a thing as history, or a consistent human evolution. They manifest the deepest distrust toward any claim of meaning in history and regard any interpretation of history as unfounded speculation. In reality, there is no presentation of facts without interpretation. The choice of facts in itself constitutes an interpretation, whether it is determined consciously or subconsciously, whether the material is deliberately chosen to back up an argument or whether it appears to impose its own arrangement.

Out of the ruins of the concepts of mankind and history a new literature arose that may be designated as moral anthropology. It deals with the question: What is man and what is his function?—a question behind which lies another: Is there a human quality, or are men, assuming themselves to be but a more highly developed form of beast, to develop beastliness to ever-higher forms? Are men bound together by the ties assumed by Christianity, or by a common human nature, or are both to be denied or ignored, and men, believing themselves tied by no bonds but those of their making, to break those and their civilization with them? Is the devil to take the hindmost, and the foremost too?

This is the question at the heart of the present catastrophe. It is the true issue about which war is being waged on all levels: military, political, economic and intellectual. There is no other question that is so urgent and frightening, no other question that so intimately

affects every person even though he be unaware of it in the come-and-go of daily life. It is not a question posed by scholars and intellectuals for scholars and intellectuals only, it is a question on which the life and death of mankind hinge. And when we look to the past of mankind for the answer to this question, we are looking to the future of man.

WHAT IS HUMAN?

SEEN IN THE LIGHT of this fundamental question—What is man and what is his function?—history is not concerned with a sequence of struggles for power, not with the sum of developments of peoples or developments in special fields, but with the development of a specific organism, the human being, of a specific quality, the quality of being human.

To begin with, we must ask: Is there a clear *distinction between man and animal*, has man any special characteristic? If a characteristic that makes man human does exist, it did not come into being suddenly, but, like all that has to do with living matter, in the course of a long development.

Now there is one respect in which anyone will admit man differs from the animal. The development of a species of animal goes no further than the development of its physical type, of its anatomical, physiological, biological features. But man, after having completed his development as a biological species, goes on changing and even developing—for the change from the Neanderthal man to Dante and Shakespeare can hardly be considered to be other than some kind of development. Man, then, develops in two zones, the biological, which he shares with the animal, and a new zone that is exclusively human. To look for a specifically human quality is therefore identical with looking for what it is that develops in this new zone—the zone of history.

If we find what we are looking for, if the facts of history can be interpreted as the development of a specific human quality, then history, in turn, takes on coherence and meaning. And if this is so,

if history shows man to have a common human nature, then the norms of unity that developed in the course of human history are not mere lofty ideals but rooted in fact; they are not arbitrarily imposed abstractions, beyond human reality and averse to human nature, but are inherent in the very existence of a shared human quality and therefore have an organic validity originating in the basic constitution of man.

Heretofore the question—What is man?—has been approached from three angles: the theological, the rationalistic (or idealistic) and the biological (or naturalistic).

The first, the *theological* theory, sees the human being from the point of view of his divine origin. Man is the creature of God and made in His image; he is part earthly, part spiritual. Herein lies his sinfulness and, at the same time, his God-given potentiality to achieve salvation by will and grace. Human history is the history of man's preparation for salvation. Thus, for this theory, the existence of a distinguishing quality in man, as well as the consistency of human history, is beyond doubt. But both are interpreted from without, from the premise of the existence of God vouched for by revelation.

The validity of the Christian theory of man was uncontested throughout the Middle Ages and has since been upheld in various versions by Catholic and Protestant thinkers, in the last decade most brilliantly by the Catholic, Theodor Haecker, in his book, "Was ist der Mensch?" (What is Man?) and by the Protestant, Reinhold Niebuhr, in "The Nature and Destiny of Man".

The second, the *rationalistic* theory, originated in the Greek and Roman view of man and was revived in a new form from the Renaissance on. This theory sees reason as man's specific feature, whether "speculative", that is, purely theoretical and disinterested reason as maintained by Alfred Whitehead, or "pragmatic" reason (involved in or directed toward practical aims) as, for instance, John Dewey contends, or the "spirit" of the German idealistic philosophy which makes spirit and reason equivalent. According to the rationalistic theory, reason is the pride and virtue of man. It is identical with the right and the good, and, consequently, human

history appears either as a straight or as a dialectic progress toward a set goal—the reign and the perfection of reason. In this theory, in fact, reason has assumed the absolute and providential quality of God.

The third, the *biological* or *naturalistic* theory, sees the human being from the angle of his natural origin, that is to say, as a stage in the gradual evolution of organic nature. In this view the human being as a form of organic nature has no essential feature except his advanced anatomical and physiological complexity. Intellect, reason, is merely a manifestation of this greater complexity; it implies a difference of degree, but not of kind, between man and animal.

There are two interpretations of this biological theory: the mechanistic and the vitalistic. According to the first, organic evolution proceeds like a self-motivated machine, according to the second, it is brought about by a vital impulse (*élan vital*). While these two variants of the biological theory share the view that reason does not constitute an essential difference between man and animal, they differ widely in the valuation of reason. The mechanistic version concedes it to be an advance, but entirely disregards the changes it has effected in the world structure in the course, indeed in the fact, of history. The vitalistic interpretation, on the contrary, considers rational evolution not as an advance, but as an aberration, and the rational faculty of man as the source of all evil, a falling-away from the harmony of nature, a weakening of instincts and vital impulses. This view was first expressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a protest against the overvaluation of reason; it came into its own in the concepts of Nietzsche and Bergson, who exalted the vital impulses and called reason in question. Their reversal of previous values was carried to extremes by Spengler, to whom man is the beast of prey in its most perfect form. To these thinkers, human history must inevitably appear meaningless.

Does any one of these theories offer a satisfactory answer to our question: What is human? The theological view, though it sees an essential difference between man and animal, interprets this difference from a point beyond man's existence, indeed, beyond

the known world. It deduces the distinguishing feature of the human being from a decision of God, which, in itself, is an assumption of human faith. Those, however, to whom faith does not suffice must seek within our known world for further evidence of the human quality.

The rationalistic view furnishes at least a substantial answer to our problem by identifying the essential quality of the human being with man's rational faculty. Yet recent research shows that the roots of the rational faculty of man can be found in animals. The experiments of modern biologists and psychologists, Wolfgang Koehler's experiments with apes, for instance, have demonstrated that animals are capable of drawing simple conclusions and not only of using instruments, but of discovering the use of such instruments independently. The mental capacity of certain mammals corresponds to that of a three-year-old child. So reason is only a more highly developed form of dispositions already present in the animal and cannot be considered the exclusively human faculty it is held to be by the rationalistic view.

The third, the naturalistic theory, which denies any essential difference between man and animal, in its mechanistic aspect totally disregards fundamental facts that it would be unable to explain in a satisfactory way. It ignores the values developed in antiquity and Christianity, self-restraint, the domination of desires and impulses, love, charity and humanity. It does not consider the achievements of human contemplation, of man's efforts to mirror the world and himself in art and philosophical speculation, to reshape, to re-create himself through the power of his intellect. And where vitalistic thinkers have taken these things into account, they have—Bergson excepted—regarded them as a perversion of natural instincts, as an insidious distortion of the will-to-power by which the weak succeeded in dominating the strong.

But even if we suppose that the major part of human history were a dead end, were perversion and degeneration, then this very perversion and degeneration would constitute a special feature of the human being, one that has no parallel in animals. Art and speculation do indeed spring from a want, from suffering. They repre-

sent a refinement of impulses, a sublimation that implies a more delicate physical constitution, a weakening of the robust appetites of life. According to the premise chosen, one may evaluate these processes either as the generation of a new form of life or as a degeneration of the old. In any case, the fact that the increasing vulnerability of the organic constitution resulted in a new form of dominating the outer world, a new sphere of life that is distinctly human—this fact cannot be explained away by the invalidation of intellectual life implied in the naturalistic theory. Thus even this negative interpretation of a specifically human quality presupposes an essential difference between man and animal. In denying this difference, the naturalistic theory contradicts itself.

The exclusively human feature we are seeking is to be found not in any partial functioning of the human constitution, but rather in a general quality of man that is the pivot of all the various achievements and manifestations of his civilization, a quality that cannot be localized anatomically or physiologically, but that emerges gradually from the complex totality of the human organism. This is *man's faculty of going beyond himself*, of transcending the limits of his own physical being. This quality, which was first stressed by Max Scheler and Reinhold Niebuhr, does not coincide with reason, for it manifests itself not only intellectually but emotionally. It is this faculty, for instance, that makes man capable of true love based on choice and affecting his whole existence, of love regardless of recompense.

Man's faculty of overstepping his own being is identical with what is understood by the term "*spirit*". The functions of this faculty are twofold. In the first place, it enables and induces man to discern, and to detach himself from, an outward, contrasting being which is recognized in its own distinct orbit. Or, to be more exact—for the order is rather the reverse—spirit is at first the faculty of detaching and discerning a definite non-self from a definite self. It is the ability to objectivate and to subjectivate.

This act of discerning and detaching, of objectivation and subjectivation (or self-objectivation), is the prerequisite for the second

move, for the actual transcending of the limits of the self, for entering into a conscious, super-corporeal relationship with the non-self. In acknowledging a non-self as a distinct entity, man puts himself into the place of the other being, he becomes capable of vicarious feelings and thus transcends his own limits. Limits cannot be transcended before they are recognized.

Thus spirit is not only the faculty of discerning and detaching, but, at the same time, of establishing a relation between a self and a non-self, the faculty of overstepping the limits of the self. It is discerning and uniting in one. It is the very essence of a being concerned with more than itself. A person leads a spiritual life in so far as he rises above his personal, "practical" interests, as he is able to detach himself from his own and conceived self and to grow more and more objective, to integrate himself in a higher, comprehending objective.

Let us take an example. To a lion, a deer is only prey; it serves no purpose but to provide food and satisfy appetite. To a man, a deer may be prey, but it is also a deer, a being with an independent existence. Man can imagine himself in the place of an animal, he does so every time he studies its special conditions, requirements and ways of life. To be sure, his purpose is often to make the animal an even more useful prey; he protects and breeds it in order to provide more or better food for himself, to have it work for him, or even for the mere pleasure of hunting it. He is even capable of such a paradoxical attitude as to love the animals he kills. Even when man's purpose is the same as the animal's, his method is different. In so far as man uses the animal as a prey, he does not differ from the animal. But in so far as he protects, breeds, studies and loves the animal, he recognizes it as having an orbit of its own, he establishes an orbit separate from his self, an orbit that he can enter deliberately, and thus brings about a new and conscious relationship. This attitude is distinctly human and is made possible only by the faculty of discerning and transcending, the faculty of spirit.

Man's transcending, his overstepping of self, is more easily recognized when not only his methods but his purpose differ from the

animal's, as in his disinterested pursuit of art, philosophy and science. Where man's methods differ from the animal's, his faculty of spirit may be recognized as a fact. Where his purpose differs, spirit has come to be accepted as a value to such a degree that its being and remaining a fact is often forgotten or denied. We want to emphasize here that, although spirit as value must and will be treated in its proper place in this book, the term spirit as we use it is not meant to carry any value overtones with it.

Spirit emerges from the totality of the human organism. Its gradual evolution becomes manifest only by the results it produces, by the sequence of growing objectivations that make the way mankind travels a mirrored and known way—human history. Spirit is at first a new force, a new impetus in man. By its increasing activity, it develops into a perfected faculty of the human being. Finally its accumulation of objectivations comes to constitute an entire sphere of life, comprising various fields such as religion, art, philosophy and science. It is in the course of this development that spirit, just because it is man's faculty of rising beyond his corporal self, becomes a value, a good worth striving after. Indeed, by setting it up as a value, man implicitly recognizes spirit to be his distinguishing quality. It must, however, be kept in mind that, as we saw before and as we shall see later, spirit as a fact can also work in a sense contrary to itself and to its meaning as a value, not toward the human, but toward the inhuman.

Accordingly, spirit does not mean something outside or above man, in either the popular or the theological sense; it is not to be confused with spirits, holy or unholy. It is especially not to be confused with reason, though reason has been developed and perfected by spirit and was part of the spiritual evolution.

Since spirit evolves from the human organism as a whole, since it is a vital impetus, it comprises and moves the human organism as a whole. It comprises emotional as well as intellectual life; it forms and affects human impulses and the whole vital attitude of the human being. Reason, on the other hand, is a faculty and function of the intellect only. It is the intellectual act of associating and connecting experiences, of assembling them into a chain of cause

and effect, that is, of drawing conclusions. Out of this follows another act: abstracting generalities from repeated single conclusions and so making conclusions reliable and available for general use. "This stone cuts because it has an edge" is an example of the simplest kind of conclusion. "All stones that have an edge cut", the step from "many" to "all", is the great short cut, the step from repetition to generalization. This act of generalization is a second and higher form of conclusion. It leads to a third, still more complex and general conclusion, the purely abstract concept of cause and effect as such. And this concept is the prerequisite of all the elaborate short cuts, the elimination, description and creation of repetition that constitute logic, science and technics. Out of the practical applications of this assembling of conclusions, generalizations and abstractions come all our methods of procedure, institutions and instruments of life; indeed, the assembly-line is materialized reason, the materialized chain of cause and effect. This whole scheme of the rational structure is, of course, not to be taken as a description of the actual evolution of reason, which happened in an entirely different way.

The structure is one which emotional life can only disrupt. Reason cannot include emotional life; on the contrary, it imposes itself on it, in the final analysis, it opposes it. While spirit is an educator of emotional life, shaping and sublimating it, reason appears as a dictator who does not take emotions into account at all. Of course, reason too is influenced and determined by emotional life, as psychoanalysis has shown in regard to individual psychic processes. But this very evidence brings out the fact that this influence is illegitimate and contradictory to the essential principle and claim of reason.

Spirit—man's faculty of discerning and transcending—manifests itself in three ways, each essentially and exclusively human: the first is what we shall call *existence*, the second is *history*, and the third is that special demeanor and psychic attitude which is rightly termed *humanity*. To speak of a feature of the human being as humanity may appear to be a tautology. But it is not a

tautology, because the species man, and so, mankind, unfortunately cannot be identified with the behavior we call humanity. This behavior is an exclusively human feature, but it is not a general feature of mankind.

Existence, the primary and general form in which spirit manifests itself, is the basic procedure of discerning and transcending, of objectivation and subjectivation (or self-objectivation), by conceiving a non-self, or a self, as an exact, finite entity. To exist means more than merely to be. The word existence derives from the Latin "ex-sistere", "ex-stare", and means to be out-standing, out-staying, out-lasting. It means being in a prominent, distinct and lasting way. The animal lives unaware of itself; it simply *is*. It has only immediate, corporal being, a being in the instant, from moment to moment. Man lives in awareness of himself, of a constantly conceived, constantly felt whole of personal life, distinct from both the world around him and his own corporal being, his being in the instant. So he lives outside as well as inside himself, outside as well as inside the instant. His awareness of himself is a form of discerning, his living outside himself and the instant is a form of transcending. Together they enable him to alter instants and merge them into a continuity, a conscious life, in which he forms a lasting unit, a personality, a character; in a word, they enable him not only to be but to exist.

From the same root as existence grows *history*. Detaching, as we shall show later, first a past and then a future from the instant in which he lives physically, man discerns the dimension of time from his own corporal present. So he comes gradually to distinguish his temporal self, his individual lifetime, first from the life of his stock and then from the life of the whole of humanity, comes, that is, to conceive first of genealogy and then of history. He becomes capable of drawing conclusions from the past to the formation of the future, of planning, transforming not only his own life but the life of coming generations. And the concept of history, that is, the unity of mankind in the dimension of time, induces man to adapt his life to ideal, universally human goals.

Humanity, a specific attitude of man toward his fellow man and

his fellow creature, is also based on man's faculty of discerning and transcending, on his faculty of conceiving another human being as a distinct and independent existence and, at the same time, of putting himself in the place of that other being. This leads to the sublimation of erotic impulses; it leads to love in the full sense of the word, to true friendship, in other words, to all kinds of spiritually established, disinterested relationships. Eventually it leads to an attitude of regard for fellow men and fellow creatures, to respect for the rights and for the dignity of the human being. And it leads to the concept and the postulate of a unity of mankind in space, of an actual human community.

The important thing to remember is that the whole development from the animal to the highest of human goals is simply a development of the primary faculty of discerning and transcending, those acts of spirit which make man human. Spirit as a value derives from spirit as a fact, an impulse.

WHAT IS EVOLUTION?

WHEN WE SET OUT to consider history as human evolution, new problems immediately arise. Throughout the modern era, belief in historical *evolution* has been synonymous with a belief in *progress*, in the ever-increasing perfection and happiness of man. When, in our century, people began to realize that man was far from growing better and happier, that, on the contrary, barbarism and anarchy were springing up among apparently civilized peoples, they abandoned in their disillusionment the idea of human evolution too.

The instance of individual life shows clearly that evolution is not identical with moral improvement or greater happiness. An adult is not necessarily better and hardly happier than a child. His rational faculty has developed, but this rational faculty does not imply moral improvement or increased well-being. Yet it cannot be denied that a certain evolution takes place in the growing-up of an individual. In the sphere of national life, also, plain people

whose intellectual faculties are not developed to any high degree often show more kindness and happiness than people of great intellectual development. So we must separate the problem of evolution from the problem of progress.

The problem of progress in itself is very intricate. The progress of the individual does not coincide with that of the masses. Historical evidence shows that the perfection and the well-being of the individual is restricted by the rising standard of the average. This phenomenon may even cause a complete reversal: the lowering, the leveling-down of the standard of the leading individuals.

We must also differentiate natural kindness from conscious and conscientious moral behavior. Then, too, simple happiness under primitive, natural conditions may decline when rationally organized welfare in a highly civilized society is attempted. The moral and social status may break down completely when the former decays before the latter has been achieved. We are now in such a period. In times like these, decent behavior is no simple matter, for it is no longer merely a moral, but also a mental, task. It requires a highly developed intellectual faculty, the ability to grasp the very complex social situation of a closely interrelated nation and world, a task so difficult that people abandon it and relapse into the moral and social anarchy of today. Since this anarchy is as much an intellectual as a moral question it is not necessarily evidence against a general progress of mankind. If man should succeed in mastering his world intellectually then the process we are going through just now may turn out to have been "reculer pour mieux sauter". The whole problem of human progress is a moral one, with which we cannot deal until we have done what we can to understand the condition of our world through investigating human evolution. Although morality and organized welfare form an integral part of human evolution, their development is not simply identical with it, and a specifically moral point of view would only serve to blur our subject.

Apart from the theories that affirm or deny evolution according as they assume mankind to progress or decline, there is the *cyclic theory*, which holds that life in general, and human life in partic-

ular, does not proceed along straight lines, be it upward or downward, but rather in a circular movement as eternal recurrence of the same processes.

The cyclic theory is, in fact, the only basic argument against the idea of evolution as such. Still, it cannot invalidate this idea. As we said before, the difference between the Neanderthal or Aurignac type of man and Dante or Shakespeare is the first and simplest evidence of human evolution. On the other hand, the cyclic theory cannot be altogether rejected. It contains a certain amount of truth in so far as it corrects and modifies earlier concepts of evolution as a straight, upward movement, a steady advance without relapse or interruption. From our survey of human history, the realization will crystallize that there is no evolutionary process without powerful set-backs and reverses that apparently imperil the whole movement but actually drive it forward all the more. Every action arouses a reaction, it even requires this reaction to provide a fresh impulse to further actions. Thus reversals are the strongest, though the cruellest, carriers of every evolutionary and revolutionary process. And, in the long run, a progressive movement is sometimes more effectively aided by reactionaries than by promoters.

The idea of a cyclic motion of history, then, does not wholly contradict the idea of evolution. Evolution is a most complex process that includes both a progressing and a reversing element; it is neither straight nor circular, but proceeds in a revolving movement, at once expanding and advancing, like a spiral.

We have defined the human quality as man's overstepping of the limits of his own being, and have stated that it consists of two main acts, the establishment of these limits by detaching and discerning a non-self from a self, and the establishment of a new and conscious relationship with the clearly conceived non-self by transcending self toward the non-self.

History as the evolution of the human quality, then, is the *successive development of these two acts or faculties of man*. In its early periods, human history is mainly the formation of the faculty of detaching and discerning. The later part of human

history is the genesis and perfection of the quality of transcending.

Accordingly, the subject of human history is man's relation to the world that surrounds him. This world consists of a broader, non-human sphere, the universe, and a narrower, human sphere, the human community. In the process of his evolution, man first, by a series of objectivations, detaches and discerns these two spheres from his own gradually conceived existence, and later establishes his new, transcending relation to them. The differentiation of man's relation to the universe develops the human mind. The differentiation of man's relation to the human community develops the human individual.

Both processes of differentiation are a kind of focusing, a narrowing-down, in the one case, of a separate human mind or soul, as distinct from the universe, and in the other, of a separate individual, as distinct from the human community. By discerning and conceiving the objects and beings of the outer world as separate, distinct existences, man implicitly discovers his own existence and soul. And by distinguishing, first his fellow kinsmen, and then his fellow men, from his own, gradually conceived personality, he evolves as an individual. But no sooner has this narrowing-down taken place, than a broadening-out on a different plane automatically begins. Man develops techniques of thought that make his perceptions more and more a part of him, and so in a process of transcending, he begins to integrate a wider and wider area of the objective world in the human mind and in the human world. And the human individual no sooner comes into existence than the conflicts and the loneliness engendered by the separation of one man from another of themselves create a need to close the widening gap and, in the end, to establish a new and consciously organized society. So the mind, in the course of transcending, takes in more and more of the universe, and the individual shares, and includes in his more and more coordinated and cooperating existence, an ever-larger part of the human community.

For a full understanding of the crucial relation between the individual and the community, it is necessary to define terms. The contrary of individual, or rather the complementary term to "in-

dividual", is "community" or "common". The term "individual" has only one meaning; it is unambiguous. There are, to be sure, many steps between a mere outward appearance and a thorough, intrinsic realization of individuality, which does not come about until late in history; but the difference is only one of degree, not of kind. No such unambiguity exists, however, as to the term "community". There are many kinds of communities, and there are many respects in which men may form a community. A family or a primitive tribe is a community, so is a factory or a labor union; the factors that make each a community are essentially different.

The members of a family or of a tribe are bound into a community by consanguinity, by common physical features, behavior and mental cast, by common traditions, customs, habits, rituals, by a common way of life, an unconscious way of life handed down as a heritage from generation to generation. Members of a labor union or factory workers, on the other hand, are held together by a common will, by common tasks, conscious common purposes aiming at a future. A tribe and a family are entities in themselves, they govern their members intrinsically by the undefined rule of common features, habits and attitudes that these members are unable to alter at will. The members of a family or tribe derive from the existence of their community, which forms them. The community of a factory or a labor union, on the contrary, derives from the existence of the members, who form it. Such a community is built up, it is brought into being by the work or the free will, by the aggregation and cooperation of individuals. It derives from the future, not from the past.

The first kind of community, the pre-individual community, is adequately characterized by the term "species", and the second kind, the post-individual community, is best expressed by the term "collective". Modern sociologists frequently apply the term "collective" to all kinds of communities, a use which is likely to lead to confusion. This term is properly applicable only to the post-individual community, since collecting means the gathering and putting-together of different and previously existent individual entities. Thus collectivity presupposes individuals who may collect.

Neither does the term "collective", as we use it here, necessarily and exclusively designate a socialist or communist unit. It is intended to indicate any post-individual community, any community based on the common aims or purposes of pre-existent individuals.

In the light of this basic distinction, human history appears as an evolution leading from the pre-individual community to the post-individual community, through the development and completion of the individual.

The first period, from the condition of primitive man to the end of antiquity, comprises the process of man's detachment and discernment of an outer world from an inner world. This implies the disintegration of the primeval, corporal community and of the primeval conformity of man with the universe, and, correspondingly, the formation of the human individual and the human soul. The second period, from the end of antiquity to the Renaissance, includes the completion and emancipation of the human individual, his final deliverance from a superhuman rule and the setting free of the human intellect. The third period, the modern era, means the process of man's transcendence toward a clearly conceived, objective world of nature and toward a conscious, organized human community. The theme of this age is the struggle for man's reintegration in a clearly conceived universe and the struggle for a collective order.

Up to now, the huge body of historical facts has been presented according to two principles of arrangement: the development of peoples and cultures and the development of fields of human activity. To regard history as history of the human quality requires a new principle of arrangement and hence a new selection of facts. From the very outset, our undertaking could meet with the objection that the longitudinal section we make through the material of facts may not be representative of the development of man.

This objection is especially weighty in regard to *cultures*. For the unity of history can be questioned not only with reference to the consistency of human evolution, but also with reference to the variety of human cultures. Can we regard the development of

man as a single, broad stream, or has it several equally important streams, none of which can be considered fully representative?

The new "universal history", as Spengler and Arnold J. Toynbee conceived it, assumes a multiplicity of cultures, each in its own orbit and none actually to be taken as a paradigm, all having in common only general features of rise and fall, "laws of history" on the line of "laws of nature". The assumption of a plurality of human centers is, of course, indisputable. There are different branches of human evolution, different human orbits, fairly independent of one another and each of them showing specific developments. The question is whether these various orbits differ fundamentally in their human characteristics, and, if they do, whether they are really equivalent with regard to human evolution or whether one of them can be considered representative.

First of all there is that great stream of evolution that is to be the subject of our survey. We have just traced its course. It starts from the ancient Near East, from Egypt, Mesopotamia and the Iranian Plateau where manifold stocks converged and intermingled. It proceeds along the Mediterranean, crosses over to Southern Europe, to Greece and Rome, gradually expands over the whole of Europe, including Russia, and eventually extends to the Western Hemisphere.

And there are other, distinctly separate, human centers. There are different centers of primitive stocks which, as a matter of fact, have remained prehistoric, since their evolution was stunted in its beginnings. There were richly developed cultures of half-primitive peoples, Negro kingdoms in Africa, the Aztec and Maya kingdoms of the American Indians, the Malay tribes in the East Indies. Last but not least, there are the two great peoples of the Far East, the Chinese and the Indians, whose culture and human attitude touch the heights of human achievement. These two peoples, that represent huge and highly differentiated cultural spheres of their own—indeed worlds of their own—are, in fact, the only ones to challenge the course of Western civilization as the leading and representative trend of human evolution. They have a history covering three millennia of migrations, invasions, conquests, dynastic and social up-

heavals, of thoughts and concepts and arts that reach the utmost peak of subtlety and perfection.

These cultures, however, developed within the stage of human evolution where life is determined by the rule of religion, by religious ritual, precept and tradition. This means that life actually rests upon a steady and immobile foundation, and that no currents or changes appreciably alter the ways of human existence, which are conservative and governed by the magic power of an eternal world order. India is, in fact, a matrix of the cyclic theory of life, the idea of eternal recurrence. And if we observe an evolution in Indian thought, it is rather an inversion of European evolution, it leads altogether away from earthly, temporal life. Motionlessness so absolute that it attains nothingness is its most sublime, its most valued, concept.

In both these countries, up to recent times, deep reluctance and distrust prevailed against any change in general, and particularly against the introduction of new methods and tools, which were supposed to pervert and demoralize man. This attitude may be illustrated by a story of Chuang Tzu, a Chinese thinker who lived about 300 B.C.

When Tzu Kung went South to the Ch'u State on his way to the Chin State, he passed through Han-yin. There he saw an old man engaged in making a ditch to connect his vegetable garden with a well. He had a pitcher in his hand, with which he was bringing up water and pouring it into the ditch—great labor with very little result.

"If you had a machine here," cried Tzu Kung, "in a day you could irrigate a hundred times your present area. The labor required is trifling as compared with the work done. Would you not like to have one?"

"What is it?" asked the gardener.

"It is a contrivance made of wood," replied Tzu Kung, "heavy behind and light in front. It draws up water as you do with hands, but in a constantly overflowing stream. It is called a well-sweep."

Thereupon the gardener flushed up and said: "I have heard from my teacher that those who have cunning implements are cunning in their dealings, and those who are cunning in their dealings have cunning in their hearts, and those who have cunning in their hearts cannot be pure and incorrupt, and those who are not pure and incorrupt are restless in spirit, and

those who are restless in spirit are not fit vehicles for Tao [this is, very vaguely characterized, the principle of harmony]. It is not that I do not know of these things. But I should be ashamed to use them."

The same argument was repeated about 1900 A.D. by a modern Chinese scholar, Ku Hung Ming, who calls the mind of modern European civilization a "fox mind", and who assails the Europeans violently for compelling his people to accept modern trade methods and to construct railways.

When Western economic and political imperialism was looking for raw materials and colonial markets, it forced modern European civilization upon the populations of the Near and Far East. This intervention was followed by the most violent revolts, such as the Chinese Tai-ping rebellion from 1850 to 1864 and the uprising of the Boxers in 1900. And to this very day, all the industrial exploitation and selfish reorganization on the part of the Western nations have not succeeded in thoroughly Europeanizing these countries. They are helplessly dragged along by this overwhelming European civilization which, in the end, they will have to adopt in order to match its assaults.

These great cultures of the East may have attained the heights they did just because they had a chance to reach fruition within an unchanging stage of development; the point for us, however, is that they had no evolution beyond that stage which the Western world, for better or worse, has long ago left behind. It may be said that those peoples are nobler than the average people of the Western world of today, but, as we have pointed out, moral perfection and evolution are not identical. There are two decisive arguments in favor of the assumption that the broad current of Western evolution has been, up to now, the representative human evolution: first, that Western evolution has passed through the same stages as that of the East, and secondly, that it went on to further stages and developed the forms, methods and ways of life that are about to swallow all other remaining forms of culture and that are bound to become the determining factors of all future developments. Thus we may consider this Western trend as represent-

ative of human evolution as a whole, and we may, therefore, confine ourselves to the survey of this representative trend.

As for the development of *special fields of human activity*—with few exceptions, such as the development of music, which would have led us too far—they are included in our survey, not altogether as autonomous, parallel developments, but rather with a view to their changing relation to the development of the human quality. The autonomy of special departments of human activity is a disastrous phenomenon of modern times, and to extend the dividing lines backward into former ages is a falsifying interpretation of history. These fields developed as functions of man; their history is the history of their changing significance for man.

The author has attempted to re-interpret history, not by discussing it, but by re-telling it, by allowing interpretations to arise spontaneously from the arrangement of facts; he has tried to write history, not to write about history. So, if he has sometimes treated as though for the first time events and developments fairly familiar to the reader, he begs his indulgence.



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PRIMITIVE MAN

A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN QUALITY of man must begin with an investigation of his primary condition; and, to a certain extent, this condition still prevails among the so-called primitive peoples of our contemporary world. While it is true that all stages of human evolution have persisted through the ages and are still present today, this statement must be qualified by several important restrictions. The peoples that are now living in the uncivilized areas of America, Africa, Australia and the East Indies cannot be termed primitive in the strict sense of the word. The conditions of their existence are not exactly those of the early stages of humanity, for the touch of Time is laid upon all things. Even the most stable conditions are subject to change. Climate and environment, inbreeding or intermingling with neighbors, may cause decay and degeneration, further development or the falling into disuse of established customs. No human habitations are so hermetically sealed away from the rest of the world that indirect influences or rumors of far-away happenings do not seep through. Thus we can be fairly certain that the state of primitive peoples today is not wholly identical with that of early man, and so the term primitive as applied to such peoples may be inaccurate. But in the general picture they present to us, through the medium of ethnological reports, we can recognize the basic forms of the attitudes and of the mentality of primeval man. We are the more confirmed in this assumption by the fact that the picture constitutes an evolutionary link between the mental behavior

of the highly developed mammals and the first stages of historical mankind, since it combines traces of the former with elements of the latter. Thus the primitive peoples of today give the impression of dead ends branching off from human evolution. They follow their own isolated development which can hardly be called evolution, for it is halted in its beginnings, nipped in the bud. They follow their own small, isolated and limited rise and decline. And still, when all is said and done, they do furnish an outline of a certain preliminary phase of human evolution.

There has been a good deal of discussion as to why these primitive peoples have never attained higher stages of development. The answer is twofold: for one thing they may have been stopped by their limited potentialities; for another, it is certain that development, or at least the kind of development that is shown by the progression of humanity, cannot be evolved by an individual people, by a limited population, nor can it occur in groups living in seclusion from free intercourse with other groups. In tracing the steps of human development through the history of Europe, it becomes clear that tremendous efforts were necessary to effect this development, and that constant reinforcement, the repeated impact of fresh human forces was needed to bring about the civilization we live in—however poor that may still be. Such a development could be achieved only by a sequence of connected and intermingled peoples and civilizations, by the successive cooperation of various stocks, by a historical relay, a handing on of the torch. Historical evidence proves beyond doubt that the exact opposite of what the so-called race theory pretends is true: any decisive advance in human evolution has been accomplished not by breeds that are pure either mentally or physically, not by any cultural inbreeding, but by an intermixture, by the mutual impregnation of different stocks and cultures.

The understanding of primitive mentality requires a flexible imagination. Ethnologists and anthropologists have long been hampered by their method of approach; they have collected quantities of valuable data on their expeditions, but were unable to give

a comprehensive picture of the primitive state of mind because their inquiries and explorations, their stating of problems and commenting on results, were all colored by their habits of thinking and by the traditional categories of our era applied to an entirely different order of mentality. They were either puzzled by an apparently incoherent response to their questions, or they translated what they heard into their own logical terms and thereby violated the original meaning. It is only in the last decades that a group of French sociologists, most conspicuously represented by Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, have arrived at an objective approach and thorough understanding of the primitive state of mind. The chief find of these scholars is that in trying to understand the primitive mentality we must discard the whole apparatus of modern intellectual concepts, we must renounce our premise of logical coherence and put ourselves in the place of primitive man. The features of primitive life are all-too-easily distorted by pressing them into our rational molds. In order to understand these peoples, we must think in their terms, we must familiarize ourselves with their way of dealing with problems and of viewing the world. With this approach, it becomes obvious that there is indeed coherence in the thinking of primitive peoples, but that this coherence is utterly different from ours; it is a pre-logical, emotional coherence.

What does this mean? For illustrative purposes, let us consider the *mental life of animals*. If you ever had a dog and took the trouble to watch his behavior on walks or in your room, you will certainly have observed that he regarded every moving object, a rolling stone, a wave, a book falling from the desk, as a living force. The dog does not simply dodge the object as you would, he barks at it, attacks it, bites it or retreats from it, as though it were an enemy or some uncanny power acting of its own volition. Even when an object does not move but is merely unusual, bizarre in shape or odd in its proportions, the dog behaves in the same way. For him there is no difference between inanimate objects and living bodies. If only they obtrude themselves by a motion or by some peculiar characteristic, both are equally animate.

A dog is a domestic animal, a creature almost human, living

under artificial, planned and fairly safe conditions. He does not lead an independent, wandering life in the wilderness, in an ever-changing environment. He does not have to hunt his food or to be aware of constant dangers that threaten his very life. He has grown accustomed to stable and familiar surroundings and has acquired a feeling of security. He can always turn to his master for reliable protection.

But if you have ever watched a deer or any other wild creature in its native habitat, you have probably noticed that it lives in a state of perpetual vigilance, that it is beset with fears not only of animal foes but of elemental powers as well. A sudden wind, a rustling tree, a distant rumble cause terror and flight. Its senses are sharpened to a degree which in man would be called hysterical. It registers the most minute sensations, the most distant events. It always seems to be in mystical touch with a multitude of potential hovering powers. It must always be on the alert among unknown dangers that may materialize at any moment. Its vulnerability consists not only in being exposed to actual peril, but in the lack of consciousness and of a systematic memory mechanism. For, of course, an animal does have a certain kind of memory that is part of its instincts and of its sense reactions. But since it lacks consciousness, it cannot properly register experiences, it cannot recall them at will or abstract from them general conclusions as to how to meet recurring experiences of a similar and yet different kind. None of us is completely aware of the amount of protection that consciousness affords. A life without consciousness is naked and meagre. It is wholly exposed and always at the mercy of the unknown and the unexpected. It is a life in the present with no past and no future. But this present is quite different from our present that is lapped in memory and anticipation, that is only a ripple in a vast sea of conscious, half-conscious, subconscious experiences, plans and ideas. Our present is a minute transition from past to future, a continuous flux in the broad current of a known intentional life. But the present of the animal is an overwhelming, all-comprising present, cupped in darkness, a present where there is no consciousness of either birth or death. It is a present so stable,

so immobile that it is all but identical with permanence, with eternity.

This is the premise for the understanding of the *primitive soul*. There is, of course, a great difference between animals and primitive man who is already illumined by the first flashes of consciousness, by certain ideas or the shadows of ideas. Yet there are astounding similarities between animal attitudes and the attitudes of primitive man. Knut Rasmussen gives a very revealing report of an interview he had with an Eskimo Shaman, that is, a wizard, a medicine man. Lévy-Bruhl, who has a profound knowledge of the huge extant ethnological and anthropological material, calls this report a unique document since this is the only instance where primitive man, by a happy chance, has succeeded in clarifying and expressing a basic feature of his mental attitude. Rasmussen was half Eskimo himself. He was thoroughly acquainted with the language and customs of his people and had gained the complete confidence of the Eskimo men. The Eskimo Shaman said:

“... we explain nothing, we believe nothing . . .

“We fear the weather spirit of earth, that we must fight against, to wrest our food from land and sea . . .

“We fear dearth and hunger in the cold snow huts.

“We fear Takánakapsáluk, the great woman down at the bottom of the sea that rules over all the beasts of the sea.

“We fear the sickness that we meet with daily all around us . . . We fear the evil spirits of life, those of the air, of the sea and the earth, that can help wicked shamans to harm their fellow men.

“We fear the souls of dead human beings and of the animals we have killed.

“Therefore it is that our fathers have inherited from their fathers all the old rules of life which are based on the experience and wisdom of generations. We do not know how, we cannot say why, but we keep those rules in order that we may live untroubled. And so ignorant are we in spite of all our shamans, that we fear everything unfamiliar. We fear what we see about us, and we fear all the invisible things that are likewise about us, all that we have heard

of in our forefathers' stories and myths. Therefore we have our customs, which are not the same as those of the white men, the white men who live in another land and have need of other ways."

In analyzing this account, you will find that the life of primitive man, like that of an animal, is a life of alertness and fear, a life that is essentially on the defensive. In his fear and defensiveness, primitive man is unable to make a distinction between the material and the immaterial, the visible and the invisible world, an animate or an inanimate object. What matter to him are only the present or potentially present sensations and effects he continually encounters. He perceives sensations as acting forces, as spirits or as animated bodies. He does not differentiate inner and outer life, dream, hallucination or imagination born of fear and reality. Such distinctions would imply logical operations of a complex order; they would imply the systematization of experiences, the ability to abstract general conclusions from experiences—in other words, all those functions of reason that primitive man has not yet developed.

Since to him the world consists of a legion of immediate sensations and emotions embodied in the forces of nature, his life, much as the life of an animal, is based on the present and is consumed by a sovereign present that is synonymous with eternity. Primitive man is surrounded by a system of forces existing always and everywhere. They are both personal and impersonal—call them spirits, demons or souls. They are in close communication; they pass into one another. Here and there they suddenly emerge from the dark, they become manifest and dip back into darkness again. A secret, constant interchange of these mystical forces goes on in the primitive world, and it is difficult to discern whether it is a question of many single interchangeable forces or of one all-pervading force or soul or life principle that materializes in various forms and in various places.

What Lévy-Bruhl calls "a mist of unity" embraces the whole world, material and immaterial, visible and invisible, imagined and real—a unity which is not in any way clearly conceived or conceivable, but only felt and lived and therefore purely emotional and mystical; and this whole world consists of embodied emotions and

sensations. So we may well call primitive man a metaphysician. But since to him the metaphysical and the physical form one indistinct and indistinguishable entity, he is a sensual or emotional metaphysician in contrast to our concept of the metaphysical thinker who separates the physical from the abstract and is aware of a metaphysical principle as set against secondary physical phenomena.

This emotional coherence which unites the primitive world has been summed up by Lévy-Bruhl as the "*law of participation*". In the primitive world, everything and everybody participates with everything and everybody. Such participation functions as a continuous cycle. One form slips into another and still retains the same substance. Man can be or become an animal, plant, mineral and vice versa, in order to carry out some deed or effect. In every experience related to himself, primitive man suspects that such a participation or transformation has taken place. If a stone falls and bruises him, it is because an enemy sorcerer has slipped into it, or the stone people may have been offended by a kinsman and taken revenge. These stone people or plant people are the same in kind as human beings, and sometimes assume human form. To give an instance: W. E. Armstrong reports of the people of Rossel Island in New Guinea: "The stone . . . is, of course, a good deal more than it appears to the eye—it would seem to have a sort of dual existence . . . for it has an existence in Temewe (a subterranean or submarine abode), where it is human in form—in fact there seems to be a vague idea that that which really is the stone may be at the same time a stone on Rossel (Island) and a man, or perhaps it would be better to say spirit . . . in Temewe." In his report on the Maori people of Tahiti Island, Elsdon Best says: "When the Maori entered a forest he felt that he was among his own kindred, for had not trees and man a common origin, both being the offspring of Tane. Hence he was among his own folk as it were, and that forest possessed a tapu life principle even as man does. Thus, when the Maori wished to fell a tree wherefrom to fashion a canoe or house timbers . . . he was compelled to perform a placatory rite ere he could slay one of the offspring of Tane. He saw in the majestic trees living creatures of an elder branch of the great family . . . he heard the voices of

unseen beings in the rustling of branches, in whispering winds, in the sound of rushing waters . . ." Before cutting down a tree, the natives of Kiwai Island in New Guinea, as we learn from G. Landtmann, ask the spirit to leave the tree and to go to live somewhere else. To the Caribs of British Guiana, animals live and act just like human beings. "In the morning the animals go to their work, like the Indians do. The tiger and the snake and all other animals go out hunting, having to look after their family like the Indian has . . ." "To the Malays," according to a report of W. Skeat, "the tigers are human beings who assume, for purposes of their own, the tiger's shape and who have, moreover, in various parts of the peninsula . . . settlements of their own . . . There is an elephant city just as there is a city of the tigers . . . and it is the same for the rhinoceros, crocodile, wild deer, wild hog, etc."

Traces of this participation and interchange of forms among primitives are also contained in the early legends and sagas of advanced cultures, in the metamorphoses of Greek, Celtic and Germanic heroes and gods, and even in the fairytales we liked best in our own childhood, which, to a certain degree, reflects that of mankind as a whole. In his extensive studies on child psychology, the Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, has demonstrated a similar mental state for the child up to about seven or eight years: "The child is a realist, since he supposes thought to be inseparable from its object, names from the things named, and dreams to be external. His realism consists in a spontaneous and immediate tendency to confuse the sign and the thing signified, the internal and external, and the psychical and the physical."

The sphere of primitive life where participation is most pronounced, where it is, in fact, very close to simultaneousness and identity, is the *relation between the individual and the community*, be it family, clan or tribe. Here we are confronted with a fundamental phenomenon of primitive life, a phenomenon which is a starting point of human history. Primitive man has no distinct feeling of individuality, no realization of an individual self. Nor has he as yet a definite knowledge of the limits of individual life, of birth

and of death. The span of his individual existence lacks clearly defined boundaries. Like a child, he is not able to speak of himself as "I". He confuses "I" and "we". What Lévy-Bruhl calls an "organic or physiological solidarity" prevails between the individual and his community, between ancestor and offspring, that is, between the living and the dead. The individual has no life of his own, no life at all beyond the pale of his species. The species, not the individual, is the primary, the fundamental, the almighty unit and standard, the crux of every value and every event—this is what modern man finds so difficult to conceive. The individual has merely a secondary, derivative existence, and if we may speak of individuality at all, it is only "relative individuality", a shade, a slight differentiation within the compact entity of the species. The individual is a mere specimen of the species. Among the Maori, says Elsdon Best, "a native so thoroughly identifies himself with his tribe that . . . in mentioning a fight that occurred possibly ten generations ago, he will say: 'I defeated the enemy there,' mentioning the name of the tribe. In like manner he will carelessly indicate ten thousand acres of land with a wave of his hand, and remark: 'This is my land.' He would never suspect that any person would take it that he was the sole owner of such land, nor would any one but a European make such an error. When Europeans arrived on these shores many troubles arose owing to the inability of the Maori to understand individual possession of land, and land selling."

When we speak of the "members of a family", we are using a metaphor, but, as an anthropologist remarks in analyzing the language of the Melanesian people, in the case of primitive man "the solidarity of relatives among themselves is denoted in the same way as that of the various parts of an individual. The individual is to the family what a limb—head, arm, leg—is to the living body."

In hurting or offending a human being, in killing an animal or cutting down a tree—since animals and trees are conceived of as human—the native does not strike at the individual but at the whole species, of which the individual in question is only a transitory form. It is the species that will perform the task of vengeance and this vengeance will fall not on the individual perpetrator of the offence

but on any of his kinsmen, on his species as a whole. The species is responsible for every individual, and every individual is responsible for the species. There is no distinction between individual and common guilt. This is the basic explanation for the ancient custom of "vendetta" or blood-vengeance that we find even today, among some European peoples.

This is also the reason why marriage was the affair of the whole clan, why the wife was chosen, captured or bought by the clan and belonged to it as such. The appropriation of a wife did not rest exclusively with the individual man to whom she was assigned. The other men of the clan retained a potential or even virtual right to her. Among many primitive clans there are no special words for "father". The translation for the term "father" would be "old man". Children know only their mother, and that, like animals, only up to a certain age. Later even this special relationship is forgotten and entirely supplanted by the feeling of membership in a certain clan. Within such a group there are only "men" and "women". Some peoples have no designation for "husband"; they only speak of men in general.

At a more advanced stage of development, a vestige of this condition persists among many primitive peoples in the right of a brother to his brother's wife. Brothers are considered as one, a man's wives are at least the "potential" wives of his brother and, as a result of this custom, conflicts and even tragedies occurred at transitional stages of this development, when a wife grew attached to an individual man and resented the older brother-right over her. Such a brother-right institution is mentioned in the Bible as an old custom of the Jews, the Levirate, the right and even the duty of a brother to marry his brother's widow.

Another peculiar institution of primitive peoples may be understood as an expression of such pre-individual relations between the sexes: exogamy or "marrying out", which John Ferguson McLennan, the first explorer to find it, describes as "a common rule with savage and barbarous peoples never to marry a woman of their own tribal sub-division or group but always to marry a woman of a sub-division or group different from their own."

Since primitive peoples have scarcely any feeling for individuality, they have no individual property. "Primitives cannot understand that land may be an individual and inalienable property. That which may be granted to individuals, and pass from one to another, is the use of the soil and the appropriation of its fruits . . . but nothing more . . . The land, as a matter of fact, belongs—and this, in the fullest sense of the word—to the social group in its entirety, that is, to the living and dead collectively." Even all tools, household goods, weapons and other articles of use, belong to the clan. Whatever an individual may acquire or receive from a foreign visitor, he immediately distributes among the members of his clan. B. Spencer, in his report on the native tribes of Northern Australia, says: "Give a man a shirt in return for work . . . and the chances are that you will find a friend of his . . . wearing it next day."

This phenomenon has often been called "primitive communism". But this is a misnomer based on a misconception. Communism is a collectivist theory and a collective social movement. And collectivism presupposes developed individuals who collect. It presupposes a clearly conceived, deliberate intention on the part of these individuals to set up a collective. But nothing of this kind is to be found in a primitive community. The species, the tribe, the clan, the family, is an entity of its own, an original, all-powerful entity from which individuals have not as yet separated. It is this original, sovereign entity which commands its members, members, as we have seen, in the sense of "limbs". Though primitive participation and modern communism show a superficial resemblance of traits and effects, they are diametrically opposed in their trends of development. While primitive participation springs from the community and tends toward the development of the individual, modern communism begins with the individual and leads toward the development of the collective. In primitive participation the species or the tribe precedes the individuals; in modern communism the individuals precede the collective. Thus we must consider the primitive tribe as an independent entity which has a mystical effect upon the whole emotional existence of its members. The tribe produces its individuals but is not derived from them. The modern collective is

built up by rationally conceived outward aims that individuals have in common.

This primeval stage of man is the point of departure for human evolution, and its preliminary step consists in man's first acts of detaching and discerning a self from a non-self. His primitive participation with his universe and with his community begins to disintegrate as soon as he becomes aware of the *passage of time*. The participation with natural forces, animals and plants, the organic solidarity and almost identity of the clan members with one another and with their all-powerful clan, existed in that overwhelming present which is the frame of primitive life and of the primitive mind, a present which is identical with motionless duration, with eternity. To this island of an almighty present surrounded by darkness the utterly exposed life of the animal is forever confined. But man was soon led to break away from his confinement. He acquired the ability to extend his experience into another dimension, into the realm of Time. And the form in which time first manifested itself to the human mind was the past. Indeed, the first development of any true consciousness was the building up of a consciousness of the past. For the concept of the past signifies the detachment of an objectivated sphere of existence from the life in a vast present. The past gradually emerges from the omnipresent. It steals between Eternity and Now, and eventually takes over the power which was first exerted on man by the perennial present with its cycle of participating forces.

For a long time, however, this past was fixed in eternity. It was an estuary of eternity opening into the present, and it derived its strength from the dominance of eternity, or to be more exact, from a system of perennial powers. This system of perennial powers, of deities, constituted itself as an independent sphere ruling a merely present, a merely human world. It represents an objectivation of the eternal element in the primitive omnipresence of natural forces. And this process of objectivation is identical with the rise of religion. Concomitant with this first emphasizing and organizing of man's relation to the universe is a differentiation within the primi-

tive community that initiates the development of human personality.

These processes of differentiation originated in two focal points of primitive life: in the special participation between the living and the dead, and in the specific forms of intercourse in which all participation occurred between primitive man and the various forces that constantly surrounded and haunted him.

To the primitive mind, men are not necessarily bound to die through natural causes in the natural course of events, just as no change, no event whatsoever, comes about of necessity or through what we call "natural causes", that is objective, automatic processes. All events are due to accidents, or rather, to the deeds of evil spirits.

As a matter of fact, men do not die at all in our sense of the word. They do not cease to be what they are, they merely move away—go somewhere else where they continue to live in one form or another, as human beings or as animals or plants. At any rate, the dead persist as what they were. They eat and drink, and their sustenance must be supplied by the living. They suffer cold and must be clad. They require fuel, they need all the utensils they employed in actual life, their oil, their hides, their weapons, their kettles and pans. And again it is the living who must provide them. These customs reach far into the history of civilization. The Egyptians buried household goods together with their dead; the Chinese still burn paper money for their dead so that these may buy what they want. In such concepts we also find one important origin of the sacrifice or offering. Another important origin is the self-surrender of a human being as a penance for the crime of the tribe, as the propitiation of demons, an act that is designed to turn away or to transfer a misfortune aimed at the tribe. Later, man was replaced by the animal, "the scapegoat", or by a consecrated image. But from these earliest human sacrifices a line of development leads to the most exalted sacrificial death in the history of mankind, to the crucifixion of Christ.

Primitive man has no more realization of natural birth than of death. Men are not propagated by a union of the sexes but by what we would call immaculate conception, by a sort of incubus. A spirit

enters into a girl or woman who happens to be passing by, and the child she brings forth is at first hardly considered as a human being. It is a kind of sacred and, as it were, hybrid being, half human, half spirit. And it is supposed to be in close contact with the world of spirits whence it comes. Many initiations, rites and ceremonies are required to attach it gradually to earth, to make it a member of the present community. Thus birth is only another connection with the sphere of the dead, with the spirits of the clan. This is the source of the belief in metempsychosis, or transmigration of the soul, which runs through the great religions and metaphysical theories of the world.

The dead are the spirits of the species. They leave and they return. They themselves are reincarnated; through them the species is reincarnated again and again. For instance, when a native kills a tiger, he has, in a certain sense of the word, driven away the species tiger, he has banished it to the realm of spirits, and the next tiger he meets with is not another tiger, a different tiger, but Tiger; the species tiger has simply reappeared. So the dead are really living, and as they have a more constant, an apparently less vulnerable life, they are even living par excellence. They know more than the people who are actually alive, and have uncontrolled power. For this they are revered and feared. More and more they become the very essence of the species. They become the true owners of the soil and are given the best and the first of its fruits. Since they themselves are the essence of the species, of the clan, they partake only of the essence of the foodstuffs and leave the gross remainder to the offerers, who, by eating it, communicate in some way with the essential spirit of the species. Thus a first sublimation of the offering is brought about, and all the venerated and feared dead become *ancestors*. A personified essence of the species, a divine emissary, takes shape as a First Ancestor, a personal "archetype", a legendary "Elder Brother", who represents both the origin and the substance of the species. Or, too, he may be regarded as the maker, the first creator of the species. He is considered bigger and better than other members of the species. He lives elsewhere in a remote place and

can be perceived only under extraordinary conditions, in dreams, in visions or in ecstatic union. All his kinsmen draw their life and force from him.

This first ancestor need not always be a human being. He may be an animal or a plant, a rock or a star. He may or may not temporarily assume human form. Even his descendants may be not merely human beings, but leopards, aras, or crocodiles. This phenomenon is known as "totemism". (The name "totem" is of Chippe-way Indian origin. Its original meaning is tribe, but ethnologically it is used to denote any ancestral or spiritually related non-human being or object which is considered as a patron by a primitive people.) According to J. G. Frazer, the paramount investigator of totemism, its origin lies in a primitive explanation that ancestral mothers "were impregnated by the entrance into their wombs of spirit animals or spirit fruits", and that the descendants, accordingly, "are nothing but the particular animal or plant which effected a lodgment in their mother and in due time was born into the world with a superficial and deceptive resemblance to a human being."

Residues of this chimerical and dual character of primitive representations are still manifest in the art, legends and poems of the great peoples of antiquity, where we encounter creatures half-animal and half-human in sphinxes, satyrs, tritons and centaurs, to mention only a few. Such hybrids appear as fixations or incarnations of the form-fluctuations in the primitive mind. The last remnants of these persist in our civilization as heraldic symbols and as mascots.

There was, then, in the earliest stages, no clear distinction, no gap between primitive man and these creative and life-giving forces. A state of perfect participation existed. The life-giving forces were present always and everywhere. Still, in our explanation of totemism, we have the first nucleus of an ancestral myth, of an account of origins. But to shift the ancestral spirit, the totemistic essence of life to a distinct and different sphere of existence, to make a clear cut between eternity, the past and the present—for this a further

development was necessary, a process of objectivation which transformed participation into religion. This process was identical with the development of actual *worship and cult*.

A sharp distinction must be made between participation and religion. Religion begins when a human being in his present life on earth, faces a being that has existed in a past and that will exist in eternity. The word "God" originally signifies "the being worshipped", "the one to whom sacrifice is offered". And there is evidence that true worship began only when participation had paled.

"In pure totemism", says Frazer, ". . . the totem is never a god and is never worshipped. A man no more worships his totem . . . than he worships his father and mother, his brother and his sister . . . No doubt totemism may under favorable circumstances develop into a worship of animals or plants, of the sun or the moon, of the sea or the rivers . . . but such worship is never found amongst the lowest savages who have totemism in its purest form." Worship is a specific form of intercourse between human beings and divine powers, whether they be ancestors, totems or sublimations in the forms of deities. It is an advanced form of relationship and implies an objectivation if not a real sublimity of those powers.

The form of intercourse in the earliest stage, the stage of participation, was magic. Since primitive man was utterly exposed among a multitude of ever-present spirits, and suspected the work of some spirit in every happening, his life was replete with magical acts. Whatever man embarked upon was accompanied or rather enveloped by many magical procedures. There are two main courses of magical procedure: one offensive and the other defensive. The offensive course is an attempt to seize the spiritual forces, to take possession of them by some sort of communication, identification, imitation, for instance by eating the patron or hostile totem—this is the original significance of cannibalism and head-hunting—or by wrapping oneself in its hides, by wearing its feathers, imitating its gestures or habits and merging with it in mystical union, music, dance or ascetic practices. This kind of magic, in so far as it was imitation, may be considered as the "nursing mother of art", to use an expression of Frazer's. Primitive naturalism, as we find it in

the famous rock drawings of African and prehistoric peoples, has probably its origin in the magical attempt to appropriate animal forces by seizing upon their exact form.

The second course of magic, the defensive, prevails in the later and more advanced stages of development, and is characterized by exorcism, invocation and pleading, by numerous rites of atonement and propitiation. Both forms are, of course, still effective in the cults of world religions, but it is the latter, the defensive, the gentler method of dealing with the spiritual forces, from which cult and worship derived.

This began with the institution of restricted magical spheres where spiritual forces dwell and work, spheres that are comparable to electrical fields, fields vibrant with power. Ethnologically these spheres are termed "taboo", an untranslatable Polynesian word combining a propitious with a malicious significance. It means sacred as well as uncanny. Objects and beings that are taboo are considered sacred. They cannot be killed or eaten, hurt or offended, without the utmost danger. They must be approached or touched with various procedures of caution and reverence. The taboo is the nucleus of the concept sacred or holy. For example, the Hebrew word for holy, "kadosh", originally meant detached, remote, isolated. In fixing and objectivating the taboo of human ancestors, totems or places where spirits dwelt, in conjuring these spirits into holy images, in combining both forms of magic, union and propitiation, through special ceremonies of sacrifice and pleading, worship and religion gradually developed.

In the process of being handed down from generation to generation, rites and ceremonies became rigid. They were observed with anxious accuracy, they grew into a complex system, they became fixed ritual. Since they could not be changed, they petrified, and, as we saw in the confession of the Eskimo Shaman to Rasmussen, the fears of primitive creatures became embodied in the strict observance of the rituals, in resistance to changes. They developed a consciousness of past generations, of tradition, of a distinct past.

Myths arose as a first form of history, and the division of time into three spheres became clearer: eternity, the dwelling-place of the

originator, the essence of life; the past, in which former generations have learned how to deal with the deity and have transmitted myths of primal happenings (cosmogony); the present, the sphere of those now living. Eternity and the past, as the spheres of life-origin, maintained their domination over the present for a long time. In New Guinea, people remember a time when the dead and the living were not separated from one another but lived together peacefully. Here we observe the shaping of the concept of a Golden Age that prevailed at the beginning of time.

In this process of detachment of an eternal sphere from the Here and Now, heaven played an important part. It was formerly represented as not very high, as a tight cover, a hood resting on earth at the horizon. Many myths relate that at first heaven touched the earth and that one day it was sundered and lifted high up. It became the natural, the most sublime dwelling-place for the gods.

Thus man's intercourse with deity reached a stage where, for the first time, he was confronted with the principle of his origin, where, from the level of the present, he faced his beginnings in time. Mentally he detached himself from his beginnings and, at the same time, reconnected himself with them. He felt himself face to face both with the deity and with the beginning of all things.

This is what we call *religion*. Religion, in its pure sense, is still characterized by the physical bond felt in the stage of participation. The deity is still the essence of the species, the source of life of the specific tribe. But the fact that man faces the deity constitutes an essentially new relationship which goes beyond this physical bond.

Rites and ceremonies also become subjects of wisdom and knowledge. They call for experts who know. Such experts, such inspired mediators, existed previously. Even in the early stages of humanity there were wizards, sorcerers, medicine men who were supposed to know how to deal with spiritual forces, who were thought to be in closer contact with these powers and at times, indeed, to be themselves transformed into such powers and spirits. They were consulted in every difficult case. But as the traditional rituals developed

more and more, the wisdom of those wizards was systematized and canonized and with it their position. It was the wizard who was to perform or to direct the great ceremonies in man's life. The wizard became a priest, the regular representative of the highest power, and as such he himself became vested with that highest power.

The *priest* is the first form of chieftain, the first form of king. He becomes the core, the essence of the present community. In this capacity he is the actual owner of land and distributor of goods, a vicarious owner, of course, a representative or administrator of property that belongs to the true essence of the tribe: the ancestors, the totem, the god. And, as a sacred chief who is connected with the essential powers, the priest himself becomes taboo. The sacred king is the first step in the shaping of individuality, individuality still in a relative sense, since he is only the deputy incarnate of the substance of the tribe. In a later phase, the sacred king was represented as a direct offspring of the divine power, as a son of god. And on this assumption sacred dynasties have been founded.

By gradual objectivation, sublimation and symbolization, by removing the enduring powers of the species from the present into a mythical past and a distinct and distant sphere of eternity, by conjuring them into images and confining them to abodes under or over the earth or to sacred temples, man came to visualize these powers as gods. The development of magical intercourse with spirits resulted in a system of worship, ritual and ceremonies, of sacrifice and communion, adoration and pleading, from which prayer evolved. The ordinary human being has not the inner strength or wisdom to establish direct connection with his god. He requires a mediator, the sacred priest who originated in the wizard, and sometimes the mediator himself was, or became, a god.

Along with this whole process, an extension, subdivision and emphasizing of the world of superhuman, divine powers was developing. Men not only worshipped the originators of their own tribe but the spirits of other tribes who had to be dealt with as relatives, friends or potential enemies. This extension reflects social de-

velopments, fusions and subdivisions of tribes, wars and subjugation of enemy tribes, whose gods were gradually recognized and included in the original cult of the tribes.

Within a tribe, age and occupational groups were differentiated and each was under the protection of a special patron spirit. Often the gods of conquered populations or inferior domestic spirits persisted as a lower class of popular demons, beneath the heavenly world of ruling deities and degraded by them. They sometimes developed into attendants of the ruling gods, into divine messengers, i.e. angels. Gods were supposed to descend to earth and to engender half-gods, heroes, conquering kings and founders of cities.

Thus the step from participation to religion meant an evolution of human imagination from the indistinct emotional and sensational pandemonium of a vague life principle to the distinctly conceived pantheon of polytheism, an evolution from the "mist of unity" to the clearness of multiplicity. At the same time it meant a first detachment and discernment of a non-self from a self in the three spheres of existence, history and humanity.

In the objectivation of the source of life of the species as deity, man not only began to conceive of his own being on a higher plane of existence, but in the various particular totem deities, all the various objects and beings of the outer world—animals, plants, rocks, stars, the sea and the earth—emerged as distinctly conceived, separate, finite existences.

In dividing the confused, omnipresent demonic forces into those of a distant eternity and a distinct past deriving from this eternity, past and present took shape. All present life, however, remained under the absolute domination of the divine order that was handed down through the sacred past. It was governed by a comprehensive ritual that offered powerful resistance to any fundamental change.

In instituting the priest, the sacred chieftain, the king, as the earthly deputy, as the incarnation of the deity, the individual was acknowledged for the first time. And in the constant presence of conquered, subdued populations within the community, the problem of the human being as a stranger, a being alien and yet related

in that it was human in the face of a non-human world, began to make itself felt and to call for administrative distinctions in organization.

This was the condition of man when he entered upon the stage of history.

RELIGION

IN THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS, we shall trace the steps leading from the concept of tribal deities as the essence of a particular tribe to the concept of a universal god. And this evolution implies important changes in the fields of history and human relationships—the realization of a common destiny of mankind and of a mutual bond among men, a mutual obligation of men toward one another that grows into what we call ethics and morality. In other words, we shall observe the gradual transition of man from the stage of tribal religion to the stage of world religion, a process which fundamentally alters the character of man's relation to the deity. This development was carried out by the great peoples of the Near East, the Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians and Jews.

Man's relation to the powers of the universe appears in three forms, as participation, religion and world religion.

Participation is a purely physical bond: through his emotions, his sensations and through magic, man merges with his ancestral and totemistic demons. In religion, man for the first time faces his life-giving principle in the deity per se, detached from its human descendants. Man differentiates and disconnects himself from his life-giving principle and, at the same time, reconnects himself with it mentally. In worshipping the deity, he considers himself face to face with the deity. Accordingly, religion, in its pure sense, still contains the physical bond of participation. The deity is still the source of life, the essence of the specific tribe. But the fact that man by his worshipping faces and envisages the deity constitutes an essentially new relationship which goes beyond the physical, biological bond.

This new, essentially spiritual relationship is the point of departure for the development of the world religions.

The concept of world religion is the profession of a universal god as creator, lord and savior, who is no longer a biologically related ancestor. The emphasis shifts more and more from the character of the creator to the character of the actual ruler, leader and future savior. Consequently, the physical bond between man and the deity is abolished altogether. The spiritual connection, a connection sprung of faith and of confidence, constitutes the sole basis of man's allegiance to God. World religion, therefore, is not religion in its original sense, it is a creed, a spiritual profession of faith.

Participation is a physical, emotional relation to the originating power. Religion is a dual, physical and mental relationship. World religion, or profession of faith, is a purely spiritual relationship. Thus the development we shall see presently is a process of gradual spiritualization of the deity and of man's relation to the deity. At the same time, man becomes temporal, personal and human, since a universal God no longer appeals to a particular tribe but to a single human personality as such.

A spiritual god relying on the essentially spiritual relationship of faith and profession presupposes the foil of an essentially temporal and physical life. The higher the divine eternal power mounts, the more spiritual it becomes, the more it separates from an earthly, temporal existence, and the more does earthly, temporal existence become known as such, become aware of itself and emancipated.

This process of the spiritualization of the deity and of the development of the temporal world was continued by the Greeks. With them the spiritual universal God developed into a spiritual substance of the universe, and the juxtaposition of an eternal, spiritual substance and an earthly, varied and changing present brought up the problem of the various sources of human knowledge and so begot philosophical speculation.

And finally we shall see a parallel development within the world of man, the development of the first urban communities and of city life in the Greek polis, the unfolding of the individual in the course of this development, the spread of the Roman polis to world domin-

ion and the development of a contrast between the earthly universality of the Roman Empire and the rootless individuals that are created through the intermingling of these peoples in the empire. The earthly universality of this world empire affords the secular frame and stage for the spiritual universality of Christianity.

ORIENTAL KINGDOMS

THE FIRST HISTORICAL STAGE of mankind is represented and characterized by the great kingdoms of the ancient Orient, Egypt, Babylon, Assyria and Persia. These first great kingdoms as well as the smaller kingdoms which rose and fell in the early millennia before Christ, for instance, the kingdoms of the Minoans, the Mittani, the Hittites, the Hurrians, the Phrygians, the Lydians—all these kingdoms had one fundamental feature in common, they were all theocracies. They were ruled and owned by gods or by kings and dynasties that were supposed to be either descendants or deputies of gods, “tenant farmers” of gods, as the Sumerians put it.

These kingdoms were agglomerations or fusions of tribes which settled along and between the great rivers and seas of North Africa and the Near East. It is no mere coincidence that human history started on its great progression from that region around the Eastern and Southeastern shores of the Mediterranean that may be compared to a grandiose amphitheater. From inner Africa, from Arabia, from the heart of Asia, the Iranian Plateau, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, a variety of tribal stocks came together at this focus. There was friction, competition, interrelation and intermingling of peoples drawn to the Mediterranean as filings to a magnet.

Frequent wars were caused by a struggle for expansion and for favorable dwelling-places. And those tribes that were numerically the strongest and that were most vital—which often meant more barbarous—overran the smaller tribes and established cultures. In this way, their sacred rulers gained enslaved populations for manual labor, and this enabled them to erect their mighty temples, pyramids and palaces—gigantic, indestructible monuments.

Eventually, by such incorporation of different stocks, these peoples succeeded in building up the first empires in history. One may, in fact, call the Egyptian, the Babylonian and the Persian kingdoms the first world powers, not only internally, with regard to the extent of their territories and the vast unfolding of their administrations, but also externally, in that they were the first to establish what we should call international relations on a large scale and international cultural standards. Alliances were formed, sporadic diplomatic intercourse was fostered. And along the great rivers and across the linking Mediterranean Sea, a slow, cumbersome trade with foreign powers was beginning to flourish and with it an exchange of cultural achievements and influence.

But with all their achievements, these ancient kingdoms never went beyond the primeval, tribal stage of humanity. The essence of the tribe was, and remained throughout, the predominant if not sole concern of communal life. Yet the primary state of the so-called primitive communism, of the leveled and undivided power and property of the whole tribal body, had been overcome. The essence of the tribe was already concentrated and crystallized in fixed and powerful deities and divine rulers.

Originally, kings were mainly priests, but later, owing to the frequency of tribal conflicts and the task of military organization and leadership, they became primarily warriors. And though they remained the divine or at least sacred chiefs, who still performed essential cult ceremonies, a special class of priests and their subordinates arose to perform cultic functions, and sometimes rivalry and antagonism broke out between kings and priests.

The population was a mere ramification of the central core. And life went on dominated by rituals and regulations grown rigid through the practice of generations, and watched over by a hierarchy already intent on the increase of personal power. Even the great new achievements of these peoples, the invention and development of writing, for instance, the Egyptian hieroglyph and the Sumerian cuneiform writing, at first helped all the more in the preservation of the past, in the codification of the ancient rites and customs. The present was rigorously chained to the past.