

Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion

THE LOST SHEEP IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

**NEW PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY, GENDER,
RACE, AND ANIMALS**

Edited by
Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe



The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion

Contemporary research in philosophy of religion is dominated by traditional problems such as the nature of evil, arguments against theism, issues of foreknowledge and freedom, the divine attributes, and religious pluralism. This volume instead focuses on unrepresented and underrepresented issues in the discipline. The essays address how issues like race, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, feminist and pantheist conceptions of the divine, and non-human animals connect to existing issues in philosophy of religion. By staking out new avenues for future research, this book will be of interest to a wide range of scholars in analytic philosophy of religion and analytic philosophical theology.

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New Perspectives on Disability,
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Edited by Blake Hereth and
Kevin Timpe

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To Benjamin, Jameson, Margaret, Mary, Sadie, and Kona,
children of God who shame the wise—

To everyone whose voice has been silenced, whose dignity
has been downtrodden:

*He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.*

—Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”



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Acknowledgments

This volume was conceived in the summer of 2016, growing from dissatisfaction with the state of contemporary philosophy of religion. While both of us had complained publicly and privately about this, the further step of *doing* something about it was a step into the darkness. Each of us had worked to change philosophy of religion in small ways—Kevin with disability, Blake with non-human animals—but these efforts were piecemeal and unlikely to solicit widespread attention. So, in October 2016, Blake contacted Kevin about the possibility of a volume that would not only cover underrepresented topics, but one that would also actively seek to promote work done by philosophers from underrepresented groups.

The ideas in this book are due principally to the imagination of the contributors. When the call for papers was released, we invited contributors to write about underrepresented topics in philosophy of religion. We were pleased and thrilled to see a smattering of philosophical questions that, until now, have oft been under-discussed or outright ignored by the larger sub-discipline. Despite our inability to include all of the fascinating abstracts sent to us, we can report that the boundaries of contemporary philosophy of religion are expanding in exciting ways. This is good because, as we observe in our introduction, philosophy of religion is something of an ‘occupied’ territory and the ‘occupiers’ are not especially diverse. The field therefore reflects a relatively narrow set of interests. Fortunately, that is changing thanks to essays like the ones in this volume. We’re thankful especially to philosophers from underrepresented groups who are willing to introduce new and important issues motivated by their own historically marginalized experiences. This volume is a testament to the fact that when queer philosophers, philosophers of color, disabled philosophers, women philosophers, and non-Christian philosophers work together, great things can happen.

Special thanks are owed, too, to our Routledge editor, Andrew Weckermann, who enthusiastically embraced our project, and to Allie Simmons, who shepherded the volume to its final conclusion. Our project coincided with three similar projects: a special issue of *Res Philosophica* edited by Jon Jacobs, the 2018 Logos Workshop in Philosophical Theology at the

University of Notre Dame led by Michelle Panchuk and Mike Rea, and the volume that resulted from that same workshop. Each of these projects embraces the work we undertake in this volume, and we benefited greatly from the partnerships. So we extend our thanks to Jon, Michelle, and Mike for supporting what could have been seen as a competing project. Much of our work was also inspired by the late Marilyn McCord Adams, whose tireless work in defense of LGBTQ+ persons and their interests has been for many of us the very hand of God in the world. Finally, we are grateful for our partners, Rebekah and Allison, who were wellsprings of good ideas for this book and without whom the volume would not exist. Their courage, love, and desire to see philosophy of religion change for the better can't be overestimated.

Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe
April 2019
Seattle, WA

Foreword

As most readers of this volume will know, over the past 50 years there has been a remarkable resurgence of philosophy of religion within the analytic tradition of philosophy—less so within the contemporary continental tradition. The essays in this collection constitute an expansive and venturesome contribution to that resurgence, taking it in distinctly new directions.

The flourishing of analytic philosophy of religion has not suffered from lack of critics, critics both hostile to the movement and critics sympathetic to it. In their introduction to *The Lost Sheep*, the editors, in order to explain the particular contribution that the essays make to the movement, offer a very helpful survey of the sorts of criticisms that have been lodged against the movement.

Some of those opposed to the movement make no secret of the fact that it is religion they deplore. Others are opposed not to religion but to analytic philosophy. They dislike it for its dry, ‘lifeless’ style, finding the style especially inappropriate for discussing religion. Others disapprove of the fact that analytic philosophers, rather than discussing religion as such, have focused most of their attention on one particular religion, namely, the Christian religion. It’s not really philosophy of *religion*. And yet others are critical of the fact that, rather often, participants in the movement do not discuss the topic at hand ‘objectively’ but write in defense of some component of their own religious thought or practice. It’s not ‘real’ philosophy, these critics say, but apologetics. One wonders whether these critics would launch the same criticism against the writings of contemporary naturalists—or against the writings of the so-called *new atheists*, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Sam Harris—that it’s not ‘real’ philosophy but apologetics.

Those who have no problem with analytic philosophy of religion as such but are critical of the way in which it has developed generally find it too narrow in various respects. The editors share this criticism, as do I.

A criticism that those working in ancillary fields—religious studies, theology, biblical studies—often lodge against the movement is that analytic philosophers are ignorant or dismissive of work in their fields,

sometimes arrogantly so, with the result that learning from developments in those fields is foreclosed. Others lament the fact that most analytic philosophers of religion focus their attention on theistic religions, especially the Christian religion, rather than bringing religions in general into the discussion. Others regret the narrow range of participants in the movement; the great majority of participants are white males. And many of those sympathetic to the movement lament the narrow range of topics that have been discussed. Philosophical theology and the epistemology of religious belief have garnered far and way most of the attention. This present volume is an important contribution to correcting those last two types of narrowness: the narrow range of participants and the narrow range of topics.

The religion of some people is pinched, consisting of little more than some beliefs about God, some beliefs about the afterlife, and a couple of moral maxims, such as do unto others as you would have them do unto you. But if we look at the religions of human beings in general, what we see is that, in thought and practice, religious people engage, in distinctly religious ways, the totality of what we human beings care about: plants, animals, the environment, disabled persons, youth, old age, sickness, health, morality, violence, love, justice, certain books, certain images, certain places, birth, death, sex, marriage—on and on. And what we see is that it is not just white males who are religious but human beings of all sorts. The signal contribution of this volume is that, with great philosophical imagination, the authors engage religiously a good many of the vast array of things that we human beings care about, and that the racial, ethnic, and gender identity of the authors is diverse.

As I was reading the essays, two contrasting images came to mind: one, the image of formerly peering at religion through cracks between the boards along with men like me; the other, the image of now looking at religion through doors thrown wide open with people quite different from me.

Nicholas Wolterstorff



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Introduction

Kevin Timpe and Blake Hereth

The ‘Standard Story’

According to a fairly standard story, philosophy of religion and philosophical theology are flourishing as subspecialties.¹ As one proponent of this standard story puts it: “Never since the late Middle Ages has philosophical theology so flourished as it has during the past 30 years” (Wolterstorff 2009, 155; see also Swinburne 2005; Hasker 2019). The present flourishing was made possible by the collapse of logical positivism and empiricist and Popperian requirements of falsifiability in the middle of the 20th century. This collapse was then followed by an increase in theistic, as opposed to naturalistic, philosophy of religion.² During the ‘metaphysical turn’ of the 1970s, analytic philosophy of religion began a period of proliferation. Initially, this renewed interest focused largely on religious language, religious epistemology, and natural theology (including not only arguments for existence of God but also competing accounts of the nature of the traditional divine attributes). Then, beginning in approximately the mid-1980s, philosophy of religion broadened out in a number of ways. It underwent diversification, both in terms of topics and in terms of methodology. (As we’ll see below, this diversification wasn’t as robust as many think it should be. *The Lost Sheep* seeks to make philosophy of religion even more diverse than it has been, by welcoming into the fold topics and perspectives that previously have been marginalized.) Paul Draper and Ryan Nichols think that evidence of the standard story is easy to find, including the interest of students of all levels and the quantity of articles, journals, books, and conferences devoted to philosophy of religion (Draper and Nichols 2013, 420f.). The flourishing of philosophy of religion has even led Alvin Plantinga to admit that specifically Christian philosophy of religion, which as discussed below is the vast majority of contemporary philosophy of religion, now faces the potential danger of “triumphalism” (Plantinga 2011, 268).

While the standard story holds sway as a description of philosophy of religion in the later decades of the 20th century and the opening of the 21st, it is not uniformly endorsed. John Loftus, for instance, thinks that

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it fails. Instead of flourishing, Loftus thinks that philosophy of religion is in a ‘crisis.’ What exactly, one might ask, is the nature of this crisis?

There is no longer any debate about what the truth is among intellectually honest individuals. Faith-based reasoning is not a virtue. Faith as a method is unreliable. It should no longer be tolerated as a justification for anything. . . . We can no longer take obfuscationist philosophy used in defense of the Christian delusion or any other religion seriously.

(Loftus 2016, 113)³

Though it’s not inevitable, Loftus thinks it’s only a matter of time before the curtain is pulled back and the philosophical wizard is revealed for a theological charlatan. Loftus’s reasoning for this conclusion, in our view, leaves much to be desired. But he isn’t alone in rejecting the standard story. Graham Oppy, for instance also rejects it, though his rejection of it is more measured than Loftus’s excessive rhetoric (see Oppy 2019).

Criticisms of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Even if, unlike Loftus, one thinks that the standard story is true—or true enough as a general characterization of an academic field and its practitioners—one could still think that the standard story is problematic as a view about what philosophy of religion ought to be.⁴ Philosophy of religion, after all, is not without its critics.

Among these critics is Nick Trakakis, who argues against analytic philosophy of religion in his provocatively titled book, *The End of Philosophy of Religion*. Analytic philosophy, Trakakis argues, is in a “deep crisis” (Trakakis 2008, 113).⁵ It appears “‘colorless’ and monotonous, even mournful and melancholic in its endlessly futile attempts to render everything rationally comprehensible” (Trakakis 2008, 1). Whereas philosophy ought to, like religion, connect with the “existential and lived dimension” (Trakakis 2008, 115) of life, too often analytic analyses and arguments “quickly become convoluted and technical” (Trakakis 2008, 49). Trying to capture the lived experience of religion in analytic prose renders the material sterile, controlled, and constrained. The overly objective approach, inherited from analytic philosophy’s modeling itself on the supposed objective and neutral approach of science, “cannot come to terms with the mysterious transcendent reality that is disclosed in religious practice” (Trakakis 2008, 2; see also Westphal 1973). Trakakis’s book’s title is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Unlike Loftus, he doesn’t seem to think that philosophy of religion is floundering. But it should end, at least as practiced in its current form:

This kind of philosophy may not, as a matter of historical fact, have come to an end, but a growing awareness of the unduly narrow

ends that can be pursued under its banner, as well as the personal and political dangers involved in the pursuit of such ends, is leading to widespread calls for an end to be finally put to this approach to philosophy.

(Trakakis 2008, 1)

The analytic approach to philosophy is especially problematic in philosophy of religion given that “philosophy of religion is the last place one would expect to find such a disconnect between life and thought, between the lived praxis of faith in the philosophical pursuit of wisdom (*philosophia*)” (Trakakis 2008, 2). Philosophy of religion needs to recognize this disconnect and work to take back engagement with the lived experiences rooted in their wider socioeconomic environment of religious believers (Trakakis 2008, 118).

In an extended review, Timothy Knepper compares to *The End of Philosophy of Religion* to a “Hollywood blockbuster [that] fails to deliver on a provocative title” (Knepper 2014, 123). Knepper agrees that analytic philosophy of religion of the sort that Trakakis is calling for the end of is problematic, primarily because of

the simple fact that philosophy of religion is significantly out of step with, and therefore has very little offer to, one of its parent fields, religious studies. . . . Philosophy of religion can look more like philosophical theology—not a (relatively) religiously neutral examination of reason-giving in the religions of the world, but an overt apologetic for (or against) the reasonableness or value of some particular kind of religion.

(Knepper 2014, 123)⁶

Philosophy of religion, Knepper goes on to argue, is strangely silent when it should be contributing to “cultural-historical diversity among the human acts of religious reason-giving about which it inquires . . . [including fostering] diversity of race, gender, class, and creed among its inquiring community” (Knepper 2014, 123). We return to the issue of diversity below.

Perhaps unsurprisingly given that what you hold in your hands is a book in the philosophy of religion, we don’t find the above objections to philosophy of religion, either individually or collectively, to be unanswerable. However, our goal in the present book isn’t to argue for why philosophy of religion is worth doing. We think arguing for such is a worthy goal, but not our present goal. While we think that philosophy of religion is worth doing, we agree with some of its critics that, even if it ought to continue, certain features of philosophy of religion need to change.

Some think that philosophy of religion is not just problematic in detail, but in whole. What is called ‘philosophy of religion’ isn’t, since it’s not really engaged in philosophical inquiry at all. John Schellenberg

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illustrates this suspicion about specifically Christian philosophy of religion in the following passage:

What Plantinga and Co. are doing is not really philosophy at all, as I have mostly been assuming so far, but rather theology or theological apologetics, on behalf of the Christian community as they understand it, using the tools of philosophy.

(Schellenberg 2009, 100; see also Schellenberg 2019)

And Greg Dawes levels a similar objection:

While the arguments put forward by many Christian philosophers are serious arguments, there is something less than serious about the spirit in which they are being offered. There is a direction in which those arguments will not be permitted to go. Arguments that support the faith will be seriously entertained; those that apparently undermine the faith must be countered, at any cost. Philosophy, to use the traditional phrase, is merely a ‘handmaid’ of theology. There is, to my mind, something frivolous about a philosophy of this sort.

(Dawes 2014; for discussion and criticism of this more general suspicion of philosophy of religion, see Taliaferro and Dressen 2013)

This sort of objection is most often raised against specifically natural theology. We agree that some of the natural theology that is published by Christian philosophers is theologically or apologetically motivated philosophical inquiry. But we don’t think that natural theology is the only proper task in philosophy of religion. As Scott MacDonald has argued, “even if strict natural theology represents an appropriately philosophical manner of reflection on theological matters, it is a mistake to think of it as the only sort of theological reflection open to philosophers” (Macdonald 2009, 20f). Whereas one task of philosophy is justification, another appropriate task is what MacDonald calls clarification. The philosopher of religion engaged in clarification is

not primarily concerned with the epistemic justification of [a particular view]. She is concerned instead with understanding, developing, systematizing, and explaining it. It is possible for her to do all these things without raising the issue of its truth or her justification for holding it. The fact is that a very large part of philosophy has nothing directly to do with the truth or justification of certain theories or propositions. . . . Clarification of theological matters is a legitimate task for the philosopher. Philosophers have not only a justificatory but also a clarificatory role to play in theology. Moreover, given that the nature of clarificatory activities is such that one can engage in them without regard to the epistemic status of the theories one

takes up, it follows that there can be no epistemic restrictions of any sort on the kinds of issues open to philosophical clarification. . . . When the philosopher takes up these kinds of issues with the aim of articulating and developing them, probing their internal coherence, joint consistency, and systematic connections, and exploring their relations to other theological and nontheological doctrines, she will be engaged in appropriately philosophical reflection on specifically Christian theological matters.

(Macdonald 2009, 24f.)⁷

So, if the task is primarily of the clarification of religious belief rather than a justification for it, we don't see an author's commitment to a particular religious tradition (or even opposition to religious belief altogether) as an insurmountable obstacle. It is true that clarification in philosophy of religion should be understood as conditional in nature, where that conditional is 'if a particular religious tradition or doctrine is taken to be true. . . .' Granted, this requires accepting theological evidence within the philosophical approach in question. But we don't see this as ultimately problematic so long as it's done transparently.

The Need to Diversify in Light of Narrowness

Much more problematic, in our view, is a set of objections to contemporary philosophy of religion which hold that the field is too restricted in one or more ways. Here we'll mention four, though we don't think that these are exhaustive. The first, already hinted at in the comments from Knepper but also found in Schilbrack, is that philosophy of religion is too narrow in terms of its engagement with cognate disciplines like religious studies, comparative religion, biblical studies, and historical theology. It's this narrowness that leads scholars in these other areas to disengage from, or never engage with, analytic philosophy of religion. Harriet Harris and Christopher Insole, for instance, write that

theologians are very resistant to engaging in the kind of reflection that analytical philosophers of religion employ. . . . We should not assume that this is due to a sense of threat from philosophy. On the contrary, it is often because philosophers seem to theologians to take an inappropriate approach to the Bible, to religious phenomena[,], or to articles of faith.

(Harris and Insole 2005, 17)

Doing either theology or religious studies well requires engagement with sources, disciplines, and approaches that do not easily lend themselves to analytic analysis. Few analytic philosophers of religion have professional training in these areas. Speaking specifically of Christian philosophers of

religion (and, as we'll see shortly, they're almost all Christian), Alan Torrance writes that the philosopher of religion

is obliged to engage with a book that is full of metaphor, rhetorical plays, and the semantic shifting of everyday concepts, not to mention the kind of counter-intuitive claims and hermeneutical dilemmas that would cause most analytic philosophers to turn to drink. This makes it tempting for theologians to allow the theism of natural theology to condition the distinctively historical character of knowledge of God as we find it presented in the philosophically counter-intuitive testimony of the Old and New Testaments.

(Torrance 2013, 31)

Related here are the claims that philosophers of religion often take problematic, and in some cases naïve, approaches to revealed texts and other theological sources (see Cortez 2013) or that they're insufficiently attentive to the historical nature of the religious faith that they're seeking to engage. Thomas McCall, for instance, says that philosophers working on religious issues are sometimes "naïve with respect to the history of doctrine," particularly an awareness of and sensitivity to the social and intellectual context of those doctrines (McCall 2015, 27; see also Simons 2019, 199).

What it would take to pay attention to religious studies, historical theology, and religious hermeneutics is an even more daunting task when one considers the second way in which contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is too narrow, and that's in terms of the sort of religions (or, in most part, *religion*) that it seeks to engage. We noted how Knepper thinks that contemporary philosophy of religion fails to be sufficiently diverse:

the object of inquiry in any philosophy of religion that has something to offer to the academic study of religion must be religiously diverse—not the religious reason giving of some one religion or type of religion but the religious reason-giving of all religions in so far as this is possible. . . . For philosophers of religion hardly understand anything about human acts of religious reason—given in general their diversities, patterns, deployments, genealogies—if they limit their inquiry to a small subset of the whole. First, philosophers of religion risk mistaking part for the whole.

(Knepper 2014, 125–126)

And the part it has in mind that is too often mistaken for the whole is hardly a shock: Christian theism.⁸ Knepper isn't the only one to raise this criticism about the overly Christian focus of analytic philosophy of religion. Moti Mizrahi recently writes that analytic philosophy of religion "does not pay much attention to religions other than Christianity,

even monotheistic religions other than Christianity, such as Judaism and Islam” (Mizrahi 2019, 3; see also De Cruz and De Smedt 2017; Draper and Nichols 2013; Frankenberry 2004). Knepper notes that in three recent edited collections on philosophy of religion (Peterson and VanAragon 2004; Nagasawa and Wielenberg 2008; Kvanvig 2009), only two of the 88 total entries devote significant attention to religions other than Christianity or Judaism (Knepper 2014, 10 footnote 12; see also Loewen 2015). Even books with entries on Hinduism, Buddhism, and African or Chinese religions, like the *Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion* or Blackwell’s *A Companion to Philosophy of Religion*, are typically overly Christian-centric in terms of the specific topics explored at length (e.g., chapters on resurrection but not reincarnation, or chapters on divine command theory that engage almost exclusively Christian authors despite a robust history of the same issues in Muslim theology). J. Aaron Simmons describes the non-Christian and especially non-theistic perspectives in much philosophy of religion, where these perspectives are found, as usually nothing more than “an add-on to the book . . . rather than a constitutive aspect of the various questions being asked throughout” (Simmons 2019, 199). As Knepper again notes, “given that they are collections in the philosophy of *religion*, their lack of diversity with respect to religious-philosophical commitments is more conspicuous” (Knepper 2014, 10, footnote 12; see also Oppy 2014, 118; Schilbrack 2014; Simmons 2019).

The second kind of narrowness that one finds in the contemporary philosophy of religion can be found in the diversity, or lack thereof, of those who are doing the contemporary work in philosophy of religion. In addition to, as discussed above, being overwhelmingly Christian,⁹ the field of philosophy of religion is overwhelmingly male and even more overwhelmingly white (see Knepper 2014, 10, footnote 12).¹⁰ Contemporary analytic philosophy in general has begun paying more attention to diversity. But philosophy of religion seems to lag behind this general trend. This lack of diversity should not be ignored. Knepper thinks that being unaware of the lack of diversity is more troubling than the lack of diversity (Knepper 2014, 133).

Contemporary philosophy of religion as a whole is also overly cognitive. This isn’t to say that the focus on the rationality of religious beliefs or particular religious doctrines is problematic, nor that any particular author working on these issues is at fault for doing so. Rather, the point is one about the overarching pattern that leaves out important religious practices (see Cottingham 2014, especially ch. 1 and 7). Merold Westphal writes that “the primacy of [the] theoretical reasonable” needs to be challenged, as does the “corollary that our chief end is to collect a pocket full of true propositions about God” (Westphal 2019, 79). Philosophy of religion has been criticized along these lines for tending toward a hyper-intellectualism that doesn’t sufficiently connect with, for instance, religions’ commitment

to spiritual formation, worship, and other practices (for an articulation of and reply to this worry, see Crisp 2017, 165; for related discussions see Wolterstorff 2018; Ebels-Duggan 2019; Simmons 2019).

We take the preceding paragraphs to sufficiently establish a number of ways in which contemporary philosophy of religion is too narrow, even though we think the case for that conclusion is sufficiently obvious for those familiar with the discipline. What might not be as obvious is *why* that narrowness is problematic, if in fact it is. As indicated earlier, we don't think that it's problematic for, say, a white male to write about how a particularly philosophical issue, say the contemporary free will debates, relates to Christian eschatological doctrines. What we think is problematic is the distribution of (or lack thereof) a wide range of authors writing on a maximal spread of religious topics, engaging with a wide variety of religious traditions and related scholarly fields. Harriet A. Harris argues that

the narrow focused and rigour promoted by analytical philosophy reduces the ambition of philosophers of religion. It clips our wings by restricting itself to it what Basil Mitchell . . . calls 'minute philosophy,' philosophy that stays with these topics that can be treated with exemplary clarity into rigour.

(Harris 2005, 101)

Similarly, Eleonore Stump has drawn our attention to the ways that "philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition has tended to leave to one side the messy and complicated issues involved in relations among persons" (Stump 2010, 25). While she agrees with Harris that the focus on rigor restricts its focus to those topics where such rigor can be pursued, she thinks it's misleadingly imprecise to locate the problem simply in such narrowness:

Its cognitive *hemianopia* is its problem. Its intellectual vision is included or secured for the right half of the cognitive field, especially for the part in reality that include the complex, nuanced thought, behavior, and relations of persons. The deficit will perhaps be undetectable in work on modal logic or philosophy of mathematics, but in any issues where the interactions of persons make a difference [like religion] it is more likely to be in evidence.

(Stump 2010, 25)¹¹

Even if the standard story about philosophy of philosophy of religion in the 20th century that we began with is true, things have changed dramatically in the past 50 or 60 years. As J. Aaron Simmons puts it, "today contemporary Christian philosophy is no longer the excluded community within the philosophical mainstream, but instead is now in the position of potentially excluding those who don't fit into its own

self-conception—either of proper Christianity or proper philosophy” (Simmons 2019, 200).

If, as Draper and Nichols argue, group membership can create bias (Draper and Nichols 2013, 430), one way to try and reduce that bias is to increase the range of views held by the group.

Given these forms of narrowness, we think philosophy of religion would benefit from widening or diversification in a number of ways—by bringing more sheep into the fold. Fortunately, that seems to be happening. We understand the present volume to be part of a larger effort to diversify philosophy of religion in light of these forms of narrowness. Specifically, our volume seeks to direct attention to both underrepresented topics and persons within philosophy of religion. In terms of topics, there’s been an almost exclusive focus on what Amber Leigh Griffioen has called ‘proper philosophy of religion,’ relegating ‘anti-orthodox philosophy of religion’ to the fringe.¹² The contemporary scene within philosophy of religion is dominated by classic problems in the discipline such as problems of evil and other arguments against theism, issues of foreknowledge and freedom, the divine attributes, and religious pluralism. We think these traditional issues are important and note our support of further work on them. Nevertheless, these are not the only topics of importance. Other important topics have been left unrepresented or underrepresented in the contemporary literature. “[I]t may be that the primary threat to Christian philosophy today does not come from particular notions of anti-realism or naturalism, but instead from the emergence of potential hegemonic privilege and hermeneutic amnesia within contemporary Christian philosophy itself” (Simmons 2019, 196). This privilege also relates to a need to focus on authors from historically underrepresented groups.¹³ Despite our efforts to help philosophy of religion diversify, we admit that even in this book there are kinds of diversity that are still not present. Methodologically, our volume prioritizes what is often referred to as analytic philosophy. And even though it’s specifically a work in analytic philosophy of religion, it is nevertheless perhaps too limited in terms of its theological assumptions (or, to put the point a slightly different way, perhaps too little explicit attention is paid to those assumptions). Our list of contributors is also too heavily American/European, and thus interacting almost exclusively with Western theological traditions (and especially the Christian tradition). Our book isn’t intended to do everything that is needed. In fact, no single volume could do all that needs to be done. Nevertheless, it’s intended to be a part of this larger trajectory that we endorse. We must start somewhere.

The Present Volume

This brings us to what we *do* cover in this volume. The volume is divided into five sections. The first section addresses philosophical methodology

within philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. The second section is about religious epistemology and experience. The third and fourth sections cover the place of non-human animals and disability in philosophical theology, respectively. The fifth and final section address issues of sex (including reproduction), gender, and race.

In Chapter 1, Helen De Cruz leads off by exploring how intersectionality affects the practice of philosophy of religion, which is obviously related to the issue of narrowness of perspectives mentioned above. To do this, De Cruz conducted a study with 12 people in two focus groups, all of whom are academic philosophers of religion. Drawing from the APA's Directory of Philosophers from Underrepresented Groups, De Cruz selected philosophers whose identities are in some way marginalized within academic philosophy generally and philosophy of religion more specifically. Those identities include Jewish, Muslim, Mormon, queer, trans*, woman, Latinx, African American, and Asian American from the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Germany. Her focus group studies show not only that personal life experiences sparked interest and provided continued motivation to work in philosophy of religion, but also that the participants experienced significant *exclusion* within philosophy of religion. For example, some religious minorities report that they modify their presentations for a predominantly Christian audience. As De Cruz argues, the underrepresentation problem in philosophy of religion affects not only those who are underrepresented. It can also serve to explain why the sociological borders of philosophy of religion have failed to expand.

Michelle Panchuk's chapter takes its cues from De Cruz's empirical work and charts an expanded vision for philosophy of religion. Whereas traditional philosophy of religion has, like most of philosophy, shown a strong preference (if not a mandate) for a purportedly 'objective' methodology in which the philosopher is fully dispassionate and uninvested, Panchuk argues such an approach isn't feasible. In fact, that practice routinely privileges cisgender, heterosexual, middle-class, able-bodied, white, Christian, and male points of view. She draws on feminist theories of epistemic oppression to show how implicit attitudes and epistemically exclusionary practices harm both communities and the quest for philosophical knowledge. For example, philosophical discussions of race and gender often mention historical abuses of these groups, and 'solutions' proposed to these practices are often highly politicized. When, for example, a philosopher of religion who is also African American defends their view on how these wrongs should be righted, only to have their views subjected to further doctrinal tests from a predominantly white audience, they risk appearing as biased or emotionally invested if they defend their oppressed status or a theological proposal for relieving it. In other words, they appear as if they (but not their interlocutors) are *failing* to occupy the dispassionate view from nowhere. Panchuk writes (56),

If those who are not cisgender, straight, able-bodied, white, Christian men are more likely to be seen as not occupying that view, as especially emotional and especially biased, then it follows that members of underrepresented groups in the profession are most likely to be in a position where they feel the need to smother their own testimony.

In order for philosophy of religion to progress, it must include more non-dominant voices. Panchuk recommends making room for those voices by changing how philosophy is done. Instead of privileging an objective view from nowhere, we should recognize that this is unachievable by fallible beings who can scarcely escape their own epistemic positioning. Not only should we show epistemic humility in the face of our finitude, we should actively *embrace* non-dominant perspectives and assign a higher credence to them than we would otherwise. We should do this because the epistemic condition of those in privileged groups tends to *lessen* their knowledge by depriving them of other valuable perspectives. By widening the epistemic ‘in-group,’ we widen the knowledge that comes with it. Thus, Panchuk argues we should do philosophy “with the whole self” (73).

In Chapter 3, Kirk Lougheed opens the section on religious epistemology and experience. Despite considerable work on the epistemology of religious experience (Alston 1991; Moser 2008), issues of epistemic injustice have received comparatively little attention. Lougheed’s chapter works to begin filling that gap. Following Miranda Fricker (2007), Lougheed contends that testimonial injustice “occurs when a testifier is given less credibility in her report about proposition P than is (epistemically) deserved” due to her inclusion in “a certain social group” (80). Women, for example, are members of a particular social group and their testimony often receives less credibility than it deserves, as Panchuk has already observed. This not only empowers members of dominant social groups, but *harms* those of less dominant (including oppressed) groups. Similarly, hermeneutical injustice occurs “when someone lacks the conceptual resources to fully understand her experiences because of the social group to which she belongs” (82). Lougheed then introduces readers to religious experience. He argues that intuitive knowledge is both possible in the context of religious experience and counts as evidence for religious beliefs. Using two fictional examples of otherwise credible persons whose history includes religious experiences, Lougheed claims that it would be presumptively irrational *not* to trust them.

Lougheed then invites us to consider common epistemic practices in the educated West. Theists, or at least those who claim a history of religious experience, often have their testimony rebuffed in those contexts. He cites Christopher Hitchens, Daniel Dennett, and Richard Dawkins as examples of persons who are *dismissive*—indeed, often *preemptively* dismissive—of religious persons and their testimonies. These individuals have their testimonies dismissed *because* they are members of a particular

social group. Yet these individuals are often otherwise credible. Without a defeater for their testimony, Lougheed argues, the New Atheists and others are committing epistemic injustices. Moreover, Lougheed argues that even if someone is justified in believing that naturalism is true, which precludes the possibility of certain kinds of veridical religious experience, the general credibility of those who testify to having religious experiences is still *evidence* for the propositions supported by those experiences and should be treated as such. The tendency to dismiss testimony of religious experience out of hand fails to treat such experience as evidence.

The next chapter, by Joshua Cockayne, advocates a particular and oft-ignored kind of religious experience: olfaction. Contemporary accounts of religious experience prioritize seeing and hearing (Alston 1991; James 1902); Cockayne's chapter reveals a rich history of the use of smell in religious experience. As Cockayne observes, accounting for smell is an important feature of any exhaustive epistemology of religious experience since it includes experiences from social groups whose testimonies often receive little uptake in many religious settings. As an example, he cites the testimony of an autistic individual who expressed excitement at the prospect of smelling Jesus—a prospect others found surprising. After reviewing both ancient and contemporary views of the place of olfaction within religious experience, Cockayne draws on work by Adam Green (2009) to argue that “ordinary sense perception (seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and, indeed, smelling) should be thought of as providing opportunities for indirect, but non-metaphorical experiences of God” (98). As a model of this, Cockayne applies N. Russell Hanson's (2002) and Michael Rea's (2018) accounts of *seeing-as*. According to Cockayne, even if a person's background beliefs and other cognitive states incline them to interpret certain experiences as perceptions of God, this can and does ‘count’ as an indirect, non-metaphorical experience of God. He argues:

An ultrasound technician, in virtue of her training, sees a blob on a screen as the leg of an unborn child. . . . Just as the training of the ultrasound technician means that her various background beliefs and other cognitive states incline her to have certain experiences *as* perceptions of arms and legs of fetuses, a person with the relevant cognitive states might perceive an internal sense, an audible voice, or a beautiful sunset as an experience *as* perceptions of God.

(113)

The technician's experience of the fetus, while indirect, is clearly non-metaphorical. She does not experience the blob as a metaphor for a fetus in the same way that someone might experience a crown as a metaphor for Queen Elizabeth II. Similarly, the smell of incense during Mass might serve not simply as a metaphor for God, but an indirect experience of God, even if the experiencing subject's background beliefs and

experiences play a role in how they perceive the incense. As Cockayne argues, “one benefit of this account is that it leaves room for the kind of subjectivity (or subject dependency) of religious experience” (115). It’s also inclusive of more kinds of religious experience, as the example with the autistic’s comments about smell shows.

In Chapter 5, Joshua Blanchard offers a Jewish perspective on ‘divine reversals’: cases in which God appears to take the side of ‘the enemy’ in response to injustices committed against them. This runs counter to the typical theme of God standing alongside the Israelites in battle and in their quest for the Promised Land. The Hebrew Scriptures, however, clearly show both possibilities. For example, God appears to promise land to the Israelites only to side *against* them in battle and deliver the land to the Babylonians. The lesson, Blanchard claims, is that “correctness about doctrine and morals can be pulled apart from not just divine favor but also real relationship and covenantal standing, even divine favor and standing *with respect to those very matters that one is correct about*” (131), which has interesting implications in a number of places in contemporary philosophy of religion in addition to debates over political and theological Zionism. In the debate about Christian sexual ethics, for example, even if a conservative position is true, it might also be true “that, *for the time being* and even for quite a while, God not only permits but sanctifies alternative models that serve the underlying values” for human love and sexuality in the first place (133). To illustrate: if God’s plan for love and sexuality includes, as an essential goal, that love persist despite trials and tribulations, then oppression against gay love might result in God *legitimizing* that love for a time. Although far from settling these issues, Blanchard’s essay poses the unsettling possibility that even the theologically clearheaded might be confronted with a God who sides against them in cases where they are “failing to live in ways that reflect the values that undergird the very idea that one is right about” (135). Perhaps this is why, as some have argued, it is not enough to be right but to be ‘right about being right’ or to be ‘right in the right way.’ Blanchard’s conclusion could thus put constraints on how we ought to engage in philosophy of religion.

Even a cursory glance at the major issues in contemporary philosophy of religion and philosophical theology reveals an anthropocentric bias. Humans are at the forefront our research. Non-human animals (hereafter ‘animals,’ even though this shouldn’t be taken to imply that humans are not animals) have been discussed only at the periphery, particularly with respect to the problem of evil. The two major contemporary philosophical monographs on animals, for example, have focused exclusively on the problem of evil (Murray 2008; Dougherty 2014). Fortunately, animals are the subject of increased attention. Dustin Crummett’s chapter, “Eschatology for Creeping Things (and Other Animals),” introduces the book’s section on animals. This paper builds on Crummett’s prior work

on animals within philosophy of religion (Crummett 2017), where he argued that traditional philosophers of religion have ignored the suffering of insects, which (controversially) he argues have a morally relevant kind of well-being. In this chapter, Crummett reviews six arguments for animal universalism, the thesis that all animals with interests will receive eternal, infinitely good afterlives. According to the Beneficence Argument, which Crummett defends, moral agents (including God) have a presumptive obligation to benefit others, especially when there's no moral cost to doing so. Since providing animals with eternal, infinitely good afterlives would benefit them, God is obligated to save them from death and bring them to heaven (or someplace just as good). This is Crummett's primary, original contribution to the defense of animal universalism.

Crummett then considers a handful of other arguments, arguing that most of them are either implausible or are insufficiently attentive to the diversity of animals such that the argument doesn't establish animal *universalism*. For example, he argues that the Harm Avoidance Argument (Graves, Hereth, and John 2017) fails because it's unclear that all animals are harmed by their premature deaths. Crummett also argues that the Compensation Argument, according to which God is obligated to bring all animals to heaven because they have suffered unjustly in the world (Murray 2008; Hereth 2018), fails to establish animal universalism. The argument fails, he argues, because God is obligated *only* to provide enough of a good afterlife to suffering animals that their earthly harms are sufficiently compensated. Eternal, infinitely good afterlives go beyond that, so they aren't required. Despite what Crummett believes are the failings of these arguments, he argues that both his Beneficence Argument and two other arguments—the Divine Love Argument and a modified Relationship Argument—jointly make a powerful case for animal universalism.

In Chapter 7, Faith Glavey Pawl explores the possibility that animals might share human awareness of the divine. To show this, she reviews the long history of theists, particularly Christian theists, who have held that humans are aware of God's existence and attributes. She considers two models for thinking about human awareness of God: propositional knowledge and what Eleonore Stump calls "Franciscan knowledge" (Stump 2010). We acquire perceptual knowledge in cases where we have direct, presentational knowledge of something, such as a chair or the presence of a person in the room. But we have Franciscan knowledge, or knowledge of persons, when we have knowledge-by-acquaintance. Pawl uses Frank Jackson's famous example of Mary, the color-blind scientist, to illustrate this kind of knowledge:

If poor Mary had been locked in a prison with only third-person descriptions of other people for her whole life, but had never had a face-to-face contact with anyone, she would not know anyone *as*

a person. No amount of propositional knowledge gained from biographical sources could suffice for Mary to know her own mother in the way she would know her if she were to encounter her face to face. (166)

After exploring reasons for skepticism of animal awareness of God, Pawl defends an argument from analogy. She argues,

1. The God of Christian theism is personal and desires to be known and loved by God's creatures.
 2. Loving and knowing God both require some awareness of God.
 3. Humans are able to know and love God because God has endowed them with capacities that allow them to be aware of God (or God's activity in the world), and because God communicates Godself to them in ways suited to their capacities.
 4. There are animal analogs of those human capacities which are tied to awareness of God.
- (C) Thus, we should expect that animals endowed with such capacities can have awareness of God.

(173)

Animals, therefore, likely have Franciscan knowledge of God—a knowledge of God's person. This is distinct from, and does not entail, that animals have propositional knowledge of God, since they may not understand propositions at all any more than young human children do. Yet young human children know their parents in some sense. Pawl then defends a further claim: that animals who are aware of God might direct praise to God. “Why *not* think,” she asks, “that sentient creatures, especially ones with rich capacities for social cognition, can relate to God in a way that involves their capacities for social connection?” (175). She concludes with some applications of animal knowledge of and communion with God, one of the most interesting of which is her contention that some of the contemporary literature on the problem of animal suffering is lacking in speculative depth: “But if I am right that some animals are capable of experiencing communion with God in *this* life,” then perhaps “we can come up with better stories” about animal suffering (179).

The concluding entry on animals is Blake Hereth's “Animal Gods.” Hereth defends the view that some non-human animals *are* divine, and warns that if zootheism is true “then a lack of attention to non-human animals within philosophical theology is not only a glaring omission but an *impious* one,” since it reflects an improper exclusion of divine individuals (183). Ze distinguishes zootheism from zoomorphism, the view that some divine person(s) appear as animals (as Zeus did), and zoolatry, where some animals are worshipped or worthy of worship irrespective of their divinity status. Hereth proceeds to endorse Anselmian theism, or

perfect being theology, according to which God is maximally perfect. Ze then offers two arguments for an Anselmian-motivated zootheist view: the Power Argument and the Incarnation Argument. According to the former, God's moral perfection entails maximal fairness which is a presumption of shared power among those with interests, including animals. If a divine person exists but no animal is a divine person, then divine persons have decisive power over animal interests, which is less than maximally fair. Thus, either there are no divine persons or there are divine animals. Thus, if theism is true, then zootheism is true. Hereth concludes this argument by remarking that "it's not enough for [divine animals] to exist *contingently* within the Godhead, for contingent membership in the Godhead is contingent power in the Godhead and contingent power is contingent maximal fairness" (189). Thus, according to Hereth, "animal members must enjoy *necessary* membership in the Godhead and share eternally in the Godhead's power" (189).

The second argument Hereth gives for zootheism, the Incarnation Argument, aligns with the one popular strand of thinking about the Christian Incarnation that God became incarnate principally to share in human suffering to demonstrate their love and solidarity with us (Anselm 1998; Swinburne 1994; McCord Adams 2008). Hereth also approvingly cites black liberation theologian James Cone (2018, 128), that God incarnates principally to identify with the suffering of the oppressed, and reviews recent attempts to argue that this includes suffering alongside animals (Creegan 2013, 60; Clough 2013, 81–82). Ze argues that these thinkers are mistaken to reject animal incarnations, and that there's something problematic about a God who takes on the flesh of humans to share in their suffering but declines to incarnate as the animals that humans routinely oppress. Hereth argues that just "as the world needs not only a white savior but a *black* savior, so also the world needs not only a human savior but an *animal* savior" (197). Having motivated an animal incarnation, ze reviews three ways this might occur, defending one. On the Appearance View, God merely appears as an animal without becoming one. On the Transformation View, preincarnate God isn't an animal but becomes one. And on the Preexistence View, God was always an animal but comes to join the earthly world in its suffering. Hereth rejects both the Appearance View and the Transformation View in favor of the Preexistence View, which ze argues entails zootheism. Thus, if the Incarnation Argument succeeds, then zootheism is established.

The next three chapters engage issues related to disability in philosophy of religion. The first two chapters in this section seek to show disability too needs to be given a more prominent place in philosophy of religion. Leading off is David Efrid's "The Resurrection of the Minority Body: Physical Disability in the Life of Heaven." Assuming the traditional account of the resurrection of the body in Christian theology, Efrid argues that there are no reasons that all physical disabilities would need to be

eliminated in heaven, what Efrid calls ‘the elimination view,’ despite the history of Christian reflection on the topic typically assuming that the elimination view is true. Efrid begins by drawing on the work of Elizabeth Barnes, who argues that physical disabilities are ‘mere-differences’ rather than ‘bad-differences.’ While there may be some physical disabilities that involve ‘bad-difference’—Efrid suggests that disabilities that involve so much pain that they prevent a person from experiencing God in the ways involved in heaven—it’s not the case that all physical disabilities involve ‘bad-difference.’ Since not all physical disabilities detract from a person’s well-being, there’s no reason that they would need to be removed for the perfection of human flourishing in heaven.

On Efrid’s view, God has no reason to need to eliminate all physical disabilities for the life in the world to come. They could be, as he puts it, “minority bodies in heaven” (213). While disability might shape a person’s practical identity, the existence of acquired disabilities shows that not all disabilities are part of a person’s metaphysical (or numerical) identity. But Efrid also thinks that God wouldn’t retain all physical disabilities, even if they involve positive and not just neutral differences, unilaterally. Efrid favors what he calls ‘the optionality view’ in which God gives those who have physical disabilities in their early lives the option of retaining or eliminating those disabilities in their heavenly lives. Efrid gives three reasons why a person could reasonably choose to retain their physical disability, including as a sign of their love for and union with God despite the trials of their early life.

Kevin Timpe’s contribution also looks at the presence of disability in heaven. Elsewhere, Timpe has argued, like Efrid does in the present volume, that there could be ‘mere-difference’ disabilities in heaven (Timpe 2020). Since our theological beliefs about disability can shape religious communities’ behavior toward individuals with disabilities, the view that disabilities can’t be present in heaven sometimes contributes to religious communities not fully welcoming and valuing disabled individuals at present. Here, in “Disabled Beatitude,” Timpe examines positive reasons for thinking that there not only *can be* but *will be* disabilities present in the beatific vision. Theologians Nancy Eiesland and Amos Yong have argued that the Incarnation, and particularly the retained scars Jesus had in the resurrection, support that there will be disabilities in heaven. Timpe argues, however, that their arguments only support that the marks of disability will be present, and that the presence of the marks of disability doesn’t entail that the disabilities are still present. Instead, Timpe finds other reasons to affirm heavenly disability. Though not decisive, the social nature of disability identity and disability pride suggest certain corporate goods that could contribute to the goodness of heaven. He then suggests that there are goods related to a number of specific disabilities (e.g., Williams syndrome and autism) that could contribute positively to the goodness of heaven. He also considers some general features of human embodiment that God had

good reason to instill in creation but which also make disability possible. There are numerous kinds of human diversity that plausibly contribute to the goodness of creation; thinking that of those kinds of diversity disability can't contribute to the perfection of heaven is rooted in normative biases that presume all disabilities involve bad-difference.

The closing chapter for the section on disability is Scott Williams's "When Personhood Goes Wrong in Ethics and Philosophical Theology: Disability, Ableism, and (Modern) Personhood." Williams's essay is as much an exploration of *how* conceptions of personhood go wrong as *when* they go wrong. He carefully reviews the history of moral philosophers, particularly John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Mary Anne Warren, whose views on personhood exclude those with profound cognitive disability. Such views, argues Williams, are "obviously and deeply morally disturbing" (272), though he concedes that some might regard the exclusion of fetuses as less obviously problematic than the exclusion of the cognitively disabled. He then offers two arguments against these conceptions of personhood, the first of which he calls the Moral Shift Argument: if modern conceptions of moral personhood are true, then profoundly cognitively disabled human beings aren't equal members of the moral community, which is false. Williams thinks this argument has gained traction in recent years and has been defended at length by philosophers like Eva Feder Kittay (2016). The reason for excluding the cognitively disabled is grounded in a putatively 'moral' preference for non-disabled lives, and that preference, so Williams and Kittay argue, is a preference for 'normal' (i.e., non-disabled) human lives, which is objectionable. Williams's second argument, which he calls the Argument against Exclusive Moral Personhood, is more complex than the first. In it, he argues that Warren (and, one assumes, all those who agree with her assessment or who advocate similar positions) has a good reason for the exclusive association of modern personhood with direct moral status only if her conception of a person is self-evident. But it's *not* self-evident. There's no fine-grained analysis of personhood, making her conception neither clear nor distinct. Furthermore, the modern conception of personhood is at best a relatively recent minority position (277).

After defending these two arguments at length, Williams contends that philosophy of religion is rife with Warren-type views of personhood. Developments in Social Trinitarianism in the 19th and 20th centuries, for example, create models of personhood on which "incommunicable mental powers (e.g., intellect and will)" and "incommunicable mental acts, including higher-order cognitive acts" are essential to personhood, thereby excluding those incapable of performing higher-order cognitive acts (285). It's here, in Williams's view, that philosophy of religion has taken bad cues from contemporary ethics. Can talk of personhood be saved, in Williams's view? The answer, he thinks, is 'no': "Personhood, modern or Boethian, is bad for ethics and unnecessary for conciliar Christian theology" (288). We should disavow it.

In addition to bringing philosophy of religion into greater interaction with non-human animals and disability, this volume also seeks to engage issues related to sex and gender. In Chapter 12, Stephen T. Davis and Eric T. Yang raise a provocative and underexplored question within philosophical theology: “Marriage, Reproduction, and the Incarnation: What Could Jesus Do?” Despite popular-level speculation about whether Jesus ever married or reproduced, the topic has attracted surprisingly little philosophical attention. Davis and Yang distinguish between two questions at the outset. The first is whether it’s *morally impermissible* for an incarnate God to marry, have sex, or reproduce. The second is whether it’s *overall unfitting* for an incarnate God to do this. As they point out, surprisingly, “no academic scholar has offered an argument for the moral impermissibility of Christ” marrying or procreating (294). Davis and Yang defend the view that although Christ marrying or procreating while incarnate passes the permissibility test, it would fail the overall fittingness test. ‘Fittingness,’ in the relevant sense, is a matter of whether engaging in a behavior “would bring about a greater number of desired effects” (302). Actions that satisfy this condition are overall fitting, and actions that fail to satisfy the condition aren’t overall fitting. The likely effects of Christ marrying, having sex, or reproducing include idolatrously elevated statuses for Christ’s partner and children and a denigration of “those who are single or without children” (305). These effects are not only negative, but have such a negative valence that they tip the scales of fittingness toward overall unfitting. Davis and Yang argue that because God will do what is overall fitting, it follows that in the Incarnation God wouldn’t marry, have sex, or reproduce, even though such actions would be permissible for God.

The next chapter, by Kelli D. Potter, critiques Mormon theologies of gender through a transfeminist lens. She points out that Mormonism is theologically and philosophically interesting due to its materialist commitments about the nature of God, who is claimed to be embodied. A further commitment of Mormon theology, clarified in “The Family: A Proclamation to the World” (1995), is that gender “is an essential characteristic of individual premortal, mortal, and eternal identity and purpose” (316). Each human being, on this view, has exactly one definite gender and has both essentially and eternally. Potter argues that this view is central to orthodox Mormon theology because it underpins their view that “[h]uman beings are Gods in embryo and part of being a God is being in a procreative, heterosexual, and eternal marriage” (317). If one’s gender could change, or if there could be non-binary genders, this view would be undermined since then some marriages would be either non-heterosexual or only temporarily heterosexual. The implications, she argues, are clear:

Moreover, a member of the church that was assigned ‘female’ at birth might come out as a trans man and petition to be ordained

to the priesthood. This is very dangerous because it threatens the LDS Church's patriarchal system of governance. It seems clear that the LDS commitments to patriarchy, heteronormativity, and cis-normativity are intertwined. The latter two are a necessary condition for maintaining the patriarchy, which gives cis-het men the power to control the direction of the church.

(317)

But, Potter argues, the possibility of trans persons doesn't undermine the theology of the Proclamation. The fact that a person can be embodied as male, for example, doesn't entail that their spirit isn't female. This possibility has not escaped the attention of Mormon theologians; but Potter argues that their 'solutions' are implausible. They could claim, for example, that there *can't* be a mismatch between one's gender and one's biological sex. The fact that such an obvious reply hasn't been given is indicative, she argues, that "the homophobic and sexist tail is wagging the theological dog" (319). The problem, Potter contends, is not "whether to accept or reject the language of the Proclamation," but rather "whether there is a non-arbitrary rationale for interpreting it in an anti-trans manner" (325).

In Chapter 14, Hilary Yancey defends the view that gender will persist in any just afterlife. She pits herself at odds with some philosophers, such as Sally Haslanger (2000, 2012), who defend the view that just societies can't contain women or men as genders. What gender presently is, on Haslanger's view, is a way of being marked for privilege or subordination due to particular bodily features—typically the ones used for reproduction. Yancey locates her project within philosophical theology by asking whether *resurrected* persons will be gendered. Contrary to Haslanger and others, Yancey argues that it's a *requirement* of justice that resurrected persons sometimes be gendered. First, she argues that gendered oppression is both real, systemic, and severe. Persons are wronged because of their gender. This is an uncontroversial commitment between Yancey and Haslanger. Second, the victims of identity prejudice must bear their gendered properties when they receive the moral rectification they are due, since "they must be capable of recognizing themselves as the participants in the injustices that they suffered, so as to fully experience the restoration of justice" (335). Yancey's defense of this claim is further supported by the fact that if sexists were forced to make amends with their victims but knew their victims were no longer gendered, they could view their good deeds as not being directed to women but to genderless persons—an outcome consistent with their normative sexist ends. Yancey concludes her chapter with an examination of whether gender is accidental or essential, exploring how resurrection justice works under either possibility.

David Worsley's chapter "Limbo, Hiddenness, and the Beatific Vision (and Procreation, for Some, in the Life to Come)" continues the volume's

engagement with eschatological issues in philosophy of religion. Worsley engaged with previous work by Timpe (2015) which provides a philosophical argument for limbo as an alternative eschatological option in addition to heaven and hell. (The limbo advocated by Timpe is importantly different than the limbo often found in Catholic theology.) Worsley follows Eleonore Stump and argues that persons must exercise higher-order desires to cooperate with God so that God can remove the stain of original sin, in order to be fit for admittance into heaven. However, Worsley also thinks that the stain of original sin, apart from the guilt of unrepented mortal sin, isn't sufficient for deserving hell. Limbo is offered as an option precisely for those who die with the stain of original sin but without unrepented moral sin. Since some individuals die without *any* higher-order desires, it might appear that they are all consigned to limbo for the eschaton. But this appearance, Worsley argues, is misleading. He argues that *everyone* will eventually leave limbo because God will grant each 'Limbonian' the higher-order desires necessary to gain entrance either to heaven or hell. However, to preserve creaturely freedom, it's also necessary on Worsley's view that "God must remain (at least partially) hidden, such that [they] are not determined to desire divine union" (351). We ought to expect a certain degree of divine hiddenness not only in the present life, but in limbo. The Beatific Vision, for all its wonderfulness, entails *full* knowledge of God, and such knowledge would exclude rational reasons for choosing against God. Worsley then raises two other theological implications of limbo, so understood. The first is that given the possibility of redemption for limbonians and the centrality of the incarnation is securing the possibility of redemption, we have reason to think there could be another incarnation in limbo. Second, if incarnation requires an incarnational birth, we also have reason to think endorse the possibility of procreation in heaven. Thus, procreation is possible in limbo.

The volume closes with a call for philosophy of religion, and specifically Christian philosophy of religion, to address issues related to race. Sameer Yadav begins "Religious Racial Formation Theory and Its Metaphysics: A Research Program in the Philosophy of Religion" by arguing that "if we are going to understand and evaluate the merits of an intersection between Christian group identity and various forms of racism, what is needed is a research program" (365). But the resources for developing such a research program are "strewn across the landscape of many distinct academic disciplines, lacking any integrated framework that might coordinate them" (365). Rather than offering a substantive theory of the intersection between race and the Christian religion, Yadav seek to gather these three distinct disciplinary contributions—sociohistorical, philosophical, and normative-theological—into a single integrated explanatory framework (366). He accordingly seeks to provide what Nathaniel Goldberg calls a "conceptual cartography" by

which to understand a religious racial formation theory (366). Such a theory, however, can't be determinate apart from a specification of its underlying metaphysic that determines what social categories like 'Christianity' and 'race' are. Philosophers of religion thus need not only to engage in social ontology but also explore how approaches to social reality have historically led to the racist attitudes that infect so much Christian, and particularly white evangelical, culture. Yadav's chapter illustrates the need for interdisciplinary work that the criticisms of much extant philosophy of religion, as discussed above, call for.

As mentioned above, these essays merely contribute to the task of expanding the current exploratory boundaries within analytic philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. More is certainly needed, and we commend further work on both these and other topics. There is much growing to be done, but development must begin somewhere. Our hope is that this volume, and the essays within it, are in service to a larger movement within religious philosophy that amplifies issues and voices that have been historically both unheard or misheard.¹⁴

Notes

1. One of use has endorsed the standard story elsewhere; see Speak and Timpe 2016; Timpe 2009.
2. J. Aaron Simmons suggests that the rise of philosophy of religion also correlates with the increased political and cultural capital of evangelicalism, particularly in the American context.
3. Though not fans of contemporary philosophy of religion, Paul Draper and Ryan Nichols claim that attempts to end philosophy of religion are "misguided" and "arguably . . . pathological" (2013, 438). More on their objections to contemporary philosophy of religion below.
4. This is the view of Schellenberg 2019; Moser 2019, who seem to endorse the standard story but think the developments at the heart of that story have not been beneficial.
5. To be fair, Trakakis aims his critique at what he thinks are the excesses of philosophy of religion, not philosophy of religion per se. There is, in his view, a proper role for analytic philosophy of religion to play.
6. In the conclusion, Knepper continues:

If philosophy of religion is supposed to be philosophy *about* religion, then neither continental nor analytic philosophy of religion is philosophy of religion. Rather, they are, at best, philosophies of narrow subsets of religion (religionized postmodernism and Christian theism, respectively); at worse, theological efforts at understanding and defending those subsets (that more closely resemble philosophical or apologetic theology).

(2014, 144)

7. Compare clarification to what Gary Gutting refers to as

the process of persuasive elaboration[:] . . . a matter of working with a set of ideas or claims and developing them . . . all for the sake of showing

their interest and power. In short, it's a matter of showing what we can *do* with certain ideas.

(Gutting 2009, 89)

8. There are, of course, exceptions such as Harrison 2010; Oppy 2019; Kapitan 2009. But these are, as the saying goes, the exceptions that prove the rule.
9. "Exacerbating the problem at the group level is the fact that the vast majority of philosophers in English-speaking world who specialize in philosophy of religion are theists—remarkably, just over 70 percent according to recent studies" (Draper and Nichols 2013, 440; citing De Cruz 2012; Bourget and Chalmers 2009). Dissenting here, Paul Moser argues that Christian philosophy isn't Christian enough, with practitioners of supposedly Christian philosophy tending to

omit the crucified Christ, as an actual person, from their philosophy, despite the indispensable role of the term 'Christ' in the term 'Christian'. . . . We find no definitive role for the crucified Christ as God's supreme mediator and Savior for humans and their 'advice' [obviously a reference to Plantinga]. So, we seem to be left with some kind of 'mere theism' that falls short of being 'Christian.'

(Moser 2019, 210)

10. Notice that the literature we've cited thus far, which we take represents a representative sampling of contemporary philosophy of religion, is written by scholars who are overwhelmingly male and even more uniformly white. And this is to say nothing of their sexual orientation, gender identity, disability status, etc.
11. Stump's own preferred method to correcting this cognitive *hemianopia* is to rediscover narrative.
12. Personal communication. In using this terminology, Griffioen is reporting the way that many in the discipline view the boundaries of 'properness,' not defending that use.
13. In her contribution to this volume Helen De Cruz talks about the need to specifically commission minority perspectives in philosophy of religion; we put together our contributors to do just this.
14. We are grateful for helpful comments from and discussions with Michelle Panchuk and Aaron Simmons about this introduction.

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