A NAVY SECOND TO NONE: The History of U.S. Naval Training in World War I

MICHAEL D. BESCH

GREENWOOD PRESS

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Contributions in Military Studies, Number 215

GREENWOOD PRESS
Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Besch, Michael D., 1949–
A Navy second to none : the history of U.S. naval training in World War I / by Michael D. Besch.
p. cm.—(Contributions in military studies, ISSN 0883–6884 ; no. 215)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–313–31909–X (alk. paper)
1. United States. Navy—History—World War, 1914–1918. 2. Sailors—Training of—United States. 3. Naval education—United States—History—20th century. I. Title. II. Series.
D589.U6 B39 2002
940.4'5973—dc21 2001031530

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001031530
ISBN: 0–313–31909–X
ISSN: 0883–6884

First published in 2002

Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.greenwood.com

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Preface

If one were to gather any moderately well-informed assembly of individuals and question them about the American Navy in World War I, it is likely that, after a few blank stares, most would make reference either to the anti-U-boat war or the immense accomplishment of transporting the American Army to and from Europe. It is most unlikely that any of our hypothetical group would mention education or training. Yet where men were actively engaged, in terms of sheer importance to the success of the two previously mentioned campaigns, no endeavor was as great or as successful.

In researching this vast and fascinating subject on American naval education and training for World War I, several themes presented themselves. It is first of all a story of people—"characters" if you will. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels has been vilified and praised. Was he the incompetent antiwar, pacifist bungler portrayed by Bradley Fiske and William Sims?[1] Or was he the great builder, educator, and democratizer who created the modern navy we know today? The role of Daniels is central, but what of the other major figures in the navy—Fiske, Sims, Henry Mayo, and William Benson, the first chief of naval operations? What roles were played by these men in the training process? Did Woodrow Wilson or the young assistant secretary of the navy Franklin Roosevelt, provide any sense of direction? As the story unfolds, what will become apparent is the distinct lack of input from these major figures and the concomitant vital roles played by lesser figures—by captains and commanders, by minor admirals and district commandants, by ensigns and lieutenants.

The story is not only that of the officers. The memoirs, diaries, letters, and newspaper and magazine stories of the common seamen and officer trainees,

nurses, chaplains, and support personnel provide a richness, depth, and personal meaning to the fabric of the tale not present in the mass of circular orders and memos of the naval establishment.

The second theme in this work is the question of the navy's preparedness for the war. Although it was generally recognized that the navy was better prepared than the army in 1917, was everything in place? Just what had been planned? What steps had been taken? Furthermore, were those steps the right ones given the unusual nature of this brutal war—particularly with submarines, aircraft, and long-range naval weapons? The importance of the Naval Preparedness Act of 1916 cannot be overstated. Yet, as the events unfolded, the shortcomings—even shortsightedness—of the act became increasingly apparent. One key example will suffice. The act provided for a significant increase in the number of ships, from 340 to 497—an increase of 46 percent—yet did not address sufficiently either the recruiting or training of men to staff man these ships.[2]

This leads to the third consideration of this study: Just what was the basic nature of the planning and execution of the myriad training and educational activities that the navy undertook in the brief period between 1917 and 1918? Describing and evaluating this complicated training establishment is perhaps the major undertaking of the ensuing pages. The magnitude of the task is evidenced by a brief, cursory look at some of the numbers involved. In 1912, there were 3,094 officers and 47,515 enlisted men in the navy. In July 1916 this had grown to 4,293 officers and 54,234 enlisted men. In July 1917 the numbers had ballooned to 8,038 officers and 171,133 men, and by war's end, 32,474 officers and 497,030 enlisted men served in the naval forces of the United States.[3]

A fourth theme seen surfacing at various points in the texture of this story is the sense that many of the "old" elements of warfare experienced yet one more flowering—never to be seen again. Although privateering in the traditional sense disappeared for all practical purposes with the Confederate Navy in the Civil War, a vestige of that pursuit reappeared in the form of wealthy yacht owners donating their ships and crews to the navy to be armed and converted to fighting ships. The *Corona, Admiral, Cherokee, Carolla IV*, and *Corsair* were but five examples of such ships. Along with this "old war" trait came the practice of well-to-do men pursuing and receiving commissions on the basis of their wealth and social standing. This practice was under constant attack by the Bureau of Navigation and Secretary Daniels himself, yet it occurred in many instances.

Public support of American forces in time of war is neither an "old" element nor absent even today. However, the nature of that support in World War I was distinctly different. The donation of land, equipment, facilities, and services has almost no subsequent parallel. Henry Ford donated a huge farm in New Jersey. William Wrigley not only donated the airplanes and equipment to form the first aviation school at Great Lakes, Illinois, but also funded the entire operation of the school for the first two years of its existence. Men still held a myopic romanticism toward the prospect of war. Recruiting offices were swamped by prospective warriors. The thrill and adventure of battle and a wholly unsup-

portable desire for revenge proved irresistible allures. It was a time—not unlike the early days of the Civil War—when young eager men went off in pursuit of honor and glory.

A fifth factor, and one which strongly influenced training, was the development of new weapons systems. Aircraft had first been employed by the United States Navy in the Mexican conflict of 1914, but aviation blossomed during the war. On April 6, 1917, Naval Aviation could claim a force of thirty-eight officers (pilots) and 163 men; the Marine Air Corps had five officers and thirty men. By November 11, 1918, these numbers had exploded to 6,716 naval officers, and 30,693 enlisted men, and the Marine Air Corps grew to 282 officers and 2,180 enlisted men—an increase 170 times the original number or 17,000 percent.[4]

Submarine warfare brought about a whole new division of training, developed to serve this new weapon system. In addition to the airplane and the submarine, new technology in the fields of wireless radio communication, mine warfare, undersea submarine detection, aerial photography, and gasoline propulsion created needs for highly technical training, and schools formed in many locations to meet these needs. Not all technologies became successes on the battlefield. Pigeons and kite balloons promised to be valued systems but were in essence dead ends.

A final theme to the book is the story of the adaptation of new approaches to learning. The prewar concept of naval training had focused on an apprentice/master approach to education. Training was carried on at a leisurely pace with small classes learning from experienced senior officers. The need to rapidly build a highly trained technical force created a need for new approaches to education. Professionally designed curricula, consistently applied in a distributed educational system and delivered in an accelerated format to adult students, presaged an educational paradigm that characterizes professional education in today's academic environment. The naval training establishment would never be the same.

NOTES

1. Tracy Barrett Kittredge, *Naval Lessons of the Great War* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921), vii; Testimony of Admiral Sims and Bradley Fiske in *U.S. Senate Report on the Naval Investigation by the Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921).

2. The Naval Preparedness Act of 1916 called for building 157 new ships over the next six years. The best estimate we have of the ship strength at the time the act was passed is determined by taking the ship strength as was recorded at the outset of the war, 344, and subtracting those ships completed in 1916—four.

3. *Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1918* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 72. There is considerable variation in the reported numbers of men enlisted and trained during the war. This topic will be dealt with in some detail in Chapter 12.

4. Thomas T. Craven, History of Aviation in the United States Navy From Its Beginning Until the Spring of 1920, NA, RG 45, ZGU, box 911, 75.

Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to thank a few of the dozens of individuals who were kind enough to lend their assistance to this lengthy project. First, I very much appreciated the kind, perceptive guidance and encouragement provided by Dr. Ralph Weber of Marquette University. In the process of researching this topic, I had the good fortune to receive assistance from Davis Elliott, Glenn Helm, and Barbara Auman of the Naval Historical Center Library as well as David Green and Ed Phinney of the Naval Historical Center Photographic Section. Rick Peuser at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., provided significant help in uncovering documents that in at least one instance, "no one had ever asked for before." A most pleasant and fruitful study was spent at the Nimitz Library at the Naval Academy in Annapolis. My thanks there to Alice Creighton, Mary Rose Catalfamo, and Gary LaValley. Gordon Calhoun at the Hampton Roads Naval Museum was kind enough to rummage through the museum's archives to find material on the Jamestown Exhibition and the early days of the Norfolk base. One of the most enjoyable visits was to the Naval War College Library in Newport, Rhode Island, where Evelyn Cherpack provided many unique sources of information. John Sheppard, public affairs director at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center, provided direction and copies of priceless photographs of Great Lakes during the war. The staffs at the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, the Pensacola Naval Museum, the Library of Congress, and the Marquette University Library were also most helpful.

To the following groups and individuals I owe the greatest debt of gratitude. First, thanks to the president, the vice president of academics, and the Board of

Regents at Concordia University Wisconsin for their financial and moral support of the project.

Finally, thanks to my family, especially my wife, Pamela, who endured the mood swings inherent in writing this book and, in the end, was kind enough to type most of the manuscript.

Prologue

Voyage of the Subchaser 294

On March 25, 1918, I went aboard of the Subchaser *294* as Executive Officer, continuing on duty on that ship as Executive Officer and later as Commanding Officer until June 13, 1919.

This ship, together with subchasers *291* to *302* inclusive made the trip to the east coast and with the exception of Subchaser *302*, which was sold to Cuba, made the return trip to Bremerton, Wash. The Subchaser *302* left Puget Sound Navy Yard, first going south to Mexican waters. It did not encounter bad weather, and no definite idea of the seaworthiness of these ships was obtained from it. The next chasers to leave for the south were subchasers *291* to *294* inclusive. The crews and officers of course had had no chaser experience, and did not know what to expect from the boats. Leaving the Yard May 6, 1918, we proceeded to Port Angeles, Wash, where the gas tanks were refilled and deck loads made ready for sea. The gas consumption had not been definitely determined and it was decided to carry 1,000 gallons on deck. This weight on deck did not add to the seaworthiness of the vessels, but with everyone hoping for good weather, a start was made from Port Angeles, for San Francisco on May 7th.

Unfortunately, a promise of good weather was not fulfilled the wind rising and blowing about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour by the time Cape Flattery was turned. On rounding the cape, the seas struck us abeam, and when *294* heeled over under the first one, it seemed as though she was going over. But, she righted herself and we began to feel that the boat might be able to stand the weather. The seas kept on coming and the boat continued to do plain and fancy rolling, which damaged nothing except the health of the crew and the food in the galley. The crews and officers, as I have said, were men without any great amount of sea service, some few had been

out in large ships, but none had been out in ships that rolled, pitched, and corkscrewed with the unbounded enthusiasm of the chasers.

In a very short time, good health was but a memory for most of them, tho [*sic*] the officers seemed to have better luck. However, there were enough men left on all boats to keep them running. The weather continued bad, and off the Columbia River *292* developt [*sic*] engine trouble that necessitated her putting in to Astoria. *291* standing by to render aid and going in to Astoria with her. *293* and *294* kept on after passing the Cape on the coast of California, the weather moderated and San Francisco was made without further trouble. *293* and *294* proceeded to Mare Island, trouble having developt [*sic*] with the strut bearings. A few days later *291* and *292* made port, after an uneventful trip from Astoria. The boats were at Mare Island for three and a half weeks, while experiments were made with various types of strut bearings. It was finally determined that lignum vita was the best material, and all boats were dockt [*sic*] and these bearings installed. On June 5 the ships left Mare Island for San Diego, making an uneventful trip, except for a few days of fog at the entrance to Santa Barbara Channel.

At San Diego the ships made a short stop, taking on gas and supplies, and on June 8, left for Pechelinque, Mexico, in company with two more Mare Island chasers, the flotilla being under command of Lieut. (jg) Roscoe Howard USNRF., commanding officer of *294*. By this time the crews were becoming accustomed to the ships and the black gang had most of the kinks ironed out of the engines, and barring bad storms, the future began to look more pleasant.[1]

NOTE

1. Ensign R. W. Capps, *Voyage of the Subchaser 294*, June 1919, NA, RG45, ZPN, box 982.

1

Preparedness and the Coming War

> You are told that there has been some sort of neglect about the navy. There has not been any sort of neglect about the navy. We have been slowly building up a navy which in quality is second to no navy in the world.
>
> —Woodrow Wilson[1]

THE CAMPAIGN FOR NAVAL PREPAREDNESS

Destiny often chooses strangely in casting roles to be played on the world's stage, and none more strangely at first glance than the choice of Josephus Daniels as secretary of the navy. Daniels' only link with the navy had been through his brother-in-law, Ensign Worth Bagley, who the only American naval officer to die in the Spanish-American War. His father had been a shipwright for the Confederacy, but Daniels himself knew little of the navy. In fact, he wrote on March 27, 1913, after his first visit to the Washington Navy Yard,

> For three hours I went from ship to ship and from place to place, saw a torpedo fired from a torpedo boat, and witnessed the making of everything that goes into a battle ship. It was my first visit to a navy yard and it was a revelation. Capt. Jones, the Commandant, and the master machinist and others explained the various operations. My knowledge of machinery and battle-ships is so slight that I understood very little of operations or explanations.[2]

This ought to occasion no surprise. His background was that of a small-town newspaperman; his appointment as secretary the reward for loyal, thoughtful

political support of the new president, Woodrow Wilson. Aside from two years as the chief clerk of the Interior Department in 1893–1894, Daniels had spent his life in North Carolina.

What made Daniels an even more curious choice for a position as the head of America's arguably most important armed force was his outspoken pacifism. The period from 1913 to 1917 is marked by repeated instances of Daniels refraining from taking any steps to strengthen the navy that might have been construed as preparing for war. To the very end he opposed the war. As late as March 20, 1917, Daniels and Secretary of Agriculture Albert Burleson were the only two cabinet members *not* to speak out in favor of war.[3] More than any other cabinet member, Daniels soon became the center of controversy and endured some of the most vicious attacks that any cabinet member was forced to endure. The debate focused on differences of opinion relative to whether the navy was adequately prepared for war. Preparation meant different things to different people. It had been the practice to keep a certain large number of older ships in a "reserve" fleet, crewed sufficiently to maintain the mechanical systems on board the ship but nowhere near sufficient to take the ship into battle. In Daniels' view, preparedness meant a state of trained readiness on the part of existing personnel on *active* warships. To Republican war hawks, such as Augustus P. Gardner (R-Massachusetts), or Admiral Bradley Fiske, or even the assistant secretary of the navy, Franklin Roosevelt, preparedness meant having a naval force that would be able to defeat any enemy to come against it. Implicit in this stance was the opinion that all existing ships should be fully manned and ready for war.

On October 16, 1914, Gardner introduced a resolution in the House calling for an investigation into the navy's state of preparation by asking, "Is the Navy able to defend the Monroe Doctrine against Germany or enforce an Asiatic exclusion against Japan?" Gardner said no. (Interestingly, Franklin Roosevelt had told Admiral Fiske that the resolution was his idea.)[4] The investigation found that there was no basis for the charge, but Gardner continued the fight. In a speech delivered March 15, 1915, in Bay City, Michigan, Gardner charged that Daniels had misinformed the country about the state of national defense.

Although Gardner was perhaps the most outspoken civilian critic, Admiral Bradley Fiske, the aide for operations, was the most outspoken and the most knowledgeable military critic. In a memo to Daniels on November 9, 1914, he identified a shortage of both officers and enlisted men. The officer problem, he pointed out, was one that could not be immediately addressed because of the fact that it took four years to train a midshipman at Annapolis and the number there was fixed by law. The enlisted complement could be increased. However, Fiske did not place much hope in Daniels' solution of relying on the reserve and naval militia and recommended instead an increase of 19,600 enlisted men in the regular navy.

A second issue that concerned Fiske was a perceived deficiency in training. The shortage of personnel and a lack of department organization, combined with

the shortage of small craft, resulted in a lack of coordinated, progressive training. Daniels denied the two points, but, as shall be shown in this study, there was some truth to Fiske's claims.

In the spring of 1915 Fiske, along with the assistant secretary of the navy, Franklin Roosevelt, arranged for a "war game" in Chesapeake Bay. The game took place in May. The Blue fleet represented the American navy and the Red fleet portrayed the invading fleet. Curiously, red had previously been used to represent Great Britain, whereas black had been the color for Germany. Although the opposing fleet was clearly representing Germans, the color code was that of Britain. The situation was to be as real as possible; however, Fiske and Roosevelt had "stacked the deck" against the home fleet in that the invading fleet knew full well the tactics of the defending fleet. In the end, the Red fleet defeated the Blue, ostensibly pointing out the unpreparedness of the American navy.[5]

As the United States' entry into the war came closer, Gardner and Fiske were joined by other advocates of naval preparedness such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.), Representative Richard Hobson (D-Ala.), Teddy Roosevelt, Rear Admiral Austin Knight (president of the Naval War College), former Secretary of the Navy George Meyer, and "285 out of 400" newspapers. H. B. Stedman, of Hartford, Connecticut, a banker and critic of Daniels, forwarded one such newspaper column to Daniels on March 29, 1917. The article from the previous day's *Boston Herald* was titled "Daniels Must Go," and went on to say, "He has demoralized the discipline of the Navy; he has allowed the equipment and the personnel to fall more short of even ordinary requirements than any predecessor of recent times." Stedman recommended that Daniels resign to relieve Mr. Wilson of "further embarrassment."[6]

However, Daniels also received support. Andrew Carnegie, in 1915, considered Daniels a "wise Secretary of the Navy" for pursuing a rational increase in naval preparedness while not rushing headlong into a building race with Britain and Germany.[7] William McAdoo, who later became secretary of the treasury and Wilson's future son-in-law, characterized the navy in January 1917 as a "great establishment, ranking well up into a Navy of the highest international standing."[8] Woodrow Wilson often came to the aid and support of his beleaguered secretary. In a speech to the Manhattan Club on October 28, 1915, he declared the navy the first line of defense, and as currently reorganized under Daniels, the most efficient and notable of modern times. He promised to "hasten [the] pace a little to bring the Navy to a point of extraordinary force and efficiency as compared with the other navies of the world."[9] A subsequent speech in Milwaukee on January 31, 1916, proclaimed, "There has been no neglect about the Navy which in quality is second to no navy in the world."[10] Later that day, in Chicago, he added the following statistics to illustrate the progress Daniels had made. Three years before there had been 182 vessels in the navy, whereas now there were 238. In addition, three new dreadnoughts and fifteen smaller ships would be added in a month or two. The number of sailors had

increased by 6,000, and whereas three years before there had been four aviation officers, there were now 121 plus thirty-seven new airships and a new School of Practice in Pensacola.[11] The next week in an address in St. Louis, Wilson proclaimed that the United States was building "incomparably the greatest navy in the world."[12] Daniels claimed to have increased enlistment to the level allowed by law—an increase of some 5,824 men. This, said Daniels, was sufficient to man the twenty submarines, four battleships, four destroyers, six gunboats, six cruisers, and three monitors that had been added to the active fleet. If one were to do a quick calculation, the added complement resulted in a figure of 135 men per ship. The complement of a battleship of the era ranged from 869 for the old *Michigan* to 1,384 for the new *Oklahoma* or *Nevada*.[13] Even a small destroyer of the period carried a crew of 101 men.[14] Therefore, 5,824 men were insufficient to man the new ships. Regarding training, Daniels quite rightly emphasized the increased opportunities for advancement from enlisted to officer rank. He also noted the drop of 17 percent in desertions from enlisted ranks.[15]

Where did the truth lie? Admiral Charles Badger, senior member of the General Board during the war, provided an analysis of the proposals for new ship construction and increases in personnel, in the years preceding and during the war for the benefit of the Senate subcommittee investigating the navy in 1920. The following chart presents the recommendations of the General Board, the Navy Department (or Secretary of the Navy), and the Congress for battleships/battle cruisers, submarines, destroyers, and auxiliary ships during the years from 1910 to 1917. (Note that recommendations for 1910, for instance, cover the fiscal year ending in June 1912; those for 1911, the year ending 1913, etc.)

Recommendations for New Ships, 1910–1917

Year	*Entity*	*Battleships, Battle Cruisers*	*Scouts, Destroyers*	*Submarines*	*Other Ships, Auxiliaries*
1910	General Board	4	20	0	19
	Navy Dept.	2	0	2	6
	Congress	2	8	4	7
1911	General Board	5	20	5	13
	Navy Dept.	2	0	0	2
	Congress	1	6	8	5
1912	General Board	6	16	6	12
	Navy Dept.	5	16	6	12
	Congress	1	6	4	2
1913	General Board	4	16	8	11
	Navy Dept.	2	8	3	0
	Congress	3	6	8	0

1914	General Board	4	16	19	11
	Navy Dept.	2	6	8	2
	Congress	6	6	18	1
1915	General Board	8	34	37	18
	Navy Dept.	4	18	30	3
	Congress	16	60	68	13
1916	General Board	6	24	27	20
	Navy Dept.	4	18	18	2
	Congress	4	18	18	2
1917	General Board	7 to 28	As many as possible	30	0
	Navy Dept.	No increase over previous approved levels			
	Congress	0	$125,000,000	$32,397,000	0[16]

Clearly, the General Board, which comprised senior naval officers, consistently recommended the greatest number of ships. During the period 1910 through 1911, Daniels, the secretary of the navy, recommended fewer ships than did the General Board and fewer ships than even Congress authorized. Only in 1912 did Secretary Meyer recommend the number of ships favored by the General Board; however, Congress authorized only thirteen of the thirty-nine ships, or one-third of those recommended.

During Daniels' first four years, the General Board once again advised building more ships than did the secretary, whereas Congress, as in 1910 and 1911, authorized more ships than the secretary recommended. In 1916, Congress authorized exactly what Daniels recommended. The pattern Daniels followed reflected no greater conservatism than his predecessor, and in fact, Daniels' annual recommendations averaged nearly twice his predecessor's annual recommendations.

The question of an adequate force of officers and men constitutes a much more complex issue. The same report that Admiral Badger presented to the Senate committee relative to ship proposals also contained a similar report on requests for manpower increases:

Recommendations for Increases in Enlisted Personnel

Year	*General Board*	*Navy Department*	*Congressional Authorization*
1908	0	0	0
1909	0	3,000	3,000
1910	equal to needs of new vessels	0	0
1911	unspecified number	proportional to tonnage	4,000
1912	0	0	0

Year	*General Board*	*Navy Department*	*Congressional Authorization*
1913	sufficient to fully man the fleet	0	0
1914	unspecific recommendation	0	0
1915	11,000	14,222	17,200
1916	81,300	81,300	81,300
1917	48,848	78,000	217,320[17]

As was so often the case, numbers recorded varied considerably depending on the source. However, from the data recorded by Admiral Badger, Daniels certainly did not falter in increasing the potential size of the navy after 1914.

In a hearing before the Sixty-third Congress on December 10, 1914, Daniels explained his stance on naval personnel. In the discussion Daniels allowed that he had added 4,600 men in 1914, thereby meeting the maximum number allowed for the first time in history. (The apparent contradiction with the figures shown in the Recommendation Chart is explained by the fact that the chart calls for increases in the *authorized* strength. Prior to 1914, the *actual* strength was considerably below the authorized strength.) Rather than requesting additional regular enlisted men, Daniels' plan called for establishing a reserve force of 25,000. This force would comprised experienced former naval personnel who had returned to civilian life. Daniels preferred the idea of having a ready force of trained men to the thought of putting more new men into training.[18]

The flaw in Daniels' concept was his estimate of potential volunteers from the men retiring. There were, thought Daniels, some 38,000 eligible former sailors from which to draw the needed 25,000-member force. As events would prove, it took the United States's entry into war to move that number to volunteer, and his concept of a reserve force built of experienced men would be, in 1917, supplanted by a reserve force of inexperienced, part-time, would-be sailors. Nonetheless, in 1914, this idea formed Daniels' plan to staff the fleet. In addition, however, he said he would be requesting authorization for men to man the new battleships *Mississippi, Idaho*, and *California*, then under construction.[19]

Daniels' sanguine outlook aside, those in the fleet complained bitterly over a shortage of personnel. One officer, Lieutenant Harold Stark, a friend of Franklin Roosevelt, wrote from his posts as commander of *Torpedo Testing Barge 1* in Newport in October 1915 that "here as elsewhere we have the same haphazard detail or no detail of men." Stark wondered if the shortage existed only on shore and asked Roosevelt if shore stations were in fact taken into consideration when calculating the number of men needed in the navy.[20] Roosevelt responded that the estimation for 1915 included a recommendation for 10,000 men. Until recently, he added, these estimates had not included shore stations despite Roosevelt's recommendation to do so.[21] Roosevelt himself advised Admiral William

Benson in March 1916 to seek an immediate increase of 15,000 men in the enlisted force.[22]

The recommendations for personnel strength varied primarily because of the differing opinions regarding manning the reserve fleet. In the current parlance the reserve fleet is referred to as "the mothball fleet." Ships in mothball status carry no crew. In the pre–World War I era, older ships were kept in a reserve fleet. Skeleton crews remained on board the ship to maintain the mechanical equipment, combat rust and corrosion, and, in general, keep the ship in such a condition that with little extra work it could join the active fleet.

Politicians, naval activists, and other advocates of ultra-preparedness referred to the reserve fleet when attempting to make the point that the navy was undermanned. Daniels, Roosevelt, and other naval officers would respond that it had always been the practice to keep a certain number of ships in the reserve fleet—not in full commission and not fully manned. In a speech to the Navy League on April 13, 1916, Roosevelt discussed the issue. According to his calculations, 18,000 men would be needed to fully crew all ships in the navy, but he also said that 200,000 men would be needed in time of war with a major power. Roosevelt went on to highlight instances of recent history, the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the 1912 mobilization under President William H. Taft, and so on, to provide examples of how, even in those days, men were drawn from shore stations and the naval militia to adequately crew the ships. Roosevelt backed the recommendation of both the General Board and Secretary Daniels for an increase of 15,000 men. This, thought Roosevelt, would meet the immediate needs of the force.

To meet potential war needs, the 200,000 men referred to previously, Roosevelt made three recommendations. The regular force of the navy would, with the additional 15,000, amount to approximately 75,000 men. The additional 125,000 would come from a reserve force made up of:

1. former retired officers and enlisted men of the regular navy and Naval Militia (15,000);
2. men currently engaged in seafaring pursuits—merchant marine fishermen, Great Lakes sailors, and so on (30,000–40,000);
3. civilians not connected with the merchant marine or navy.[23]

For the first time, someone had identified accurately what would become the core of the American naval force in World War I.

THE NAVAL MILITIA AND NAVAL RESERVE

Since the time of the American Revolution, local or state militia organizations had been a part of the military structure of the United States. Although most of

the attention of historians has been drawn to army militia units, naval militia were organized in many of those states bordering large bodies of water.

The effectiveness with which these various groups operated varied widely. Some, like Massachusetts, were extremely well organized. The Massachusetts Naval Cadet Training Program, for instance, became the model for the Annapolis Reserve Officer Training program during the war. Other militia suffered from poor organization, underfunding, and old, or even no, equipment. The *Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1914* identified the following problems:

1. inefficient use of federal funds given to the militia;
2. sloppy uniforms, bedding, and clothing;
3. weak correspondence (reports to the department);
4. poor conditions of some of the ships;
5. lack of instruction;
6. lack of textbooks;
7. too many officers.

To address this issue, Congress, on February 16, 1914, passed the Naval Militia Act. This act established the Division of Militia Affairs under the Bureau of Navigation in the Navy Department. The act also provided for pay, transportation, and subsistence of the Naval Militia during such times as the officers or men were actually engaged in any cruise or encampment authorized by the secretary of the navy. In addition, by authority of this act, officers and men of the regular navy were assigned as inspectors and instructors of the Naval Militia.[24]

That the militia formed a sizable potential force is reflected in the numbers of men enrolled. In 1914 there existed 596 officers and 7,132 enlisted men in the militia. As the following chart displays, the state enrollments reflected the importance of nautical matters as well as the population of the state:

State	*Officers*	*Enlisted Men*
California	64	634
Connecticut	22	258
District of Columbia	13	208
Florida	16	73
Illinois	45	549
Louisiana	26	330
Maine	10	175
Maryland	18	132
Massachusetts	45	603
Michigan	43	427

Minnesota	17	174
New Jersey	29	361
New York	84	1,351
North Carolina	43	332
Ohio	18	229
Oregon	14	228
Pennsylvania	12	180
Rhode Island	14	182
South Carolina	14	103
Washington	17	305
Wisconsin	13	114[25]

The Naval Militia received their training much as the Naval Reserve does today. There were periodic meetings during the year that culminated in a two-week cruise during the summer. Typically these cruises were made on militia vessels—old regular navy ships donated or lent to the militia. In addition, militia officers were invited to sail at any time on board regular navy vessels to receive additional training. In 1914, for instance, seventeen actually did so. Officers were also encouraged to attend classes given at the Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, but few if any did so.[26]

One of the perceived weaknesses of the militia had been its officer pool. A new standard was set under which militia officers were given three years to pass a proficiency exam.[27] Other steps to improve militia training included a new emphasis on gunnery rather than scraping and painting, the publication of new training manuals, establishing militia schools for professional subjects such as accounting, and expanded opportunities for officer training.[28]

In 1915, militia membership totaled 606 officers and 7,706 men.[29] By the following year, the numbers had risen to 636 officers and 9,170 men. In addition, the militia maintained thirty-two ships ranging from the relatively new battleship USS *Kearsarge* (1899) to the much older USS *Granite State* (1818) and the side-wheeled steamer USS *Wolverine* (1842).[30] When the Naval Militia was mobilized on April 6, 1917, 666 officers and 9,500 men swelled the ranks of the regular navy.[31] Enrollment reached a peak of 805 officers and 15,000 enlisted men during the war. Recruiting in the militia continued until September 1917, when it was suspended by the secretary of the navy.[32] Because it was subsumed by the regular navy as the National Naval Volunteers, the Department of Militia Affairs ceased operation in July 1918.[33]

Daniels had long sought the creation of a national, not a state, naval reserve force. To him such a force represented the best solution to the problem of rapidly manning the fleet during time of war. In his report of 1915, Daniels envisioned the reserve force manning auxiliary ships, minesweepers, and coastal patrol vessels in time of war. Although Daniels expected that most of the retired navy

men would join the reserves, recruiting got off to a slow start, and by the end of the first year only 176 had enrolled.[34]

THE NAVAL ACT OF 1916

No act of Congress had as much of an impact on the navy during the World War I era as the Naval Act of 1916 passed by Congress on August 29, 1916. The act filled sixty pages and addressed virtually every aspect of naval operations. The following items highlight the significant portions of the act:

1. Aviation	$3,500,000.00
2. Naval Militia and National Naval Volunteers:	
General Operations	$1,270,737.73
Militia Ships: Illinois	25,000.00
Minnesota	165,000.00
Militia Schools: New York	125,000.00
Massachusetts	125,000.00
Other States	250,000.00
3. Recruiting	224,228.84
4. Naval Training Stations and Schools	
California (general)	70,000.00
(improvements)	32,475.00
Newport	85,000.00
Great Lakes	80,000.00
St. Helena (Hampton Roads)	25,000.00
Naval War College	38,850.00
Naval Academy (improvements)	70,000.00
(operations)	703,946.92
Total schools	$1,105,271.90
5. Existing Ship Repair and Maintenance	$3,915,000.00

6. New Ship Construction:

Quantity Authorized	*Type*	*Quantity Funded*	*Cost Each*
10	First-class battleships	4	$ 11,500,000
6	Battle cruisers	4	6,500,000[35]
10	Scout cruisers	4	5,000,000
50	Destroyers	20	1,200,000
9	Fleet submarines	0	
58	Coastal submarines	3	1,200,000
	Coastal submarines	27	700,000