

# Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific

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The United States, Japan, and  
the Asia/Pacific Region, 1895-1945

WILLIAM F. NIMMO

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PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut  
London

**Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific**

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**For Nancy, Ron, and David**

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## **Preface**

This book is intended to introduce the general reader to a survey of U.S. involvement with the East Asia and Pacific region in the period from 1894 to 1945, the half-century leading up to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and concluding with Japan's surrender in 1945. An effort has been made to describe the general character of the U.S. position concerning what in the past was called the Far East and the ways in which the nations of East Asia and the western Pacific have responded.

The transformation that took place during the twentieth century in Western attitudes toward Asia is reflected in the vastly changed attitudes of the United States and European powers. Japan's position also has undergone enormous change. After the opening of Japan to the West by Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his successors in the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan attempted to surpass even the Western powers in its establishment of territorial acquisition and hegemony over a vast area of East Asia. With the discrediting of its military expansionists by the atomic bombings of 1945 and unconditional surrender, Japan seems to have been vaccinated against its former feudalistic military spirit. In the 1990s, public sentiment in Japan even opposed the dispatch of a Self-defense Force Engineer Battalion to assist in road and bridge construction in war-torn Cambodia, on the basis that dispatch of a quasi-military unit to another Asian country might be misinterpreted as a rebirth of Japanese militarism.

This book provides a historical trail of the diplomatic, economic, and military actions of the United States in East Asia and the Pacific from the first Sino-Japanese War to World War II. It examines revisionist claims that the United

States led Japan into war in 1941, or that war could have been avoided by a more conciliatory policy on the part of Washington.

Japan's militarists were a menace to peace in Asia and the Pacific, inflicting extensive atrocities on other Asians as well as Allied prisoners of war during World War II. Japan initiated numerous "land-grabs" on the flimsiest of pretexts, and postwar revisionists attempted to justify these actions by claiming that the primary goal of Japanese conquest was to eject white colonial power from East Asia. Chinese, Korean, and Filipino sources—along with numerous groups in Japan, perhaps a majority—disagree. Expressions of outrage from Asian nations ravaged by Japanese militarism continue to be heard at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Japan, in the twenty-first century, seems far removed from its pre-1945 imperialistic nature. It is a democratic nation, with a freely elected parliament, and a constitution that provides safeguards for individual liberty. The great majority of Japanese appear to have no desire for a return to the past, but echoes of Imperial Japan are still heard from a small, but vocal minority of ultranationalist groups. Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party (in spite of the name, it is a conservative party) often caters to this group. In May 2000, newly installed Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro called Japan "a divine nation with the emperor at its center." Claims of the divine nature and uniqueness of Japan are precisely what led to a half-century of military and territorial expansion, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent devastation of World War II in the Pacific.

Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names in this book follow the standard practice, that is, family name followed by given name, except where the names have been Anglicized, for example, Syngman Rhee. Following the usage of official U.S. government documents, accent marks, such as the macron, which indicates that a vowel is long, are omitted.

The Wade Giles system of romanization of the Chinese names and locations is used in this text because that is the system that was in use for the period covered by this survey. Accent marks and apostrophes associated with Wade Giles have been omitted because they are meaningless to the great majority of English readers. A conversion table to Pinyin is provided in the appendix.

Most locations are referred to by the names used in the first half of the twentieth century. An exception is Formosa, cited a few times by that name, but more often identified by its Chinese name of Taiwan.

## CHAPTER 1

### **The Beginnings: New Experiences for Americans in Asia and the Pacific**

The colonial expansion of Western nations into Asia beginning in the sixteenth century made it inevitable that China and Japan would eventually be drawn into a relationship with a nation that did not even exist at that time, one that would ultimately be founded as a result of concurrent exploration and penetration into the Western Hemisphere by representatives of some of those same European countries. Portuguese and Spanish traders arrived in Asia in the sixteenth century, along with missionaries seeking to spread the Christian faith. Russian Cossacks, looking for mineral riches, moved eastward in Siberia along the Amur River region and were making overtures for an invasion of the watershed area north of the river.<sup>1</sup> While this foreign encroachment was taking place, a transitional era was in the making with a new dynasty, the Ching, forcing out the old Ming, and attempts being made to unify and strengthen China. Thus the Ching, or the Manchu rulers as the new regime came to be known, faced major challenges in dealing with both domestic and foreign obstacles.<sup>2</sup>

Spain and Portugal were joined by Britain, France, and the Netherlands in expanding their influence into South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. Portuguese expeditions in the East Indies were replaced by the Netherlands in the late sixteenth century, which led to political and territorial control. The Philippine Islands were in Spanish hands by 1565 only a few years after the Portuguese had established an enclave at Macao on the China coast in 1557.<sup>3</sup> (Macao was returned to China on December 19, 1999, after 442 years as a Portuguese colony.)

Japan, prior to the arrival of westerners in Asia, had a maritime tradition and a reputation for having bold seafarers that sailed over much of the seas in

Southeast Asia and beyond. Japanese ships were frequently in the harbors of the Philippines, Java (Indonesia), and even as far as India. Some estimates show as many as fifteen thousand Japanese living in the Philippines in the sixteenth century. But the advent of Western exploration was a major concern to Japanese rulers, who themselves were in the midst of struggles for internal control in a divided nation.

In Japan, the initial reaction was one of cautious reception to the overtures of missionaries and traders from Europe. When Portuguese traders arrived in 1543, followed in 1549 by Francis Xavier, the Jesuit missionary who was instrumental in bringing Christianity to Japan, the country was still in turmoil from decades of civil war and had no controlling central authority. This era, known as the Sengoku period, the Age of Warring States, was brought to an end by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who finally unified Japan in 1590.<sup>4</sup>

Two events occurred about this time that reflect a continuity in Japan's view of the outside world: first, an edict denouncing Christianity together with a decree expelling the Jesuit missionaries; and second, invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597.<sup>5</sup> The denunciation of Christianity showed a rejection of foreign culture and a fear that the religion was becoming too influential, especially in southern Japan. Mistrust of the European traders and missionaries was based on suspicion of their territorial ambitions, as observed in other areas of Asia.

The invasions of Korea reflect long-standing objectives of Japan for conquest of the peninsula and China. One of the primary causes was Korea's refusal to allow passage of Hideyoshi's troops in a planned conquest of China. The proximity had previously led to Japanese military involvement with the Korea Peninsula in the seventh century and presented a natural target for expansionist activities. Even as far back as the sixteenth century, Japan had a goal to dominate China. Although unsuccessful, a pattern was established that would be followed three centuries later by a modernized Japan in its invasions of Korea and China. It is also noteworthy that Hideyoshi began the invasions within a very short time after military unification of Japan. A large army leads—in Japan's case, at least—to a use for that force.

When Hideyoshi died in 1598, there was a scramble for power and Tokugawa Ieyasu, after defeating his rivals, was appointed shogun in 1603. There were fifteen successive leaders, all designated with the title of shogun, during the Tokugawa era (1603–1867). Tokugawa Ieyasu, who died in 1616, was concerned about Christian inroads in Japan but took no action to ban missionaries. But the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu, saw the relative weakness of Japan compared to European powers and established a policy of national seclusion—barring not only Christians, but also all foreigners—in 1639 as a means of protecting Japan from colonization.

During the same era, on the other side of the world, English settlers had begun settlement of the North American colonies, first with Roanoke Island in 1587, followed by Jamestown in 1607 and Plymouth in 1620. Jesuits from England explored the Potomac River in 1634 and established a Catholic colony

in Maryland, with an additional goal of converting the Indians. For the next two centuries, Japan continued its policy of isolation while the New World colonies developed, with thirteen of them becoming an independent nation, the United States of America. Both the United States and Japan continued as primarily agrarian societies with little or no knowledge of each other.

Prior to the American Revolution, the colonies had no direct involvement with Asia. Even though colonists had developed a taste for tea, silk, spices, and porcelain, British policy required that Americans import Asian goods only through the trade monopoly of the British East India Company. British officials also levied a tax on all imports into the American colonies. The Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, where cargo from China was thrown overboard by irate colonists, was a protest against this tax. After independence, however, ships from the United States began to visit Chinese ports, and by 1810 voyages were being made on a regular basis, usually taking as much as a year for the round trip.

From its beginnings as an independent nation, the United States viewed Asia as an opportunity for trade. American sailing ships visited Chinese coastal ports long before official relations were established or envoys posted there. In fact, consular duties were performed by shipping or trading company representatives.<sup>6</sup> By the early nineteenth century, American missionaries had begun work in China that was to continue for more than a hundred years. With the advent of steam-powered vessels and the increased expansion of European powers into East Asia, a need was perceived for formalization of relations with China.

The United States and China negotiated a Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce, referred to as the Treaty of Wanghia, in 1844, thereby normalizing procedures for trade, tariffs, establishment of consulates, designation of treaty ports (Canton, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo, and Shanghai), extraterritorial rights for American citizens concerning criminal justice, and a provision for most-favored-nation treatment in relation to other treaty powers. This treaty was modeled after the 1842 British pact with China.<sup>7</sup> Americans and Europeans were restricted to the treaty ports and special permission was required to travel to inland China. This condition was changed by the Chefoo Convention in 1876 that permitted foreigners to travel anywhere in China provided they had a passport.

Most of the treaties between Western powers and China, and later pacts with Japan and Korea, contained provisions that were to earn them the general classification of “unequal treaties.” Provisions allowing Western powers to determine and govern tariff arrangements, as well as the fact that the host countries had no legal control over foreign citizens resident in the treaty ports, were to prove especially irritating. Prior to the treaties, British and American seamen accused of criminal acts against local residents by Chinese authorities were punished in brutal fashion—for example, by strangulation—with no right of appeal. Once the treaties were in effect, however, the pendulum swung the other way and local officials perceived lenient treatment of foreigners for crimes

against their citizens. As larger numbers of foreigners began to reside in treaty ports, China and Japan made removal of the unequal provisions a major priority.

In less than a decade after the treaty with China, the United States began to look at trade possibilities with Japan. In addition, whaling ships from New England were dominating the lucrative hunt for whales in the Sea of Japan. Although the whalers did not visit Japanese ports, occasional shipwrecks resulted in marooning of American seamen on Japan's shores, long imprisonment, and brutal treatment. These practices were of concern to merchant houses in Boston and New York, and to officials in Washington.

The island nation also provided a desirable location for a coaling station for merchant ships on Pacific voyages. By the 1850s, American westward advancement had seen the rapid settlement of California and the Oregon Territory along with ever-increasing influence over Hawaii and other areas of the Pacific. The United States had no territorial ambitions in the Pacific or Asia, but sought to maintain and develop trading rights on a par with European nations. American predominance in Hawaii was already assured earlier in the century and cemented with an 1849 treaty of commerce, but Russia controlled Alaska and the northern Pacific rim.

In 1853, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry, with his fleet of "Black Ships," pried Japan open to the Western nations, but in contrast to China, initial relations were established by official U.S. agencies rather than through commercial interests. Perry arrived in Tokyo Bay bearing a letter from President Millard Fillmore, making a show of force that would convince the Tokugawa Shogunate that relations with the Western world were inevitable. After spending the winter in Okinawa, Perry returned to Tokyo Bay in early 1854 and negotiated an official treaty between the United States and the shogun's representatives, providing for the opening of two ports of call where American ships could "be supplied with wood, water, provisions, and coal, and other articles" and for "the buying and selling of articles and goods in exchange for gold and silver coins" or in exchange for other articles and goods. The treaty also permitted the United States to appoint a consul to reside at Shimoda.<sup>8</sup>

While Perry's official instructions from Washington may have referred to trade, coaling stations, and the welfare of shipwrecked sailors, an even more important purpose of his mission was to prevent Britain from monopolizing trade in the Pacific as it had already accomplished in India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Singapore, and Hong Kong. The American commodore envisaged a steamship line from California to various ports in the Pacific, including Hawaii and Japan that would be dominated by Americans. Perry also saw Russia as a competitor for control of the North Pacific, which caused just as much concern as Britain.<sup>9</sup>

After more than two centuries of Tokugawa rule, Japan had developed problems in its class system where the samurai held a higher position than merchants. The issue was that the samurai had power but no money, while the merchants had money but no power. Thus, to some groups in Japan, this early form of *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) of Perry's visit was viewed as a beneficial opportunity

for a restructuring of society. Furthermore, the Japanese were also concerned about a strong Russia in areas to the north of Japan.

In the face of factional opposition within Japan, Townsend Harris, the first American emissary, negotiated commercial and consular treaties with the shogunate in 1857 and 1858 that provided for an exchange of embassies, the opening of additional ports, the right of American citizens to reside in those ports and to be exempt from Japanese law, and a system of customs duties.<sup>10</sup> Japan also enacted similar treaties with the Netherlands, Britain, France, and Russia. From the beginning, relations between Japan and the United States were established under a framework of treaties regulating commercial activities, diplomatic affairs, rights of citizens residing abroad, and customs duties.

The next decade witnessed major upheavals in the internal affairs of Japan between forces loyal to the Tokugawa Shogunate and their domestic enemies, who advocated restoration of imperial court authority at Kyoto. Furthermore, there was widespread opposition to the commercial treaties that led to violence as some feudal lords were placed under house arrest, antiforeign nobles and court officials were thrown out of office, and their leaders executed.<sup>11</sup> Intense opposition to the opening of Japan to foreigners—and the murder of some of them—as well as contention between forces loyal to the shogunate and proimperial activists resulted in numerous battles and assassinations. The southern feudal lords, or *daimyo*, actively opposed the Tokugawa Shogunate and sought a restoration of imperial power, power that effectively had been in the hands of the shogun for most of the preceding seven centuries.

Even though Ii Naosuke, the shogun's great councilor and a staunch defender of the treaties with the West, was assassinated in 1860, the advent of modern Japan moved closer to reality. That same year, a contingent of Japanese officials traveled to the United States to participate in the ratification of the Harris Treaty in formalities with President James Buchanan in May 1860. The turmoil in Japan continued throughout much of the 1860s until the shogun's forces were defeated bringing about the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the resumption of rule through imperial power.

Japan was not the only nation experiencing internal unrest during this period. The Civil War in the United States (1861–1865) was consuming most of the energy, finances, and attention of Washington, and major portions of the country were in upheaval. Meanwhile, Britain, the Netherlands, Russia, and France, the other Western powers enjoying treaty rights with Japan, were active in establishing maritime and commercial interests. Antagonism by various Japanese elements was directed at representatives of the European powers, however, and the Americans lost little ground in those years.

After the surrender of Confederate forces in April 1865, the United States began to develop rapidly as an industrial nation, one that would surpass Britain by the century's end. Also, continued westward expansion resumed when Alaska, including the Aleutian Islands, was purchased from Russia in 1867, even though most Americans—at least those who had any opinion on the matter at

all—were skeptical of the acquisition, calling it “Seward’s Folly.” Development of the areas west of the Rocky Mountains, such as California and Oregon, however, enjoyed popular support. Earlier, the United States, during the administration of President James Knox Polk, who was elected on a “Manifest Des-tiny” platform, had obtained the Oregon Territory from Great Britain in 1846. As a result of Mexico’s defeat in the Mexican War (1846–1848), large territories, including California, had been ceded to the United States, leading to enthusiastic westward expansion. The transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, and continued interest in Hawaii was accelerated for commercial, political, and military activities.

After 1868, Japan began an intense program of modernization so as to be competitive with the Western powers and to avoid the fate that had befallen other Asian countries that had come under domination of European nations. The Meiji emperor moved his court to Edo, renamed Tokyo (literally: Eastern Capital), in November 1868 because most Japanese saw that location as the real seat of power. Several thousand American and European experts were recruited and brought to Japan to advise and teach on Western education, technology, finance, agriculture, and government. In addition, Japanese from various professions as well as students were sent to the United States and Europe to observe and study governmental organizations, technology, banking and finance, economics, transportation, military science, and other subjects needed for the rapid modernization of Japan.

In the next twenty years, vast changes were implemented in Japan, enough so that, on the surface at least, it appeared as though a different country had been created. The operative slogan during this era was *fukoku kyohei* (“Enrich the Country and Strengthen the Military”). All of this was in accordance with the Five Articles of Emperor Meiji’s Charter Oath:

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all state affairs decided by public opinion.
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in actively carrying out the administration of affairs of state.
3. The common people, no less than the civil officials, shall be allowed to pursue whatever calling they choose so that public apathy may not beset the land.
4. Evil practices of the past shall be abandoned, and actions shall be based on international usage.
5. Knowledge shall be sought all over the world, and the foundations of imperial rule shall be strengthened.

The first railroad line was opened in 1872, between Tokyo and Yokohama. Inauguration of a modern army based on a peasant backbone instead of the former samurai hierarchy was created the next year. Yamagata Aritomo, who served in political office as well as in positions of military leadership, was the

chief architect of Japan's new army. He was instrumental in the passage of the 1873 Conscription Act through which peasants were drafted for military service. The establishment of a modern Japanese navy was also begun at this time, but initial emphasis and funding was placed on the army.

In the decades leading up to 1900, telegraph and telephone service were inaugurated, and streetcars, electric lighting, industrialization, and the creation of a skilled labor force were accomplished. Establishment of a parliamentary system of government, suffrage (males only, on a limited basis), and cabinet system, and development of industry, education, a modern railroad system throughout the country, and steamship lines were among the major innovations of this period.

Throughout the first three decades of the Meiji era, a prime objective of Japanese officials was the revision of the unequal treaties, with major emphasis on the removal of the extraterritorial provisions concerning legal jurisdiction over citizens of Western powers resident in Japan. President Chester Alan Arthur commented on this matter in his 1883 message to Congress:

The question of the general revision of the foreign treaties of Japan has been considered in an international conference held at Tokio [*sic*], but without definite result as yet. The Government is disposed to concede the requests of Japan to determine its own tariff duties, to provide such proper judicial tribunals as may commend themselves to the Western Powers for the trial of causes to which foreigners are parties, and to assimilate the terms and duration of its treaties to those of other civilized States.<sup>12</sup>

In its rush to modernization and attempts at hegemony over neighbors in Asia, some leaders in Japan began to look at war with Korea even as early as 1873, only twenty years after emerging from isolation. This initial effort proved abortive due to pressure from the Meiji court and the opposition of other officials who, outside the country on study missions, were hastily called back home to stop this action. However, it was not long before the war rumblings started again.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, in the face of a weakened China, the rapidly westernizing Japan established business interests in Korea, Manchuria (northeastern China), and Formosa (Taiwan), thereby paving the way for the political and military expansionists that were to follow. Japan and China concluded a commercial treaty in 1871.<sup>13</sup>

In 1874, a Japanese expeditionary force was sent to Taiwan on the pretext of punishing China for the killing of shipwrecked sailors from the Ryukyu Islands, claiming the exclusive right to speak for the Ryukyu Kingdom. After extended negotiations, China paid an indemnity to Japan for damages and for the Japanese army barracks constructed on Taiwan. China further agreed not to condemn Japan for its action, which led the British minister in Japan, Harry Parkes, to remark that the settlement was nothing more than an invitation to further aggression.

Okinawa, which earlier had existed as a part of the Chinese tribute system, and more recently had been identified as the Ryukyu Kingdom with its own emperor, but was actually under the double subordination of both Japan and China, was annexed by Japan in 1879 as a prefecture. Other territories were added to Japan during the same period. The northern Kurile Islands were ceded to Japan by Russia in 1875 in exchange for Russian rights to all of Sakhalin Island. The Kurile Islands were administered as an integral part of Japan from 1875 to 1945. Also, a group of small islands extending about a thousand miles out to the southeast from Tokyo, the Volcano and Bonin Islands—known in Japan as the Ogasawara Islands—were annexed by Japan in 1876. Iwo Jima, the site of a major battle in World War II, is a part of this island group.<sup>14</sup>

As China and Japan became increasingly involved with Western nations, it became apparent that emigration of laborers would be a practical method for dealing with a burgeoning population while also providing an opportunity for impoverished peasants to earn higher wages. China supplied large numbers of laborers to Hawaii and the United States beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Japanese began arriving several decades later. Thousands of Chinese were brought to California during the gold rush of 1848–1849 and by the 1860s large contingents were working in mines and on construction of railways in the western United States. Relatively few Japanese were in the United States in the late nineteenth century, but more than one hundred thousand Chinese lived there. Californians were alarmed at the separatism of the Chinese, who saw themselves as transients who would stay in America only for a while and then return to China, and their refusal to “acculturate to the norms of American society.” Chinese often worked in the most lowly and odious of jobs, while spending only minimal amounts of money in California, and saving the rest or sending it back to families in China. These problems led to the congressional exclusion acts of 1882, 1888, and 1892, that prohibited further immigration of Chinese to the United States and placed special restrictions on Chinese already in the country.<sup>15</sup>

Hawaii did not become a territory of the United States until 1898, but for most of the century prior to that time Americans had exercised a strong voice in the affairs of the governments of the islands. American planters in Hawaii put pressure on Congress after the Civil War to pass a reciprocity treaty to remove tariffs from the import of sugar into the United States, but it was not until 1876 that such a treaty was passed and put into operation. This pact greatly increased sugar production in the islands and intensified the need for additional contract laborers.

The first shipment of Japanese contract laborers to Hawaii was a small group of 148 immigrants in 1868, but disputes between Japanese and Hawaiian officials brought a halt to further immigration for the next seventeen years. Most of the Japanese remaining in Hawaii in 1885 had married Hawaiian or Portuguese women (Portuguese workers had also been brought to Hawaii) and their presence was not noticeable.<sup>16</sup> In 1885, relations were repaired and large numbers of Japanese began to travel to Hawaii. By 1890, Japanese constituted the

single largest category of workers, which generated fear—on the part of American residents—of a takeover of Hawaii by Japan.<sup>17</sup>

Japanese communities in Hawaii began to take on an appearance of permanence with all the trappings of home, such as Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, festivals, and Japanese-language newspapers. American residents, unable to penetrate the puzzling language and privacy of the laborers, grew resentful and uneasy. According to William Adam Russ, Jr.: “The chief cause for the Revolution of 1893 and for final annexation was one in which sugar and immigration were entwined together. In other words, there was danger that Orientals would shortly overwhelm white civilization in the islands.”<sup>18</sup>

Debate over renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty, originally limited to a seven-year period, was conducted in Congress from 1886 to 1887 with much criticism, especially from sugar, sorghum, and rice-producing states of the South. In addition to the economic and agricultural issues, a major controversy erupted over a proposed amendment—originated by the Senate without the consent of President Grover Cleveland or his secretary of state—that would cede Pearl Harbor to the United States. Aggressive action by Germany in the South Pacific as well as British overtures—following completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway— to increase Pacific competition gave ammunition to treaty proponents. Backed by expansionists and advocates of strong naval power in the Pacific, the Senate approved the amended treaty January 20, 1887, followed by heated disputes in both the United States and Hawaii as to whether the pact represented an actual cession of territory or a lease. After an exchange of notes indicating, in effect, that Hawaii retained residual sovereignty over Pearl Harbor and that the United States would relinquish the port in the event of abrogation of the reciprocity treaty, ratification by Hawaiian officials was given and the treaty was proclaimed in Washington in November 1887.<sup>19</sup>

While the earlier Kamehameha kings were generally viewed as noble and fair, Kalakaua, who ruled from 1872 until his death in 1891, was seen as a tyrant and scandalous in his debauched behavior as he drank heavily in the last year of his life. In addition, he was described as untruthful, corrupt, and weak. As residents of American ancestry gained control of business and government, a new constitution was adopted and put into effect on July 1, 1887, making the king responsible to them.<sup>20</sup> By 1889, insurrections and instability in Honolulu led the United States to station a naval warship in Hawaii on a permanent basis.

Liliuokalani, known previously as Mrs. John Dominis, the wife of a man born to a Boston sea captain and a Hawaiian woman, became queen upon Kalakaua’s death and experienced increasing difficulty in her dealings with the now-dominant American settlers. The queen’s decision to disband the legislature on January 14, 1893, along with her plans for a new constitution taking power away from the whites and restoring authority to the natives precipitated a revolution.<sup>21</sup>

American troops (162 officers and men) from the USS *Boston* landed in Honolulu and three days later a provisional government—that was to rule until

annexation by the United States—was established with Sanford B. Dole as its leader. The new government was composed of an executive council of four men—all citizens of Hawaii, but of American ancestry—and an advisory council of fourteen men, none of whom were native Hawaiians. Thus, the top officials in the new government consisted solely of men of American and European ancestry, representatives of an ethnic group that made up only a small percentage of the total population. Although most of them were classified as “Hawaiian citizens,” they were in no way representative of the native or Asian populations. Their chief goal, mainly for economic reasons, was annexation to the United States. Native Hawaiians, however, did continue to be employed in lower-level positions within the bureaucracy. The monarchy was abolished in a bloodless revolution and Liliuokalani, although making several unsuccessful appeals to the U.S. government and experiencing confrontation with Americans, never regained the throne.<sup>22</sup>

Shortly after the revolution, several officials of the new provisional government traveled to Washington to promote annexation. The group arrived in the Capitol in February 1893, the last month of President Benjamin Harrison’s administration. Again, as with the Reciprocity Treaty, some of the southern states were opposed to annexation and so were a number of influential news journals. Although Harrison, a Republican, was favorable to annexation, his successor, Democrat Grover Cleveland, whose first term preceded Harrison, resumed the office of president on March 4, 1893, with strong opposition to annexation.<sup>23</sup>

President Cleveland proposed the restoration of Queen Liliuokalani to the throne, but changed his mind when the queen revealed that one of her first acts would be to behead the members of the provisional government. Annexation Party members saw a need for a more permanent—at least for four years— government of the Republic of Hawaii.<sup>24</sup> Debates over the new government and entitlement to citizenship, along with voting privileges, proved to be a major challenge to organizers of the new government. Proposals were made to permanently disenfranchise the Chinese and Japanese, treating them as temporary residents who would eventually return to their own country. The commander of U.S. naval forces in Hawaiian waters, Admiral J. G. Walker, reported to the secretary of the navy that there was much concern about the wisdom of denying the vote to the Japanese. He added: “Many persons here both in and out of the government think the Japanese a possible source of future danger.”<sup>25</sup>

The issue was finally resolved by declaring that all persons born or naturalized in Hawaii prior to 1894 were citizens (of Hawaii), and that subsequent naturalization would be limited to those who could pass a strict examination, which would eliminate most Chinese and Japanese. The Republic of Hawaii was proclaimed July 4, 1894, and the United States quickly recognized the new government.<sup>26</sup>

The matter of who was to govern was not settled yet, however. Residents loyal to the throne, the Royalists, attempted to overthrow the government and reestablish the monarchy by mounting an armed insurrection on January 6, 1895.

Officials of the Republic of Hawaii declared martial law and subdued the rebels in short order. Queen Liliuokalani, who claimed she had nothing to do with the revolt, was arrested a few days later and charged with treason. She signed a statement renouncing her right to the throne, acknowledged that the government of the Hawaiian republic was the only lawful government of the Hawaiian Islands, and that the “late Hawaiian monarchy is finally and forever ended.” Nevertheless, the former queen was tried by military commission, found guilty, and sentenced to five years of hard labor with a fine of \$5,000. Her sentence was later commuted to house arrest and she was released in eight months. The insurrectionists were tried and found guilty; some received death sentences while others long prison terms. Within a year, however, the death sentences had been commuted and all prisoners were paroled.<sup>27</sup>

The United States was also expanding into the southwest Pacific where rights were obtained for a coaling station at Pago Pago in Samoa in 1878. This led to rivalry with Great Britain and Germany that nearly erupted into open warfare before a joint protectorate was arranged in 1889. A partition of the islands ten years later resulted in the eastern islands—American Samoa—becoming a possession of the United States.

Another area of American involvement in the Asia/Pacific region prior to 1898 was Korea. This peninsular country, jutting southward from the Asia mainland, had long been a tributary state of China, and was even more fiercely determined than Japan to remain closed to foreigners. Ships from Western nations began appearing near the Korean coastline as early as 1832, but hostile acts occurred between ships’ crews and Koreans. An American merchant ship, the *General Sherman*, was met with an unfriendly reception when it entered

Korean waters in 1866 seeking trading opportunities. Alarmed defenders, wanting to keep Korea closed to all foreign intercourse, fiercely attacked the ship, burned it to the waterline, and killed all crewmen.<sup>28</sup> Korean officials, keenly aware of the troubles China had experienced with foreigners, were determined to avoid similar experiences. Also, the Korean government viewed the propagation of Christianity on the peninsula with apprehension, considering religion and trade as a guise to spread Western ideas with a consequent endangerment of indigenous culture and territorial integrity. While French missionaries had been permitted earlier, resulting in the conversion of about twenty thousand Koreans to Catholicism, many of the missionaries and converts were executed after Korea began to shun foreigners and break off all contact with Western powers.<sup>29</sup>

In 1871, five years after the *General Sherman* incident, the United States sent a detachment of five navy ships to Korea in a belated reprisal and another attempt to establish trading relationships. Again, the Americans met fierce resistance from Korean fortifications and suffered heavy casualties. Seeing no need to force the issue at this point, the U.S. forces decided to pull back and await another opportunity. The other Western powers were preoccupied with their own problems—France with Indochina, Britain with India, and Russia with coloni-

zation of the Maritime Territory. China was in a weakened condition after internal rebellion and foreign encroachment had left it focused on its own difficulties. That left Japan with an uncontested opportunity to force an entry into Korea.

After the aborted Korea attempt in 1873 and the Formosa incident of 1874, Japan created a pretext for action in 1875 by provoking an attack on a Japanese ship in Korean waters. This action forced an agreement leading to the 1876 Treaty of Friendship between Japan and Korea, known as the Treaty of Kangwha. The treaty had a two-fold purpose: to show that Korea was no longer a tributary state of China, and to set the stage for Japan's preeminent rights in Korea. The treaty "permitted Japan to survey Korean coastal waters at will and it also contained an extra-territoriality clause authorizing the establishment of Japanese settlements on land to be leased in the opened ports, with their Japanese residents subject to Japanese law as applied by Japanese courts."<sup>30</sup>

A report from the British commissioner of customs at Newchang, in northeast China, reflects the rapid changes experienced after Korea's treaty with Japan:

The exchange of commodities between Newchang and Corea [Korea] has not been on such an extensive scale as it was at one time, owing, it is said, to the footing which the Japanese have secured for themselves on the eastern side of the Korean peninsula. By virtue of a treaty which they have concluded with the Coreans, two places on the seaboard, called Bushan [Pusan], in the south, and Yuanshan [Wonsan], in the east, have been opened to them, and through these new ports they have been supplying the country with many things which were formerly admitted into it on the western side.<sup>31</sup>

In addition, Chemulpo (Inchon) was designated as a treaty port. Japanese officials became deeply involved in the internal affairs of Korea after 1876, especially in attempts to place a sympathetic member of the royal family in a position of influence so that Japan could accomplish its goals. When the former president of the United States, Ulysses S. Grant, visited Tokyo in 1879, he was highly impressed with Japan's modernization and advancement, and supported the Japanese position in Korea. Britain, however, sided with Chinese attempts to continue supremacy over Korea. Hostile action in 1882 resulted in the killing of a number of Japanese in Korea bringing about the intervention of both China and Japan. Japan, relying on its 1876 treaty, sent additional ships and troops to Korea, but when China dispatched forty-five hundred troops to the peninsula, the Japanese decided to pull back and wait for another day.

Chinese officials, concerned over Japan's ambitions, prevailed upon Korea to conclude treaties with the United States, France, and other Western nations. U.S. Navy commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, initially rebuffed in his attempts to negotiate a treaty in a direct approach to Korea, was able to conclude a treaty with Korean emissaries with the assistance of Chinese officials in 1882.<sup>32</sup> This was followed by Korean treaties with Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, and France, giving recognition to Korea's status as an independent nation. China, however,

was not able to sustain its hegemonic position in the area and the treaties simply set the stage for future Japanese control of Korea.

The treaty between the United States and Korea (Kingdom of Chosen) was patterned after earlier treaties concluded with China and Japan, including the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction over American citizens in Korea.<sup>33</sup> President Arthur, in his 1883 message to Congress commented:

In pursuance of the policy declared by this Government of extending our intercourse with the Eastern nations, legations have during the past year been established in Persia [Iran], Siam [Thailand], and Corea. It is probable that permanent missions of those countries will ere long be maintained in the United States.

A special embassy from Siam is now on its way hither.

Treaty relations with Corea were perfected by the exchange at Seoul, on the 19th of May last, of the ratifications of the lately concluded conventions, and envoys from the King of Tah Chosun [Korea] have visited this country and received a cordial welcome. Corea, as yet unacquainted with the methods of western civilization, now invites the attention of those interested in the advancement of our foreign trade, as it needs the implements and products which the United States are ready to supply. We seek no monopoly of its commerce and no advantages over other nations, but as the Chosunese, in reaching for a higher civilization, have confided in this Republic, we cannot regard with indifference any encroachment on their rights.<sup>34</sup>

Japanese influence in Korea increased significantly in the 1880s and many younger Koreans went to Japan for study, while Japanese representatives promised assistance to the progressives in Korea in the event of a coup. The progressives, seeking to modernize Korea along the lines of Meiji Japan, sought to make a break from the Chinese hegemony by overthrowing the Korean queen with her traditional ties to China. The coup attempt was made in 1884, at a time when the Korean progressives viewed an ongoing war between China and France over Indochina as keeping the hegemonic power occupied. However, 1,500 Chinese soldiers remained in Korea and were easily able to defeat the progressives and the 140 Japanese legation troops stationed in Seoul, forcing the Japanese to flee to Japan.

Japan continued making determined efforts to weaken China's dominant position on the Korea Peninsula. While Korean officials sought to hold Japan accountable for its actions in the attempted coup, the Japanese sidestepped the Korean charges and instead demanded compensation for their losses rather than take responsibility for their participation in the debacle. An agreement was worked out with China whereby both Japanese and Chinese troops would withdraw from Korea. In 1885, Japan and China concluded the Treaty of Tientsin that gave each power the right to dispatch troops to Korea, if needed, provided prior notification was given to the other power. Both nations began replacing soldiers with merchants in an attempt to maintain a presence in the Korea Peninsula and China initially won this phase of the struggle.

By the 1880s, the Korea Peninsula was becoming a focal point in East Asia

for a number of powers: China, as the hegemonic power, Japan, as a new element from the east, and a number of European nations as well as the United States. President Cleveland commented in his 1885 message to Congress on relations with Korea:

No opportunity has been omitted to testify the friendliness of this Government toward Korea, whose entrance into the family of treaty powers the United States were the first to recognize. I regard with favor the application made by the Korean Government to be allowed to employ American officers as military instructors, to which the assent of Congress becomes necessary, and I am happy to say this request has the concurrent sanction of China and Japan.<sup>35</sup>

But as malice built up against the Chinese merchants and their excesses, Korea began to lean to Russia, seeing that nation as a way of playing China against Japan. After an 1888 treaty that gave Russia special privileges in the northern part of Korea, Britain became alarmed and occupied a small Korean island for strategic defense against the Russian navy. China then pressured Britain to leave while Germany and the United States were sought after by Korean officials as a means of resolving the impending crisis.<sup>36</sup>

In the next few years, Japan gained economic ascendancy in Korea with large numbers of merchants from Japan establishing themselves throughout the country. Their aggressive ambition and cutthroat competition rapidly drove out Chinese and Korean merchants. The open ports of Korea—Inchon, Pusan, and Wonsan—saw the establishment of Japanese merchants on an unprecedented scale. The overwhelming majority of businesses and approximately three-fourths of the ships entering those ports were Japanese. Furthermore, most of the goods imported from Japan were actually produced in Japan, while Chinese exports to Korea were mostly reexports of goods that had been manufactured in Britain.

Japan provided 81 percent of Korea's imports in 1885, but just seven years later, because of increased imports from China, this advantage had been reduced to 55 percent. This condition caused intensified competition from Japanese merchants, who by now had spread out to rural areas of Korea, including the gouging of the peasants who had to pay with rice, priced unfairly low, for exportation to Japan. This situation along with heavy tax burdens led to a peasant revolution, spearheaded by a religious society known as the Tonghak, who ultimately called for a crusade to expel the Japanese and westerners. The peasant revolt picked up a large following and became a threat to the government in Seoul, whereupon the Korean king then called on China for help in subduing the revolt.

Upon learning of this turn of events, Japan also decided to send troops to Korea. In any event, the revolt was put down by the Korean government before either Chinese or Japanese troops arrived. Nevertheless, Japan seized upon this opportunity by having its troops, which arrived in Seoul before the Chinese, hold the king under its control. The Tokyo government claimed that the Chinese notification of dispatching troops had made an unjustified claim of Chinese

suzerainty. The Japanese navy then attacked and sank a British merchant ship (chartered by the Chinese government) that was bringing Chinese soldiers to Korea.

What actually had happened was that, while ten years earlier Japan had backed away from a fight with China, it had now bolstered its military forces significantly so that it had an undeniable superiority over China—and was a match for other powers—leading Japan to begin its assertion of hegemony over other Asian nations. This action resulted in the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).<sup>37</sup>

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## CHAPTER 2

### Expansion in Asia and the Pacific

#### THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1894–1895

Japanese army forces in Korea were increased significantly in May and June 1894 through the use of subterfuge by Army Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami Soroku and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. Vagueness in the wording of Kawakami's statement indicated that a small increase in troop strength would take place, but Japanese army commanders were deliberately making a major addition of troops. And the Japanese minister in Seoul claimed he was unaware that so many troops were being brought into Korea.<sup>1</sup> This type of misleading comment by field commanders to Tokyo officials was to be repeated many times over the next fifty years, but with the ambiguity of the Japanese language, it provided a convenient cover so that national government officials in Tokyo could claim innocence. The Japanese term for the misleading of superiors by subordinates, *gekokujo*, is translated in one dictionary as "overbearing of the lower against the upper," and was a concept that dated to feudal times. Japanese negotiators, even more so in dealing with foreigners, are noted for adroitness in applying terms from their own language in translations that can cause confusion to the unwary. This obfuscation made it difficult to pinpoint any particular individual or group.

In any event, once the increases in the field had transpired, even the highest officials in the Japanese government rarely reversed the actions of field commanders. This lack of corrective action by the civilian government in Tokyo is attributable to the 1889 Constitution of the Empire of Japan, the Meiji constitution, which made the army and navy chiefs directly responsible to the emperor

rather than to the national legislature, the Diet. Also, for much of the period prior to 1945, navy and war ministers, who were career military officers rather than civilian appointees, had the power to cause a dissolution of the civilian government by withholding their concurrence in the appointment of other ministers. In ancient Japan, it was assumed that the shogun—the generalissimo and military dictator—would speak for the emperor on military and foreign affairs. This tradition prevailed over a period of centuries during the Kamakura Shogunate, 1192–1333, the Muromachi Shogunate, 1338–1573, and the Tokugawa Shogunate, 1603–1867.

On July 23, 1894, Japanese soldiers in Korea forced the Korean king to issue a decree expelling Chinese soldiers from Korea, but the Chinese resisted. As the disputes between China and Japan over Korea became more heated, open warfare erupted two days later, when the Japanese warship *Naniwa* fired upon and sank the British ship *Kowshing*, which had been chartered by the Chinese to transport troops to Korea. Even more appalling was the killing of Chinese soldiers in the water by machine gun fire from *Naniwa*. Japanese navy officers used the pretext that *Kowshing* did not salute *Naniwa* even though the latter showed an admiral's flag and had commanded the British ship to stop. The Japanese took this action without a declaration of war, setting a pattern that was to be followed on other occasions. The sinking of *Kowshing* resulted in the deaths of over one thousand Chinese soldiers. The ambiguity of the Japanese language provided a pretext that was used by the naval general staff in Tokyo to falsely assert that Chinese troops had fired initially before abandoning *Kowshing*.<sup>2</sup> This was also a Japanese pattern of behavior that was observed in later wars. The *Kowshing* had sailed from Tangku near Tientsin on July 23, 1894, and was bound for the Chinese garrison at Asan, about fifty miles south of Seoul.

Foreign Minister Mutsu instructed the Japanese ambassador in London to apologize for the sinking of the British ship *Kowshing*. There was talk of a payment of an indemnity, but Britain eventually abandoned its right to any claim for damages.<sup>3</sup> Again, this type of ploy was to be used on numerous occasions over the next half-century—whenever a Japanese field commander caused the peacetime destruction of a ship or other possession of a Western power, Tokyo was forthcoming with profuse apologies. This stratagem worked as the passion of the moment in Britain or the United States usually subsided within a few days.

Japanese army commander Yamagata Aritomo developed contingency plans for strategic operations in Northeast Asia prior to 1894. In fact, a Japanese covert intelligence operation had been at work in China since 1879, and more recently Japanese spies in Korea and Manchuria had been collecting order of battle information on Chinese troops in those areas.<sup>4</sup> Japan's intentions were reflected in increased expenditures for army and navy functions during the decade from 1885 to 1894.

On July 28–29, 1894, a Japanese “combined brigade” began the offensive

against Chinese troops by attacking and defeating the Chinese garrison at Songhwan, south of Seoul. These events transpired without a declaration of war that was not forthcoming until August 1. From then on, the Japanese had the upper hand as fighting proceeded north to Pyongyang where Chinese forces were defeated on September 15.<sup>5</sup> From this point, Japanese troops continued to maintain the offensive, advancing across the Yalu River—where the Japanese navy destroyed a large number of Chinese ships—into Manchuria, thence westward to the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur. Chinese forces were completely driven out of Korea by mid-October 1894.

Hiroshima served as the major headquarters in Japan for operations in Korea and China. To show that he was taking personal responsibility for the conduct of the war, Emperor Meiji established his headquarters there in September 1894 and the national Diet also convened there. It is unlikely, however, that the actual conduct of the war was directed by the emperor, but his ministers saw that it was necessary to show that direct control had been returned to the monarch as opposed to earlier rule through the military leader, the shogun. Policy direction for the war came from Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) while military operations were directed by Yamagata, the field commander of the First Army.

Additionally, naval shipyards at nearby Kure, a naval academy at Eta Jima, and the army headquarters in Hiroshima made the area a site of major army and navy operations fifty years before an atomic bomb was eventually dropped there in 1945.

The prime minister, Count Ito Hirobumi, addressed the Diet in Hiroshima on October 19, 1894, and thanked “the *mikado* [emperor] for advocating the imperial standard and for personally assuming direction of the war.” Ito concluded: “His Majesty rightly considers China the enemy of civilization. We will comply with the imperial desire to destroy the barbarous obstinacy of that power.” The Diet, according to Japanese newspapers, exhibited great patriotic fervor during this session and increased military appropriations unanimously.<sup>6</sup>

Britain, the United States, and other Western powers viewed the events unfolding in Korea with considerable interest. Britain had been in negotiations with Japan for a new commercial treaty—a revision of the earlier unequal pact— but was alarmed over the actions related to Korea. Formal talks began in April 1894, but events of the next few months led to hesitation on the part of the British. Nonetheless, the treaty was signed on July 16 and ratifications exchanged on August 25, 1894, ending British extraterritorial rights when it went into effect in 1899.<sup>7</sup>

The United States was also in the process of treaty revision with Japan, but American public sentiment generally favored the Japanese over China, viewing Japan as a civilizing force for Asia. Much of this attitude had been fostered based on careful strategy by Japanese officials to mold a favorable opinion of Japan among the American public. This public relations effort intensified during the Sino-Japanese War when government agents in Tokyo hired foreign residents of Japan—some of them die-hard expatriates from the United States—to

write material designed to win over American public opinion. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan, which replaced the earlier unequal treaties and abolished extraterritorial rights for Americans in Japan, was concluded on November 22, 1894, with the stipulation that the treaty was to go into effect in 1899.<sup>8</sup> This, along with revised treaties with other Western powers, satisfied a major goal of the Meiji government.

The United States remained neutral during the Sino-Japanese War but played an important part in the protection of lives and property in the war zone. Both China and Japan accepted American offers for the protection of civilians of one nation residing in the other nation's territory. Large numbers of Japanese were in Tientsin and Shanghai while Chinese citizens lived at various locations in Japan, especially Yokohama and Kobe. Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham forwarded dispatches in late July 1894 to U.S. ministers in Tokyo and Peking directing them to act as agents for Chinese and Japanese residents in their respective areas for the duration of hostilities.<sup>9</sup>

Due to concern for American missionaries in Korea at the time of the Tonghak rebellion, President Grover Cleveland sent the USS *Baltimore*, the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, to Korea in June 1894.<sup>10</sup> The large number of Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Korea at this point, however, posed much more of a threat to American residents than the now-vanquished peasant rebellion group. Within a few days, U.S. Marines from the *Baltimore* marched into the American legation compound in Seoul.<sup>11</sup>

As hostilities spread into Manchuria, the United States became increasingly involved in protecting the lives of American residents in the affected areas. President Cleveland, the son of a Presbyterian minister and the brother-in-law of a missionary in South Asia, was particularly receptive to pleas of the American Board of Missions and representatives of Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopal denominations for the safety of missionaries. There were approximately a thousand missionary families in these areas. Cleveland turned to Navy Secretary Hilary A. Herbert who ordered a major portion of the fleet, small though it was in 1894, to Asian waters.<sup>12</sup>

The Japanese army deployed to the field was organized into two major commands: the First Army under Yamagata, who had previously served as chief of the general staff, cabinet minister, and prime minister, and was generally regarded as the "father of the modern Japanese army"; and, the Second Army, under General Oyama Iwao, the war minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister Ito. This unusual arrangement of appointing central government officials of the highest level as field army commanders reveals the great importance Tokyo gave to the war with China. It was not to be a simple war to assure the independence of Korea; instead, the defeat of China was the real purpose. It was to be the first step in becoming an imperial power on the Asian mainland and designed to impress on Western powers the message that Japan would not be an easy target for imperialist ventures.

While the First Army moved through southern Manchuria toward Newchang,

the Second Army concentrated on the Liaotung Peninsula. Two divisions sailed from Hiroshima in October 1894 and landed on the coast about fifty miles northeast of Port Arthur, the Chinese naval base. Japanese strategy was to attack the defenses of the base from the rear. Japanese intelligence agents had discovered that the coast artillery guns were useful only in defending Port Arthur against attack by sea.

Troops of the Second Army captured Port Arthur on November 21, 1894, and all of the Liaotung Peninsula fell into Japanese hands. The Chinese were no match for the invaders, even though stiff resistance was noted in some areas, but, surprisingly, Port Arthur fell in a day. It was at this point that the most outrageous behavior of the entire war occurred—the murder of large numbers of Chinese civilians. Details underlying the cause of this brutal incident vary, but apparently what set the Japanese troops off was the decapitated heads of several Japanese soldiers—killed in the fighting—displayed on wooden stakes. Some reports indicate that Japanese army units then went on a rampage, murdering every Chinese in sight. Reports from individual soldiers confirmed these brutalities, even though they were quickly covered up by the Japanese High Command.<sup>13</sup> Independent reports from an American army officer, Lieutenant M. J. O'Brien, a military attaché in China, and substantiated by an American ship captain along with a Russian military agent confirm that there was a slaughter of civilians and defeated Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur on November 21, 1894. Reports of the massacre led to a reversal of public opinion in the United States, creating outrage over Japanese actions. But swift action by the propagandists of the Japanese ministry in Washington put a spin on the atrocity by making it appear as just a heated battle. Most Americans forgot about it within a few days.<sup>14</sup>

Japan's Second Army, strengthened by fresh troops from Hiroshima, began the invasion of the Shantung Peninsula about a hundred miles to the south across the Gulf of Chihli from Port Arthur in January 1895, while Japan's navy converged on the scene at Weihaiwei and destroyed the Chinese fleet on February 12, 1895. Japan completed the defeat of Chinese army forces on the Shantung Peninsula by the end of February, and units of the Second Army began to rapidly move aboard troop transports to reinforce the First Army for continued aggression into Manchuria. Some of the hardest fighting of the war took place as three Japanese army divisions faced a Chinese army with an estimated strength of about twenty thousand troops. The Japanese army captured Newchang and areas to the west in early March 1895. This put a large Japanese army within striking distance of China proper, but IGH in Hiroshima directed a move to establish control far to the south in the area around Taiwan. Naval forces, accompanied by army troops, sailed for the Pescadore Islands to assure that Taiwan would be included in the booty for its initial foray into East Asia as an imperial power.<sup>15</sup>

By 1894, Japan had made amazing changes in its external appearances. Rapid modernization following patterns of European and American industrialization