# REPRESENTING RED AND BLUE

## HOW THE CULTURE WARS CHANGE THE WAY CITIZENS SPEAK AND POLITICIANS LISTEN

DAVID C. BARKER
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OXFORD

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*To Meg, Matt, and Dorothy (Mom), with all my love…*

*DCB*

*To Ronda, Mason, and Izzie (dog), with all my love….*

*CJC*

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# Preface

This book has been a long time coming. When we fielded our first pilot survey for the project, we lived on the same continent, our hairlines were fully intact, everyone "knew" Hillary Clinton was going to be the next president of the United States and no one outside of Illinois had ever heard of Barack Obama.

But really, the book began germinating many years before that, in a graduate seminar taught by Bob Erikson at the University of Houston. It was there that we began to think and argue about what the proper role of an elected representative really ought to be (eager graduate students that we were). During the 16 years that followed, while navigating our share of hiking trails and perhaps more than our share of barstools, we found a few other subjects to debate as well (stripes vs. solids, *Anchor Man* vs. *Talladega Nights*, and Giordano's vs. Gino's East come to mind), but sooner or later our attention always turned back to the political events of the day—and not infrequently to the subjects discussed in this book.

The next 65,000 words are a byproduct of those many spirited conversations. Chris first had to convince David that most citizens have instinctive and discernible preferences about the way they want their elected officials to represent them—that some citizens prefer leaders who pander to public opinion, while other citizens prefer leaders who shirk it—and that those preferences influence the actual governing habits of elected officials. Some time later, David had to invest even more time making the case that the Red/Blue Culture Wars in fact underlie those dynamics—specifically, that over the past generation, by championing and rewarding "principled leadership," the Christian Right has prompted many Republican politicians to turn a deaf ear to constituents' policy demands. Eventually, we came to see eye to eye on just about everything (except the title, but that is a longer story). We hope that those exercises in persuasion eventually produced a narrative that at least some readers will find compelling.

The data, of course, helped each of us argue our cases. It was with queasy stomachs, though, that we would analyze each new year of mass survey responses and congressional roll-call votes. In our careers, we have been struck by how often those pesky human subjects fail to behave as they "should," according to some seemingly brilliant theory that we think we have concocted. In light of those experiences, we would wonder whether "last year's findings" had been artifacts or the byproduct of an anomalous period in time. After all, our theory was constructed, little by little, with Culture War flashpoints serving as backdrop: the "two-for-one" Clinton presidency, the Gingrich rise and fall, the Lewinsky scandal and impeachment overreach, the Bush versus Gore electoral college mess, George W. Bush's outspoken Christian traditionalism, same-sex marriage controversies in state after state, and so on—all fueled by increasingly popular partisan media sources that seemed to amplify the cacophony. Indeed, it was during precisely this stretch in time that the terms "Red America" and "Blue America" emerged and became ensconced in the American lexicon.

What if all of that were to cool down, we wondered, once Clinton and Bush faded from public memory? What if Barack Obama was right when he told the audience at the 2004 Democratic National Convention that "we are not a collection of Red States and Blue States, but the United States…"? Might voters, once different issues and a different kind of leader emerged, stop wielding their Sunday-morning habits as cudgels and return instead to the norm of a collective "civil religion" that had characterized most public discourse for the previous three generations? If so, then the story we were crafting with this research might have fallen apart before we had even had the chance to open Microsoft Word.

The answer to these questions turned out to be a decisive "No." It is clear that the Republicans have cemented their hold on white Christian traditionalists as a constituency, just as seculars and progressive Christians continue to migrate unabated to the Democrats. And as we see it, the past few years have seen public debates over religious questions become, if anything, more pronounced. For example, the controversial comments made by Obama's former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, might have hurt the candidate more if so many Americans hadn't already been convinced that he is a Kenyan-born Muslim. Moreover, just as Fox News annually bemoans the liberal "War on Christmas," progressive authors and commentators continually decry a Republican "War on Science." And when it comes to outspoken Christian traditionalism in the public sphere, recent Republican presidential hopefuls Huckabee, Palin, Bachman, and Santorum make George W. Bush look like an Episcopalian by comparison. Meanwhile, on the *New York Times* bestseller list,

the smug-atheist manifesto has practically become a literary category unto its own (e.g., Dawkins, Harris, Hitchens, Maher).

So it is clear to us that, as of this writing, the Culture Wars have not cooled and the role of religion in American politics has not waned. But that isn't exactly big news. What is more relevant is the staying power of our claim that in Blue America, politicians tend to listen more intently to public opinion than they do in Red America, because that is the way each respective constituency likes it. It was easy for us to see a pattern when Bush and Clinton were serving as primary reference points. After all, Bush won points with his base by routinely bragging throughout his presidency about "standing on principle" (especially when it came to the increasingly unpopular Iraq war), which was a deliberate dig at Clinton, who had habitually consulted polling data to determine everything from his position on welfare reform to his vacation whereabouts (Yellowstone was deemed much more "American" than Martha's Vineyard). These observations helped to spark our theory in the first place.

And as time went on, former Democratic presidential nominees Gore and Kerry didn't hurt our case either. In 2000, Gore's poll-driven personality makeovers were so quick and pronounced they might have made Philip Seymour Hoffman envious. And Kerry, of course, was the guy who famously "voted for it (the Iraq War) before he voted against it."

But maybe what we had taken as evidence of a Red/Blue pattern toward one style of representation or another was really just idiosyncratic to the Clinton–Bush years. Maybe Blue America doesn't *necessarily* embrace policy pandering after all, we wondered. And maybe Red America doesn't instinctively reject it. Could the age of Obama reverse the trend?

As of this writing (in February 2012), it would not appear so. Can there be any doubt, from 2008 to 2012, which party's members were more inclined to bargain, compromise, moderate, and mollify the other side in order to appeal to the median voter? Whether the issue was the federal stimulus package, or health care reform, or taxes, or shutting down the government, or raising the debt ceiling, or collective bargaining rights, or reforming Medicare, or closing the Guantanamo Bay detention center, or whether religiously affiliated hospitals would be required to deny/provide coverage for contraception in their insurance plans, it was the Obama administration and the Democrats in Congress that regularly moved ever-closer to the ideological Center, while the GOP folded their arms on the Right and stayed put—even as congressional approval rates fell to historic lows (and disproportionately for Republican legislators). All of this makes sense in light of a CBS poll taken on September 16, 2011, that revealed Republican voters to be seven times more likely than Democrats to say that politicians "should stick to their positions, even if it means

not getting as much done" (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/16/politics/main20107599.shtml).

Perhaps the most compelling anecdotal evidence in support of our argument can be observed by taking a casual glance at the 2012 GOP nomination contest, and by comparing it to past Democratic contests. Recall the reputations for compulsive pandering that Clinton, Gore, Kerry all garnered. And recall how the Right hated them for it. But when it came to the Democratic faithful, the candidates' eagerness to please may have induced some head shaking at times but it didn't keep voters from supporting those guys at the ballot box; Clinton, Gore, and Kerry all won their party's nomination rather easily, after all.

By contrast, in 2012, establishment frontrunner Mitt Romney's reputation (fair or not) as a popularity-chasing opportunist who lacks core convictions has led the conservative base to desperately search for almost any alternative who will be willing to thumb his or her nose at the median voter. One Christian-Right darling after another—no matter how unpalatable to the general electorate—has gotten his or her chance to seize the nomination from Romney: Michelle Bachman, Rick Perry, Herman Cain, Newt Gingrich, Rick Santorum. Even Ron Paul has a lot of admirers for his apparent consistency. Romney may get the GOP nomination yet, but if he does it will be over the objection of a traditionalistic base that divided its support between other, more "trustee-oriented" candidates.

So, when it comes to acknowledgments, we suppose we should start by thanking Messrs. Clinton, Bush, Gore, Kerry, Obama, Romney, and Santorum (et al.) for making our argument easier than it otherwise might have been.

Second, we want to recognize all the people at Oxford University Press—especially John Jost, the editor of this series; Abby Gross, our publishing editor; and Joanna Ng, her editorial assistant—for a careful, expedient, supportive, and thoroughly professional publishing experience.

Third, we thank Steve Ansolabehere for organizing the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, without which our data collection would have likely been cost-prohibitive, and the folks at YouGov/Polimetrix (especially Samantha Luks [whose life we made much more difficult than it needed to be on a few occasions]), for managing our data collections.

Fourth, we offer our gratitude to our home institutions, the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Strathclyde, for supporting our research (including grants from the Central Development Research fund and Richard D. and Mary Jane Edwards Endowed Publication Fund at Pitt and the John Anderson Research Lectureship funds at Strathclyde)…and for hiring us in the first place.

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Sixth, we are greatly indebted to the many people who have offered their thoughts and/or encouragement on this project over the years. The biggest thanks go to Jamie Druckman, who offered so many helpful comments, on multiple occasions, that we feel like he should practically have a co-authorship. Nearly as helpful was David Leege. Others whose help and/or support was invaluable include Marc Hetherington, Robert Shapiro, Morgan Marietta, Paul Djupe, Brian Calfano, Keith Gaddie, David Dohorty, LJ Zigerell, Christopher Wlezien (also for sharing data!), Kathleen Knight, Gary Jacobson, Shanna Pearson Merkowitz and John McTague (also for sharing data), David Sears, Jim Guth, Shaun Bowler, Ken Wald, Richard Wood, John Hibbing, Jeff Cohen, Walt Stone, Steve Ansolabehere, Michael Goodhart, Jon Hurwitz, George Krause, Jonathan Woon, Kris Kanthak, Steve Finkel, Barry Ames, David Judge, Robert Johns, Val Brkich, Amy Erica Smith, and PadiHallam Joseph (for excellent research assistance!). We also thank the many discussants at the many conferences where we presented papers developing our argument and research (whom we have to admit are too numerous for us to remember at this point. Or maybe it is just that we are getting too old to remember. Either way . . . ).

Personally, David would like to acknowledge my mother, Dorothy Notgrass, for her tireless support and for teaching me, by example, how to work hard, to keep on "keeping on," and to stay kind. Mom, you will always be my role model. I also want to recognize my son, Matthew, for showing me what courage really looks like. You can do anything, Matt, and I am very proud of you. Finally, I want to thank my lovely bride, Meg, for all the daily encouragement, warm companionship, laughter, and sincere love a person could ever ask for (and for patiently helping me find my keys, wallet, phone, eye drops, way to the grocery store, etc.). I am, without a doubt, The Luckiest.

In the same way, Chris would like to thank his family (and gimlets) for all of their love and support over the years. This book was started well after my mother was long gone, but there is no doubt that it would not have begun without the love and encouragement she provided when she was around. And she

had the good forethought to leave Josephine, Tom, and Kendel around to take over for her. Mason, my best buddy, has helped to keep me grounded over the years, never ceasing to remind me that it is important to do your own thing (even if others might tell you it is daft). And to Ronda, there is no way I would have completed my contribution to this project without your love, support, encouragement, affirmation, and general putting up with me. Thank you.

CHAPTER 1

# Introduction: Saddling the Drunken Mule

> Many progressives slavishly follow polls.
>
> —*George Lakoff*, Thinking Points *(2006)*

> So?
>
> —*Vice President Dick Cheney (March 19, 2008), in reference to polls showing that two thirds of Americans then opposed the Iraq War*

How, exactly, do you want your government to represent you? Should the leaders you elect simply do what you tell them, even if it means compromising some of their deeply held beliefs? Or should they doggedly stand on principle, even if it means neglecting some of your demands for change? Of course, how you answer this question may depend (in part) on your policy preferences and whether your political "team" currently holds power. That is, we citizens tend to admire politicians when they respond to the sounds of *our* voices, but we decry "shameless pandering" when they listen too intently to those from the other side of the aisle. So when we read the quotation above by Vice President Cheney, in which he appears to casually dismiss public calls for policy change, our impression of him as either a "principled leader" or an "out-of-touch tyrant" might simply come down to how we felt about the war in Iraq.

In this way, and others, the American voter[1] is not unlike a drunken mule: unfocused and fickle, but also stubborn and ornery. We mules can't be expected

[1] *The American Voter*, by Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (1960), famously offered evidence that voters in the United States are, for the most part, ill informed and capricious, but also psychologically attached to political parties for reasons that have little to do with rational calculations or issue preferences. While scholars have debated the finer points of these characterizations for decades, the basic conclusions have held up quite well over time (e.g., Jacoby, 2010).

to pay attention to the nuances of policy (let alone to keep up with what our representatives are doing), but that doesn't mean we won't buck if we get spooked. These equine tendencies create a tricky dilemma for lawmakers trying to represent their constituents: if they turn a blind eye to public opinion they may anger the majority, but if they mindlessly obey the majority they may alienate core supporters. It would seem that policy pandering (shameless or not) is quite the delicate art.

But maybe there's a way around this dilemma that lawmakers face. Suppose we voters are not all the same in terms of how we react to policy pandering. Could it be that by dutifully following public opinion, politicians keep some of us pacified with our oat-bags while prompting others of us to rear up? Might those of us in the latter group give off cues that encourage lawmakers to resist the majority's ever-changing policy demands? And might campaigning politicians send signals of their own, letting voters know ahead of time the degree to which they plan to either lead public opinion or follow it?

In this book, we suggest that the answer to these questions is "yes," and that the consequences are profound. Political scientists have spilled plenty of ink trying to understand how democratic representation "works" (for theoretical discussions of the subject, see Pitkin, 1967, and Mansbridge, 2003; for reviews of the empirical research on representation, see Wlezien & Soroka, 2007, and Hurley & Hill, 2010). Unfortunately, we still do not know very much about the *demand* side of the representation equation—who wants representatives to "listen," who wants representatives to "lead," and what difference any of it makes.[2]

Our starting point, then, is the nagging sense that because students of American politics don't really know anything about the style of representation citizens *want*, they cannot possibly know all that much about the style of representation citizens actually *get*. Our goal is to shed some light on these things.

## INSTRUCTED DELEGATES VERSUS TRUSTEES

Of course, in trying to understand how the public prefers to be represented, there are many trails of inquiry down which we could travel. For example, we

[2] However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001, 2002) have demonstrated that public preferences regarding matters of political *process*, in general, are at least as consequential for democratic politics as are public *policy* preferences. In that way, since preferences regarding representation style are also matters of political process, rather than policy, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's research lays important groundwork for this project.

could try to explain how the public defines a constituency in the first place (e.g., Should lawmakers focus on representing their local constituents, or do they have a national constituency? Furthermore, do lawmakers have a responsibility to represent *all* constituents, or only those who voted for them?). Or, for another thing, we could try to understand preferences regarding whether representatives should look and sound like a majority of their constituents (i.e., should mostly Italian American constituencies be represented by Italian American lawmakers, Catholic constituencies by Catholic lawmakers, and so on?). And that is just the beginning.

Alas, if we were to try in this one book to understand how people think about all (or even some) of these different aspects of representation, things would get messy, and fast. Thus, in case the point is not already clear, we restrict our inquiry here to the question of why some citizens seem to prefer and reward politicians who follow the public's policy demands, while others seem to favor politicians who rely more on their personal judgment when making policy.

In keeping with longstanding political science vernacular, we label these styles of representation the *instructed delegate* style and the *trustee* style. The instructed delegate style is so named because constituents "instruct" their "delegate" (the representative) as to how he or she should vote on legislation and on what issues should be at the top of the legislative agenda. By contrast, the *trustee*-style moniker stems from the fact that constituents "entrust" the representative to make decisions in their interest.

If we can figure out even part of the answer as to why citizens vary in terms of whether they prefer instructed delegates or trustees, we think we can gain some perspective into why some politicians actually do seem to follow public opinion more often than others do. The eventual punch line to this book is that certain citizens, by encouraging representatives to turn a deaf ear to public opinion, effectively mute the democratic voices of other citizens. In other words, we think we have identified a way that citizens can "quiet" their neighbors—in the political arena, at least.

## WHY THESE TERMS?

The terms "instructed delegate" and "trustee" are far from perfect labels for each of the respective styles of representation on which we will be focusing. For one, readers unfamiliar with the primary scholarship on this subject may find these terms obtuse and not all that intuitive. After

all, one cannot just glance at those words, out of context, and have much of an inclination as to what they could mean. The "delegate" term is particularly difficult, because it could be confused with the verb (and homograph) "delegāte," which suggests precisely the opposite of what we are trying to convey. However, in wringing our hands over these terms, all of the potential alternatives seem to suffer from even bigger problems. For example, if we replace "instructed delegate versus trustee" with "poll-based versus principle-based," the normative implication is that those who prefer instructed delegate-style representation somehow lack consciences or principles, which is of course not true. Furthermore, if we use "public opinion-based versus internal judgment-based" it is not clear what exactly "public opinion" is—is it the opinion of the district's constituents, of the country as a whole, of just those in the representative's political party, or what? Of course, we could have adopted Jane Mansbridge's (2003) reformulated terminology of "gyroscopic," "promissory," "anticipatory," and "surrogate," but these concepts incorporate more than the simple dichotomy represented by the "instructed delegate" and "trustee" terms, which would have *really* complicated things (and in our experience, students have a very difficult time understanding some of the Mansbridge terms anyway). On the whole, then, we have decided to hold our noses and stick with the terms that have the broadest and longest-standing tradition of usage within the political science community—so as to maintain continuity if nothing else.[3]

[3] In this book, we are writing to audiences from many different research traditions, including political psychology, legislative studies, religious studies, and American politics more generally. We think we even have a few things to say to the "normative political theory" community. Many of these academic audiences are surely not familiar with the newer terminology that Mansbridge (2003) has suggested. That is yet another reason to follow convention and use the terms of which most political scientists have probably at least heard. In short, we get it—we understand that representation styles are a lot more complicated than the simple delegate versus trustee dichotomy, and we applaud the efforts of Mansbridge and others to provide more precise definitions and distinctions. But the other considerations we have listed provide compelling reasons to stick with the older terms. As they say in "Monty Python and the Holy Grail" (1975): "Look…Camelot!" [repeated twice, as trumpets play a fanfare as the camera cuts briefly to the sight of a majestic castle] "It's only a model." "Shhh!"

## THESE ARE GUT-LEVEL PREFERENCES

Importantly, we do not suspect that people spend much cognitive energy sitting in their back gardens and pondering these matters, Rodin's *Thinker*-style. Furthermore, to the extent that citizens ever do think about such things, we suspect that their preferences are often, in the main, motivated by policy or partisan interests. In other words, as we alluded to in the first paragraph above, when someone knows that her opinion on an issue matches that of the majority, there is a good chance that she prefers the instructed delegate style, because that style would probably give her the policy outcome she wants. On the flip side, when she perceives herself to be part of the minority on an issue but sees her elected representative as a kindred spirit, she has an incentive to prefer the trustee style, because under those conditions the trustee style would increase the odds of getting the policy outcome she wants.

But if that was all there was to the story, this book would not be very interesting, and we could stop writing right now. We argue there is much more to people's representation-style preferences than figuring out which style is most likely to get them what they want—something deeper and more systematic. After all, given widespread public disinterest regarding politics, many citizens may not even know whether theirs is the majority or minority opinion on a given policy matter; nor do citizens really have a much of a clue, much of the time, whether their representatives' policy stances really match their own. Drunken mules, remember?[4]

What citizens may have a sense for, however, is the degree to which they just instinctively like "leaders who lead" (trustees), on the one hand, or "public servants who listen" (instructed delegates), on the other. In other words, without

[4] Some readers may be familiar with the mathematical concept of a "drunkard's walk," which has to do with randomness (for more on this subject and how it may affect all kinds of human behavior, see Mlodinow, 2008). Our reference to a drunken mule does *not* suggest anything about citizens' representation preferences being random. The behavior of a drunken mule may be unfocused, fickle, stubborn, and ornery, but it is not necessarily random. Indeed, a great deal of research we will discuss later (e.g., Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Stimson, Mackuen, & Erikson, 1995) argues that the public has discernible preferences on all sorts of political matters, which both predict and respond to what the government does. Now, when it comes to preferences regarding representation styles, we suspect that they are mostly instinctive, rather than well-thought-out, but we certainly do not think they are random. That is our point in this book: preferences about representation styles are systematic and predictable to a certain extent, which has meaningful consequences for political governance.

ever really thinking about it at all, a citizen might pick up cues about a potential representative's representation style from the politician's campaign rhetoric. She may then reward the politician with her support when she recognizes a kinship (she may not even know *why* she likes a given politician's style, only that she does). And once the politician is in office, this pattern may continue: overall patterns of approval or disapproval may be shaped, in part, by whether the representative's governing style is consistent with the one constituents find most instinctively palatable. We suspect that enough elected officials get recognized, elected, and rewarded/punished in this way so as to ultimately color representation itself in predictable hues across different American constituencies.

## THE ARGUMENT, IN BRIEF

So if citizens' preferences for one or the other style of representation ultimately affect electoral outcomes and the way politicians actually govern, what exactly are the factors that determine whether citizens prefer instructed delegates or trustees in the first place? Our central claim is that cultural traditionalists—especially, but not exclusively, evangelical Christians—tend to embrace trustee-style representation more readily than do seculars, religious progressives, or civil libertarians. By extension, we contend that as long as religious and other cultural differences continue to color ideological identification, partisanship and vote choices in the United States—with cultural traditionalists trending Republican, and seculars, religious progressives, and civil libertarians migrating Democratic—then preferences regarding styles of representation may also come in distinct partisan shades of "Red" and "Blue."[5]

But *why*? Drawing significantly on James Davison Hunter's (1991) "Culture Wars" thesis (see also Wuthnow, 1989), Marc Hetherington's and Jonathan Weiler's (2009) research on American authoritarianism, Jonathan Haidt's (2012; also Kessebir & Haidt, 2010) work on moral reasoning, and John Jost et al.'s (2003) work on motivated social cognition (to name just three), we suggest that the distinction stems from clashing cultural worldviews between

[5] When we use the terms "Red" and "Blue" in this context, we do not simply use them as synonyms for Republican or Democratic partisanship (though that is obviously what they technically stand for on television networks' electoral maps). We believe that these terms have taken on a more subtle meaning, colloquially, referring more to the cultural distinctions that divide some Americans politically. In other words, a crimson "Red" state or district is not simply one that votes solidly Republican, but rather one that votes solidly Republican for reasons that include a strong religious, racial, or otherwise cultural component.

traditionalists and progressives. When it comes to the so-called Culture Wars, we hear a lot through the media about how "Red Americans" supposedly love barbeque, SUVs, and Hank Williams Jr., whereas "Blue Americans" apparently favor brie, Subarus, and John Coltrane. Really, though, the Culture Wars thesis has much less to do with differences in personal taste than it does with core value priorities—whether one prioritizes equal rights and social tolerance, on the one hand, or religious and cultural traditions, on the other.[6]

To break it down even further, the original Culture Wars thesis supposes that cultural progressives and cultural traditionalists differ with regard to very basic assumptions: Is human nature good or bad? Is morality absolute or contextual? Should authority be hierarchical or egalitarian? Is human progress inevitable or hopeless? Putting it rather provocatively, Hunter summarized by claiming that American political conflict is no longer only about whether the New Deal or even "the Sixties" were good ideas, but also about whether the 18th-century Enlightenment was a good idea.[7]

"Fine," a reader might say, "but how could this kind of cultural conflict explain something as seemingly unrelated as differences in preferences regarding representation styles?" To preview our argument, we suggest that cultural traditionalists tend to instinctively embrace a relatively constricted vision of representative government (much like their conservative forbearer Edmund Burke did), wherein leaders try to act in the interests of the public by not allowing public whims to modulate principled commitments (assuming of course that the leader in question is principled and devout). As such, these traditionalists (as compared to progressives) often feel less comfortable with instructed delegates as representatives, because instructed delegates empower those whims—allowing them to compromise what traditionalists view as certain essential truths.

To elaborate (and, we hope, simplify) this point just a bit more, we suggest that the style of representation one prefers has a lot to do with the particular brand of democracy with which one instinctively feels most at ease. That is, instructed delegate-style representation corresponds to a fairly radical vision of democratic government that emphasizes popular sovereignty—a

[6] This is not to suggest that conservative Republicans do not value equal rights or that liberal Democrats reject traditional morality. It is merely to suggest that when these two sets of values come into conflict as they pertain to a particular policy issue, the "New Right" of the past 40 years has been more likely to prioritize cultural traditions than has the "New Left," and vice versa (e.g., Layman and Green, 2006).

[7] For details of the argument, see Hunter (1991). For empirical assessments in support of this view, see Layman (2001), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), and Barker and Tinnick (2006).

participatory "marketplace of ideas" in which the *demos* shape policies on an ongoing basis. By contrast, trustee-style representation corresponds to the much more limited *institutional* model of representative government, in which citizens cede policymaking power to a presumably exceptional few—maintaining the option to "kick the bums out" after some established period of time, of course, but otherwise demanding that representatives merely follow the rule of law and make sure Yellowstone opens on time.[8]

The basic point we are trying to make is that instructed delegate-style representation is simply more radically democratic than is trustee-style representation, so those inclined to support more radical visions of democracy are also more inclined to support instructed delegate-style representation. And cultural traditionalists are among the least inclined to favor radical visions of democracy, so our argument goes, because they are among the least inclined to trust the changing tides of public opinion.[9] There are several underlying reasons why we believe this is so. In Chapter 3, we will delineate and discuss

[8] Importantly, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, the instructed delegate style could in theory place even greater value on popular sovereignty than does a direct democracy in which citizens make policy directly by voting "yes" or "no" on referenda. That is, in a direct democracy, policy decisions come down to which side can better mobilize supporters to the polls to vote on that policy. Policy then moves in a particular direction regardless of the size of the majority that voted for it—50.05% voting "yes" means the policy is adopted. On the other hand, in a representative democracy with instructed delegate-style representation, representatives may seek to moderate agendas and bills (introducing amendments and the like) based on the *distribution* of majority/minority opinion among their constituents, thereby amplifying minority voices to a somewhat greater extent than is possible in a direct democracy. At this point, we are making a theoretical, not an empirical, point. That is, we are not arguing that representatives necessarily do moderate agendas, bills, etc., so as to reflect minority opinions in their districts. They may or they may not—we don't know. Our point is that they *have the opportunity to do so* in a representative democracy with instructed delegate-style representation, whereas there is no such opportunity for minority voices to be reflected in a strict direct democracy.

[9] However, to the extent that certain negative stereotypes about Blue Americans are accurate (namely that progressives tend to be a bunch of pointy-headed elitists who think they are too good to drink domestic beer or drive domestic cars, etc.), one could certainly imagine our hypothesized relationship going the other way. That is, if cultural traditionalists really do constitute the majority of "real Americans," as former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin would say, then perhaps it is they, not secular progressives, who agitate for more popular sovereignty in society. We do not "buy" this framework, but it provides useful alternate hypotheses to our own, which helps to establish the falsifiability of ours.