

EDITED BY

BRIAN DAVIES

ELEONORE STUMP

The Oxford Handbook *of* AQUINAS

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BRIAN DAVIES
AND ELEONORE STUMP

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Abbreviations

CG	Aquinas, *Contra errores Graecorum*
CT	Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae*
DEE	Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*
Diu. nom.	Aquinas, *Expositio super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*
DPN	Aquinas, *De principiis naturae*
DSS	Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*
DUI	Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*
In BDH	Aquinas, *Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus*
In BDT	Aquinas, *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate*
In CA	Aquinas, *Expositio super librum De causis*
In DA	Aquinas, *Sententia Libri De anima*
In DC	Aquinas, *Sententia super librum De caelo et mundo*
In DMR	Aquinas, *Sententia de memoria et reminiscentia*
In Gal	Aquinas, *Expositio et Lectura super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Galatas*
In Heb	Aquinas, *Lectura super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Hebraeos*
In Meta	Aquinas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*
In NE	Aquinas, *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*
In PA	Aquinas, *Sententia Libri Posteriorum Analyticorum*
In Peri herm.	Aquinas, *Expositio Libri Peri hermeneias*
In Phy	Aquinas, *Sententia super Physicam*
In Rom	Aquinas, *Lectura super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos*
In I Cor	Aquinas, *Lectura Super Primam Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Corinthios*
In II Cor	Aquinas, *Lectura super Secundam Epistolam Pauli Apostoli ad Corinthios*
Met.	Aristotle, *Metaphysics*
NE	Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*
Pol.	Aristotle, *Politics*
QDA	Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de anima*
QDC	Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de caritate*
QDM	Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*
QDP	Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*
QDSC	Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis*
QDUVI	Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de unione verbi incarnati*

QDV	Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*
QDVCard	Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus*
QDVCom	Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi*
Quodl	Aquinas, *Quaestiones de quodlibet I–XII*
SCG	Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*
ST	Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*
Super Johan	Aquinas, *Lectura super Ioannem*
Super Sent	Aquinas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*

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AQUINAS

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INTRODUCTION

BRIAN DAVIES
ELEONORE STUMP

Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–1274) lived an active, demanding academic and ecclesiastical life that ended while he was only fifty (or a bit younger). He nonetheless produced many works, varying in length from a few pages to a few volumes. Because his writings grew out of his activities as a teacher in the Dominican Order and as a member of the theology faculty of the University of Paris, most are concerned with what he and his contemporaries thought of as theology. However, much of academic theology in the Middle Ages consisted in a rational investigation of the most fundamental aspects of reality in general and of human nature and behavior in particular. That vast domain obviously includes much of what is now considered to be philosophy and is reflected in the broad subject matter of Aquinas's theological writings.

The scope and philosophical character of medieval theology as practiced by Aquinas can be easily seen in his two most important works, *Summa contra Gentiles* (*SCG*) and *Summa theologiae* (*ST*). However, many of the hundreds of topics covered in those two large works are also investigated in more detail in the smaller works resulting from Aquinas's numerous academic disputations (something like a cross between formal debates and twentieth-century graduate seminars), which he conducted in his various academic posts. Some of those topics are taken up differently again in his commentaries on books of the Bible and/or works by Aristotle and other authors. Although Aquinas is generally remarkably consistent in his several discussions of the same topic, it is often helpful to examine parallel passages in his writings when fully assessing his views or the development of his views on any issue.

Aquinas's most obvious philosophical connection is with Aristotle. Besides producing commentaries on Aristotle's works, he often cites Aristotle in support of a thesis he is defending, even when commenting on Scripture. Although he dissents

from Aristotle's views in many places, most notably those connected to ethics or metaphysics and theology, there are also in Aquinas's writings many implicit Aristotelian elements, which he had thoroughly absorbed into his own thought. He also often adopts Aristotle's critical attitude toward theories associated with Plato, especially the account of ordinary substantial forms as separately existing entities. Nonetheless, although Aquinas, like other medieval scholars of western Europe, had almost no access to Plato's works, he was influenced by the writings of Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius. Through them he absorbed a good deal of Platonism as well.

On the other hand, Aquinas is the paradigmatic Christian philosopher-theologian, fully aware of his intellectual debt to religious doctrine. He was convinced, however, that Christian thinkers should be ready to dispute rationally on any topic, especially theological issues, not only among themselves but also with non-Christians of all sorts. Since in his view Jews accept the Old Testament and heretics the New Testament, he thought Christians could argue some issues with both groups on the basis of commonly accepted religious authority. However, because other non-Christians, "for instance, Mohammedans and pagans, do not agree with us about the authority of any scripture on the basis of which they can be convinced . . . it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, to which everyone is compelled to assent—although where theological issues are concerned it cannot do the whole job" (since some of the data of theology are initially accessible only in Scripture).[1] Moreover, Aquinas differed from many of his thirteenth-century Christian colleagues in the breadth and depth of his respect for Islamic and Jewish philosopher-theologians, especially Avicenna and Maimonides. He saw them as valued coworkers in the vast project of philosophical theology, clarifying and supporting religious doctrine by philosophical analysis and argumentation. His own commitment to that project involved him in contributing to almost all the areas of philosophy recognized since antiquity, omitting only natural philosophy (the precursor of natural science).

A line of thought with such strong connections to powerful antecedents might have resulted in no more than a pious amalgam. Aquinas's philosophy avoids eclecticism, however, because of his own innovative approach to organizing and reasoning about all the topics included under the overarching medieval conception of philosophical Christian theology, and because of his special talents for systematic synthesis and for identifying and skillfully defending, on almost every issue he considers, the most sensible available position.

Because Aquinas developed most of his thought within the formal confines of thirteenth-century theology, and because this has in turn affected his place in the history of philosophy and the assessment of his work, some attention must be paid to the ways in which much of what we recognize as philosophy was an essential component of what he thought of as theology.

Aquinas devotes the first three books of *Summa contra Gentiles* to a systematic development of natural theology, which he saw as part of philosophy.[2] As part of philosophy, natural theology must be based entirely on "principles known by the

natural light of intellect,"[3] principles of the sort that underlie Aristotle's metaphysics, which Aristotle himself thought of as culminating in theology (see Aquinas's interpretation of that thought in the prooemium to his *Sententia super Metaphysicam* [*Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*]). In fact, the way Aquinas works in *SCG* I–III strongly suggests that he may have thought of natural theology as a science subordinate to metaphysics, somewhat as he would have understood optics to be subordinate to geometry.

There is something odd about that project of his that scholars have sought to understand. By Aquinas's day, the churchmen governing universities had overcome most of their initial misgivings about the recently recovered works of the pagan Aristotle and had acknowledged officially that the study of Aristotelian physics and metaphysics was compatible with the then universally recognized availability of revealed truths about God. Medieval Christians had come to appreciate the ancient philosophers' attempts to uncover truths about God on the basis of observation and reasoning alone as having been justified, even commendable, given their ignorance of revelation. Although no philosopher in Aquinas's circumstances could have justifiably undertaken a new project of natural theology heuristically, nonetheless, from their point of view no opprobrium would attach to natural theology taken up expositionally. The aim of such an enterprise would be not to develop theology from scratch but rather to show, in the spirit of Romans 1:20, the extent to which what had been supernaturally revealed could, in theory, have been naturally discovered. Such an enterprise is what *SCG* I–III seems to represent, in the view of some contemporary scholars.

What Aquinas himself says about his purpose in writing *Summa contra Gentiles* suggests that what he wrote had at least its formal cause in his consideration of the interrelation of philosophy and Christianity. He begins by writing about the concerns of a wise person, one of those "who give things an appropriate order and direction and govern them well."[4] Obviously, such a person has to be concerned with goals and sources, and so the wisest person will be "one whose attention is turned toward the universal goal, which is also the universal source," which Aquinas takes to be God.[5] Because this natural theology is oriented as it is, "it must be called the greatest wisdom itself, as considering the absolutely highest cause of all."[6] Therefore, the highest, most universal explanatory truth must be wisdom's concern.

Anyone aspiring to wisdom will attend to metaphysics, since, Aquinas reports, Aristotle rightly identified metaphysics as "the science of truth—not of just any truth, but of the truth that is the origin of all truth, the truth that pertains to the first principle of being for all things."[7] And, as Aquinas says in an observation that suits his own enterprise, "sometimes divine wisdom proceeds from human philosophy's starting points."[8] Nonetheless, since it is the business of one and the same science "to pursue one of two contraries and to repel the other . . . the role of the wise person is to meditate on the truth, especially the truth regarding the first principle, and to discuss it with others, but also to fight against the falsity that is its contrary."[9] The truth regarding the first principle will be the truth about God, supposing natural

theology can show that God exists; and so the explanatory truth associated here with metaphysics is the truth associated also with theology.

In this pursuit by way of reason, Aquinas must and does shun "authoritative arguments" of any sort, but he shows good sense in not restricting himself to "demonstrative arguments" in developing natural theology. He does, of course, use demonstrative arguments when he thinks that he has them, but, like almost all philosophers of any period, he recognizes philosophy's need for "probable arguments" as well. A demonstrative argument takes as its premises propositions that explain the fact in the argument's conclusion by elucidating its causes (or, sometimes, its effects), and so it produces, or presents, scientific understanding. A probable argument, the sort that has always been most prevalent in philosophy, is one based on premises of any sort that are accepted widely or by experts in the relevant field; and so one group may be convinced by a probable argument that another group rejects.

In addition, Aquinas also frequently engages in what has come to be called philosophical theology, the application of reason to revelation. Philosophical theology shares the methods of natural theology broadly conceived—in other words, analysis and argumentation of all the sorts accepted in philosophy—but it lifts natural theology's restriction on premises, accepting as assumptions revealed propositions. This includes those that are initially inaccessible to unaided reason, such as the "mysteries" of Christian doctrine. In his many works of philosophical theology, Aquinas tests the coherence of doctrinal propositions (including the mysteries), attempts explanations of them, uncovers their logical connections with other doctrinal propositions, and so on, in order to bear out his conviction that the doctrines themselves are eminently understandable and acceptable, and that the apparent incoherence of some of them is only a feature of our initial, superficial view of them.

Aquinas's *Summa theologiae* is the paradigm of philosophical theology. The very first Article of the very first Question makes it clear at once that it is not natural theology of which *Summa theologiae* is a summa, since it begins by asking whether we need any "other teaching, besides philosophical studies," which in Aquinas's usage means the studies that medieval beginners in theology would have just completed in the arts faculty. The question arises because philosophical studies are characterized not only as dealing with "the things that are subject to reason" but also as encompassing "all beings, including God," as a consequence of which there is a part of philosophy that is theology.

Although Aquinas accepts this characterization of philosophy's subject matter as universal and as including a part that is properly called theology, he offers several arguments to support his claim that revealed theology is nonetheless not superfluous. In one of those arguments, he claims that a thing's "capacity for being cognized in various ways brings about a difference between sciences." By this he means that different sciences can reason to some of the same conclusions on the basis of different premises or evidence. In his example, he points out that in order to support the proposition that the earth is round a naturalist uses empirical observations, while a cosmologist might support that same conclusion on a strictly formal basis.

"And for that reason," he concludes, "nothing prevents the same things from being treated by philosophical studies insofar as they can be cognized by the light of natural reason, and also by another science insofar as they are cognized by the light of divine revelation. That is why the theology that pertains to *sacra doctrina* [in other words, revealed theology] differs in kind from the theology that is considered a part of philosophy."[10]

In this argument, Aquinas might appear willing to concede that revealed and natural theology differ only in this methodological respect, that they simply constitute two radically different ways of approaching the very same propositions about God and everything else. However, he would not actually concede this. There are propositions that belong uniquely to revealed theology's subject matter, simply because the different premises with which revealed theology begins can also lead to conclusions not available to unaided reason. And, of course, no doctrinal proposition that is initially available to human beings only in virtue of having been revealed by God can be part of natural theology's subject matter.

On the other hand, no propositions appropriate to natural theology are excluded from *ST*'s subject matter. The propositions that belong to natural theology form a proper subset of those that belong to revealed theology:

> It was necessary that human beings be instructed by divine revelation even as regards the things about God that human reason can explore. For the truth about God investigated by a few on the basis of reason [without relying on revelation] would emerge for people [only] after a long time and tainted with many mistakes. And yet all human well-being, which has to do with God, depends on the cognition of that truth. Therefore, it was necessary for human beings to be instructed about divine matters through divine revelation so that [the nature of human] well-being might emerge for people more conveniently and with greater certainty.[11]

When he sums up his examination of *sacra doctrina*, or revealed theology, Aquinas says that its "main aim . . . is to transmit a cognition of God, and not only as he is in himself, but also as he is the source of things and their goal, especially of the rational creature."[12] Thus, the subject matter of *sacra doctrina*, the theology presented in this *summa* of theology, is the most basic truths about everything, with two provisos: first, it is about God and about things other than God as they relate to God as their source and goal; second, among the things other than God with which it deals, it is especially about human beings, whose study of theology should be motivated by the fact that their well-being depends specially on their grasp of certain theological truths. And, Aquinas insists, universal scope is just what one should expect in a rational investigation of the truth about God: "All things are considered in *sacra doctrina* under the concept of God, either because they are God, or because they have an ordered relationship to God as to their source and goal. It follows from this that the subject of this science is really God," even though the intended explanatory scope of the science is universal.[13]

In referring to *sacra doctrina* as a "science," Aquinas means to characterize it as a systematic, reasoned presentation of an organized body of knowledge consisting

of general truths about some reasonably unified subject matter. In that broadly Aristotelian sense, it is not obviously wrong to think of theology as a science (as it would be in the narrower, twentieth-century sense of "science"). It is in that sense that the science of theology as Aquinas develops it in *ST* would now be called philosophical theology, the enterprise of employing the techniques and devices of philosophy in clarifying, supporting, and extending the propositions that are supposed to have been revealed for theology's starting points. Thus, some of the work of philosophical theology is an attempt to explain revealed propositions and systematically work out their implications. Like natural theology, which is subordinate to metaphysics, philosophical theology is a subordinate science. However, because it begins its work on divinely revealed propositions, Aquinas identifies the science to which it is subordinate as God's knowledge of himself and everything else, available to human beings directly only in the afterlife.[14] As he says earlier, "For us, the goal of faith is to arrive at an understanding of what we believe—[which is] as if a practitioner of a subordinate science were to acquire in addition the knowledge possessed by a practitioner of the higher science. In that case the things that were only believed before would come to be known, or understood."[15]

Not even the doctrinal mysteries are impervious to rational investigation, although unaided reason could never have discovered them. Regarding one central mystery, for example, Aquinas says: "It is impossible to arrive at a cognition of the Trinity of the divine persons by means of natural reason."[16] However, he says this in the twenty-second of a series of seventy-seven Articles of *ST* devoted to analyzing and arguing about the details of Trinity, in other words, in the midst of subjecting this mystery to philosophical theology. As he explains in the very Article in which he rules out the possibility of rationally discovering that there are three divine persons:

> There are two ways in which reason is employed regarding any matter . . . in one way to provide sufficient proof of something fundamental . . . in the other way to show that consequent effects are suited to something fundamental that has already been posited. . . . It is in the first way, then, that reason can be employed to prove that God is one, and things of that sort. But it is in the second way that reason is employed in a clarification of Trinity. For once Trinity has been posited, reasonings of that sort are suitable, although not so as to provide a sufficient proof of the Trinity of persons by those reasonings.[17]

Aquinas is also careful to point out that it is not mere intellectual curiosity or even a defense of the faith that is served by a rational clarification of the doctrine of the Trinity. In his view, this application of philosophical theology—confirming faith by reason, showing that belief in the Trinity is not after all irrational, exposing the intricate connections between these and other doctrinal propositions—aids one's understanding of creation and salvation.

The present volume is intended as a guide to Aquinas's thinking on almost all the major topics on which he wrote. In 1993 one of us (Eleonore Stump), together with Norman Kretzmann († 1998), edited a comparable volume, which appeared as *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*.[18] That well-received volume, however,

consisted of only ten essays, contained comparatively little on Aquinas's treatment of wholly theological issues, and had almost nothing to say about Aquinas's life and influence. The present book is much fuller. In addition to documenting Aquinas's life and work, it includes contributions that explain the Greek, patristic, Jewish, and Islamic influences on Aquinas's thought, and it also contains entries that show the historical reception and development of Aquinas's views. There are many more essays exploring the philosophical and theological topics discussed by Aquinas.

The book begins with a part devoted to historical background. This part includes an account of Aquinas's life and works by Jean-Pierre Torrell, whose *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* is the currently most authoritative biography of Aquinas.[19] It also contains a series of essays that set Aquinas in his intellectual context. These essays focus on the sources that are likely to have influenced his thinking, the most prominent of which (apart from the Bible, of course) were certain Greek philosophers (chiefly Aristotle), Latin Christian authors, such as Augustine, and Jewish and Islamic writers, such as Maimonides and Avicenna. The subsequent parts of the book address topics that Aquinas himself discussed. These include metaphysics, the existence and nature of God, ethics and action theory, providence and evil, epistemology, philosophy of mind and human nature, the nature of language, and an array of topics in philosophical theology, including Trinity, Incarnation, sacraments, and resurrection, among others. These parts include more than thirty contributions on topics central to Aquinas's own worldview. The final parts of the volume address the development of Aquinas's thought and its historical influence.

Although the volume thus aims at being comprehensive, readers familiar with Aquinas will undoubtedly find that some part of Aquinas's thought that strikes them as particularly important is not represented here. Sadly, it is not possible to do everything in one volume, even a fat one. At any rate, it is abundantly clear that some compromise is necessary between the ideal plan of presenting all of Aquinas's thought and any practicable plan for one book. We have tried to pick those issues and topics that allow a reader to see Aquinas's whole worldview in broad outline and to appropriate in particular some of its richest and most powerful parts.

Aquinas's philosophy includes reflection on some basic metaphysical topics while extending to discussions of what can be known by reason when it comes to the existence of God.[20] He has views to offer on questions such as "What is it for something to exist?" "How should we distinguish between things in the world?" "What is it for something to be an individual in the world?" and "How should we understand causation?" He also has views to offer on questions such as "Can we know that God exists?" and "Can we give some account of God's nature?" Parts II and III of this book try to explain and comment on what Aquinas has to say by way of answer to such questions.

Yet Aquinas's intellectual interests range beyond metaphysics and natural theology. As the list of topics given above shows, he also had a concern with many other areas of philosophy as well. Aquinas often insists that moral philosophy would be redundant if people lack freedom of choice. So Part IV begins with an account of

Aquinas's views on human freedom and agency, and it continues with consideration of Aquinas's approach to happiness, law, natural law, conscience, virtue and vice, and the theological virtues, among other things. Part V deals with Aquinas's theories of human knowledge and the nature of mind, as well as the relation of reason to faith. Part VI traces Aquinas's account of the nature of language and its limits when it comes to God.

The next part covers topics in philosophical theology. It includes an account of Aquinas's views on the problem of evil. Other chapters present Aquinas's account of the Trinity, the Incarnation, life after death, prayer, and the work of the Holy Spirit, among other things. Part VIII focuses on the progress of Aquinas's thought and its influence. It includes accounts of the ways in which Aquinas's ideas developed over time and the different ways in which subsequent thinkers have viewed and interpreted Aquinas's thought.

Finally, any attempt to present the views of a philosopher in an earlier historical period that is meant to foster reflection on that thinker's views needs to be both historically faithful and also philosophically engaged. So the present book combines both exposition and evaluation insofar as it is appropriate for any particular contributor to engage in both. It is our hope, therefore, that this *Handbook* will prove useful to someone wanting to learn about Aquinas's philosophy and theology while also looking for help in philosophical interaction with it.[21]

For invaluable assistance in preparing this volume for publication we are much indebted to Barb Manning, Stephen Chanderbhan, Zita Toth, and Gideon Jeffrey. We are also grateful to Peter Ohlin of Oxford University Press for helpful advice and for his patience in waiting for a work that was longer in the making than we originally expected it to be.

NOTES

1. *Summa contra Gentiles*, I.2.11; hereinafter *SCG*.
2. Cf. *Summa theologiae*, I q.1 a.1 ad 2; hereinafter *ST*.
3. *ST* I q.1 a.2.
4. *SCG* I.1.2.
5. *SCG* I.1.3.
6. *SCG* II.4.874.
7. *SCG* I.1.5.
8. *SCG* II.4.875.
9. *SCG* I.1.6.
10. *ST* I q.1 a.1 ad 2.
11. *ST* I q.1 a.1.
12. *ST* I q.2, intro.
13. *ST* I q.1 a.7.
14. *ST* I q.1 a.2.
15. *Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate* 2.2, ad 7.

16. *ST* I q.32 a.1.

17. *ST* I q.32 a.1.

18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

19. Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

20. It is often said that Aquinas thinks that he can prove the existence of God. But he does not. For Aquinas, God's existence is identical with his essence, which Aquinas takes to be incomprehensible to us. He does, however, argue that we might make a philosophical case for "God exists" being true (on a certain understanding of "God"). For the distinction between "the existence of God" and "God exists," see Lubor Velecky, *Aquinas' Five Arguments in the "Summa Theologiae" 1a 2, 3* (Kampen: Pharos, 1994).

21. Parts of this introduction are revised versions of sections in the entry "Thomas Aquinas," by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge Press, 1998) and a small section of the prefatory material taken from Eleonore Stump's *Aquinas* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

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PART I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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CHAPTER 1

LIFE AND WORKS

JEAN-PIERRE TORRELL, O.P.

The Early Years

Thomas Aquinas was born in 1224/25 in the family castle of Roccasecca in southern Italy between Rome and Naples. Of minor nobility, his family was related to that of the counts of Aquino, from which he would be given his name. At the age of five or six years, being the youngest son of a large family, he was offered as an oblate to the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino. His biographers agree that his parents cherished the wish that he would someday be the Abbot. Aside from a good formation in Latin letters, the child acquired at the abbey a profound understanding of the Bible and a solid initiation in the study of Augustine and Gregory, whose influence is apparent in all of his works. He maintained above all a contemplative orientation that remains the distinctive mark of his theology.[1]

Due to troubles caused by the war between Pope Gregory IX and Frederick II, the young monk was sent to Naples in 1239 at the age of fourteen or fifteen to begin there his studies at the *studium generale* founded fifteen years earlier by Frederick II. Sicily and the south of Italy were, at that time, the seat of an intense intellectual life that was encouraged by the emperor. Thanks to the numerous translations of Michel Scot and his school, Aristotelian science, Arabic astronomy, and Greek philosophy and medicine were flourishing at Palermo, Salerno, and Naples. Little is known precisely on these years of Aquinas's studies at Naples except the names of two of his professors: Master Martin and Peter of Ireland. They are known well enough that we can deduce that Aquinas could have familiarized himself very early with the natural philosophy of Aristotle and his metaphysics, as well as with the work of the Arabic commentator Averroës and probably also with that of the Jew Maimonides.[2]

At Naples, Aquinas made the acquaintance of the Order of Preachers (Dominicans) who had been there since 1231; he took their habit in the spring of

1244. This initiative on his part was met with strong family opposition that was manifested by the kidnapping of the novice and his imprisonment at Roccasecca for about fifteen months (spring 1244 to summer 1245).[3] Tocco reports that he turned the forced leisure to profit by praying, reading the Bible in its entirety, and studying the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.[4] Two shorts treatises that have long been attributed to this period, *De fallaciis* and *De propositionibus modalibus*, are now known to be inauthentic. The persistence of Aquinas in his choice succeeded in convincing his obstinate family. This episode highlights a spiritual characteristic of Aquinas that would mark him profoundly in his life and his work. In his writings on religious life, his attachment to the intellectual ideal (study, teaching, preaching) and to the mendicant poverty of his order is evident.[5]

Having been released by his family, the young Dominican was sent to Paris (1245–48), to the convent of St. James, to continue his studies under the direction of Albert the Great, who introduced him, most notably, to the work of Pseudo-Dionysius. He deepened his knowledge of the *Ethics* of Aristotle and appropriated the methods of the masters of the arts, whose courses he appears to have frequented. Sent with Albert to Cologne to found a new Dominican *studium*, Aquinas completed his formation as an assistant to his teacher (1248–52). At the end of that time (or shortly thereafter),[6] he taught *Super Isaiam* and *Super Ieremiam*, the first and precious witnesses of his spiritual approach to the Bible.[7]

First Assignment to Paris (1252–1259)

Sent back to Paris by his superiors to take his masters in *sacra doctrina*, Aquinas stayed there seven years (1252–59). At first as a bachelor of the sentences under the master Eli Brunet, he spent two years (1252–54) commenting on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard but did not manage to write his text until 1256. This "manual," which had been used in Paris since Alexander of Hales, groups into four books the divers opinions (*sententiae*) of the Fathers of the Church and of the medieval theologians according to the major subjects of sacred doctrine: (1) the triune God is indivisible in His essence and in His three Persons; (2) God considered as Creator and His works; (3) the Incarnation and the Redemption; and (4) the sacraments and the last things. The commentary of Aquinas is shot through with his personal views and he does not hesitate to distance himself from Lombard or to disagree with him. Still a young theologian, he had borrowed a good deal from his master, Albert, and from his contemporary, the Franciscan Bonaventure. His concern for documentation, however, can already be observed by the frequency of his quotations: Aristotle (2,000; *Nicomachean Ethics:* 800; *Metaphysics*: 300; *Physics* and *De Anima*: approximately 250), Augustine (1,500), Denis the Areopagite (500), Gregory the Great (280), John Damascene (240), and so on. These numbers highlight a feature that remains

constant: Aquinas does not think in a closed box but rather maintains a dialogue with all of the thinkers available to him. *De principiis naturae* and especially *De ente et essentia* must be attributed to this period. They both display a strong Avicennian influence.[8]

Once a master in theology (1256), Aquinas found himself engaged in the quarrel with the secular masters at Paris (William of Saint-Amour and his partisans), who were opposed to allowing mendicant religious into the university.[9] Aquinas refuted their arguments in *Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem* (1256), where he takes up the defense of his order and reclaims for religious the rights to study and to teach. This conflict was prolonged for a while with new adversaries (Gerard of Abbeville and Nicolas of Lisieux) under different aspects and provoked the publication of two other works: *De perfectione spiritualis vitae* (1269–70) and *Contra doctrinam retrahentium a religione* (1270–71). Little known, these books uncover the doctrine of the religious life of the author and throw some light on the combative character of his personality.[10]

The primary obligation of Aquinas consisted, nevertheless, in composing his magisterial commentaries on the Bible; *legere* was the first charge of the *Magister in Sacra pagina*. It is not known exactly which of the books of the Bible Aquinas commented on during this period (probably some epistles of Paul), but he was faithful to this obligation during his life and several of his commentaries have been conserved: aside from *Isaiah*, *Jeremiah*, and *Lamentations*, the following courses must be mentioned: (*Lecturae* or *Expositiones*) *On Job* (Orvieto: 1261–65), *On Matthew* (Paris: 1269–70), *On John* (Paris: 1270–72), *On the Psalms* (Naples: 1273). It is difficult to know exactly the dates for the commentaries on the epistles of Paul.[11] Long neglected, these thousands of pages of biblical theology have recently become the object of growing attention for both their exegetical technique and their bearing on speculative theology.[12] Comprising an important part of his work, these commentaries must be read and used alongside the systematic expositions. These latter also give a decisive role to the Scriptures (25,000 biblical citations in the *Summa theologiae* alone) as they are not merely an authority amongst others, but the very source and structure of theological exposition.[13] Conscious of the limits of allegorical exegesis, Aquinas privileged the literal sense, which he judged to be the only sense suited to theological argumentation. He did not reduce it, though, to the philosophical sense but included in it the spiritual sense.

The second great obligation of a Master was to hold Disputed Questions (*disputare*), either ordinary or public.[14] The questions *De ueritate* belong to the first category. Each day, after having given the morning lesson, the master and his bachelor would rejoin their students in the afternoon to "dispute" on a chosen theme. As the three hours allowed for this active pedagogy were insufficient to exhaust the subject, they would proceed article by article; eventually, certain very short articles could be regrouped into one meeting and, inversely, a longer or more delicate subject could be broken up into several meetings. The result (objections, replies, and

magisterial determinations) were reassembled later into one text and published together in final form: a question with a unified answer. The elaboration of *De ueritate* was thus spread out over three academic years (1256–59) at about eighty articles per year, which correspond roughly to the number of days of teaching. Without being able to give a detailed account of its contents, it can at least be said that the whole is divided into two sections: (1) truth and knowledge (q.1–20); (2) the good and the appetite for good (q.21–29). Aside from the intrinsic interest of the subjects treated, *De ueritate* is particularly interesting for following and understanding the thought of Aquinas. On certain points (providence, Christology, grace, instrumental causality), he had already changed his opinion from those expressed in the commentary on the *Sentences* and he would change his views again in the later works.[15]

Unlike the ordinary daily disputations proper to the school of a determined Master, the public quodlibetal disputations only took place twice a year during Lent and Advent. They took place in two sessions: in the first, and as their name indicates, the assistants, masters, students, or even curious onlookers could raise any sort of question (*de quolibet ad voluntatem cuiuslibet*). The master would normally allow his bachelor to respond and would not intervene unless he ran into problem; he would give his magisterial determination in the second session, which would take place the next day or several days later.[16] Aquinas left two series of such questions: the first (*Quodlibets* VII–XI) date from the first period in Paris; the next set (I–VI and XII) dates from the second period (1268–72). The subjects treated are numerous (260, with more than 20 for each meeting); the questions of high speculation are well represented, but the practical questions are not lacking. The quodlibetal literature is deeply rooted in the life of the university (a quarrel between mendicants and seculars; the unity or plurality of substantial forms), but the subjects of private or public morality and of economics relate also to the pastoral preoccupations of the participants. In the life of the university, then, is reflected that of the entire era and this makes a fascinating subject of study.[17]

Associated with this same era, the *Super Boetium De Trinitate* is one of the few testimonies of his own writing (along with a part of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the commentary on the *Sentences*); it is also the only commentary of this text of Boethius to be written in the thirteenth century. While the subject matter of the work makes it eminently theological in character, this work provides the most extended Thomistic explanation of the methods of the various sciences.[18] Fruit of personal reflection carried out with pen in hand, the date of this work is uncertain: "somewhere between the middle of *De ueritate* and the beginning of *Contra Gentiles*, either in 1257–58 or at the beginning of 1259".[19] The same is true for the other commentary on Boethius: *Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus* is probably after *Super Boetium*, but it is not possible to say more exactly.[20] Essentially a work on metaphysics, the purpose of this short work is to discover whether beings are good in their essence or by participation; this is why philosophers naturally begin their study of Aquinas's account of participation with this work.[21]

Stay in Italy: Orvieto (end 1259–1265)

At the end of the preceding period (June 1259), Aquinas had to go to Valenciennes to the General Chapter of the Dominicans to participate in a commission charged with the task of promoting studies. It is not clear exactly when he left for Italy, where he went first to Naples (?; 1259–61)[22] and then to Orvieto (1261–65). In this last convent, Aquinas took the role of convent lector and helped his confreres prepare for the ministries of teaching and confession. He also brought with him several major works.

The date of the *Summa contra Gentiles* (*SCG*) has been the object of extended research of specialists.[23] It is certain that the fifty-three first chapters were written before he left Paris, that Book I was finished in Italy between 1259 and 1261, Book II in Orvieto in 1261–62, Book III in 1263–64, Book IV in 1264–65.[24] The work may be characterized as having two purposes: "to display the Catholic faith" and "to reject the contrary errors." The *SCG* has given rise to the most varied interpretations (philosophical, missional, apologetical, ecumenical). It is a theological enterprise, as the use of arguments from authority (Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, the Symbols of faith) clearly show. The work proposes to study all that human reason can discover about God:

I. What is proper to God: His existence and His perfections.
II. The procession of creatures from God; that is to say, the act of creation and its effects.
III. The ordering of creatures to God as their end: providence and divine governance.
IV. The truths inaccessible to reason and known only by faith: God as Trinity, the Incarnation of the Word and redemption, sacraments and the last things.

The order of the first three books clearly echoes the structure Aquinas had already found in the *Sentences* of Lombard, and it prefigures the circular structure that he sets out in the *Summa theologiae*: all things come from God and all things return to God under His guidance. It should be said that this structure also follows Aquinas's own logic, as was shown by G. Emery.[25] Parallel to the *SCG* and moving back and forth between the two works, Aquinas wrote the first part of the *Compendium theologiae* (1–246: *De fide*). This "handbook," written at the request of his friend Raynald, would be taken back up in Naples in 1272–73, but would remain unfinished.[26]

At the same time (1263–65), Aquinas wrote *Super Iob*, which offers a lovely example of literal exegesis that is used in the service of doctrinal reflection on the suffering of the just innocent, which suffering is reconciled with divine goodness: "The entire *intentio* of the book is to show by probable reasons that human affairs are governed by divine providence."[27] This was also the central subject of Book III of *Summa contra Gentiles*, which was written at about the same time; it can be seen that Aquinas knew how to organize his work.

Many other works of more modest size were written at the same time to satisfy friendly requests: *De emptione et uenditione* (1262) is on the morality of lending with interest; *Contra errores Graecorum* (1263–64) is a study of the contested doctrines that were given him by Pope Urban IV. To the very end of this period in Orvieto (unless they belong to the beginning of his stay in Rome), we can also attribute *De rationibus fidei, Expositio super primam et secundam Decretalem*, and *De articulis fidei et ecclesiae sacramentis*, which are brief explications of the Catholic faith written at the request of various correspondents.[28]

From amid these various works, the composition of the Office of *Corpus Christi* (1264), which was also requested by Pope Urban IV, must be brought out. Once contested by the Bollandists, its authenticity is accepted today and it must be noted that this is an important text for understanding its author's Eucharistic doctrine. The authenticity of the hymn *Adoro Te*, also suspected, is no longer in doubt thanks to the work of R. Wielockx.[29] It is, once again, at the request of Urban IV that Aquinas undertook the *Catena aurea*, a commentary on the gospels with the help of excerpts from the Fathers of the Church (*On Matthew* was finished in 1264; *Mark, Luke*, and *John* were completed in Rome from 1265 to 1268). This work reveals Aquinas's stunning erudition in the Patristics: he is the first in the Occident to use the complete corpus of the first ecumenical councils.[30] Well versed in the Greek and Latin Fathers (57 Greeks and 22 Latins), he has an affinity for some authors: Gregory the Great (2,470 uses), John Chrysostom (3,563 uses in the scriptural commentaries), but above all Augustine whose considerable influence (some 10,000 citations in the entire works of Aquinas), which grew over the course of Aquinas's work (*Sentences*: 1,518; *ST*: 2,801), is particularly clear on the subjects of the divine ideas (a transposition of a platonic theme), the Trinity, the fittingness of the Incarnation, the nature of the soul, beatitude, law, grace and sin, and so on.[31] Called a "turning point" by Weisheipl, the *Catena aurea* served as a source of references for Aquinas himself over the course of his career and exerted a great influence on the rest of the history of theology.[32]

Stay in Rome (1265–1268)

In 1265, Aquinas was sent to Rome by his superiors to found an "experimental" *studium* at Santa Sabina for some select students of his Order over whom he would have complete authority.[33] According to Ptolemy of Lucca, Aquinas would have once again commented on Book I of the *Sentences*; Ptolemy said he had seen a copy of this work, but he also said that the manuscript had disappeared. Over the course of the twentieth century, the researchers of the Leonine Commission found anonymous annotations in the margins of a commentary on Lombard in a manuscript at Oxford (Lincoln College, lat. 95). L. Boyle was certain that these were the course notes of a student of Aquinas that reflect the lost commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*. This fragmentary text, which corresponds to Distinctions 1–18 and 23,

was recently edited by John F. Boyle who has no doubt regarding its authenticity;[34] other scholars are also of this opinion.[35] It is nevertheless permissible to raise a few doubts: many of the annotations are clearly Thomistic, but others are not. Those that are authentic, far from representing a new work and an intermediary stage in the evolution of Aquinas's thought presuppose rather the prior existence of the works from which they are borrowed. The identification of the marginalia with the lost commentary seems, then, to remain a matter of conjecture.[36]

By all accounts, the three years in Rome (1265–68) were occupied with several major projects of which the principal was the beginning of the *Summa theologiae* (*ST*). The writing of this work seems to have been provoked by the dissatisfaction Aquinas felt after his experience at Orvieto. To compensate for the insufficient formation received by his young confreres, he would have conceived a new work that would treat the entirety of theology, dogmatic and moral, in one organic and ordered whole.

The dates of the writing of the *ST* were long contested by scholars; here is what seems to be the most certain. Written in Rome between 1265 and 1268, the *Prima Pars* (*ST* I) was circulating in Italy by the latter date. The *Prima Secundae* (*ST* I-II) was not begun before the return to Paris (1268); according to an old opinion, its completion was in the summer of 1270,[37] but Gauthier has shown that it was not written until 1271.[38] As to the *Secunda Secundae* (*ST* II-II), begun shortly afterwards, it was finished before December 1272. It was thought until recently that the 20 or 25 first questions of the *Tertia Pars* had been written in Paris at the end of the winter of 1271–72, but it seems more likely that this part of the *Tertia Pars* (*ST* III) was written in Naples by December 6, 1273, the date when Aquinas stopped writing. He had reached the sacrament of penance.[39] The rest, known under the name "*Supplementum*," was written by his disciples and based on his commentary on the *Sentences*. Aquinas would have, thus, carried with him the burden of this work during the last seven years of his life in spite of the other occupations that he undertook at the same time.[40]

The structure of the *ST* has given rise to numerous discussions.[41] Aquinas makes use of a circular structure that leads the reader in a dynamic movement of the "exit" (*exitus*) of creatures from the first Principle, Creator of all things, and their "return" (*reditus*) to Him. If a Neoplatonic influence is not to be excluded, it is not to be overestimated either, as this movement is not a necessary emanation but rather a free creation. Aquinas more likely found his inspiration in contemplation of God of the Bible, the Alpha and Omega of all things. Without having exclusive claim to this circular way of seeing things (it is to be found first in Albert and, to a lesser degree, in Bonaventure), Aquinas uses it in several of his works where he is able to integrate into it the contingency of the history of salvation and, above all, the work of Christ "come from God and [going] to God" (John 13:3).

As to its content, the Thomistic synthesis begins with a sort of preface (*ST* I q.1) in which the author explains the nature and the method of *sacra doctrina* (a concept with more breadth than our "theology"). The *Prima Pars* treats of God in himself in this way: first in the divine essence (q.2–26) and then in the Trinity of Persons (q.27–43). Contrary to what is sometimes said, this is not a purely philosophical

treatment of *De Deo uno* followed by *De Deo trino* of the Christians, but rather this is the one and only living God of the Bible known through His works and through revelation that He made of Himself (cf. Exod. 3:14 and Rom. 1:18 ff.) and at whose service Aquinas placed all of the intellectual resources he had at his disposal (Aristotle and his commentators, Boethius and Augustine, among others). This is followed by a consideration of the way in which creatures proceed from God: creation in itself (q.44–46); the distinction of creatures: in general and in particular, according to the good and the bad (q.47–49); spiritual creatures (q.50–64); the work of six days, which is a commentary on the biblical narrative of creation (q.65–74); man, in his rational nature and as the image of God (q.75–102); the government of creation, where secondary causes concur with the work of God (q.103–19).

The study of the return of man to God begins in the *Secunda Pars*. This enormous part is divided into two very unequal parts: first the ultimate *end* of this return movement (*ST* I-II q.1–5: beatitude), then the *ways* by which the human being comes to this end or, to the contrary, turns away from it. This vast category of "ways" stretches out over two volumes. The *Prima Secundae* first takes up human actions in themselves (q.6–89), which is to say voluntary and free actions that are, thus, capable of either good or evil (q.6–21). Then it treats the passions of the soul (q.22–48). Having come through Cicero, Seneca, and Ambrose of Milan, the stoic heritage contributes greatly here. Next comes the interior qualifications of human actions, the virtues and vices generally (q.49–89), then the exterior factors that influence human action: law (q.90–108) and grace (q.109–14).

The *Secunda Secundae* is a detailed reprise of these first things as an analysis of the theological virtues: faith, hope, and love (*ST* II-II q.1–46), the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance (q.47–170). With each virtue is included its proper acts and contrary vices. This is followed by a study of the charisms and states of life in the Church. This section is completed by the treatise on the contemplative life (q.171–89), which corresponds, by provisional inclusion, with the definition of beatitude at the beginning of the consideration of human action.[42]

The *Tertia Pars* is consecrated to Jesus Christ who, in his humanity, is the way to beatitude. The first section (*ST* III q.1–59) is divided in two major sections in which Aquinas studies: (1) the ontology and the psychology of Christ in the mystery of the Incarnation in itself (q.1–26) and (2) that which the Word did and suffered in his flesh for the salvation of humanity (q.27–59). The second section is constituted by a study of the sacraments: in general (q.60–65), then baptism, Eucharist, penance (q.66–90; the rest is left unfinished). A third section would have given a detailed consideration of the blessed life, which man enters through the resurrection of Christ, but Aquinas died before being able to write this part (the *Supplementum*, which sometimes completes certain editions of the *ST*, was composed by his disciples based on his *Commentary on the Sentences* and thus does not reflect his final thoughts on the matter).

As to its sources, the Thomistic synthesis owes tribute to multiple philosophies from stoicism (through Cicero and St. Ambrose) to Neoplatonism (through Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius), but Aristotle is the dominant authority along with his Arabian (Avicenna and Averroës) and Jewish (Avicebron and Maimonides)

commentators. From a theological point of view, the predominant influence is that of the Bible and the Fathers of the Church.

These elements are, nevertheless, only materials and sometimes even simple instruments for the unified theological project at the service of the subject to be known: God Himself. Everything else is placed in relation to Him. Developed above all in the *Super Boetium De Trinitate* and the *ST* (I q.1), this theological theory is at once speculative and practical. Its contemplative orientation (*speculativa)* remains within the line of the *intellectus fidei* of Augustine and Anselm but, in the service of this end, Aquinas uses two givens from Aristotle.

The notion of "science" is verified as soon as there is "discourse" in which reasoning about two given truths puts them into relation with each other: the first, which is better known, plays the role of the explanatory principle; the second is dependent insofar as it is the explained conclusion. Little by little, the whole of revealed truth is thus organized, according to its internal relations, into a coherent synthesis that reproduces, in a human manner, something of the intelligibility of the divine design of the world and the history of salvation.[43]

The theory of subalternation, also received from Aristotle, is of utmost importance for the status of this *sui generis* science: thanks to subalternation, theology is attached by faith to the knowledge that God has of Himself. It is situated on the trajectory that goes from faith to the beatific vision: the end of this *scientia* (also called *sacra doctrina*) is contemplation of the first Truth.[44] Equally practical, this knowledge is the director of human action, which it must orient properly and clearly toward its final end, God Himself. *ST* is not only a dogmatic reflection centered on the mystery of God; it also develops an important part of moral theology that treats of human action in an ample way unequaled until that time.

Not all was equally new in this vast synthesis that takes up and organizes all that was essential of the theological heritage of the preceding centuries. In particular, the metaphysical views that underpinned the project provoked, in that time, lively reactions. The principal merit of the *ST* was and still is to make intelligible the internal connections of that which is given by faith. If some of its "physical" presuppositions (the celestial bodies) hold no interest today except for historians of thought, most of its elaborations remain part of the common good of Catholic theology. The treatise on God and especially the Five Ways to establish His existence, the divine names and the Trinitarian relations; Creation; the ontology of Christ and the instrumental character of His humanity; the relations of human freedom to the all powerful divinity in light of the theology of grace; these are the most remarkable points of the work.

Two features of the work must be brought out more clearly than is usually done. First, there is the moral theology in its entirety that shows itself to be new on two points.

1. It assembles into a single organically structured work all the material of dogmatic and moral theology. This method stands in sharp contrast to the manuals of the time.[45] Ethics is here torn away from the narrow confines of voluntarism and passes from a morality of duty to a morality of virtue and beatitude of profoundly evangelical inspiration.

2. The unification of the treatment of human action in the light of its ultimate end is an intuition that continues to bear fruit.[46]

In strict correspondence with the contemplative nature of theological knowledge, the moral theology of *ST* opens with a consideration of the beatitude to which the Christian is called. It could not proceed in any other way, "because the first Truth, which is the object of faith, being also the end of all our desires and of all our actions, faith acts through charity in a manner which, according to Aristotle, the speculative intellect becomes practical by 'extension.'"[47] Completely impregnated with the theological virtues, theology is therefore able to grow into a spirituality whose main axes easily stand out: the Trinitarian vocation of man, the image of God, restored to the image of the first born son, thanks to the first gift of the all present and acting Holy Spirit. Grace not destroying nature, it is also possible to envisage a spirituality of creation in which the glorious liberty of the children of God can begin to flourish.

Second, in the treatment of Christology, Aquinas integrates for the first time in the Occident the givens from the major Christological councils. His most original contribution is found in the questions consecrated to the "mysteries" of the life of Christ.[48] Aquinas is the first and only one of the medievals not only to speak of the principal events that, from birth to death, mark the human existence of the incarnate Word (the *acta et passa Christi in carne*) but to treat them as a structured whole, conceived as an element in his speculative theology.[49] Each mystery is considered in the context of soteriology along with its ontological and moral implications. Aside from their theological interest, the pages in which Aquinas examines the role of the humanity of Christ in the work of salvation methodically and with careful attention to Scripture and the Fathers have an evident bearing on spiritual theology. The effects of mysteries of the life of Christ in the one who receives them opens up rare and fruitful vistas on the Christian life. For, not only does grace comes to us through Christ; it is also "Christ-molding."[50]

The work of Aquinas is not reducible to the *ST*, but it offers a good overview of his thought. It must be noted, nevertheless, that even though the author's views are strong enough to be found in several of his works, he did evolve and change on several points. *ST* may be read most profitably by keeping in mind that it is the work of a searching spirit. To ignore this would be to transform it, mistakenly, into a rigid system. For, although it is in fact a coherent synthesis, it remains open.[51]

During his stay in Rome, Aquinas not only completed the writing of the *Catena aurea* (1265–68), but he also disputed or wrote several Disputed Questions. The series of ten Questions *De Potentia* (1265–66) brings into view two main subjects. The first six questions are brought together around the theme *De Potentia*:

1. The power of God in general
2. The generative power of God
3. The creative power
4. The creation of matter
5. The conservation in being of created things
6. Miracles.

The last four questions pertain to Trinitarian theology:

7. The simplicity of the divine essence
8. Relation in God
9. The divine persons
10. The procession of the divine persons.

If not in its volume, at least in its metaphysical profundity, *De Potentia* is comparable to *De ueritate* and it represents a link of the greatest importance in the evolution of the thought of the Master. It is not possible to speak of the Thomistic theology of creation, of divine government, or the Trinity without having recourse to these elucidations. The twenty-one questions of *De anima*, held at Santa Sabina during the school year 1266–67, appear to have been disputed before a public comprised of more than just the students of Aquinas; it was the time when Aquinas was writing the corresponding questions of the *ST*. As to the question *De spiritualibus creaturis*, which was disputed or written the following year (1267–68), it was not published until after his return to Paris.[52]

Although its date has long been uncertain, *De diuinis nominibus*, the commentary on the treatise on the *Divine Names* by Pseudo-Dionysius, is to be situated sometime after March 1266 in Rome.[53] Aside from its own proper interest, this work offers the occasion of recalling the importance of the Platonic elements present in Thomistic doctrine.[54] This influence is notable (1,702 citations, of which 899 are from the *Divine Names*); Dionysius is, with Augustine, one of the means by which Neoplatonism counterbalanced what would otherwise be the dominating influence of Aristotle. His supposed apostolic authority is not imposed in an absolute way on Aquinas. Thus, for the knowledge of God, although Aquinas retains his theory of the three approaches (causality, negation, eminence), the apophatism of the *Divine Names* is only a step in a much longer and more global approach in which the positive knowledge of God is admittedly analogical, but real all the same.[55] The Dionysian influence is also felt in numerous other themes such as angelology and the category of sign in the theology of the sacraments. Dionysius is nevertheless carefully criticized on several key points: for Aquinas, God is not beyond being but is the *Ipsum esse subsistens*; being is prior to goodness, and the axiom *Bonum est diffusivum sui* is interpreted in an Aristotelian sense.[56]

Several responses to theological consultations (*Responsiones de 108, de 43, de 6, de 30 et 36 articulis*) also date from this time in Rome (1265–68), as well as the short work *De regno ad regem Cypri*.[57] But the activity of commenting on Aristotle that Aquinas began around that time with *Sentencia libri De anima* must be mentioned. The three books of this work were finished and spread through Italy before September 1268, but *De sensu et sensato*, which completes it, was not finished until 1269 in Paris. As with all of the commentaries on Aristotle, these books were not taught orally but were written in order to prepare for the *ST*.[58]

Second Assignment to Paris (1268–1272)

Aquinas is to be found back in Paris starting in September 1268; three reasons seem to have motivated recalling him there.

There had been a renewed outbreak in the quarrel between the mendicants and the seculars; against the latter, Aquinas would write *De perfectione spiritualis vitae* (1269–70) and *Contra retrahentes* (1270–71). Many questions from the *Quodlibets* II–V and several sermons bear witness as well to this agitation.[59]

Aquinas also had to combat the conservatives who saw in Aristotle nothing but a threat to the Christian faith. From the outset of the propagation of the *Physics*, the question of the eternity of the world was of concern to theologians, in particular, to Bonaventure and Pecham. They declared this thesis inconceivable and thought themselves to have demonstrated that the world had a beginning. Aquinas held, by contrast, that only faith can show that the world began and that it is not possible to construct a proof to the contrary. This thesis was a constant for Aquinas, and it reappeared with force in *De aeternitate mundi* (1271): not only had the beginning of the world not been demonstrated and could not be demonstrated, but it is possible that the world is eternally created.[60] Aquinas placed himself in opposition to the same Franciscan theologians on the subject of anthropology: in order not to attribute spiritual activities and animal functions to the same soul, they postulated the existence of three different souls according to the different levels of human life: vegetative, sensitive, intellectual. For Aquinas, the very same soul exercises the triple function of animation because the higher power of the substantial form includes and realizes the lower power. The unity of the living being of an intellectual nature that is man is thus more perfectly assured. The disagreement took place also in Christology: for the Franciscans, the existence of a *forma corporeitatis* was necessary for the numerical continuity of the body of Christ during the three days of his death; for Aquinas the permanence of the hypostatic union was sufficient to maintain the numerical identity of the body of Christ between the moment of his death and that of his resurrection.[61]

It was also necessary to oppose the monopsychism (only one soul) of the "Averroist" masters of the faculty of arts (notably, Siger de Brabant and Boethius of Dacia).[62] *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas* (Nov.–Dec. 1270) is the pivotal point in the controversy. Making use of the most recent translations of Aristotle and of his commentators, Aquinas shows his adversaries to what extent their Averroës is opposed both to the doctrine of Aristotle and to Christian faith and he embarrasses these philosophers by defying them to give some account of the common experience that "this particular man thinks" (*Hic homo singularis intelligit*).[63]

Despite these various conflicts, Aquinas continued his regular teaching.[64] This is the era of *Super Matthaeum* (1269–1270); *Super Ioannem* (1270–1272), one of the most finished scriptural commentaries; a second *Lectura in epistolas Pauli* (1271–72; Romans and the beginning of I Corinthians). Aquinas skipped from Matthew to John because he thought that the first took the place of the two other Synoptics, whereas the fourth gospel had something unique to offer: "The other evangelists treat principally the mysteries of the humanity of Christ; John brings his divinity to the forefront."[65]

Aquinas also disputes and writes the first fifteen questions *De malo* (1270–71) finishing Question 16 in 1272. The question *De unione Verbi incarnati* is likely most properly placed at the end of this stay in Paris (Spring 1271), but this date is con-

tested,[66] as well as that of question *De uirtutibus*.[67] *Quodlibets* I–VI and XII also date from this period,[68] as well as the writing of the *Secunda Pars* of the *ST* in its entirety (1271–72). To this several letters and theological consultations written at the request of different correspondents must be added: *De mixtione elementorum, De motu cordis, De operationibus occultis naturae, De iudiciis astrorum, Epistola ad ducissam Brabantiae*, and so on.

Two works stand out from among these, but it is not clear whether they were written in Paris or in Naples (1272–73). Unfinished, *De substantiis separatis* was called "one of the most important metaphysical works of the Aquinian," and its first chapter is seen as the most elaborate Platonic synthesis of Aquinas. As to *Super De Causis*, which compares *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus to the Dionysian corpus, Aquinas was the first to identify its author with an anonymous Arabic philosopher who had borrowed a great deal from Proclus.[69]

The commentaries on Aristotle are worth mentioning separately. The writing of the following works can be set in Paris: *Physica*: 1268–70; *Peryermenias*: 1270–71; *Ethica*: 1271–72; *Politica I–III*: 1272 [?]; *Posteriora Analytica I* 1–26: 1271–72. Begun in Paris, the other works were continued in Naples (1272–73), but left unfinished: *Posteriora Analytica* I 27–II 20; *Metaphysica; De caelo et mundo*; *De generatione et corruptione*; *Super Meteora*. Although Aquinas was once considered a faithful disciple of Aristotle, contemporary researchers are more reserved with regard to the exactness of his commentaries; Aquinas reads the Stagirite in his own way hoping to stretch him in a Christian direction rather than to recover the Aristotle of history. Added to the other works, these writings represent an extraordinary amount of labor; it is likely that Aquinas was aided by several secretaries.[70]

Return to Naples and the Last Years (1272–1274)

In the spring or at the beginning of the summer of 1272, Aquinas was sent back to Italy to found a new Dominican *studium* in Naples. In addition to the commentaries on Aristotle, he continued working on the *Tertia Pars* of the *ST* (*ST* III q.1–90) and probably taught a class on the epistle to the *Hebrews* and on the *Psalms* (1–54).[71] He recommenced work on the *Compendium theologiae* but wrote only a few chapters (II 1–9: *De spe*). He preached also to the faithful on the *Ten Commandments*, the *Credo*, and on the *Pater* (1273).

Thanks to the depositions at the process of canonization in Naples (1319) and at Fossanova (1321), which are precious to the historian, we know this last period of Aquinas's life in greater detail than the rest of his life. His confreres at the convent describe his life and his person: he became more peaceful and receptive; his manner of preaching was simple and concrete. He renewed relations with his family and was designated by his brother-in-law Roger of Aquila as executor of his will. Due to repeated mystical experiences and massive physical and nervous fatigue, Aquinas

ceased writing and teaching around December 6, 1273. Called by Gregory X to the council of Lyon and victim of an accident along the way, he fell ill and died on March 7, 1274, at the Cistercian abbey of Fossanova. Canonized by John XXII in 1323, Aquinas would be proclaimed Doctor of the Church by Pius V on April 15, 1567.[72]

NOTES

1. This brief biography presupposes the others done elsewhere, aside from William of Tocco. *Ystoria sancti Thome de Aquino de Guillaume de Tocco (1323)*, ed. Claire le Brun-Gouanvic (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1996); see also Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, *The Person and His Work*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005); Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 2, *Spiritual Master* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003); Simon Tugwell, O.P., *Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings* (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1988); and James A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974; 2d ed. with Corrigenda and Addenda, 1983) for the necessary justifications.

2. Aquinas, *Opera omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1882–), I* 1 (1989), 67*–68*; hereinafter cited as Leonina.

3. Despite the divergent sources and their apologetical embellishments, the historical reality of this episode cannot be doubted; cf. A. Tilatti, "La cattura di Tommaso d'Aquino da parte dei parenti," in M. C. De Matteis, ed., *Ovidio Capitani: Quaranta anni per la storia medioevale* (Bologna: Patron Editore, 2003), 345–57.

4. Tocco, *Ystoria* 10:110–11.

5. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:1–17.

6. According to A. Oliva, *Les Débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la* sacra doctrina. *Avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des* Sentences. (Paris: Vrin, 2006), 207–24, the first biblical commentaries must be situated in Paris instead of Cologne.

7. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:18–35; Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., and D. Bouthillier, "Quand saint Thomas méditait sur le prophète Isaïe," *Revue Thomiste* 90 (1990): 5–47.

8. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:36–53; cf. Alain de Libera and Cyrille Michon, ed. and trans., Thomas Aquinas–Dietrich de Freiberg, *L'Etre et l'essence, Le vocabulaire médiéval de l'ontologie*; commentary by Alain de Libera and Cyrille Michon, "Point: Essais" (Paris: Seuil, 1996).

9. M.-M. Dufeil, *Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polémique universitaire parisienne, 1250–1259* (Paris: Picard, 1972).

10. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:75–95.

11. Cf. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:54–59, 120–21, 198–201, 250–61.

12. Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM Cap., D. A. Keating, and J. P. Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to the Biblical Commentaries* (London and New York: T. & T. Clark International, 2005); Gilles Emery, O.P., "Biblical Exegesis and the Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity in St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on St. John," in Gilles Emery, O.P., *Trinity in Aquinas* (Ypsilanti, Mich. and Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2003; 2d ed., 2006), 271–319; M. Aillet, *Lire la Bible avec S. Thomas: Le Passage de la littera à la res dans la Somme théologique*, Studia friburgensia 80 (Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1993).

13. W. G. B. M. Valkenberg, *Words of the Living God: Place and Function of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 211–27.

14. B. C. Bazán, "Les Questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de théologie," in B. C. Bazán, G. Fransen, J. F. Wippel, D. Jacquart, *Les Questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental 44–45 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 12–149.

15. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:59–69; S.-T. Bonino, *Thomas d'Aquin: De la vérité Question 2 (La science en Dieu)*, Introduction, traduction, et commentaire, Vestigia 17 (Paris: Cerf; Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1996).

16. J. F. Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions Chiefly in Theology Faculties," in Bazán et al., *Les Questions disputées*, 151–222; J. Hamesse, "Theological *Quaestiones quodlibetales*," in C. Schabel, ed., *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century*, Brill's Companion to the Christian Tradition, I (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006), 17–48.

17. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:207–12; cf. Leonard E. Boyle, "The Quodlibets of St. Thomas and Pastoral Care," in Leonard E. Boyle, *Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas* (Louvain-La-Neuve: Federation Internationale des Instituts d'Etudes Medievales, 2000), 13–35 (also *The Thomist* 38 [1974]: 232–56); Kevin White, "The *Quodlibeta* of Thomas Aquinas in the Context of His Work," in C. Schabel, ed., *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 49–133.

18. Cf. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "Philosophie et théologie d'après le Prologue de Thomas d'Aquin au *Super Boetium de Trinitate*. Essai d'une lecture théologique," *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 10 (1999): 299–353.

19. Leonina 50, 6.

20. Leonina 50, 263–64.

21. Cf. Louis Bertrand Geiger, *La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 2d ed., Bibliothèque thomiste 23 (Paris: Vrin, 1953); Cornelio Fabro, *La Nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Turin: Società editrice internazionale, 2d rev. ed. 1950; 3d ed. 1963); G. Casey, "An Explication of the *de Hebdomadibus* of Boethius in the Light of St. Thomas's Commentary," *The Thomist* 51 (1987): 419–34.

22. This is the hypothesis of Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas*, 165–66. Tugwell, *Albert and Thomas*, 221, is in agreement on this point.

23. Cf. R.-A. Gauthier, "*Introduction*" *à Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Somme contre les Gentils* (Paris: Editions universitaires, 1993); this book brings to light and sensibly modifies the first "Introduction historique" by the same author and that was published in a translation of *Contra Gentiles*, by R. Bernier and M. Corvez (Paris: Lethielleux, 1959), 7–123.

24. Leonina 25/2, 486–88.

25. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:101–16, 415; Gilles Emery, O.P., "The Treatise of St. Thomas," in *Trinity in Aquinas*, 71–120; there are excellent introductions and commentaries in the French edition: Thomas Aquinas, *Somme contre les Gentils*.

26. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Thomas d'Aquin: Abrégé de théologie (Compendium theologiae)*, Introduction, Texte latin, trad. Française, et annotations (Paris: Cerf, 2007), 7–34.

27. Cf. Denis Chardonnens, *L'Homme sous le regard de la Providence*. Providence de Dieu et condition humaine selon l'*Exposition littérale sur le Livre de Job* de Thomas d'Aquin, Bibliothèque thomiste 50 (Paris: Vrin, 1997).

28. Cf. Gilles Emery, O.P., ed. and trans., Thomas d'Aquin, *Traités. Les Raisons de la foi. Les Articles de la foi et les sacrements de l'Église*, Introduction, traduction, et annotation (Paris: Cerf, 1999).

29. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:129–36; R. Wielockx, "Poetry and Theology in the *Adoro Te deuote*: Thomas Aquinas on the Eucharist and Christ's Uniqueness," in Kent Emery and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans*: *Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 157–74.

30. Cf. M. Morard, "Thomas d'Aquin lecteur des Conciles," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 98 (2005): 213–365.

31. P.-Y. Maillard, *La Vision de Dieu chez Thomas d'Aquin: Une lecture de l'*In Ioannem *à la lumière de ses sources augustiniennes*, Bibliothèque thomiste 53 (Paris: Vrin, 2001); M. Dauphinais, B. David, and M. Levering, eds., *Aquinas the Augustinian* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007).

32. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:126–38; Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas*, 163–76.

33. Leonard E. Boyle, *The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas*, Etienne Gilson Series 5 (Toronto: P.I.M.S., 1982).

34. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Lectura romana*, 1–57.

35. M. M. Mulchahey, *"First the Bow is Bent in Study . . . ." Dominican Education before 1350*, Studies and Texts 132 (Toronto: P.I.M.S., 1998), 278–306.

36. Cf. A. Oliva, "La Questione dell'*alia lectura* di Tommaso d'Aquino," *Quaestio* 6 (2006): 516–21; Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "Lire saint Thomas autrement," in Boyle, *Facing History*, xxi–xxiv; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:45–47 and 413.

37. P. Glorieux, "Pour la chronologie de la Somme," *Mélanges de science religieuse* 2 (1945): 59–98; I. T. Eschmann, "A Catalogue of St. Thomas' Works," in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook (New York: Random House, 1956), 386–88; Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas*, 221–22.

38. Gauthier, *Introduction*, 80; cf. 65–67; cf. R. A. Gauthier, ed., *L'Ethique à Nicomaque*, II, *Introduction* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 2d ed., 1970), 128–29, n. 135. The reason for this date is that the *ST* I-II relies heavily on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle (more than 100 times) according to the translation of Moerbeke, which Aquinas did not have in hand until the end of 1270. Gauthier is in agreement with O. Lottin on this, who placed the *Prima Secundae* after q.6 of *QDM* (end 1270).

39. *ST* III q.90 a.4.

40. With more or less hesitation, many think that Raynald of Piperno could be the author of the *Supplement* but others are more reserved (Leonina 12, p. xvi ff.); Eschmann, *A Catalogue*, 388.

41. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:50–156; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 2:101–5.

42. For more details on the *Secunda Pars*, see Stephen J. Pope, ed., *The Ethics of Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002).

43. Cf. Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2d ed. (Montréal and Paris: Institut d'Études Médiévales and Vrin, 1954), 255–76; Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., *La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle*, 3d ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1957).

44. *Super Sent* I, Prol., q.1, a.3, sol.1; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 2:1–18.

45. Cf. Leonard E. Boyle, "Notes on the Education of the *Fratres communes* in the Dominican Order in the Thirteenth Century," in R. Creytens and P. Künzle, eds., *Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Th. Käppeli O.P*, t. 1, Storia e Letteratura, Raccolta di Studi e Testi 141 (Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Rome, 1978), 249–67 (reprinted in Leonard E. Boyle, *Pastoral Care, Clerical Education and Canon Law, 1200–1400* [London: Variorum Reprints, 1981], Etude VI); Boyle, *The Setting*.

46. Servais Pinckaers, O.P., *The Sources of Christian Ethics* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

47. *ST* I–II q.3 a.2 ad 3.

48. *ST* IIIa q.27–59.

49. L. Scheffczyk, "Die Stellung des Thomas von Aquin in der Entwicklung der Lehre von den Mysteria Vitae Christi," in M. Gerwing and G. Ruppert, eds., *Renovatio et Reformatio*, (Münster: Aschendorff, 1986), 44–70.

50. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 2:125–52. Cf. also Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Le Christ en ses mystères: La Vie et l'œuvre de Jésus selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Jésus et Jésus-Christ 78–79 (Paris: Desclée, 1999), 1:13–27.

51. For more on the *ST*, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, & Reception*, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005); the *ST* continues to inspire numerous studies: D. Berger, *Thomas von Aquins "Summa Theologiae"* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft, 2004); Andreas Speer, ed., *Thomas von Aquin, Die Summa theologiae: Werkinterpretationen* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005); Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., *The Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

52. Leonina 24/1 and 2; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:161–64, 427–28.

53. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:127–29, 434.

54. Amid the numerous works in this area must be recalled at least these few: Vivian Boland, *Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis*, Brill Studies in the History of Christian Thought 69 (Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1996); C. D'Ancona Costa, "La Notion de l'un dans Thomas d'Aquin: Une confrontation des commentaires sur les Noms divins et sur la Métaphysique," *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 64 (1997): 315–51.

55. Thierry-Dominique Humbrecht, O.P., *Théologie négative et noms divins chez saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Bibliothèque thomiste 57 (Paris: Vrin, 2005).

56. J. Turbessi, "S. Thomas d'Aquin" in "Denys l'Aréopagite," *Dictionnaire de spiritualité, ascétique et mystique*, ed. Marcel Viller (Paris: Beauchesne, 1954), 3:349–56; G. O'Daly, "Dionysius Areopagita," *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, ed. Gerhard Müller (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 8:772–80; Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 32 (Leiden: Brill, 1991).

57. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:167–71.

58. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:171–78.

59. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:182–84; M. M. Dufeil, "Évolution ou fixité des institutions ecclésiales: Une controverse universitaire. L'édition critique de trois oeuvres polémiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 55 (1971): 464–79.

60. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:184–87; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 2:227–31. Cf. L. Bianchi, *L'Errore di Aristotele: La Polemica contro l'eternità del mondo nel XIII secolo* (Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1984); T. B. Noone, "The Originality of St. Thomas's Position on the Philosophers and Creation," *The Thomist* 60 (1996): 275–300; Cyrille Michon, ed., *Thomas d'Aquin et la controverse sur L'éternité du monde*, Traités sur l'éternité du monde de Bonaventure, Thomas d'Aquin, Peckam, Boèce de Dacie, Henri de Gand et Guillaume d'Ockam, GF Flammarion 1199 (Paris: Flammarion, 2004).

61. Cf. *SCG* II.58; *ST* I q.76 a.3–4; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:187–90; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 2:252–59.

62. R.-A. Gauthier, "Notes sur les débuts (1225–1240) du premier "averroïsme," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 66 (1982): 327–74; Leonina 45/1, 218*–35*.

63. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:191–96; Alain de Libera, ed., Thomas d'Aquin, *L'Unité de l'intellect contre les averroïstes, suivi des Textes contre Averroès antérieurs à 1270*, Texte latin. Traduction, introduction, bibliographie, chronologie, notes et index, GF 713 (Paris: Flammarion, 1994); C. Luna, "Quelques précisions chronologiques à propos de la controverse sur l'unité de l'intellect," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 83 (1999): 649–84.

64. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:197–223.

65. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:197–201. Cf. M. Dauphinais and M. Levering, eds., *Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005).

66. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., "L'Unité d'être du Christ: Etat de la question," in *Thomas Aquinas, Le Verbe incarné*, t. III: Summa theologiae IIIa Questions 7–15, New edition with translation and annotations (Paris: Cerf, 2002), 391–402; Mulchahey, *"First the Bow is Bent in Study,"* 315–18; M. H. Deloffre, ed. and trans., *Thomas d'Aquin*, *Question disputée: L'Union du Verbe incarné* (*De unione Verbi incarnati*) (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 13–27.

67. See also our discussion, in Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:429–30, on the debated authenticity of two other Disputed Questions, which some have tried to attribute to Thomas (*Utrum anima coniuncta cognoscat seipsam per essentiam*; *De immortalitate animae*).

68. Table of dates: Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:211.

69. C. D'Ancona Costa, "Saint Thomas lecteur du *Liber de Causis*: Bilan des recherches contemporaines concernant le *De Causis* et analyse de l'interprétation thomiste," in C. D'Ancona Costa, *Recherches sur le Liber De Causis*, Études de philosophie médiévale 72 (Paris: Vrin, 1995), 229–58.

70. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:224–46.

71. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:250–66.

72. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, 1:267–95.

CHAPTER 2

AQUINAS AND ARISTOTLE

JAMES DOIG

Introduction

Aquinas's relation to Aristotle was that of a theologian to a source of philosophical doctrines and concepts with whose aid he formulated his theological synthesis of Christian revelation. The value for theology that Aquinas saw in Aristotelian thought led him to undertake the composition of "expositions" and *sententiae* respecting individual works of Aristotle. Through these compositions, Aquinas offered his readers the possibility of greater understanding, as well as recognition of the value of that thought for theology.

Aquinas chose Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and *On Interpretation* as the subjects of what medieval Masters termed "expositions," that is, studies proceeding through an explanation focusing on the words of the text being examined; however, only the exposition on the *Posterior Analytics* was completed. As concerns what can be considered the principal works of the Aristotelian *corpus*—the *Metaphysics*, the *Physics*, the *De anima* ("On the Soul"), and the *Nicomachean Ethics*—Aquinas completed *sententiae* (singular: *sententia*), that is, presentations in summary fashion of the doctrines he understood Aristotle to propose in each work. While he began five other *sententiae* on works of Aristotle, only one was completed, that treating in succession the two works, "On Sense and the Sensed" and "On Memory and Remembering."[1]

As was true generally of thirteenth-century Masters, Aquinas knew no Greek but read Aristotle in a variety of Latin translations. While some of these were made directly from Greek manuscripts, others were based on Arabic translations several removes from any Greek text. Since the sixth century, Latin Europe had known Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation* in Boethius's translation, but the remaining parts of the *Organon* became available in Latin only by the middle of the twelfth

century. Then too, only in the middle of that same century did Aristotle's strictly philosophical works begin to appear in Latin, and even these were at times only in a partial translation. Moreover, during Aquinas's lifetime one could not have found consensus on the exact number or identity of the works of Aristotle. Nor did Aquinas and his contemporaries have adequate historical information respecting the relation of Plato and Aristotle, not to speak of Neoplatonism and its effects on the numerous philosophical works that were being introduced into the Latin world in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.[2]

Yet Aquinas's mastery of the Aristotelian corpus available to him is evidenced by the "divisions of text" everywhere proposed in his expositions and *sententiae* on individual works. By these divisions, he not only proposed the unity he saw as constituted by the books that together make up a given Aristotelian work, but he also explained both the flow from chapter to chapter within each book and the fashion in which Aristotle proceeded from point to point within each chapter. In his expositions and *sententiae* on Aristotle, we encounter Aquinas the teacher intent on explaining both the doctrine he understood Aristotle to offer and the procedure by which it was offered. In what follows, it is Aquinas's interest in the four principle works of Aristotle's philosophy and the use of that philosophy in Aquinas's theology that is of concern.

The *Sententia* on the *De anima* and the *Summa theologiae*

In 1268, Aquinas composed the first of his *sententiae*, that concerning the *De anima* (hereinafter, *In DA*). Aristotle's study of the soul is seen to focus on the substantial form or first intrinsic formal cause that explains both the possession of life and, remotely, the motions and activities typical of various types of living beings. The soul is defined as "the first act of a physical, organic body having life in potency," and each type of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and intellective, is examined in terms of the potencies proper to each. The intellective soul, as "first act," is the substantial form whose union with a body proportionate to that soul's vegetative and sensitive powers results in the existence of a human being. While some of its powers are exercised through the organs found in the human body, its intellective power acts in a manner intrinsically independent of anything material and so is "separated."[3] As the first act of a human body, the intellective soul is understood as entailing the individualization in each human being of the intellective power, just as it insures the individualized vegetative and sensitive powers.[4] Sketched thus in broad terms is the philosophy Aquinas found in the *De anima*.

Aquinas's understanding of Aristotle's conception of the intellective soul as the substantial form of a living being differed from what was proposed by authors enjoying some influence at the time. Masters in Arts and in Theology commonly considered the intellective soul as a subsistent spiritual form, complete in itself, that

is, a particular reality.[5] Many asserted that this soul was composed of spiritual matter and form.[6] For some, each human being was constituted by several substantial forms, only one of which was the intellective soul.[7] Also proposed was the soul's presence to itself, a presence so immediate that the soul could understand itself independently of any reflection on its activities.[8] For some, the soul's grasp of its nature was indicated by Avicenna's Flying Man image: by imagining oneself as created, suspended in air in such a way that no bodily part experienced sensation of any kind, one realizes that one exists as a reality totally distinct from anything material.[9] For these Masters, when Aristotle considered the intellective soul as "first act" of an organic body, he could only have intended the soul's role as governing the body much as a sailor governs his ship.[10]

Contrary to such interpretations, Aquinas's *In DA* proposes that governance of the body is essential to the intellective soul's nature, for this soul is the form imparting to the human body whatever life it has,[11] a form that will always be incomplete if divided from the body that is its own.[12] According to Aquinas, the soul's "separation" from the body is nonetheless safeguarded; its separation or ability to act with intrinsic independence of anything material[13] accords with Aristotle's doctrine that an intellective soul, although incomplete in itself, has a nature not completely exhausted by its reality as the animating principle of a body.[14] Moreover, precisely because this soul comes into being as the first act of a body, its intellective potency is limited to knowledge whose source is found in sensation; the soul is not in any manner present to itself in such a way that it understands itself independently of reflection on its activity.[15]

These differences between Aquinas's understanding of the intellective soul and other proposals current in the 1260s suggest the goal of the *In DA*.[16] This goal may also be implicated in features characteristic of both *Prima Pars* of the *Summa theologiae* and the *In DA*, each of which was composed in 1268. Both works aim at a complete explication of their subject; both avoid unnecessary detail; both strive for clarity, never offering lengthy digressions arguing against views contrary to their proposals. As Aquinas made explicit, the *Summa*'s simplicity, directness, and completeness were intentional, for he was offering to "beginners" in the study of Christian religion all they needed to know on the subject.[17] Perhaps the *In DA* was intended as a companion piece to the questions of the *Summa* being composed at the time, that is, questions respecting the human being, his intellective soul, the relation of the soul to the human body, and the soul's powers.[18]

The *Sententia* on the *Physics*

When in 1268–69 Aquinas offered his *sententia* on the *Physics* (hereinafter, the *In Phy*), he appears to have been particularly interested in correcting interpretations proposed by Averroës.[19] The *In Phy* finds in Aristotle a general study of natural science focusing on mobile being as its subject. The conception of "mobile being" entails

that of "nature," or intrinsic principle of motion.[20] After Aristotle defines motion as the act of what exists in potency to a terminus precisely insofar as it is in potency to that terminus,[21] he notes that, while motion depends on the intrinsic material cause of the existence of mobile being (its prime matter), it is especially the intrinsic formal cause (its substantial form) that is at the root of motion.[22] Place and its opposite, the vacuum, are investigated, for they concern the most basic type of motion. Time too is examined in some detail as the measure of motion.[23] To avoid the impossible consequences of an infinite regress in causality, Aristotle proposes the necessity of including the conception of a first motion that is caused by a first immobile mover.[24] To this point in the *Physics*, Aquinas sees Aristotle discussing *communia*, that is, as showing what is entailed in a coherent view of the conceptions of motion and of mobile being, given their definitions.[25] But now Aquinas notes that Aristotle turns from *communia* to reality in proposing the existence of a first immobile being as the final cause or goal of the eternal circular motion of the first heaven. The latter, in its capacity as the first agent cause, is the first intermediary between the first immobile mover and the temporal motion of the realities of our material world.[26] Such in general is the Aristotle that Aquinas proposes in his *In Phy*.

In addition to criticizing Averroës, the *In Phy* contains a critique of Aristotle's notions of the first final and agent causes. The proof of eternal motion is said to lack efficacy insofar as Aristotle's arguments assume what they conclude, namely, that every mobile being that begins to undergo motion has itself been produced through a previous motion, and that every moment of time marking the beginning of a motion is preceded by a previous moment. Aquinas insists that Aristotle was misled by his imagination; every moment of time, every beginning of motion, was imagined as preceded by, respectively, a previous moment of time and a prior motion. Aquinas notes too that Aristotle's proposal in the *Metaphysics* of a first cause of being as such, when added to Aristotle's distinction between an agent acting by will and an agent acting by nature, should have led the latter to recognize as possible that the eternal immobile first mover could simultaneously be the first agent that, acting by will, brings into being the first motion and so, the first moment of time.[27]

Aquinas offered these criticisms while carefully explaining Aristotle's text. It is as if Aquinas wished to present a completely detailed and brief interpretation of the *Physics*, while simultaneously reducing the danger that some might feel on encountering Aristotle's doctrines of the immobile first mover.

The *Sententia* on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Summa theologiae*

In 1271–72, Aquinas composed both *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa theologiae* and the *sententia* on the *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereinafter, the *In NE*), both treatises on morality. In this *sententia*, Aquinas explains that Aristotle presents the first part of

moral science insofar as he discusses only the life of the individual human being as an agent voluntarily acting for an end through the performance of virtuous activity.[28] That ultimate end, termed "happiness," consists in the pleasurable activity of man's supreme power, namely, his contemplative intellect,[29] yet activity exercised within a society governed by the appropriate laws.[30] Moreover, this pleasure must be complete and self-sufficient if it is to satisfy the human person's natural appetite for happiness.[31] Yet as Aristotle remarks, complete happiness sufficient of itself to satisfy human nature's longing is finally unattainable. Hence, Aristotle concludes by asserting that only imperfect happiness is attainable in this life. That is, human beings can only be "blessed as men."[32]

This conclusion, while a necessary element of the moral science Aquinas saw in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is also an element of Aquinas's theological view where it is incorporated with the Christian notion of an afterlife in which perfect happiness is had through union with God. Yet in the *In NE*, Aquinas leaves unstated any reference to this Christian belief. This silence accords with what appears to be the goal of the work. In this regard, a parallel can be noted between, on the one hand, the relation of Aquinas's *In NE* to *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa theologiae* and, on the other, the relation of his *In DA* to *Prima Pars* of that work. Both *sententiae* present the Aristotelian concepts and doctrines that function fundamentally in the respective sections of the *Summa*. Just as in the *Summa*'s *Prima Pars*, the *De anima* provides the philosophical material so fundamental to Aquinas's theological exposition of the human person, so in *Secunda Pars*, the *Nicomachean Ethics* provides the philosophical foundation of his analysis of the human virtuous activity that, elevated by grace, orients the human person toward the ultimate happiness envisioned in Christian revelation. Just as the *In DA* reveals Aquinas standing almost alone in his understanding of Aristotle's vision of the intellective soul, so the *In NE* presents a view of Aristotle's intent at odds with the other two principal interpretations current at the time. Those interpretations, by Averroës and Albert the Great, considered Aristotle's discussion of virtuous activity as depicting a morality oriented to happiness within human society, rather than morality directed toward the ultimate happiness to which human nature is oriented.[33] Similar to what was noted above regarding Aquinas's presentation of his reading of the *De anima*, one suspects his *In NE* was intended as a companion piece to *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa*, a "handbook," so to speak, justifying his understanding of the Aristotelian concepts and doctrines employed in such a basic manner in the latter.

The *Sententia* on the *Metaphysics*

The *sententia* on the *Metaphysics* (hereinafter, the *In Meta*) was chronologically the last on a work of Aristotle fundamental to Aquinas's theological synthesis.[34] Aristotle is shown to develop "wisdom" or the "cognition of truth" had through knowledge

of the first causes and principles of reality.[35] Wisdom clarifies the concepts common to all types of cognition, "substance," say, or "principle," although its subject matter is being as such.[36] In this context, wisdom establishes the existence and the essence of the subjects of all subordinate sciences, while leaving to the latter the study of their subjects on the basis of information gathered through the senses.[37] Substance, the principal type of being,[38] is understood to have as its intrinsic principles prime matter and substantial form.[39] The first agent and final causes of being as such are investigated when the science turns to eternal sensible substances. The doctrines of the latter causes are similar to those proposed in the *Physics*,[40] although Aristotle adds that the first mover is an intellect identical to the intellection of itself, knowing nothing except itself.[41]

In addition to the above, Aquinas announces in the *In Meta* his own doctrine of *esse* (to-be, or being) as the intrinsic principle, which, united to essence, constitutes a substantial being as real.[42] Additionally, Aristotle is said to propose a first cause of being, as well as a first cause of motion.[43] Finally, Aristotle's doctrines of the ultimate final and agent causes are criticized just as they were earlier in the *In Phy*, although much more briefly.[44]

In regard to the doctrine of *esse*, given its role in Aquinas's theological writings, one supposes that the reader of the *In Meta* is being invited to adopt as philosophically valid a transformed Aristotelian position on being. For instance, Aristotle speaks of the intellective soul as giving being to matter, resulting in the existence of a human being.[45] Aquinas would be inviting his readers to consider the human soul as only the formal cause of the specific type of reality had in a human being; only through a principle of *esse*, proportionate to the human soul, would there exist an individual human being.[46]

Aquinas's claim that Aristotle asserts a first cause of being, and not only of motion, points to the importance of consulting both the Latin translations of Aristotle known to Aquinas and his very careful reading of them. In the present case, each of four translations of the *Metaphysics* used by Aquinas appears to justify his interpretation. For instance, one translation reads: "Nor is something the cause whereby they [i.e., the truest and the greatest of beings] exist, but they are the causes whereby others (exist)."[47]

Aristotle's argument that the first mover can know only itself supposed that knowing something other than itself would be an imperfection. Aquinas responded that in knowing himself, God would know all reality as the effect of his causality; however, as long as God does not rest enjoyably in knowledge of creatures, no imperfection is had.[48]

In both the *In Meta* and the *In Phy*, Aquinas presents Aristotle's distinction between prime matter and substantial form. In the *Physics*, Aristotle is said to examine the universal notion of the coming-to-be of material substances. In contrast, in the *Metaphysics* an examination of "the way of predication" is noted as Aristotle's procedure in comparing the diverse contents of knowledge expressed through predicates used "denominatively," that is, when they "name" a subject. In the example offered, "This material thing is a man," the predicate "man" expresses or "names" the

totality of the intelligibility proper to an individual such as Socrates. Other possible predicates, such as "white" or "large" express something much less intelligible. Accordingly, Aristotle concludes that a being is constituted by the union of a meaningless subject or matter—signified by "this material thing"—and the human essence signified by "man." As is true of every essence, its intelligibility is traced to its form.[49]

The same "way of predication" is central to Aquinas's understanding of the clarification of "common" concepts that constitutes *Metaphysics* V. Whether the concept is "being" or "principle," "habitus" or "act," or any other of the more than thirty terms studied, Aquinas clarifies its meaning by noting the ways in which it is used to name something.

Also clearly evident in Aquinas's *In Meta* is his intent to oppose interpretations basic to the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* by Averroës and Albert the Great, as well as doctrines found in Avicenna's *First Philosophy*.[50] Given this situation, as well as the evident use throughout Aquinas's theology of the common concepts clarified in the *Metaphysics*, one supposes that Aquinas intended the *In Meta* as a presentation of the science of wisdom that he found so useful in synthesizing Christian revelation.

Aristotle and the *Summa theologiae*

The principal instance of Aquinas's theological synthesis, his *Summa theologiae*, presents in easily recognizable form multiple examples of the presence of Aristotelian doctrines and concepts similar to those just mentioned in regard to the *In Meta*. Then too, this theological synthesis is conceived in accord with what Aquinas saw the *Metaphysics* propose concerning a subordinate science, that is, a study whose legitimacy and principles are established by a superior science, in this case, by divine knowledge and the revelation of the divine intention for humankind.[51] In its second question, the licit character of the proofs of God's existence is guaranteed by their adherence to the requirements of Aristotle's "demonstration of the fact."[52] In the fourth proof for the existence of God, Aristotle's authority is explicitly cited respecting the crucial basis of the argument.[53] One might continue working through the *Summa* in this way. Yet alongside the straightforward use of Aristotelian concepts and doctrines, the *Summa* employs the methodology Aquinas recognized in the *Metaphysics* when Aristotle studied not only the matter–form distinction but, more important, the common concepts.[54]

Are human terms appropriately used in speaking of God? The *Summa*'s response reveals the metaphysician investigating "the way of predication." Human intellectual knowledge, Aquinas explains, is built on terms used to signify things in one of two ways. Some terms signify concretely for they signify complete, subsisting realities, for example, "man" as predicated of an individual human being to signify the specific nature embodied in him. Other terms, however, signify abstractly, since

their signification is of a simple form, not as a subsisting reality, but rather as "that by which something is." For example, "whiteness" signifies the form by which some reality is white in color. With this knowledge at hand, Aquinas turns to his question of whether human terms can appropriately be applied to God. Because God is simple and subsistent, abstract terms or names can be attributed to him, thus signifying his subsistent simplicity. As well, since God is complete or perfect in all ways, concrete terms can be predicated of him to signify his subsistent completeness. Accordingly, terms attributable to God are at hand, even though their ultimate origin in human contact with the material world insures that they fall far short of signifying God as he is.[55]

The metaphysician is also evident when the *Summa* asks whether a relation in God is identical to the divine essence. Aquinas notes that the predication of terms falling under the genera of accidents signifies a reality having being in a subject. However, of the terms signifying accidents, only a term of relation refers the subject to something other than itself. Thus, the term "paternity" will signify the divine essence itself as begetting the divine Son. (Although the human mind conceives of the Son as distinct from the divine essence insofar as the Son is the term of the relation signified by "paternity," we recognize in that distinction only one of reason.)[56]

In discussing the possibility of the presence in a human being of a plurality of substantial forms, Aquinas remarks, "This appears impossible from the way of predication." If "animal" signified one form, and "man" another, then they could be predicated of one another in one of the following two ways. First, as a *per accidens* predication, the terms in "Man is an animal" would have no order to one another, in this paralleling the terms in "The white thing is sweet." Second, if the proposition were in the second mode of per se predication, then the subject is the basis for the predicate, after the fashion of "The object's surface is colored"; if this were so, then "man" would fall within the definition of "animal." But because "animal" is part of the definition of "man," the proposition is a strict per se predication; that is, it indicates that the meaning of "animal" is part of what is signified by "man." "Therefore it must be that it is the same form through which some reality is an animal and through which it is a man."[57]

These are but three examples. Yet one finds everywhere in the *Summa* the influence of the way of predication. Whether or not Aquinas makes that use explicit, his conceptualization of Christian revelation includes the constant application of the meanings given concepts as a result of their use in naming things.

Conclusion: Aquinas and Aristotle

The dependence of Aquinas's theology on the philosophy of Aristotle appears then in two forms. One is the evident application of Aristotle's doctrines or concepts; the other, not as noticeable, is the application of the method Aquinas found proper to Aristotle's

metaphysician. The presence in Aquinas's theology of such dependence on Aristotle, when set alongside the *sententiae* composed on individual works of Aristotle, point to the former's high regard for the latter. This regard in which Aristotle was held should not be surprising. One of Aquinas's strongest convictions concerned the impossibility that error can arise from the correct use of the human cognitive abilities given by God. That the human mind is made for the world is surely everywhere evident in Aquinas's works. And because he held this basic truth, might he not have wondered what better tool to use in developing a systematic understanding of Christian revelation than the philosophy he saw in Aristotle? For in that philosophy, Aquinas found first, the metaphysician who investigated by "the way of predication" the common human concepts properly used in knowing the world; and second, the knowledge developed through the application in the subordinate sciences of the common concepts and principles whose value is guaranteed by the work of the metaphysician. Truly, for Aquinas, Aristotle was *the* Philosopher.

NOTES

1. The unfinished *sententiae* concerned *Meteorology*, *Politics*, *Heaven* (known to Aquinas as "On Heaven and on the World"), and *Generation and Corruption*. Aquinas's writings on Aristotle are discussed in: Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., *Initiation à saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son oeuvre* (Fribourg, Suisse/Paris: Éditions universitaire/Cerf, 1993), 498–503. For the notions of medieval "expositions" and *sententiae*, see R. A. Gauthier, "*Praefatio*," *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, 47/1 (Rome: Sancta Sabina, 1969), 244*–45*; R. A. Gauthier, "Le Cours sur l'*Ethica nova* d'un maitres es arts de Paris (1235–1240)," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age* 43 (1975): 76–77.

2. On the influx of translations of Greek, Jewish, and Arabic works into Latin during the twelfth–thirteenth centuries, see Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1985), 3:205–11; Marie-Therese D'Alverny, *La Transmission des textes philosophiques et scientifiques au Moyen Age*, ed. C. Burnett (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), chs. 2–3. For the Latin translations of Aristotle's works, see the various volumes of *Aristoteles Latinus*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Paris: Brouwer, 1965–1995).

3. Aquinas, *Sententia Libri De Anima*, Leonina, vol. 45-I (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1984), 72–73, l. 366–92; 88–89, l. 70–131; 207, l. 358–83. Hereinafter cited as *In DA*.

4. *In DA*, 88–89, l. 43–131.

5. The remote source of this view is: Pseudo-Augustinus, *De spiritu et anima*, in *Patrologia Latina* (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1857), 40: col. 781 (hereinafter cited as *PL*). Influential was the assertion that the intellective soul is more properly "perfection" of the body, rather than its form: Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu sixtus de naturalibus*, in S. Van Riet, ed., G. Verbeke, intro., *Avicenna Latinus*, 2 vols. (Vol. I, Louvain/Leiden: Peeters/Brill, 1968; Vol. 2, Louvain/Leiden: Éditions Orientalistes/Brill, 1972), 1:16, l. 87–21, l. 48. Later proponents of the soul as subsistent spiritual form included: Alexander of Hales, *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventura, 1952), 2:145, l. 16–146, l. 3; Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, ed. J. S. Bougerol (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), 80, l. 1–2; William of

Auvergne, *Tractatus de anima*, in *Guilielmi Alverni Opera Omnia*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1674); reprinted: Frankfurt am Main: Minerva GMBH, 1963), fol. 67, col. A; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1885), 1–4: responsio, 414b–415a; ad 5, 415b; Peter of Spain, *Scientia libri De anima*, ed. M. A. Alonso, 2d ed. (Barcelona: Flors, 1961), 17, l. 18–31; 20, l. 10–16; 304, l. 17–18. A witness to the ideas current at the time Aquinas left Paris (1259) dates from ca. 1260, although probably not known to him: Anonymous, *Questiones in tres libros De anima*, in *Ein anonymer Aristoteleskommentar des XIII. Jarhunderts*, ed. J. Vennebusch (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1963), 116, l. 22–117, l. 33.

6. Dominicus Gundisalvus, "The Treatise *De anima* of Dominicus Gundissalinus," ed. J. T. Muchkle, intro. E. Gilson, *Mediaeval Studies* 2 (1940): 58, l. 28–31. Johannes Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, ed. D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 90, l. 28–91, l. 5. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1928), solutio, 399a–b. Pseudo-Peter of Spain, *Expositio libri De anima*, published as: *Pedro Hispano. Obras Filosóficas*, Vol. 3, ed. M. Alonso (Madrid: Instituto Luis Vives, 1954), 328, l. 32–329, l. 6. Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 67, l. 75–82; 70, l. 67–69 and 75–77. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, responsio 414b–15a; ad 6, 415b–16a. Anonymous, *Questiones*, 455, l. 262–456, l. 276.

7. The source of this doctrine appears to be had in Avicebron, *Fons vitae*, ed. C. Baeumker, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Bd. 1, H. 2–4 (Münster, 1892), 211–27. Proponents included the following: Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae*, ad 1–7, 422b; Peter of Spain, *Commentarium in De anima*, ed. M. A. Alonso, in *Obras Filosóficas*, n. 2 (Madrid, 1944), 656, l. 9–30; Anonymous, Magister Artium, *Lectura in librum De anima a quodam discipulo reportata* (Ms. Roma Naz. V. E. 828), ed. R. A. Gauthier (Grottoferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1985), 155, l. 212–256, l. 233; 214, l. 311–315, l. 326; 219, l. 442–44. Somewhat similar to the doctrine of a plurality of forms is the notion of the intellect as a separated substance whose union with the sensitive soul results in a composed form that as such is the act of the human body: Anonymous, *Questiones*, 142, l. 70–76; 176, l. 118–28.

8. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, responsio, 86a; ad 1, 90a. Bonaventure, *Opera omnia*, obj. 3, 122a.

9. Avicenna, *Liber de anima*, 36, l. 49–37, l. 68. Gundisalvus, "The Treatise *De anima*," 37, l. 17–32. Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 51, l. 27–41. William of Auvergne, *Tractatus de anima*, fol. 82, col. B – fol. 83, col. A. Peter of Spain, *Commentarium in De anima*, 650, l. 3–24.

10. Gundisalvus, "The Treatise *De anima*," 42, l. 11–15. Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, 5, l. 23–26, l. 3; 7, l. 1–13. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae*, 385–86. Jean de La Rochelle, *Summa de anima*, 385b–386a. Anonymous, *Questiones*, 163, l. 51–59; 176, l. 131–32, dated ca. 1260, the year following Aquinas's departure from Paris, illustrates the currency of this view of Aristotle's definition of the soul.

11. *In DA*, 79, l. 106–21; 85, l. 155–74.

12. This is implied in these texts: *In DA*, 74, l. 36–75, l. 44; 76, l. 141–50; 86, l. 239–57.

13. *In DA*, 222–23, l. 202–20.

14. *In DA*, 207, l. 372–83.

15. *In DA*, 216, l. 65–86.

16. Although Aquinas devotes a few paragraphs to the rejection of the interpretation of the agent and possible intellects attributed to Averroës, both the failure to mention the latter's name and the brevity of the discussion also indicate that Aquinas's goal is to present Aristotle's views in as straightforward a way as possible. See *In DA*, 220, l. 89–221, l. 166.

17. *ST* I, prologus.

18. *ST* I q.75–88.

19. The twenty-some "corrections" range from the mild: *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M. Maggiolo, (Turin: Marietti, 1954), no. 8: "His [i.e., Averroës's] exposition is inappropriate because as a whole it does not have one goal and because the Philosopher does not intend to show" to the harsh: *In Phy*, no. 966: "The argument Averroes has proposed is completely frivolous," and in no. 1083: "What the Commentator says is evidently false." Hereinafter cited as *In Phy*.

20. *In Phy*, no. 145.

21. *In Phy*, no. 285.

22. *In Phy*, nos. 150 and 152–53.

23. Place and the vacuum: *In Phy*, 201–70, lect. 1–14; time: 273–312, lect. 15–23.

24. *In Phy*, nos. 885–86 and 891–94.

25. *In Phy*, nos. 972 and 1083.

26. *In Phy*, nos. 1004–5, 1081–84, and 1168.

27. *In Phy*, nos. 974–90.

28. *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, Leonina, vol. 47 (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1969), 4–5, l. 50–54, and 99–109. Hereinafter cited as *In NE*. For moral virtue in general, see: *In NE*, Bk. II, cc. 1–11; for the principles of virtuous activity, such as voluntary action and choice, see: Bk. III, cc. 1–13; for individual moral virtues, see: Bk. IV, c. 14–V, c. 17; for intellectual virtues, see: Bk. VI, cc. 1–11.

29. *In NE*, 582–83, l. 1–15; and 583, l. 71–78.

30. *In NE*, 597, l. 1–29.

31. *In NE*, 14, l. 1–6; 31–32, l. 60–76; and 32–33, l. 136–217.

32. *In NE*, 60, l. 215–22; and 595, l. 141–44.

33. Averroës, *Commentarium in Ethicorum*, in *Moralem totam philosophiam complectentes cum Averrois Cordubensis in Moralia Nicomachia expositione*, Vol. 3 of *Aristotelis Stagiritae Libri* (Venice: Juncta, 1562–1574; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva G.m.b.H., 1962), fol. 8vH-I and fol. 9vG-H. Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones*, ed. W. Kübel, in *Opera omnia*, T. XIV, P. I–II (Cologne: Aschendorff, 1968–72 and 1987), 75, l. 72–76, l. 4; 714, l. 27–31; 746, l. 5–16. For a more complete statement of interpretations of the *Nicomachean Ethics* current at this time, see James C. Doig, *Aquinas's Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 8–24.

34. A detailed study showing the *In Meta* to be Aquinas's proposal of the structure Aristotle intended for the *Metaphysics* is had in: Gabriele Galluzzo, "Aquinas on the Structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione medievale* 15 (2004): 353–86.

35. *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M. R. Cathala & M. Spiazzi, (Turin: Marietti, 1950), nos. 1, 35, and 51. Hereinafter cited as *In Meta*.

36. *In Meta*, no. 534.

37. *In Meta*, nos. 1147–51.

38. *In Meta*, nos. 1245–47.

39. *In Meta*, nos. 1276–79.

40. *In Meta*, Bk. XII, lect. 5–9.

41. *In Meta*, nos. 2611–14.

42. *In Meta*, nos. 556–58.

43. *In Meta*, nos. 295 and 1164.

44. *In Meta*, nos. 2496–99.

45. *De anima*, II, 1, 412a8–9. The Latin translation used by Aquinas is found in: *In DA*, 67. Aquinas's interpretation is had in: *In DA*, nos. 100–17.

46. e.g., see: *ST* I q.76 a.1 ad 5; a.2 ad 2; *QDP*, q.6 a.6 ad 8.

47. The passage in question is *Meta.*, II, 1, 993b26–30. The translations are found in *Aristoteles latinus* 1970–95: (Vol. 25/1–1a, 37, l. 7–11 *Vetustissima trans.*; 120, l. 3–7 *Vetus trans.*); (Vol. 25/2, 37, l. 6–10 *Media trans.*); (Vol. 3/2, 44, l. 29–34 *Moerbecana trans.*). The Latin text of Aristotle given in *In Meta*, 84, while not a critical edition, is very close to the *Moerbecana*, which makes Aquinas's point more clearly than the other three.

48. *In Meta*, nos. 2614–16. The difference between Aquinas's approach to Aristotle's position in the *In Meta* and the *QDP* illustrates the care with which Aquinas interprets Aristotle when that interpretation is his goal; see *QDP*, q.3 a.16, obj. 23 and ad 23.

49. *In Meta*, nos. 1287–89. That the metaphysical proof is more demonstrative, see *In Phy*, no. 107. A related discussion adding detail is had in *QDP*, q.9 a.1, resp.

50. James C. Doig, *Aquinas on Metaphysics: A historico-doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972), chs. 4–5.

51. *ST* I q.1 a.2. See *In Meta*, nos. 391–92, 1147–51, and 2249–51.

52. *ST* I q.2 a.2. See *In libros Posteriorum analyticorum*, in *In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum analyticorum expositio*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi, (Turin: Marietti, 1955), nos. 195–97. Hereinafter cited as *In PA*.

53. *ST* I q.2 a.3, where Aquinas cites *Metaphysics* II as asserting first, that the most true beings are the greatest beings and then, that the greatest reality included within a genus is the cause of all others within that genus. For his interpretation of the passage at issue, see *In Meta*, nos. 292–98. An additional indication that Aquinas saw the fourth proof as Aristotelian and not Platonic is had in *ST* I, q.6 a.4.—Two or three years prior to *ST* I, Aquinas offered what is essentially the fourth proof; see *QDP*, q.3 a.5, cor.

54. Note, e.g., the investigation of predication in *In Meta*, Bk. V, lect. 1–22.

55. *ST* I q.13 a.1 ad 2.

56. *ST* I q.28 a.2.

57. *ST* I q.76 a.3 ad 2.