MORAL FEELINGS, MORAL REALITY, AND MORAL PROGRESS
BY THE SAME AUTHOR

The Possibility of Altruism
Mortal Questions
The View from Nowhere
What Does It All Mean?
Equality and Partiality
Other Minds
The Last Word
The Myth of Ownership (with Liam Murphy)
Concealment and Exposure
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Mind and Cosmos
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Thomas Nagel
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This short book comprises two essays that are related to one another and that deal with questions that have occupied me for some time. The first, “Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge,” originated as a Dewey Lecture given at Harvard Law School in 2015. Toward the end of that lecture I made some remarks about moral progress. T. M. Scanlon was in the audience, and in the discussion afterward he posed a question about my invocation of that idea which made me think I had to say more about it. The result was “Moral Reality and Moral Progress,” my contribution to a symposium marking the award of the Lauener Prize to Scanlon in 2016. I presented a greatly expanded treatment of the topic to the NYU Colloquium in Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy, conducted by Samuel Scheffler and Jeremy Waldron, in 2018; and I gave a version of it as the Jerusalem Lecture in Moral Philosophy at the Hebrew University in 2019. I am grateful for comments and criticisms received on all these occasions.

Both essays are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes
an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments. The result is that only some advances in moral knowledge are discoveries of what has been true all along.

The first essay was published in the *London Review of Books*, June 3, 2021.

The second essay has not been previously published, but the shorter Lauener Prize essay from which it derives was published in Markus Stepanians and Michael Frauchiger, eds., *Reason, Justification, and Contractualism: Themes from Scanlon* (de Gruyter, 2021).

T. N.
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