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edited by Brandon C. Look

Leibniz and Kant

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BRANDON C. LOOK

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Unless otherwise noted translations of the works of Leibniz, Kant and other historical figures are from the standard English-language editions.

A	Leibniz, G. W. 1923–. *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*. Ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften. Darmstadt and Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Cited by series, volume and page number.
A/B	Kant, Immanuel. 1998. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (in Ak. 3 and 4). Translations from *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited according to the first (A) and second (B) edition page numbers.
AG	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1989. *Philosophical Essays*. Ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Dan Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett. [= AG]
Ak	Kant, Immanuel. 1902– . *Kants gesammelte Schriften*. Berlin: Königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (now Walter de Gruyter). Cited by volume and page number.
Anon-K_2	Transcriptions of metaphysics lectures from early 1790s (in Ak. 28).
Anth	*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (in Ak. 7). “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.” In: *Anthropology, History and Education*. Ed. Günter Zöller and Robert Loudent. Trans. Robert Loudent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 231–429.
AT	Descartes, René. 1897–1913. *Oeuvres de Descartes*. Ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. 12 vols. Paris: L. Cerf. Cited by volume and page number.
BDG	*Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (in Ak. 2). “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration the Existence of God.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*. Ed. and trans. D. Walford. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
C	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1903. *Opuscules et Fragments Inédits de Leibniz*. Ed. Louis Couturat.) Paris: Félix Alcan, 1903. (Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1988.)
CSM	Descartes, René. 1985. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. 2 vols. Ed. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited by volume and page number.
D	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1768. *Opera omnia, nunc primum collecta*.... 6 vols. Ed. Louis Dutens. Geneva. (Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1989.) Cited by volume and page number.

DM — Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Discourse on Metaphysics* (in A VI 4, 1629–1688; in AG 35–68). Cited by section number.

EEKU — *Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft* (in Ak. 20). First Introduction to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. In: *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

FM — *Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?* (in Ak. 20). "What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?" In *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Trans. Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 349–412.

GM — Leibniz, G. W. 1849–1863. *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften*. 7 vols. Ed. C. I. Gerhardt. Halle: Schmidt. (Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1971.) Cited by volume and page number.

GMS — *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (Ak. 4). "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals." In: Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*. Ed. and trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 37–108.

GP — Leibniz, G. W. 1875–1890. *G. W. Leibniz: Die philosophischen Schriften*. Ed. C. I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin: Weidmann. (Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965.) Cited by volume and page number.

GW — Wolff, Christian. 1962– . *Gesammelte Werke*. Ed. Jean École et al. Hildesheim: Olms. Cited by division, volume and page number.

H — Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1985. *Theodicy*. Ed. and trans. E. M. Huggard. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

KpV — *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Ak. 5). Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*. In: Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*. Ed. and trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 133–271.

KrV — *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Ak. 3 and 4). Immanuel Kant. English translations from *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited according to first (A) and second (B) edition page numbers noted as stated above.

KU — *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Ak. 5). *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

L — Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1969. *Philosophical Papers and Letters*. Ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker. 2nd ed. Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel.

LA — Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1967. *The Leibniz–Arnauld Correspondence*. Ed. and trans. H. T. Mason. Introduction by G. H. R. Parkinson. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

LC	Leibniz's letters to Samuel Clarke. From GP VII 352–420. Cited by letter and section number. Translations from *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence*. Ed. H. G. Alexander. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956.
LDB	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 2007. *The Leibniz–Des Bosses Correspondence*. Ed. and trans. Brandon C. Look and Donald Rutherford. New Haven: Yale University Press.
LH	*Die Leibniz-Handschriften der königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover*. Ed. Eduard Bodemann. Hanover and Leipzig: Hann'sche Buchhandlung. Cited according to Bodemann's classification.
Log	Logik (in Ak. 9). "The Jäsche Logic." In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*. Ed. and trans. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 527–640.
MAN	*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften* (Ak. 4). Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. In *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Trans. Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 181–270.
MKTI	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas* (in A VI 4, 585–592; in AG 23–27).
Mon	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Monadology* (in GP VI 607–623; in AG 213–225). Cited by section number.
MP	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Philosophical Writings*. Ed. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson. London: Everyman, 1995.
MSI	*De Mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et Principiis* (Ak. 2). "On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World" (Inaugural Dissertation). In: Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*. Ed. and trans. D. Walford. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 373–426.
OCM	Malebranche, Nicolas. 1958–1984. *Oeuvres complètes de Malebranche*. Ed. André Robinet. Paris: Vrin. Cited by volume and page number.
Pölitz	*Religionsphilosophie Pölitz. Lectures on Religious Philosophy from 1780s* (in Ak. 28).
PNG	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. *Principles of Nature and Grace* (in GP VI 598–606; in AG 206–213). Cited by section number.
Prol	*Prolegomena zu einer jeden künfigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (in Ak. 4). *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as a Science*. In *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Trans. Gary Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 49–169.
R	*Reflexionen* (Ak. 15–19). Immanuel Kant, *Notes and Fragments*. Ed. Paul Guyer. Trans. Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

RB	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1996. *New Essays on Human Understanding*. Ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited by page numbers, which correspond to the Akademie edition in A VI 6.
Rel	*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (1794)* (in Ak. 6). Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, and Other Writings*. Ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
ÜE	*Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht warden soll* (in Ak. 8). “On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One.” In *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath. Trans. Henry Allison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 283–336.
V-Lo/Busolt	Logik Busolt (Ak. 24).
V-Lo/Dohna	Logik Dohna (Ak. 24). “The Dohna-Wundlacken Logic.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*. Ed. and trans. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 379–423.
V-Lo/Pölitz	Logik Pölitz (Ak. 24).
V-Lo/Wiener	Wiener Logik (Ak. 24). “The Vienna Logic.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*. Ed. and trans. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 249–377.
V-Met/Dohna	Metaphysik Dohna (Ak. 28). “Metaphysik Dohna.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* Ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 355–391.
V-Met-L_1	Metaphysik L_1. (Ak. 28). “Metaphysik L_1.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* Ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 19–107.
V-Met-L_2/Pölitz	Metaphysik L_2. (Ak. 28). “Metaphysik L_2.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* Ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 297–354.
V-Met-Vron	Metaphysik Mrongovius. (Ak. 29). “Metaphysik Mrongovius.” In: Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Metaphysics* Ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 109–288.
V-Th/Baumbach	*Danziger Rationaltheologie nach Baumbach* (Ak. 28).
WF	Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1998. *Philosophical Texts*. Ed. Roger S. Woolhouse and Robert Francks. New York: Oxford University Press.

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1

Kant's Leibniz

A Historical and Philosophical Study

*Brandon C. Look (University of Kentucky)**

1 Introduction

The essays in this volume concern the relation between the philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the two giants of eighteenth-century German philosophy. While Kant refers often to Leibniz in his writings, sometimes praising him but more often criticizing him, it is nevertheless difficult for the historian of philosophy to know how well Kant understood Leibniz and what Kant actually understood under the name "Leibniz." What *could* Kant have known, after all? What were the texts available to him? What works do we know that he read and studied? What shaped his picture of Leibniz's thought? These questions are certainly not of merely antiquarian interest either, for if it can be shown that Kant did not know Leibniz's philosophy well, then his claims of victory over his silent opponent might need to be moderated. Even if Kant's general criticism of Leibniz should be valid, even if he understood the historical Leibniz in sufficient detail, it is still important to understand what Leibnizian theses were at issue in Kant's critique of dogmatic metaphysics.

In attempting to understand the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of Leibniz's philosophy in the eighteenth century and, in particular, how Kant could have seen Leibniz, the following facts should be borne in mind. First, Leibniz never wrote a *magnum opus* comparable to Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy*, Spinoza's *Ethics*, or Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that could serve to express his considered thought. Thus, the philosophical and historical position that Spinoza and Locke were in with respect to Descartes or that Hume was in with respect to Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley differs vastly from the position of Kant vis-à-vis Leibniz. Moreover, the typical form of Leibniz's philosophical expression differed from that of his great early modern counterparts. With the exception of his *Theodicy* and book-length commentary on Locke's *Essay*, Leibniz's philosophical writings tended to be short, occasional essays, letters, and private notes and

* Thanks to Ursula Goldenbaum and to the members of the Early Modern History Workshop at the Institute for Advanced Study, who read an earlier draft of this chapter and gave valuable feedback.

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memoranda. Yet, of Leibniz's essays, only a relatively small number were published during his lifetime. And while there was a small cottage industry of publishing Leibniz's works posthumously in the eighteenth century, it is actually surprising how few *new* works appeared in the first five decades after Leibniz's death in 1716. It was not until the great editions of Raspe (Leibniz 1765) and Dutens (Leibniz 1768) that the philosophical public had anything approaching a detailed picture of the depth and breadth of Leibniz's work. And many of Leibniz's reflections on the nature of logic and even metaphysics were not published until well into the nineteenth century. Unsurprisingly, historians of philosophy from the mid-1800s on have been in a much better position to understand Leibniz's philosophy in all its variety and complexity than Kant ever could have done. Further, much of Leibniz's thought was filtered through the writings of others—most notably, Christian Wolff and his disciples—and, to some degree, altered in the process.

One might add to this list of facts about the history of the reception of Leibniz's philosophy that Kant was not always terribly concerned about the details of the history of philosophy. In fact, he had a rather negative view of those more interested in studying the texts of others than in thinking through a philosophical problem for themselves. As he remarks in the preface to the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), "There are scholars for whom the history of philosophy (ancient as well as modern) is itself their philosophy; the present prolegomena have not been written for them. They must wait until those who endeavor to draw from the wellsprings of reason itself have finished their business, and then it will be their turn to bring news of these events to the world" (Ak. 4:255/Kant 2002, 53). In a similar spirit, and against an opponent, Eberhard, whom Kant sees as far more devoted to the "truths" uttered by another philosopher, Leibniz, he writes, "*what is philosophically correct* neither can nor should be learned from Leibniz; rather the touchstone, which lies equally to hand for one man as for another, is common human reason, and there are no *classical authors* in philosophy" (Ak. 8:219 n./Kant 2002, 309). Kant lived this position too, for he took the thought of his predecessors as positions against which to *argue* and was less concerned to understand their views in all their historical and textual complexity.[1] It would seem unlikely, then, that Kant should hunt down various Leibnizian texts published several generations earlier in order to work out the nuances of Leibniz's system. At the same time, this means that the Leibniz with whom Kant argues may not exactly be the Leibniz who lived, thought, and wrote before him.

[1] In his *Early German Philosophy*, Lewis White Beck claims that much of Kant's information and misinformation concerning the history of philosophy came from Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae* [*Critical History of Philosophy*] (1742–1744) (Beck 1969, 277). For example, Kant falsely asserts that, on Plato's view, punishment would be unnecessary in the ideal state (A 317/B 373).

2 Leibniz's Philosophy: The Unfolding of a System

Leibniz had already been established as one of the great philosophers of Europe by the middle of the eighteenth century. Writing in the *Encyclopédie* in the 1760s, Denis Diderot effuses, "Perhaps never has a man read as much, studied as much, meditated more, and written more than Leibniz... What he has composed on the world, God, nature, and the soul is of the most sublime eloquence. If his ideas had been expressed with the flair of Plato, the philosopher of Leipzig would cede nothing to the philosopher of Athens" (1975, 7:709). While Diderot's enthusiasm for Leibniz is remarkable, what is more remarkable is that he marvels at the sheer quantity of Leibniz's writings when, in fact, only a small portion were even known to him and his contemporaries. At present, the Leibniz-Archives in Hanover contain over 200,000 manuscript pages, including over 15,000 letters to his more than 1,000 correspondents and 50,000 distinct essays, sketches, and exposés. Had Diderot known *this* he might really have followed up on his lament elsewhere: "when one compares the paltry talents one has been given with those of a Leibniz, one is tempted to throw away one's books and go die quietly in the dark of some forgotten corner" (1975, 7:678). Thankfully he was ignorant of Leibniz's enormous philosophical output. Whether we should be thankful that others in the eighteenth century were ignorant of so many of Leibniz's works is another matter.

Although Leibniz published several early works in philosophy from his student days—*Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of Individuation* (1663) and *Dissertation on the Combinatorial Art* (1666)—and in natural philosophy prior to his Paris sojourn of 1672–1676—*New Physical Hypothesis* (1671) and *Theory of Abstract Motion* (1671)—his first mature philosophical publication was not until November 1684, when the *Acta Eruditorum* printed his short piece *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas* just a month after his first statement of the calculus in the same journal.[2] Almost ten years would pass before Leibniz published another work in philosophy, even though he was working diligently on difficult issues in logic and metaphysics, composing among, other things, the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686), *General Inquiries about the Analysis of Concepts and of Truths* (1686), and *Primary Truths* (1689)—none of which would become known to philosophical readers until almost two centuries later. When Leibniz began to make his metaphysical views known to the public in the 1690s, he was already celebrated as one of the most important mathematicians and physicists of his day, having published further on differential and integral calculus as well as articles critical of Cartesian and Newtonian physics. His notion of force, in particular, became one of the crucial aspects of his new metaphysics, first announced in the 1694 essay *On the Correction of First Philosophy and the Notion of Substance* again

[2] Titles of well-known works by Leibniz, Kant, and other canonical authors are given in English; titles of other works are given in the original language with English translation in brackets.

published in the Leipzig *Acta Eruditorum*. But it was not until Leibniz presented his theory of pre-established harmony in the *New System of Nature and of the Communication of Substances, as well as the Union of Mind and Body* the following year in the Parisian *Journal des Sçavans* that he became recognized as a metaphysician of the first order. This essay occasioned a lively debate about mind–body causation throughout the republic of letters, and Leibniz went to considerable pains to respond to his various critics in different journals. Three years later Leibniz published *On Nature Itself*, again in the *Acta Eruditorum*, in which the philosophical public first encountered in connection with Leibniz's thought the term "monad."

The beginning of the eighteenth century saw Leibniz engaged in the project of critically responding to Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* which, though first published in 1690, was not studied in detail by Leibniz until Pierre Coste's French translation in 1700. When Locke died in 1704, however, Leibniz withheld publication of this, his most detailed work in epistemology, and it remained unknown until 1765, when Rudolf Erich Raspe printed it with a selection of other works that he had discovered while working at the Royal Library of Hanover. At the urging of Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia, Leibniz turned to natural religion and the classic problem of evil, which had been given new life by the writings of Pierre Bayle, and composed his *Theodicy*, published in Amsterdam in 1710. While in Vienna in 1714, Leibniz decided to write two short treatises that would present his metaphysics in a condensed form and thus make his views accessible to a wider audience. The first, the *Principles of Nature and Grace*, was sent to both Prince Eugene of Savoy, then in Vienna, and Nicolas Remond in Paris. The other treatise, the text that we have come to call the *Monadology* (a title that Leibniz never used), expands upon some issues in the *Principles of Nature and Grace* and the *Theodicy*. In his final years, Leibniz also engaged in his important correspondence with Clarke. Even on the continent, there was a tremendous interest in the so-called priority dispute between Leibniz and Newton, and it was clear that, in disputing with Samuel Clarke, Leibniz was really engaged in a kind of proxy war with Newton. Moreover, as was common in the day, Leibniz wrote his letters to Clarke with an eye to their eventual publication. While somewhat limited in their scope, these do in fact represent a fairly sophisticated presentation of some of Leibniz's views.

One of the crucial difficulties for anyone trying to understand Leibniz's views is that he wrote differently for different audiences. And what he intended for a general audience is, unsurprisingly, not as straightforward as what he wrote to his philosophical correspondents or for himself. Thus, in a passage from a letter to Placcius in 1696, famous to all Leibniz scholars, he writes, "he who knows me only from my published works does not know me" (D VI 1, 65). And in a similar vein to Jacob Bernoulli one year later, Leibniz says, "I have written countless things on countless subjects; but I have published only a few things on a few subjects" (GM III 61). The situation changes somewhat in the last decades of his

life—but only somewhat. Leibniz claims in a letter to Nicolas Remond that "It is true that my *Theodicy* does not suffice to present my system as a whole. But if it is joined with what I have published in various learned journals, those of Leipzig, Paris, and those of Mr. Bayle and Mr. Basnage, it will not fall far short of doing so, at least for the principles" (GP III 618). But we should note that Leibniz's claim is that this is enough to get the attentive reader the basic principles of his philosophy—hardly the deep foundations of the system. For example, many of Leibniz's metaphysical theses are closely connected to logical theses and theses about the nature of the infinite, and his thoughts about these topics were largely unknown until well into the nineteenth century. In fact, Leibniz is simply reluctant to share some of his views; as he writes to Des Bosses:

> I do not think those things we have discussed in letters concerning philosophical matters are suited for communication in any sort of public way, for they are unorganized and not gathered together in a system, such as I was hoping for from you. I have written these things for you, namely for the wise, not for any one at all; thus, they are hardly appropriate for the Memoires de Trevoux, which is intended more for a popular audience. I hope that you, by virtue of your goodwill toward me, would not allow them to appear in such an unsuitable place. [LDB 83]

Leibniz's reluctance to publish his more daring and difficult philosophy has invited cynicism and skepticism over the years. Bertrand Russell, for example, famously remarked that Leibniz's published work "was optimistic, orthodox, fantastic, and shallow; [his unpublished work], which has been slowly unearthed from his manuscripts by fairly recent editors, was profound, coherent, largely Spinozistic, and amazingly logical" (1945, 581). The cynicism, on the part of Russell, is that Leibniz purposefully withheld his deeper and more dangerous philosophy and published his orthodox views in order to curry favor with the rich and powerful. That is going too far. But Russell is right that the works published and intended for a wider public are conciliatory in tone and content and that what is often most interesting in Leibniz's thought is to be found in material that came to light long after his death. Ernst Cassirer indirectly suggests that we should be wary of claims of eighteenth-century scholars with respect to their knowledge of Leibniz's philosophy, for they simply could not know Leibniz's esoteric metaphysics (1998, 34).[3] For example, Leibniz's important correspondence with Des Bosses, which deepens our understanding of so much of Leibniz's metaphysics, only started to become widely available to scholars and philosophers in Dutens's edition of 1768; and, while

[3] The distinction between an exoteric and esoteric Leibniz can be seen even in the late eighteenth century, with Johann August Eberhard's *Neue Apologie des Sokrates* [*New Apology for Socrates*] (Eberhard 1787) and the critical response of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Leibniz von den ewigen Straften* [*Leibniz on Eternal Punishment*] (Lessing 1886, 11:461–487). See also Wilson (1995, 460–462). I shall discuss this issue in some more detail in §4 of this chapter.

some important letters trickled out in the mid-eighteenth century, Leibniz's correspondences with Arnauld and De Volder only became known in the nineteenth century through the editions of Grotefend and Gerhardt. Likewise, Leibniz's tremendously important and complex writings on logic and language from the 1680s, which seem to fill the three-part volume 4 of the Akademie's edition of Leibniz's philosophical writings, only began to be published at the turn of the twentieth century in Couturat's collection of texts.

In the years following his death, Leibniz's works were slowly published, but not enough and not fast enough to mitigate the judgment of Russell and Cassirer. Aside from the *Theodicy*, the best-known texts of Leibniz's philosophy in eighteenth-century Germany were certainly the *Specimen Dynamicum*, the *Monadology*, and the correspondence with Samuel Clarke. While little hangs on the matter of translation, it is of some interest that the text of the *Monadology* was never published in its original French until Erdmann's *Leibnitii opera philosopica* [*Leibniz's Philosophical Works*] of 1840. Instead, it was published in 1720 in a German translation by Heinrich Köhler as *Lehrsätze über die Monadologie* [*Theorems on the Monadology*][4] and in a Latin translation by Michael Gottlieb Hansch in 1721 in the *Acta Eruditorum* as *Principia Philosophiae, Autore G.G. Leibnitio* [*Leibniz's Principles of Philosophy*].[5] Moreover, the *Principles of Nature and Grace* was published in France in 1718 and then in German translation along with Gottsched's German translation of the *Theodicy* in 1744. Likewise, the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke was published by Clarke in 1717 and translated into German by Köhler in 1740. And it was not until Raspe's edition of the *New Essays* in 1765 and Dutens's *Leibnitii opera omnia* [*The Collected Works of Leibniz*] of 1768 that scholars and philosophers had a significant trove of Leibnizian texts to draw a more sophisticated interpretation of Leibniz's views. By that time, however, a certain picture had already been drawn. As Cassirer puts it, "The influence of Leibniz's thoughts is therefore indirect: they are efficacious only in the reformulation [*Umbildung*] that they underwent in the system of Wolff" (1998, 34). Interestingly, a more refined and subtle account of Leibniz's philosophy then began to be seen as a reaction to Kant's philosophy and other developments in the last decades of the eighteenth century through writings of Jacobi, Eberhard, Maaß, and Herder.[6]

3 The Origins of the "Leibniz-Wolffian Philosophy"

Leibniz's final years were certainly difficult. His health was failing; he was embroiled in the bitter priority dispute with Newton and his partisans over the

[4] See Leibniz (1720). [5] See Lamarra et al. (2001).
[6] My thanks to a referee for suggesting this point.

discovery of the calculus; and, when his employer, Duke and Elector Georg Ludwig of Hanover, became King George I of Great Britain and Ireland in 1714, he was told that his services were not required in London. At the same time, a young philosopher, whom Leibniz had personally helped to secure a professorship at the University of Halle, was gaining ascendance: Christian Wolff (1679–1754).

From a distance of three centuries, Wolff's fate now seems quite remarkable. No philosopher was as dominant on the philosophical scene in Germany in the first half of the eighteenth century. Johann Christian Edelmann has the simpleton character in his controversial *Moses mit aufgedeckten Angesichte* [*The Revealed Face of Moses*] complain of a "veritable lycanthropy" among the educated public—everyone was becoming a wolf.[7] By many, Wolff was even considered *dangerous*.[8] Yet, in what is still the standard history of pre-Kantian German philosophy in English, Lewis White Beck offers the following picture of Wolff and his works:

> [Wolff] illustrates what needs no illustration. He proves (though often by proofs so invalid that the fastidious reader may squirm) what needs no proof and what admits of no proof. He defines what needs no definition. He cites, by elaborate cross-references, his other works, which all too often are found not to elucidate the passage in question but to be almost equivalent to it. He recommends his other books. He boasts of what he has accomplished. He moves with glacial celerity. He ruthlessly bores. [1969, 258]

To complain that Wolff's books are boring is, however, to ignore their purpose: these works are first and foremost textbooks with a definite pedagogical goal; they are not the freestanding philosophical essays or books written for other philosophers. Moreover, Beck's extremely negative judgment should not blind us to what the situation was surely like in the German academic milieu in the early part of the century. For example, in the first decades of the eighteenth century at the University of Königsberg there was relative diversity in the curriculum, with the philosophy of the moderns, specifically Cartesianism, and Aristotelian philosophy both on offer. Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700–1766) tells us that in his first years at the university he read Descartes, Locke, Christian Thomasius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean Le Clerc, and others as well. But, in the end, he felt at sea—that is, until he came upon Leibniz's *Theodicy* and the metaphysics of Wolff: "Then it seemed to me like one who, from a wild sea of competing opinions, entered a safe harbor and, after the topsy-turvy, came again to stand on solid

[7] See Edelmann (1740 III 108), facsimile edition republished in Edelmann (1969, vol. 7.1).

[8] As we shall see, the Pietists of Halle successfully campaigned to have him exiled from Brandenburg-Prussia. And over forty years later, Leonhard Euler claimed in his *Letters to a German Princess* that "les monadistes sont des gens bien dangereux," by which he clearly meant Wolff and his followers (Euler 2003, 266 = Letter 132).

ground. I found here that certainty that I had earlier sought all over in vain."[9] Wolff's popularity and importance rested precisely in the systematicity of his presentation; that is, in the application of the mathematical method in philosophy, something that was unusual in the universities of Central Europe.[10] At the same time, the resulting philosophical books bore a superficial resemblance to the philosophical textbooks of Scholasticism they were replacing. Despite the troubles that Wolff would eventually have in Halle with conservative Pietist thinkers, his works in metaphysics, ethics, law, and natural theology came to be taught throughout Central Europe and Scandinavia in both Catholic and Protestant lands. Moreover, his textbooks in mathematics were of tremendous importance for most of the century. Indeed, even Kant used the *Elementa matheseos universae* [*Elements of Universal Mathematics*] for his own lectures in mathematics and natural philosophy.

Wolff adopted many of Leibniz's theses, advocating the doctrine of pre-established harmony, asserting the importance of the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason, and arguing that metaphysics could be expressed in a mathematical or geometrical manner.[11] And the proximity of their views in some regards led to their assimilation in the mind of the philosophical public. This fact, combined with the prominence of Wolff and his students, also had the effect of essentially drowning out Leibniz's original voice. As Giorgio Tonelli once remarked, the works of Wolff and his students in Germany "crushingly outnumbered" the works of Leibniz (1974, 444). Indeed, from the time of Wolff's troubles in Halle, a common story arose, repeated by both sympathizers and opponents alike: that Wolff essentially systematized Leibniz's philosophy. Gottsched, for example, claimed that Wolff only expressed more clearly what Leibniz had already said:

> One would err terribly if, after reading through the writings of both of them, one did not find that Leibniz and his follower had the same system in mind—though expressed in different ways. The former presented it piecemeal and in an exoteric way…The latter, however, presented everything systematically, coherently and esoterically, with many gaps filled, and countless truths added, which could be deduced as valid consequences of what went before.[12]

And Gottsched's distinguished wife, Victoria, wrote the following verse to the Marquise du Châtelet in 1742: "what half the world from Leibniz came to know,/

[9] Gottsched (1733–1734, 1: preface n.p.) also quoted in Wundt (1945, 121).

[10] This is a point that Ursula Goldenbaum makes nicely in Chapter 2 of this volume.

[11] To this end, Wolff (and Baumgarten) presented arguments that purported to demonstrate the Principle of Sufficient Reason. See Look (2011b).

[12] Quoted in Döring (1999, 62–63), Preface to the 3rd volume of the translation of Bayle's *Dictionary*.

our great man Wolff did better still winnow."[13] Writing to Meiran in 1741, Voltaire, whose sympathies were always with Newton, Locke and other empiricist philosophers, runs the thought of Leibniz together with Wolff, damning both:

> Frankly, Leibniz just came to muddle the sciences. His insufficient reason, his continuity, his plenum, his monads, etc. are the seeds [*germes*] of confusion from which M. Volf [Wolff] has methodically drawn [*a fait éclore méthodiquement*] 15 quarto volumes, which will more than ever give German minds the taste for reading much and understanding little.[14]

By the end of the century, the close relation between Leibniz and Wolff had become standard. As the Baron von Eberstein put it:

> Leibniz's excellent thoughts were still little used, and they were just scattered throughout his writings, not formed into a cohesive whole and brought together with other truths. In short, other than in Leibniz's mind, there did not exist a metaphysics. But the builder of a system worthy of the name was Christian Wolff. [Eberstein 1794, 1:123]

The story became official when Hegel presented his lectures on the history of philosophy and wrote, "On the whole Wolff's *Philosophy* is in its core Leibniz's philosophy, except that he systematized it" (1971, 20:259).

Kant himself, on numerous occasions, likewise spoke of a close family resemblance between the philosophy of Leibniz and the philosophy of Wolff. For example, in the opening of his polemic against Johann August Eberhard, who had claimed that the *Critique of Pure Reason* contained nothing that could not already be found in the writings of Leibniz, Kant countered, "How it came to pass that these things were not long ago already seen in the great man's philosophy and in its daughter, the Wolffian, he does not, to be sure, explain" (Ak. 8:187/Kant 2002, 283). But Kant *was* aware of some important differences. His account of the Leibnizian monadology, for example, in the "Amphiboly" chapter of the *Critique*

[13] "Und was die halbe Welt vom Leibnitz neu gelernet,/Hat unser großer Wolf noch besser ausgekörnet" (Gottsched 1763, 122).

[14] Quoted in Cassirer (1998, 35); see original citation to Meiran 5 Mai 1741 (Voltaire 1820–1822, 58:119). Cf. his letter to Maupertuis, August 10, 1741 (ibid., 150–152). "That man [Wolff] brings back to Germany all the horrors of scholasticism overloaded with *sufficient reasons*, *monads*, *indiscernibles* and all the scientific absurdities that Leibniz brought into the world out of vanity and that the Germans study because they are Germans." Voltaire's friend and lover, the Marquise du Châtelet, also saw Wolff as following Leibniz, but she clearly had a much higher opinion of Leibniz than did Voltaire—advocating essentially a Leibnizian explanation of living forces rather than the solution offered by British and continental Newtonians. See Châtelet (1740, 12–14 and chs. 20 and 21). Voltaire and Châtelet eventually separated, having irreconcilable differences over Leibniz, Wolff, and presumably other matters.

of Pure Reason shows that he was careful not to conflate the two monadologies.[15] Nevertheless, Kant did group Leibniz and Wolff together in crucial respects. He did not employ the term "rationalist"; in fact, the term "rationalist" and its cognates are rarely used by Kant.[16] Rather, Leibniz and Wolff were both guilty of engaging in "dogmatic metaphysics," by which Kant meant attempting to make claims about the supersensible without having first engaged in a critique of the powers of the human intellect. And the contrast that Kant draws throughout his Critical writings, the opposing schools that his philosophical system is designed to resolve, is between "dogmatism" and "empiricism."

The term "Leibniz-Wolffian Philosophy" was commonplace in the century, thus solidifying the connection between the two thinkers. For his part, however, Wolff was uncomfortable with it and in his autobiography charged his own student, Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693–1750), with creating it (Wolff 1841, 142). But this is certainly not true. Bilfinger did discuss the commonality between Wolff and Leibniz on the issue of pre-established harmony in his early works, but he also recognized differences between the two thinkers in a score of other areas.[17] It is much more likely that the term derived from Wolff's opponents: Joachim Lange, Franz Budde, and Andreas Rüdiger.[18] Whether or not Wolff's philosophy should be seen as the systematization of Leibniz's philosophy, it is indisputable that anti-Wolffians *correctly* saw similarities between Leibniz and Wolff on the crucial matters of faith and freedom.

What first drew the ire of Pietist thinkers in Halle were Wolff's lectures on the natural religion of the Chinese, in which he argued that Chinese culture proved that it was possible to lead moral lives without a revealed religion.[19] Such a view, then as now, was greatly disturbing to conservative religious thinkers, and the Halle Pietists argued that the philosophy of Wolff was opposed to Christian orthodoxy. Wolff tried to defend his view from such charge, but to little avail.[20] To some degree, however, Wolff was merely continuing along the path that Leibniz had already established several decades earlier.[21] For Leibniz played an important role in creating an interest in Chinese culture and the interaction between Jesuit

[15] See Rutherford (2004, 215f.).

[16] The Paralogisms of Pure Reason is directed against theses in the "*rational* psychology" of Wolff and Baumgarten—theses that Leibniz, too, endorsed.

[17] See Bilfinger (1723), Bilfinger (1741), and Wundt (1945, 150 n.).

[18] See Wundt (1945, 150 n.). See also Ludovici (1737 vol. 1, §136). That a group should be labeled by its opponents is, of course, all too common. The Pietists themselves owed their sobriquet to their opponents at the end of the seventeenth century (Hinrichs 1971, 1).

[19] An excellent modern edition with a very helpful introduction can be found in Wolff (1985).

[20] Wolff claimed, for example, in lectures and in his *Theologia naturalis* that there was no conflict between reason and revealed religion. But Joachim Lange took great pains to argue the contrary position before his theology students (Hartmann 1737, 385–387).

[21] It is not clear that Wolff ever read Leibniz's *Novissima Sinica*, however; instead, it is likely that his interest in Chinese philosophy was piqued by the publication in 1711 of translations of six classical Chinese philosophical texts by the Jesuit François Noël (Noël 1711). See Wolff (1985, xxi ff.).

missionaries and the Chinese people, publishing in 1697 the *Novissima Sinica* [*The Latest on China*], which concerned the Chinese rites controversy. His reflections on the nature of the Chinese religion led him to argue that Chinese culture demonstrated the independence of morality from the teachings of revealed religion. Put differently, Leibniz held that the practical moral dictates of Confucianism were identical to the practical dictates of Christianity.[22] In the *Theodicy*, he also explicitly took up the issue of the relation between faith and reason, arguing that reason can never conflict with the word of the Bible when properly understood. Pietist thinkers, however, saw the issue differently and regarded Wolff's lectures as an affront to the Christian religion and the moral order.

The more interesting philosophical issues concerned the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, freedom, and determinism and the relation between mind and body. And this philosophical problem-complex certainly played as great a role in animating the dispute between Pietists and Wolffians.[23] The Pietists demanded that the soul freely exercise causal influence on the body, and they saw the doctrine of pre-established harmony as inconsistent with any kind of orthodox libertarian doctrine. Indeed, in his writings against Wolff, Lange put Leibniz, Wolff, and Spinoza in the same camp and argued that all three philosophers embraced a kind of fatalism or necessitarianism (Lange 1723, 65–66).[24] Spinoza, of course, would happily have accepted this claim. Leibniz, however, developed a rather involved metaphysical system that allowed him to endorse a kind of compatibilism; yet much of the philosophical underpinning of this more complex defense was unknown in this period. For example, no philosophers of the eighteenth century could have been familiar with the kind of reasoning that Leibniz employed in his correspondence with Arnauld or in the *Discourse on Metaphysics* which appealed to a "complete individual concept" for each substance.[25] Wolff, for his part, rejected any hint of Spinozism, affirming that the world came about through an act of divine will; he further sought to argue that the doctrine of pre-established harmony (with substance dualism) was the best defense against the kind Spinozistic fatalism the Pietists so feared, for the soul always acted according to its own laws.[26]

[22] For more on this issue see Li and Poser (2000), Riley (1999), and Leibniz (1994).

[23] See Watkins (1998) and Goldenbaum in Chapter 2 of this volume.

[24] But as Wundt has remarked, while Lange railed against Leibniz's system in his *Modesta disquisitio*, he cited almost exclusively the work of Wolff as evidence of Leibniz's pernicious doctrine (Wundt 1945, 150 n.).

[25] In the *Theodicy*, Leibniz did present an account of freedom, according to which an agent is free if and only if the contrary of a particular action does not entail a contradiction (that is, if and only if there is another possible world in which the agent (or likeness) does otherwise). See the final sections, §§410ff., in which Leibniz discusses the different Sextuses in different possible worlds. This view is directly related to Leibniz's earlier view, but the logical conception of substance is notably absent in this popular work.

[26] See Wolff (1737a II:3); Wolff (1737b, 14–17).

Despite the common narrative about the "Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy," the differences between the two thinkers on a number of issues were known to many in the eighteenth century, at least to those who cared to look. Wolff highlighted many of these differences himself, and other scholars at the time were keen to point out these differences as well.[27] Ludovici, for example, who attempted to write one of the first histories of Leibniz's philosophy, *Ausführlicher Entwurff einer vollständigen Historie der Leibnitzischen Philosophie* [*Detailed Outline of a Complete History of the Leibnizian Philosophy*], urged readers to distinguish between Wolff and Leibniz: "one will find the true philosophical system [*Lehrgebäude*] of Leibniz not at all in the writings of Wolff, or at least only in pieces and very imperfectly expressed."[28] And as Formey put it in his *Histoire Abrégée de la Philosophie*, Wolff "profited from the ideas of Leibniz; but he did not completely follow them, and he put many of his own thoughts into his system."[29]

It might serve to give a concrete example of the way in which Leibniz's mature philosophical views were obscured from the view of the philosophically minded reading public by Wolff and his followers. While it is by no means a settled issue in Leibniz scholarship, it is fair to say that, according to the standard interpretation, Leibniz was an idealist.[30] That is, he believed that the world was grounded in the mind, or that the mental or the formal was alone fully real. As he expressed it in a letter to Burcher De Volder in 1704, "considering the matter carefully, we must say that there is nothing in things but simple substances, and in them, perception and appetite" (G II 270, AG 181). In other words, only simple substances, or minds, truly exist; bodies are phenomena, though they are grounded in the simple substances. The simple substances are themselves unities endowed with forces, which in turn can be understood in terms of representational activity and their capacity to express or mirror the entire world from a unique point of view. For Leibniz, however, not all representative or expressive states are conscious sensations; indeed, individual substances simply *express* the world, though often, even mostly, unconsciously. While Wolff also claimed that the ultimate constituents of the world were simple substances or monads, it is clear that *his* monads did not have the mental, dynamic, or representational features that Leibniz's did; he denied the thorough-going and universal mirroring of simple substances, down to the least *petite perception*, and in so doing rejected Leibniz's monadology and a more sophisticated version of pre-established harmony.[31] In the end, Wolff's

[27] The differences between Wolff and Leibniz are very important to bear in mind in trying to understand the reception of Leibniz and the history of Leibnizianism in the eighteenth century. This issue has been discussed by many scholars of the period—e.g. Tonelli (1963, 1966, 1974, 1987); Beck (1969, 1993); Wundt (1924, 1945); École (1979, 1998) and, more recently, by Jauernig (2008, 2011). See also Goldenbaum (2004, 27–28).

[28] Ludovici (1737 II 427).

[29] Formey (1760, 297).

[30] The literature on this subject is extensive. I present an introduction to the debate and defense and interpretation of a kind of Leibnizian idealism in Look (2010).

[31] See e.g. Wolff (1737c, §243 and 1720, §§598ff.). See also Erdmann (1876, 63).

simple substances were not so much metaphysical points as they were physical monads, the least ingredients in material beings. And there was thus a great deal of truth in his comment to his benefactor Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel that Leibniz's system of monads "begins where mine ends" (Wolff 1841, 82).

Wolff and his students, however, largely prevented the Leibnizian monadology from being interpreted in what we might now think of as an idealistic manner. In his *Dilucidationes philosphicae* [*Philosophical Explanations*] (1725), Bilfinger defined idealism as the thesis that there is an infinite spirit and that finite spirits are dependent upon it, but that nothing else exists beside spirit. Further, for Bilfinger, spirits are simple beings endowed with intellect and will; they are immortal and capable of reward and punishment. Bodies, on the other hand, have no real existence outside of us; they are simply thought by us to have real existence because they are represented as existing outside of us and because these representations follow a constant order (§115). Now, according to Bilfinger, Leibniz did not advocate idealism for two obvious reasons. First, while Leibniz's simple substances are endowed with perception, they are not all endowed with intellect and will, because intellect and will require distinct cognition (§110). Thus, for Leibniz, it is false that all beings are *spirits*—even if all simples are essentially mind-like. Second, Bilfinger claims that idealism entails the view that there is nothing real and independent to which our mental representations correspond. But since Leibniz's view is that each mind represents other monads—that is, other real existents, albeit confusedly and *as* bodies—it is nevertheless the case that Leibniz's representations correspond to something *real*. But it should be clear from this account that one could be *both* an idealist in our sense and a non-idealist in Bilfinger's sense—as, I would argue, Leibniz in fact was. That is, one could claim that the ultimate beings are mind-like, incorporeal beings, endowed with representations, while also holding that representations do correspond to things independent of a perceiving mind. Indeed, on my view, the correct interpretation of Leibniz's metaphysics—from 1679 on—is one in which minds or the mental or the formal ground all other beings.[32] Wolff also argued that Leibniz was not an idealist—though he did so perhaps for self-serving reasons. For Wolff, dogmatic thinkers can be classified either as monists or dualists, the former in turn either as idealists as materialists (which is what Leibniz said as well). But, insofar as Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony requires that bodies be recognized as *real* and distinct from minds, then Leibniz must be a kind of dualist.[33] As has been pointed out already, Wolff himself disliked the expression "Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy," and he correctly saw that the crucial aspect of

[32] I argue for this view in detail in Look (2010 and 2017).

[33] See the Preface to the *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (usually called the *German Metaphysics*) (that is, Wolff [1720]). Of course, neither Bilfinger nor Wolff had the texts that make the arguments most forcefully for Leibnizian idealism (in our sense of the term), e.g. the correspondences with De Volder and Des Bosses.

Leibniz's system was the monadology, which, to the extent that he understood its idealistic underpinnings, he rejected.[34] At the same time, however, Wolff *did* advocate the system of pre-established harmony as a solution to the problem of mind–body causation. Wolff's solution to this metaphysical dilemma was to de-emphasize the idealistic tendencies in Leibniz's thought, seeking to make Leibniz into a dualist like himself.

Further, since he advocated a substance dualism of mind and body, Wolff was left to endorse a system of pre-established harmony that resembled Leibniz's popular presentations of his own theory. And the same was true of his students. For example, in his *De harmonia animi et corporis humani, maxime praestabilita, ex mente illustris Leibnitii, commentatio hypothetica* [*Hypothetical Commentary on Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony of the Soul and Human Body*] (1723), Bilfinger demonstrates a level of knowledge of the actual historical debate about the doctrine that Wolff rarely showed himself, but he nevertheless cannot get behind the Leibnizian façade. He gives an argument for the "metaphysical union" of mind and body that Leibniz had claimed to exist in his discussion with Father René-Joseph de Tournemine, and in doing so, offers a perfectly respectable Leibnizian defense of pre-established harmony. For example, Bilfinger says the following in a footnote to his discussion of Tournemine's objection that the "harmony" of mind and body can never constitute a real union:

> It is impossible that a true physical relation or union exist between our soul and body, unless the soul is also a body. The physical does not pertain to anything but body. You say, what is physical? But whatever is common to soul and body is itself metaphysical. Therefore, the union too, which is common to them, is metaphysical. For metaphysics is just that which is goes beyond the spirit and the body.[35]

Bilfinger's explicit argument is that, for the mind and body to form a "real, physical union," the mind would have to be corporeal. Since it is not, the mind and body can have at most a metaphysical relation between them. And the relation is metaphysical, he claims, because it extends beyond the spiritual and corporeal realms. If one takes the Leibnizian language of minds and bodies at face value—as Tournemine, Wolff and Bilfinger all did—then this is as good a response to Tournemine as one can give. What Bilfinger could not have known is that the problem that Tournemine highlighted is one that Leibniz took quite seriously—though only in its extension to the realm of monads. In a draft of a letter to Des Bosses in 1706, just as his debate with Tournemine was going to press, Leibniz

[34] See Rutherford (2004). Wolff was also no advocate of Leibnizian optimism as expressed in the *Theodicy*.

[35] Bilfinger (1741, 218), reprinted in GW III 21).

writes, "The union I find some difficulty explaining is that which joins the different simple substances or monads existing in our body with us, such that it makes one thing from them" (LDB 23). But, as I have argued elsewhere, this is a problem that plagues Leibniz for the last decade of his life.[36]

German philosophy in the first decades after Leibniz's death became a partisan affair. By 1736 there were 126 polemical attacks on the "Leibniz-Wolffian" philosophy; Wolff countered with 14 separate defenses of his views, and his students and followers contributed another 68 works.[37] Whatever differences there may have been between Leibniz and Wolff, they were clearly on the *same* side, fought most vociferously by Pietist theologians and philosophers, who denied the principle of sufficient reason, pre-established harmony, and the conformity of faith and reason. This dispute between rationalists and Pietists is central to the rest of the century in German intellectual life, and the later culture war between Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment thinkers is in some ways presaged in it.[38] The philosophical landscape in Central Europe was also becoming even more complex as the empiricism of Locke and scientific methodology of Newton were making headway in Germany. Thus, Wolff and his supporters found themselves fighting opponents on several different fields of battle.[39] This complexity also meant that Kant could eventually carve out a position as both an Enlightenment philosopher and an opponent of Leibnizian and Wolffian rationalism.

4 The Philosophical Scene in Mid-century Germany

As a matter of institutional power, Wolff's philosophy predominated in most German universities. Although Wolff's works were officially banned in Brandenburg-Prussia from the time of his expulsion from Halle, they were widely used throughout the rest of the German-speaking world. And his students occupied positions at nearly all major universities. Moreover, by the 1730s Frederick William I evidently had grown tired of the Pietist attacks on Wolff, for he removed the ban on Wolff's philosophy and even tried to lure the most prominent German philosopher back to his lands from the Landgraviate of

[36] See Look (1999).

[37] Hartmann (1737, 835ff.). Of these anti-Wolffian polemical attacks, many were by non-philosophers, and they lacked a certain degree of philosophical sophistication. This sophistication will come, however, in the works of Crusius and others in the next generation.

[38] At the same time, insofar as Pietism was individualistic and anti-authoritarian, it can also be seen as also contributing to demise of *ancien régime* Europe.

[39] Christian Thomasius and his followers were also important in the eighteenth-century German philosophical world. (See e.g. Beck [1969] and Hunter [2001]; Wundt [1945], on the other hand, claims that Thomasius had relatively little impact on German philosophy until his ideas were taken up by counter Enlightenment philosophers in the 1780s.) However, as their views are not directly relevant to the way that Kant came to understand the philosophy of Leibniz, I shall ignore this strand of history here.

Hesse-Kassel, where Wolff had been for over a decade. Wolff refused the invitations, citing his gratitude to the university in Marburg and the difficulties of such a move, but upon the accession of Frederick II in 1740 Wolff was successfully coaxed back to Halle to take up the chancellorship of his old university. By all accounts (including Wolff's own), crowds greeted him like a hero upon his arrival in the city.[40]

There then began what can best be thought of as a second wave of Wolffianism. In many works of academic philosophy that would become central to Kant's own studies and teaching, Wolff's philosophy was spread and further developed. A short list of such works will be familiar to any Kant scholar: Gottsched's *Erste Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit* [*Foundations of a Complete Philosophy*] (1733); Baumeister's *Institutiones philosophiae rationalis* [*Principles of Rational Philosophy*] (1735) and *Institutiones metaphysicae* [*Metaphysical Principles*] (1738); Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (1739) and *Aesthetica* (1750); and Meier's *Vernunftlehre* [*Doctrine of Reason*] (1752). In these and other writings of the period Wolff's influence is on clear display. Comparatively few academic philosophers used as a springboard for further reflection the actual writings and thought of Leibniz.[41]

At the same time, some philosophers started to push back against this school, advancing arguments far more thoughtful and interesting than those given by the majority of Pietist polemicists. Certainly the deepest of these authors was Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), whose *Dissertatio de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinatis, vulgo sufficientis* [*Dissertation on the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determining Reason, Commonly known as the Principle of Sufficient Reason*] (1743) and *Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegengesetzt werden* [*Outline of the Necessary Truths of Reason, insofar as they are Opposed to Contingent Truths*] (1745) among other works opposed doctrines central to both Leibniz and Wolff and had a great impact on the young Kant.[42] Indeed, in several important respects Crusius laid the groundwork for many of Kant's central views, in asserting the fundamentality

[40] Hinrichs (1971, 440); Wolff (1841, 167–170).

[41] There are also, however, differences between these philosophers and Wolff, which are sometimes important. In a fascinating article, École (1991) argues that many of Kant's claims about Wolff's philosophy come from his reading of Baumgarten, Baumeister, and Gottsched and not directly from Wolff's texts themselves; for when Kant misrepresents Wolff, it is usually in a manner and on a topic that can be found in one of these other authors. As should be clear, I believe the same is sometimes true of Kant's claims about Leibniz's philosophy. It should also be pointed out that, while his *Metaphysica* was clearly written in the spirit of Wolffian philosophy, Baumgarten was not simply a Wolffian rationalist. First, he actually presented views that were closer to Leibniz's than Wolff's. Second, he came from a strongly Pietist background and at the end of his life seemed to return to the fold, claiming on his deathbed that only Christ comforted his soul and "neither the philosopher nor the theologian could help, only faith alone." "My old faith, with this I depart, is the *demonstratio demonstrationum* ..." Mendelssohn saw this turn as a "misological death" and inexcusable. (Quoted in Baumgarten [2011, xxviii–xxix].) I examine Baumgarten in more detail in Look (2018).

[42] In Chapter 3 of this volume, Eric Watkins addresses the role of Crusius's thought in Kant's philosophical development.

and power of the will, in limiting the scope of the principle of sufficient reason, and in defending a theory of real causal interaction between things.

While Wolffianism was generally dominant throughout Germany, the situation in Königsberg was more complicated. The university had strong Pietist elements from the turn of the century on, and even had an eclectic mix of Scholasticism and modern philosophy as attested to by Gottsched as we saw above. While a Wolffian professor, Christian Gabriel Fischer (1686–1751), was forced to leave the university under Pietist pressure in 1725, less than a decade later the university came to tolerate Wolff's philosophy (Erdmann 1876, 19). In fact, the Pietist professor of theology, Georg Friedrich Rogall (1701–1733) required his own students to pass the *cursum philosophicum* and, in so doing, ultimately *encouraged* Wolffianism among the Pietists (Erdmann 1876, 21). On the other hand, the philosophers in Königsberg, who in many ways stood close to Wolff, also sought to correct and improve his philosophy. A clear case in point is Martin Knutzen, Kant's influential teacher, who offered one of the most important critiques of the doctrine of pre-established harmony in his *Systema causarum efficientium* [*System of Efficient Causes*] (1745) while at the same time remaining committed to central tenets of Leibniz and Wolff. Given Knutzen's commitment to Newton, his philosophy was genuinely eclectic.

Universities were not the only prominent institutions for philosophy, science, and the arts. Frederick II also decided to revive the Royal Academy of Sciences, which had been in decline since Leibniz's death under his less-than-intellectual father, Frederick William I, the "Soldier King."[43] At the suggestion of Voltaire, Frederick invited Pierre Louis Maupertuis (1698–1759), one of the most famous natural philosophers of the day, to serve as President of the Academy. Frederick then turned to a younger man to aid Maupertuis in the operation and development of the Royal Academy, Leonhard Euler (1707–1783), who at 33 was already known as the foremost mathematician on the continent. Both Maupertuis and Euler were highly critical of Leibniz and Wolff, and they used the power of the

[43] While a common story is that Frederick William I named his court fool to be Leibniz's successor as head of the Royal Academy, this is not exactly right. Jacob Paul von Gundling (1673–1731), the second president, was a trained jurist and historian and former professor of the *Ritterakademie* in Berlin, who had developed a reputation in Berlin for his amusing stories and who in 1713 was made a court councilor. While not entirely a figure held in deep respect by the king, he nevertheless was given a number of other posts along with the presidency of the Academy. And Gundling served the Academy well by requiring that one copy of every book published in the Kingdom of Prussia be housed in the library of the Royal Academy. On the other hand, it has been suggested that Gundling, whose brother was a Pietist professor at the University of Halle, played a role in Christian Wolff's banishment from Brandenburg-Prussia, since it was he who had joked that Wolff's determinism would give soldiers an excuse for desertion (Zeller 1862, 65–66). In the end, however, the fact that he came to be so ridiculed at the court probably had as much to do with Gundling's alcoholism as with Frederick William's anti-intellectualism. When Gundling died, the king had him buried in a wine barrel. See Harnack (1900, 220ff.). Hinrichs (1971, 417) rejects the idea that Gundling played a role in the Wolff affair on the grounds that Gundling said he did not do so, which can hardly count as probative.

Berlin Academy to advance their philosophical views. The reasons for Euler's opposition to Leibniz and Wolff were quite complex. On the one hand, Euler certainly saw a danger in the doctrine of pre-established harmony, for the very reasons that the Pietists had done. On the other hand, he was also a committed Newtonian, advocating the laws of motion as expressed in the *Principia* as well as absolute space and time.[44] Maupertuis also had deep misgivings about the way in which Leibniz's natural philosophy and mathematics—specifically his dynamics—were employed by his supporters. But Maupertuis himself may have been just as much caught up in the anti-Leibnizian spirit of the day as actively contributing to it. Indeed, there is a certain irony to Maupertuis's position, for in many crucial aspects his own thought was very much in harmony with that of Leibniz. Like Leibniz, Maupertuis endorsed a principle of continuity in physics and also, against the Newtonians, favored a relational or phenomenalistic conception of space and time. Moreover, his debate with Samuel König on the principle of least action reveals his complex relation to Leibniz quite well.[45]

The Academy played a central role in the philosophical and scientific world in the middle decades of the eighteenth century by sponsoring regular essay competitions. But these essay competitions not only reflected current consensus about the important philosophical issues through their choice of topics, they also arguably sought to delegitimize Wolffian philosophy through the selection of winners. In the first three competitions of the philosophical class[46]—1747, 1751, and 1755, when Maupertuis and Euler had the most influence over the Academy—the topics clearly confronted the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff.[47] The 1747 essay question concerned the nature of monads; authors were asked to prove or refute the "doctrine of monads," and in the case of a positive view of monads "to deduce an intelligible explication of the principal phenomena of the universe, and in particular of the origin of the movement of bodies." (Harnack 1900, 2:305) The winner was Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi, who submitted a work critical of the theory of monads in which he largely rehearsed the anti-monadist arguments published the previous year by Euler in his *Gedancken von den Elementen der Cörper* [*Considerations on the Elements of Bodies*].[48] In 1751, the Academy essay question focused on free will and determinism, and in this case Abraham Gotthelf Kästner, a professor of mathematics from Leipzig and supporter of Wolff, was surprisingly declared the winner. Four years later the Academy turned to the issue of philosophical optimism. While the official question explicitly cited

[44] Euler's views on the nature of space and time are complex, and so it is probably too simplistic to simply call them Newtonian. But he certainly rejected Leibnizian relationalism.

[45] See Cassirer (1998, 89); Harnack (1900, 252ff.); Beck (1969, 317–319).

[46] The Academy was divided into four classes—medical/physical, mathematical, philosophical, and philological—and each class took a turn posing an essay question.

[47] Maupertuis left his position as President of the Academy in 1753, but after the prize essay question was posed.

[48] This work can be found in Euler (1911– , III, 2, 349–366).

Alexander Pope's *Essay on Man*, it was clear that Leibniz's *Theodicy* was the target. Gottsched called out the Academy immediately on the ruse in a short essay, *De optimismi macula* [*Optimism Stained*] (1753). And the winning submission by Adolf Friedrich von Reinhard made the connection in its title, *Le Système de Mr. Pope sur la perfection du monde, comparé à celui de Mr. de Leibnitz* [*Pope's System of the Perfection of the World compared with that of Leibniz*], and savaged the optimism of both Pope and Leibniz. Ultimately, this ploy of the Royal Academy backfired, for it also occasioned a biting work critical of the question and the only work still read in connection with the essay question: Lessing and Mendelssohn's *Pope ein Metaphysiker!* In it they argue that the work of the poet and the metaphysician fundamentally differed and that a real poet neither wished to develop a metaphysical system nor could he do so even if he so wished. Thus, they claimed it was clear that what the Academy really wanted was a rejection of Leibnizian optimism. More important, their analysis of Leibniz's system also displays a penetrating reading of the *Theodicy*. As a young intellectual with scholarly and philosophical ambitions, Kant could not have been ignorant of these matters, nor could he have been ignorant of the general anti-Leibnizian and anti-Wolffian sentiment issuing from the capital.[49]

The period from the end of Leibniz's life to the zenith of Kant's philosophical career also witnessed a profound change in German intellectual and cultural life. Christian Wolff played an important positive role in this change. Not only was he one of the first professors to lecture in German, he was also one of the first to publish significant works in the vernacular.[50] Moreover, he was largely responsible for the development of German philosophical vocabulary. Wolff's influence was perhaps also so strong because, after a century in which the dominant philosophers in Europe worked outside of the university milieu, he was a professor who successfully appealed to the insights of the modern philosophers and thereby attracted a stream of students who went on to occupy many other professorships. Thus, for both linguistic and institutional reasons, Hegel was correct to call Wolff "the teacher of the Germans."[51]

At the same time, there began to arise in German-speaking lands a cultivated middle class, interested in literature, philosophy, and the sciences. At the Leipzig Book Fair in 1701, for example, there were nearly 1,000 titles listed in the catalog, nearly half of which dealt with theological matters. Eighty years later the number of titles had increased to 2,600, with a far smaller proportion concerning religion and theology. Moreover, the ratio of books in German to those in Latin increased

[49] Indeed, Kant's writings on optimism from the 1750s were occasioned by the essay competition, though he never submitted a work for consideration. See Ak. 2:27–35 and Ak. 17:229–239, also in Kant (1992b, 67–83).

[50] Christian Thomasius was also very important in this respect.

[51] Hegel (1986, 20:258).

from approximately 2:1 to 10:1.[52] By mid-century there were in Germany, as throughout the continent, ever more intellectual journals aimed at a popular and not necessarily academic audience. "*Popularphilosophen*" both created and responded to a desire for a critique of religion and the political power structures of the day.[53] While many popular philosophers advocated doctrines close to the empiricism of Locke and skepticism of Hume, many more advocated a kind of rationalism close to that of Leibniz, Wolff, and Wolff's followers. While the topics of *academic* philosophy—for example, concerning pre-established harmony and physical influx or concerning innate ideas and empiricism—were not at the forefront of these discussions, all shared a deep commitment to the power of human reason and its ultimately liberating effects.

Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) was the best of such *Popularphilosophen*. Lacking a university position, he made his living outside of professional, academic philosophy as a bookkeeper and, more importantly, as a writer of essays, reviews, and books.[54] But to call Mendelssohn a "popular philosopher" should not give the impression that his work was somehow shallow—on the contrary. Mendelssohn's writings were penetrating and interesting, and he made important advances in the rationalist positions of Leibniz and Wolff, especially in aesthetics.[55] Unfortunately, he resides now mainly in the shadow of Kant. While his *Phaedon oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* [*Phaedo, or On the Immortality of the Soul*] (1767) achieved great success and was one of Goethe's favorite books,[56] it is now best known to students and historians of philosophy as the work refuted in the Paralogisms chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. His essay *Abhandlung über die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften* [*Essay Concerning Evidence in the Metaphysical Sciences*] (1764) won the Academy's prize essay after its anti-Wolffian phase had ended and defeated Kant's submission *Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundlage der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral* [*Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*].[57] Of Mendelssohn's essay, Beck writes, "No other single work gives so perspicuous a presentation of the Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology; every strength of that tradition is persuasively presented, every fault in it inadvertently revealed" (1969, 332). Kant certainly read this work, but if he saw in it what Beck saw, then he might have been led astray, for Mendelssohn composed this essay prior to the publication of Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*, which reveals a difference between the epistemological positions of Leibniz and Wolff.

Indeed, the publication in 1765 of Raspe's edition of Leibniz's *New Essays* along with Dutens's six-volume collection of Leibniz's writings three years later led to a

[52] Ward (1974, 29ff.).

[53] The period *after* the publication of the first edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is masterfully discussed in Beiser (1987).

[54] Mendelssohn was nominated several times to become a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin, but his membership was blocked every time by Frederick II.

[55] See Beiser (2009). [56] See Lewes (1855, 1:213). [57] See Ak. 2:273–301.

wave of interest in Leibniz and a deeper understanding of his philosophy. As Max Wundt notes, "the true Leibniz was to this point not really known" (1945, 317). Not only Mendelssohn, but also Lessing and others, came to a greater appreciation of the depth and breadth of Leibniz's metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology. For example, Lessing's beautiful essay, *Leibniz von den ewigen Strafen* [*Leibniz on Eternal Punishment*] (1773), shows that he had studied Leibniz's philosophy carefully, most likely from Dutens's edition.[58] Lessing argues that Leibniz always sought to lead the reader to the truth from the path he was already on and that the distinction between Leibniz's "exoteric" and "esoteric" philosophy had to do with his manner of presentation and not with the content. But this line of argument required that Lessing know what Leibniz said in his popular publications as well as what he wrote in more guarded moments and that Lessing be able to discern the connections between the two sets of writings. It is also meant that Lessing saw that a superficial reading of the popular presentations of Leibniz's writings could lead readers astray. Another careful reader of Leibniz was Herder, who was able to see in these new editions something importantly different between Leibniz and Wolff in both style and substance:

> Since the lively mind of this man [Leibniz] liked to see everything as a hypothesis and present it half as a poem, even his monads, which Wolff himself seems not to have fully grasped, were considered just a funny tale. But I am convinced that . . . this hypothesis is the most rigorous and certainly will someday triumph.[59]

Herder's prediction for the triumph of Leibnizian monads, of course, proved wrong, but his description of the hypothetical and nearly lyrical manner of Leibniz's writings was right. By the time the Romantics came upon the scene in Germany, Leibniz was revered precisely because he had never presented a ponderous system of the sort that Wolff and his students had done.

5 Kant as a Reader of Leibniz

Ideally, scholars interested in Kant's relation to Leibniz would have a set of Leibniz's works with detailed marginalia in Kant's hand or simply extended reading notes on Leibniz's philosophy—precisely what we have in the case of

[58] For this essay, see Lessing (1886, 11:461–487). It should also be noted that, in it, Lessing took to task none other than Johann August Eberhard, Leibniz's later advocate against Kant, for his poor understanding of Leibniz in his *Neue Apologie des Sokrates* (1772).

[59] See the second dialogue of his *Gott. Einige Gespräche* (1787) in Herder (1994, 4:709). Somewhat later in the same text, Herder also writes of the *New Essays* that they are "just about the most instructive of all of the writings of Leibniz, from whom incidentally every line is instructive" (1985, 4:731–732 n.). Herder, of course, had been a student of Kant's, and they maintained a relatively active correspondence. I have not been able to find any writings in which Leibniz is discussed, however.

Leibniz's study of Spinoza. We do have, however, a catalog of Kant's library, which offers some tantalizing clues about the sources of his knowledge of his philosophical predecessors (Warda 1922). Kant owned, for example, works by many of great thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Berkeley, Boyle, Cudworth, D'Alembert, Descartes, Galileo, Gassendi, Hume, Hutcheson, Maupertuis, More, Newton, Tschirnhaus, and Voltaire.[60] He also had a good collection of works from the prominent philosophers of eighteenth-century Germany, many of which he used in his own university teaching: Baumgarten, Crusius, Euler, Gottsched, Lambert, Meier, Mendelssohn, Tetens, and Wolff. Kant also owned many books that dealt with mathematics, natural philosophy and natural history, which is again unsurprising given his teaching duties. Absent from his library, however, are works by Leibniz, Locke, and Spinoza. Of course, as all scholars and bibliophiles know, one often has books on one's shelves that one has never read, and one often has read many books that one never owned.[61] Indeed, on Kant's death, it was remarked that his library was comparatively small for an academic. It is likely also that Kant's relation to books differed from that of Leibniz's.[62] Leibniz was not only born into a family prominent in Leipzig's academic and legal circles and had free rein in his father's extensive library from the age of 8, but his official duties in Hanover included serving as the court historian and court librarian. For close to forty years, he kept an apartment in whatever building housed the court library, and for the last eighteen years of his life, after the library had been moved to Schmiedestraße 10, one could say that the royal library *was* his house. Leibniz inherited in 1676 a good library, with over 3,000 volumes, and he used his position over the years to accumulate many more philosophical and scholarly titles (Antognazza 2009, 201 and 383). Leibniz clearly felt possessive of these volumes too, for many contained his notes written in the margins. Kant, on the other hand, came from a much more modest background, with few books in the household of staunchly Pietist parents, and as a student Kant is said to have bought few books. Unsurprisingly, though, he was also known as a voracious reader. In order to supplement his income from teaching, he took on the position of sub-librarian in the *Schloßbibliothek*, essentially the university library, in 1766 and worked there for seven years, even after he was appointed Professor at the University of Königsberg. There he had easy access to many

[60] The contents of Kant's library also strongly suggest that, although he knew French, Kant preferred to read texts in German translation rather than in the original. Indeed, Waschkies has argued that Kant never refers to an original French-language text when there is a German translation (Waschkies 1987, 541f.). On Kant's limitations with French, one of his contemporaries recalled, "Of the modern languages, he understood French, but did not speak it" (Jachmann 1804, 41).

[61] A case in point: as has been mentioned, there is no doubt that Mendelssohn's *Phaedon* is a target in the second edition of the Paralogisms chapter (B 395ff.), but this book was not in his library at auction.

[62] There is a great deal of truth in T.S. Eliot's observation that "Leibniz's originality is in direct, not inverse ratio to his erudition" (Eliot 1916, 568).

books in all subjects. The added income from this new job also allowed Kant to take up new rooms in the house of his publisher, Kanter, a house that was the location of one of the best bookstores in Prussia, where it was common practice to peruse, read, and discuss the latest works of science, history, literature, and philosophy. Kant was allowed to borrow all the books he wished and read them in his own apartment (Kuehn 2001, 159–160). Even after he was relatively financially secure and had his own house, it was not Kant's practice to acquire books as it was Leibniz's. Therefore, evidence for what Kant knew and of how he understood Leibniz will largely have to come internally, from determining what topics he discussed and how and by following up on his relatively rare references to other philosophers.

Kant was surely exposed to the standard Leibnizian texts known in mid-century German philosophy: the *Specimen Dynamicum*; the *New System of Nature*; *On Nature Itself*; the *Theodicy*; the *Principles of Nature and Grace*, which was published by Gottsched along with the *Theodicy* in German translation in 1744; the *Monadology*; and the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence.[63] Nevertheless, his view of the Leibniz's philosophy was also shaped by the work of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier, philosophers Kant used in his teaching, and this is often reflected in his writings. Thus, disentangling Kant's comments about Leibniz and Leibnizianism often proves to be quite difficult.

Kant's pre-Critical writings unsurprisingly demonstrate an engagement with many of the pressing philosophical issues of the day. And, as we have seen, these issues often related to the philosophy of Leibniz, the philosophy of Wolff and tensions between growing Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment thought. A few examples here might suffice to show which texts Kant knew and knew well. Kant's very first publication *Von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte* [*On the True Estimation of Living Forces*] from 1747 addressed the *vis viva* dispute between Leibnizians and their opponents, and in the opening section, Kant quotes from Leibniz's *Specimen Dynamicum*, the *locus classicus* for Leibniz's account of *vis viva*, on the nature of extension (Ak. 1:17).[64] Likewise, Kant's work

[63] While the *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas* is a very important text in the Leibnizian corpus, a work published in Leibniz's lifetime and to which he makes frequent references in his later writings, it was not republished until the edition of Dutens and was known principally through Wolff's reworking of Leibniz's theses in his *German Logic*. I am tempted to bracket the *New System of Nature* as well, for Kant shows no signs of having studied this text; his knowledge of the pre-established harmony more likely come from his reading of the *Theodicy* and the presentations of Leibniz's philosophy by Wolff, Hansch, Bilfinger, and Baumgarten. This fact is of some importance because, as Leibniz scholars know, the *New System* also foreshadows the monadology to come and contains hints of some of Leibniz's more esoteric doctrines. While Daniel Garber (2009) has argued that the *New System* does not contain a proto-monadology, if one looks at the work of Hansch (1728), for example, who wrote shortly after Leibniz's death, one finds *monad*, *substantial form*, *soul*, and *entelechy* all used largely synonymously. Leibniz himself treats these terms as largely equivalent as late as 1710 in the *Theodicy*.

[64] However, Ursula Goldenbaum argues in Chapter 2 of this volume that Kant's arguments about living forces—inspired by the debate about Leibnizian *vis viva*—are directed less against actual Leibnizian texts and more against the *Institutions de Physique* (1740) of Émilie du Châtelet.

on optimism intended for the Prize Essay question of the Royal Academy clearly indicates that Kant knew Leibniz's *Theodicy*, by then available in German translation. Yet, many of Kant's reflections on Leibnizian issues can just as easily be traced to works of Wolff and Wolffians. For example, the early *Nova Dilucidatio* [*New Elucidation*] (1755) contains a criticism of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (Ak. 2:277), which could come either from the *Monadology* or from Leibniz's correspondence with Clarke or from any number of Wolff's books. While the brief mention of the *ars combinatoria* suggests an acquaintance with Leibniz's texts, it is far more likely that Kant's knowledge derives from the reference in Christian Wolff's *German Metaphysics* (§324). Similarly, Kant's essay *Regions of Space* (1768) clearly picks up on issues from the Leibniz–Clarke correspondence, but his references to the Leibnizian idea of *analysis situs* in the opening paragraph (and in his *Inquiry* [1763]) should not lead us to conclude that he was drawing on Leibniz. Few (if any) of Leibniz's writings on this topic were extant at this time, and it is thus much more likely that he knew of this from Wolff's *Elements of Universal Mathematics*, the text that Kant used in his teaching of mathematics. There Wolff briefly mentions the doctrine and gives a few indications of its content.[65] Moreover, even in the *Physical Monadology* (1759), Kant makes no statements about ontology that show any kind of deep knowledge of Leibniz's metaphysics beyond what one could glean from the presentations of Wolff and Baumgarten. Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766) gives another clue to the sources of Kant's understanding of Leibniz. In this work, Kant refers to an anecdote from Hansch's *Godefridi Guilielmi Leibnitii Principia Philosophiae More Geometrico Demonstrata* [*Leibniz's Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner*], in which, while drinking coffee with Hansch in Leipzig, Leibniz says that he is not sure if the monads in the coffee might not someday be human souls (Hansch 1728, 135) (Ak. 2:327). Since, to the best of my knowledge, this story is only found in Hansch's *Principia*, it is likely that Kant's picture of Leibniz was informed by his reading to Hansch's interpretation.

Certainly, the *Specimen Dynamicum*, *New System of Nature*, *Theodicy*, *Principles of Nature and Grace*, *Monadology*, and the correspondence with Clarke can give a good picture of Leibniz's philosophy, but as all students and scholars of Leibniz know, a great deal is missing from this picture. As mentioned earlier, the editions of Raspe (Leibniz 1765) and Dutens (Leibniz 1768) went a long way to filling in the details of Leibniz's philosophy and providing the philosophical community with a true resource for study. This raises the obvious question whether Kant took the time to study these works carefully. It has become common to assume, for example, that Kant read the *New Essays* in 1769, four years after the publication of Raspe's edition. This date corresponds to the time when "a great light" went on for

[65] GW II 29, 296. According to De Risi, Wolff and others are in fact responsible for the transmission and transmogrification of Leibniz's actual views (De Risi 2007, 101–102).

Kant, and reading Leibniz at this time is taken to explain the distinction in the *Inaugural Dissertation* between the sensible and the intelligible.[66] Whether or not Kant read Leibniz's *New Essays* in the 1760s and this was the spark of the great light that went on for him in 1769, it is very likely that he read the work while thinking through the issues central to the Critical project in his "silent decade," the 1770s. While the "Amphiboly" chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, contains an analysis of the weaknesses of Leibniz's philosophy, Kant's charge is ultimately that *both* Leibniz and Locke are guilty of not having properly engaged in transcendental reflection. And Kant's presentation seems clearly to have arisen through an engagement with Leibniz's dialogue with Locke. Moreover, Kant was certainly in a position to know of Leibniz's account of innate ideas as found in the *New Essays* through an article by Michael Hißman, which appeared in the *Teutsche Merkur*, a journal that he would certainly have read in Kanter's bookstore.[67] On the other hand, there is little evidence in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Kant studied the edition of Dutens, which might have led him to a more sophisticated understanding of Leibniz's *system*, comparable to that of Lessing.

In his Critical period, Kant presents a fairly consistent picture of Leibniz's philosophy. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *On a Discovery*, and *What Progress?* Kant claims that the following theses typify Leibniz's metaphysics: pre-established harmony, the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the monadology, the real opposition of forces, the principle of sufficient reason, and relationalism of space and time. There is nothing wrong with this list, but, as any Leibniz scholar will attest, missing are some crucial Leibnizian views, most obviously, the in-esse notion of truth and the complete individual concept theory of substance—metaphysical theses that actually ground those theses identified by Kant. Of course, neither Kant nor anyone writing in the latter part of the eighteenth century could have known of these views, for the texts were simply not available.

Despite Kant's important arguments against Leibniz's philosophy, he is not dismissive of it. For example, not only does he claim in *On a Discovery* that "the *Critique of Pure Reason* might well be the true apology for Leibniz," he also speaks in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* of the "intrinsically correct *platonic* concept of the world devised by Leibniz" (Ak. 8:251/Kant 2002, 336; Ak. 4:507/Kant 2002, 219). This latter claim can easily be read as saying that, if one could have cognition of the sort that Leibniz claimed—that is, if a human being could cognize the world solely through concepts alone—then it would be revealed to be just like that described by Leibnizian metaphysics. In Kant's view, however,

[66] See Refl. 5037 (Ak. 18:69). This view is suggested by Vaihinger (1881 I:48), Tonelli (1974, 437) and many others; against this view, see e.g. Wundt (1924, 160). For a very enlightening article on "das große Licht" of 1769, see Schmucker (1976).

[67] Kant refers to the article in his polemic *On a Discovery* against the Leibnizian Eberhard in 1790 (Ak. 8:244).

Leibniz's philosophy is based on a fundamentally flawed view of the nature of the mind and its relation to the world; Leibniz, according to Kant, fails to recognize that sensibility is a separate source of mental content and that sensibility works in conjunction with the understanding in the formation of our judgments.[68] One way to reconcile the seeming discrepancy between opposition and support is to see in Kant's philosophy a rejection of Leibniz's claims to *know* the supersensible objects of metaphysics—God, freedom, and the soul—through the use of theoretical reason and an affirmation of those same supersensible objects obtained through practical reason. This is, indeed, the core of the Critical project.[69]

6 Conclusion

It has become a commonplace in the history of philosophy to see Kant's work as a response to "Hume's problem"—as a response to the skeptical challenge to the possibility of (synthetic) a priori claims to knowledge. Kant's famous claim from the opening of the *Prolegomena* forces this picture upon us: "the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy" (Ak. 4:260/Kant 2002, 57). Yet, the very same passage also suggests that the Critical philosophy is a response to dogmatic philosophy, for Kant locates himself to some degree within this tradition.[70] Understanding Kant's relation to Leibniz, the greatest of the "dogmatic" metaphysicians, is therefore crucial to understanding his Critical philosophy. But, as I have tried to indicate, Kant's knowledge of Leibniz was limited in many important respects: he did not have access to many of Leibniz's writings, particularly his works in logic which, on the view of many Leibniz scholars, ground his metaphysical views or his important correspondences with Arnauld and De Volder, which present much more sophisticated treatments of ontology, modality, and natural philosophy; and a somewhat modified and caricatured Leibniz was created through mid-century advocates and opponents who could not but influence Kant's *Leibnizbild*. Be that as it may, the story of Kant's reaction to the real and imagined Leibnizian philosophy is an integral part of the story of philosophy itself.

[68] Both Anja Jauernig and Martha Bolton show in their contributions to this volume (respectively Chapters 7 and 8) that Kant's criticism of Leibniz on this matter, as it appears in the "Amphiboly" chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is overstated and that Kant's understanding of the details of Leibniz's position flawed.

[69] Paul Guyer makes this case in Chapter 9 of this volume.

[70] The extent to which Kant adhered to dogmatism is discussed by Ursula Goldenbaum and Eric Watkins in, respectively, Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume.