EMOTIONS IN HISTORY

THE EMERGENCE OF A HERO

A Tale of Romantic Love in Russia around 1800

ANDREI ZORIN

Translated by Leo Shtutin

OXFORD

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General Editors

UTE PREVERT   THOMAS DIXON

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

transcript

To Irina

Acknowledgements

I began work on this book some thirty-five years ago, when I first encountered the diaries of Andrei Turgenev in the Manuscripts Department of Pushkin House (the premises of the *Academy of Sciences Institute of Russian Literature* in St. Petersburg). Like many other researchers, I found myself spellbound by the diaries' richness and intensity. I originally had no idea that the history of emotions could serve as a possible lens to understanding this document's content, not least because the discipline itself was still in its infancy back then. Rather, my initial interest in Andrei Turgenev stemmed from the fact that he was among Russia's first Germanophiles—people who catalyzed the nation's enthusiasm for German letters and philosophy. This enthusiasm, of course, would go on to play a crucial role in determining the course of nineteenth-century Russian culture.

I owe the opportunity of working with the materials of the Turgenev family archive—materials yet to be fully inventoried—to Larisa Ivanova. Her warm, selfless, generous assistance was invaluable to me as I returned to the Turgenev papers over the years; it was invaluable, too, in my work with other documents housed in the Manuscripts Department. Larisa's department colleagues, meanwhile, offered me nothing but support and professionalism, and continued to do so after her untimely demise. To all of them, as well as to the staff of other archival repositories whose materials are used in this book, I should like to express my sincere and profound thanks.

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Introduction

Individual Experience as a Problem of Cultural History

If we were to express reputation as a fraction where the numerator represents the quantity and importance of scholarly works devoted to a particular author, and the denominator represents whatever volume of work said author has left behind, the figure we'd get for the young Russian *littérateur* Andrei Ivanovich Turgenev (1781–1803) would be extremely high indeed. Scholars have been writing about Turgenev for over a century now; he's been the subject of essays by literary theorists and historians as prominent as Alexander Veselovsky, Yuri Lotman, Vladimir Toporov, Vadim Vatsuro, and Marc Raeff. And yet the only works to be published within his short lifetime were three poems and a handful of translations.

Nor is the body of Turgenev's other efforts strikingly voluminous: it comprises two dozen minor poems; fragments of unfinished translations; three speeches he made to the Friendly Literary Society (a self-organized group of young poets that met for several months in 1801); a hundred-odd letters; and his most important work, the diaries of 1799–1803—an exceptionally interesting document, historically and psychologically speaking, but hardly one that can be described as an artistic masterpiece. Furthermore, the diaries have yet to be published in their entirety and are known to readers only from extensive citations in the scholarly literature and from Maria Virolainen's 1989 publication of some 20% of their total volume.

What the diaries afford is, at bottom, an opportunity to penetrate into the experiences of an early—if not the earliest—incarnation of Russian Romanticist Man. Andrei Turgenev may be regarded as a kind of 'pilot release' of the Russian Romanticist not so much in his literary works as in his personality. A ferocious self-exactingness; a voracious search for evidence of one's own exceptionality, without faith in which life is denuded of meaning; a painful propensity for self-examination, for scrupulous assessments of one's conformity to abstract criteria and ideal paradigms, which are not merely borrowed, ready-made, from external sources, but are intensively internalized, weighed up, and reconceptualized—this whole psychological configuration, though very much anomalous by the standards of the Russian eighteenth century, is more than familiar to readers of the great prose of the nineteenth.

Taking Turgenev's emotional experiences as our point of departure, we will attempt to reconstruct the emergence of the Romantic personality type in Russian culture. As befits the story of a Romantic hero, the focus of this book will be on love and death.

'Experience' and emotions

In her notebooks for the years 1933–1935, the Russian writer and literary historian Lydia Ginzburg wrote about a certain 'similarity' in the challenges facing 'the historian' and 'the novelist', both of whom must 'explain the same facts, albeit appraised at different scales'. She was seeking out a method of historical analysis that would facilitate a shift 'from investigations of enormous mass movements to those of ever-smaller group formations—and all the way down to the level of individuals', encompassing the most intimate aspects of their inner lives (OR RNB. f. 1377; notebook VIII-2; l. 37–38; quoted after Van Buskirk 2012: 161). Immediately following on the heels of these reflections comes an essay entitled 'The Stages of Love' (Ginzburg 2002: 34).

Ginzburg, who articulated an original theory of a so-called 'intermediary literature' poised in the interstices between documentary narrative and fiction, and who made significant contributions to this literary mode, described her own demands on historical science as eccentric. Of course, historians—especially the authors of biographies—had long theorized the impulses and motives of their protagonists, and yet speculation of this ilk was inevitably suspected of being insufficiently scientific or even belletristic in character: depictions of the vicissitudes of long-departed individuals traditionally belonged to the province of fiction. Nietzsche, for his part, lamented in *The Gay Science* that '[h]itherto all that has given colour to existence has lacked a history: where would one find a history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of piety, of cruelty?' (Nietzsche 2006: 23).

It was in the 1930s, when Ginzburg was formulating her ideas, that European historians began to lay the foundations of a new discipline. In a monumental and synoptic study, Jan Plamper traces the development of the history of emotions from the figure of Lucien Febvre, one of its pioneers, to the beginning of the twenty-first century (Plamper 2015; cf. Reddy 2010). If we are to discuss this discipline's achievements from the perspective of the programme outlined by Lydia Ginzburg, we must note that, although scholars have mastered to perfection the art of descending 'to ever-smaller group formations', the challenge of reaching 'the level of individuals' remains, in my opinion, largely unsolved.

As Thomas Dixon has shown, the category of 'emotions' was conceived in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English-language philosophy and psychology 'as a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary feelings':

> Prior to the creation of the emotions as an over-arching category, more subtlety had been possible on these questions. The 'affections', and the 'moral sentiments, for example, could be understood as both rational and voluntary movements of the soul, while still being subjectively warm and lively psychological states. It is not the case that prior to the 1970s no one had realized that thinking, willing and feeling were (and should be) intertwined in one way or another. Almost everybody had realized this. (Dixon 2003: 3)

A term introduced specifically to differentiate between the sensuous and the rational came, then, to be reconceived anew, and reacquired a formerly lost cognitive dimension. At the same time, the historical semantics of the word *emotion*, even allowing for its latest metamorphoses, supports an investigative orientation toward the study of the typical reactions of communities and groups rather than the unique experience of individuals. 'Prevailing theories detach emotion from context. When a theorist writes of anger, grief, pity, and so on, there is hidden in the text an unrecognized implication that the phenomena represented by the specific emotion term can be detached from the context of action', notes the psychologist and psychiatrist Theodore Sarbin, whose experience as a clinician encouraged him to pay particular attention to individual case studies (Sarbin 1986: 84).

That the history of emotions as a discipline experienced a particularly rapid development in English-language and, to a lesser extent, French-language scholarship also appears to have contributed to this state of affairs (Plamper 2015). As Laurent Thévenot, one of the founders of modern pragmatic sociology, takes cares to stress, 'in French and in English, the word "experience" *accounts poorly for the conjunction' of various traits*, 'notably of emotion in the anxious movement to ward the overcoming of difficulty' (Thévenot 2012: 294). Well acquainted with the Russian intellectual tradition, Thévenot devotes special attention to the heuristic resources provided by the Russian term *perezhivanie.*

Like most Russian-language philosophical categories, the word *perezhivanie* is a calque from German. A general overview of the history of the verb *erleben* and its derivative noun *Erlebnis* has been sketched out by Hans-Georg Gadamer in the first part of his *Truth and Method* (Gadamer 2006: 53–60). According to Gadamer, if the verb 'erleben', denotative of the immediacy and now-ness of the act of experiencing, was often used in the age of Goethe, the corresponding noun 'Erlebnis', though first employed in a private letter by Hegel, fully entered intellectual circulation only in the 1870s as a category connecting a fleeting moment of experience to the trace left by that moment in the subject's inner world: 'something becomes an experience not only insofar as it is experienced, but insofar as its being experienced makes a special impression that gives it lasting importance' (Gadamer 2006: 53).

The notion of *Erlebnis* grew in popularity in the wake of William Dilthey's theory of descriptive psychology, and, more specifically, following the 1905

publication of his *Experience and Poetry* [*Das Erlebnius und die Dichtung*]. The poet's experience, Dilthey asserts, finds expression in the poet's creative output and, thanks to the plenitude of said expression, can be experienced and understood anew by readers versed in the relevant historical and biographical contexts (Dilthey 1985). The philosopher was primarily concerned not with biographical authors as such but rather with their ideal essence as embodied in their creative works—which, in the philosophical tradition represented by Dilthey, enjoyed an epistemological status superior to that of everyday empirical data (Yaroshevsky 1998).

Dilthey's English and French translators employed the expressions 'lived experience' and 'vécu de conscience'. The American anthropologist Victor Turner, who utilizes the category of *Erlebnis* in its Diltheyan sense in his analysis of rituals and theatrical performances, translates it as 'experience'—but specifies the semantic differences between the two terms and indicates that a literal translation of the former would be 'what has been lived through' (Turner 1982: 12, 1–19). It is in this Turnerian sense that the word 'experience' shall generally be employed in the present work.

Experience acquires its ideal form in the act of creating and apprehending a work of art, for, according to Dilthey, experience, as Nikolai Plotnikov remarks, invariably takes shape 'in the domain of intersubjective relations, of community', and exists 'only insofar as it finds expression' (Plotnikov 2002: 91; Plotnikov 2000: 35–42, 120–122 et al.). Experience, then, entails a dynamic integration of the external and internal, making it possible to impart a historical dimension to the psychology of individual subjects (see Makkreel 1985: 5–7; Plotnikov 2000: 61–68). The Erlebnis–Ausdruck–Verstehen triad became the cornerstone of Diltheyan hermeneutics.

As Gadamer seeks to emphasize, the word *Erlebnis* became widespread when it began to be employed in biographical literature, which, especially as understood by Dilthey himself, became an account of the succession of a protagonist's experiences (Gadamer 2006: 53, 55). According to Dilthey, the biographer's true purpose was to lay bare the link between the depths of human nature and the universalization of historical life (Dilthey 1995: 141).

A meaning of the verb *perezhivat′* close to that of the German *erleben* emerged in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. In his *History of Words*, Victor Vinogradov draws attention to a representative example of its usage in Chapter 25 of the fourth part of Alexander Herzen's famous autobiography *My Past and Thoughts*: 'I even think that a man *who has not lived* [*ne perezhivshyi*] through Hegel's *Phenomenology* and Proudhon's *Contradictions of Political Economy*, who has not passed through that furnace and been tempered by it, is not complete, not modern' (Herzen 1982: 236, emphasis added). It is clear that for Herzen, a thinker brought up on and wont to deliberate about German philosophy, the word *perezhit′* here denotes a process of converting an external—in this case literary—impression into personal experience, into a facet of one's own life.

The category of *perezhivanie* entered Russian philosophical and scientific thought by way of a reconceptualization of Dilthey's notions. Lev Vygotsky, founder of cultural-historical psychology and frequent critic of Dilthey's descriptive psychology (see Vygotsky 1982–1984: VI. 225), nonetheless comprehensively appropriated the latter's ideas regarding *Erlebnis* as an all-encompassing organizing principle of psychic life that unites individuals and the realities they experience. Towards the end of his life, he articulated the idea that *perezhivanie* constitutes an integral 'unity of consciousness, that is, a unity in which the basic properties of consciousness are given as such [...] There is no experience that would not be experience of something just as there is no act of consciousness that would not be an act of consciousness of something' (Vygotsky 1982–1984: VI. 382–383; Yaroshevsky 2007).

If Vygotsky elaborated the category of *perezhivanie* with an eye on the challenges of constructing a cultural-historical psychology, the philosopher Gustav Shpet, for his part, attempted to apply the Diltheyan 'Erlebnis–Ausdruck–Verstehen' triad to history, a discipline which, in his eyes, was paradigmatic of 'a maximally comprehensive apprehension of the concrete in its limitless plenitude' (Shpet 2005: 223, 216–217). He came to focus on the verbal, or, more broadly, semiotic nature of *Ausdruck*, which served to objectify and historicize *perezhivanie* and rendered any psychological approach to it limited and unproductive. Owing to the verbal nature of *Ausdruck*, he regarded philology as 'foundational to research methods within history' (Shpet 2005: 246).

Shpet's point of departure was the conceptualization of experience offered by Edmund Husserl, whose student he had once been. Husserl understood Erlebnis as an intentional act of consciousness devoid of any empirical content, whether historical or psychological, and encompassing the external world only as an abstract horizon (for a discussion of the influence of Husserl's thinking on Dilthey in the last years of his life, see Makkreel 1975, 273–304). At the same time, in the words of Robert Bird, 'Shpet accepted Dilthey's historicism and Husserl's ahistorical phenomenology as two complementary parts of a larger whole' (Bird 2009: 31; Steiner 2009). Shpet sought to return phenomenology to the domain of history while simultaneously and fully preserving its anti-psychologism (Shpet 2005: 212–247).

Shpet's attempt to synthesize the ideas of Dilthey with those of Husserl served as the basis for the Russian linguist Grigory Vinokur's conceptualization of biography as a complexly organized system of experiences. Vinokur, still a massively underestimated thinker within the humanities, elaborated this conceptualization in a 1927 work entitled *Biography and Culture*. The approach outlined in this study has, it would seem, retained its heuristic potential; and yet, if that potential is to be realized, we must unshackle Vinokur's conceptualization from the methodological utopianism characteristic of 1920s theory.

Vinokur, following Dilthey, posited that *perezhivanie* represents a 'vehicle for specifically biographical meanings and contents', and that it gives rise to 'that sphere of private life wherein we earn the right to speak of private life as of a *creative undertaking*'. It is *perezhivanie*, Vinokur believes, that emerges as 'that new form in which the interrelationship between history and personality takes shape: in becoming an object of *perezhivanie*, historical fact acquires biographical meaning' (Vinokur 1927: 39, 37).

These Diltheyan ideas were, however, fleshed out in Vinokur's writings with a specifically 'linguistic understanding of the questions of personality' (Shapir 1990: 259–260) whereby every *perezhivanie* 'finds for itself its *own* authentic expression—an expression which, realized as it is through words or via some other cultural medium' (Vinokur 1990: 38), can always be reconstructed by researchers from its external manifestations. There is a 'structural unity' between the meaning of *perezhivanie* and the essence of behaviour: 'There are no external and internal biographies. Biography exists as *one* single life, integral and specific. [...] The external here is but a *sign* of the internal, and all biography in general is but *the external expression of the internal*.'[1] The biographer familiar with 'the factual history of external events [...] has everything he needs to glimpse the "innermost movements of the soul" as well' (Vinokur 1927: 26).[2]

The researcher regarded the gestures and actions of a biography's protagonist as 'an expressive form of *perezhivanie* realized in behaviour' (Vinokur 1927: 47–48), and considered the development of the protagonist's personality to be an analogue for the syntactic unfurling of a phrase. If a single word can be understood only as an element of a completed utterance, the meaning of any gesture or action becomes clear only within the framework of a completed life: 'Goethe, the author of *Werther*, can only remain incomprehensible to me unless I know him as a Weimar minister; and I shall understand nothing about the child Lermontov until I learn of the "eternally sad duel" on the slope of Mashuk' (Vinokur 1927: 33).

This approach, manifested in the category of 'fate', which Vinokur believed, with certain reservations, to be necessary for his analysis (see Shapir 1990: 260), presupposes an internal unity of personality subject to retrospective elucidation. Vinokur doubtless proceeded from the assumption that such a unity is either generally inherent in human beings or, more likely, that it sets apart historical figures of interest to biographers. Vinokur's use of the fates of Goethe and Lermontov to illustrate his thesis of the semantic unity of an individual's experiences is clear

[1] Italics of the author.

[2] Another thinker writing in very much same vein on this subject was Valentin Voloshinov, who attempted, in his *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, to imbue Dilthey's ideas with materialistic content: 'Not only can experience be outwardly expressed through the agency of the sign [...] but also [...] experience exists even for the person undergoing it only in the material of signs. Outside that material there is no experience as such. In this sense any experience is expressible, i.e., has potential expression. [...] This factor of expressivity cannot be argued away from experience without forfeiting the very nature of experience.' (Voloshinov 1995: 241).

testament—as, indeed, is the entire gamut of the examples he adduces—that, much like Dilthey, he was primarily interested in the biographies of poets, especially those of the Romanticist type. It is all the more telling, then, that Vinokur circumvents the notion, central to Romantic culture, of the verbal 'inexpressibility' of an individual's highest experiences by means of a rhetorical manoeuvre:

> It is true: there are indeed unverbalized experiences, but the very fact that we *know* about this non-verbalization means that the latter cannot be fundamental. I can fail to relate the relevant content to others, but I must at least utter it to myself, such that my experience truly becomes *experience*, rather than mere reflex. [...] At the worst, therefore, we can speak only of the failure, the unfortune of the biographer as an empirical individual who proved unable to procure any relevant materials, or was even doomed to a scenario where said materials would never enter his possession. But that is a question of heuristics, not of principles: an *auto*biography, for example, is not rendered impossible by this.
>
> (Vinokur 1927: 48)

An autobiography, like any other type of account about one's own experiences, is an event that necessarily takes place intravitam. As Vinokur himself asserts, however, a personality becomes accessible to understanding only once its 'syntactic unfurling' is complete—which means that its structure can be grasped only *from without*.

This logical contradiction reveals a hermeneutical quandary integral to Vinokur's conceptualization. Having advanced reflection upon one's own experience as an argument in favour of the fundamental possibility of its scholarly reconstruction, the researcher essentially equalizes the epistemological status of testimony and interpretation. Yet those who pen memoirs, those who make diary entries, and (in particular) those who relate their lives to others, whether orally or in writing, often cannot or do not want to take stock of the true motives and impulses behind their actions; acting, speaking, and writing under the influence of more or less unconscious ruses, they are not entirely sincere, or else entirely insincere, with themselves. The same applies, of course, to acts and gestures wherein the experiences of historical personages find their external expression.

All this, needless to say, is well known, and has always been so. The question, however, is whether suchlike properties of personal testimony constitute the necessary prerequisite for a hermeneutic act or whether, in fact, they represent a purely practical investigative complexity that can legitimately be neglected when constructing a theoretical model. If we proceed from the premise that the external and internal are bound in an unarguable 'structural unity' that enables the 'innermost movements' of individuals' 'souls' to be reconstructed from the 'factual history of external events', then said individuals, having as they do direct access to their own experiences, inevitably enjoy a privileged position as compared to that of historians, who look upon them from without and, more often

than not, from the vantage of another culture. At the same time, if, as William Reddy has suggested, we regard any articulation of experience as its 'translation' into the language of existing cultural forms (Reddy 2001: 63–111), then the inescapable incompleteness of that articulation, and its dependency on the addressee of the particular utterance, become immediately apparent (Reddy 2001: 63–111).

If we regard words, gestures or actions as 'signs' of experience, these can only be signs of the type that Husserl dubbed 'indicators', akin to marks or brands (Husserl 2001: II, 35), or, to borrow from the classical semiotic terminology of Charles Peirce, 'indices', such as axe notches on a tree-trunk or pawprints in the sand (Peirce 1984: 52–56). An understanding of such signs, which forever fluctuates between decipherment and interpretation, is possible only from an external vantage, defined by Bakhtin as *vnenakhodimost′* ('outsidedness') and by Gadamer as 'temporal distance' (Gadamer 2006: 290–297).

Vinokur himself was fully cognizant of the utopian nature of his constructions, which he dubbed 'purity and integrity', emphasizing that he sought to avoid 'investigative technicism and methodological didacticism' and 'wouldn't dream of teaching anyone how write a biography' (Vinokur 1927: 84). He made no attempt to implement his own project in practice. His demonstrative refusal to discuss means of reconstructing particular internal experiences allowed him to avoid recognizing the fact that far from all experiences are in principle amenable to, or destined for, realization in a culturally mediated form.

Many experiences disappear without trace and are forever lost to historians and biographers, while others manifest themselves only partially or indirectly. Furthermore, even an ideal historian—one who has all necessary materials to hand—would still be incapable of undertaking an exhaustive reconstruction of any experience, not least on account of the sheer volume of time and words that such a reconstruction would require. According to Leo Tolstoy, 'there wouldn't be enough ink in the world' to document the impressions generated over just a single day of a human life, nor 'enough typesetters' to put such an account into print (Tolstoy 1928–1964: I. 279; cf. Paperno 2014: 14). Be that as it may, I consider the historical study both of individuals' emotional worlds and of their specific experiences to be not only possible but productive.

The Structure of Individual Experience

Husserl simultaneously underscored the continuity of experiential flow and identified a unitary 'now-experience' with its own 'initial' and 'final' phases:

> Every present moment of experience, even if it be that of the initial phase of an experience freshly developing, has necessarily *a before as a limit* […] which in

> this form contains a past something, a past experience. [...] But every present moment of experience has also, and necessarily, *an after as a limit*, and that also is no empty limit; every present moment of experience, be it even the terminal phase of the duration of an experience that is ceasing, passes off into a new 'now'.
> (Husserl 2012: 167)

That the philosopher's instrumentarium included the category of *Erlebnis* was, of course, conducive to his identification of experience as a unit of consciousness—an identification far less in evidence in the writings of his great contemporaries William James and Henri Bergson, who also employed the 'flow metaphor' in their analysis of consciousness (Ricoeur 2004: 157. For a discussion of the particular difficulties James encountered in this regard, see Myers 1986: 330–333). It is not improbable that the logic pursued by these thinkers was influenced by their respective national philosophical traditions and, to a certain extent, possibly also by the languages in which they wrote.

In this study I shall rely on a model of the 'emotional process' developed by the Dutch psychologists Nico H. Frijda and Batja Mesquita (Frijda and Mesquita 1994: 52–63). Such models are, needless to say, invariably conventional representations (see, for example, two others proposed elsewhere by one of the co-authors: Frijda 1986: 454; Frijda 2007: 20), and my choice has been determined, first and foremost, by the heuristic productivity of the just-mentioned schema vis-à-vis the purposes of this research.

According to Frijda and Mesquita, emotions 'are elicited by the particular meaning associated with [an] event rather than by the nature of [that] event per se'. They refer to the process of endowing an emotion-eliciting event with meaning using the term *event coding*. In coding an event, the emotion-experiencing subject defines it (though not necessarily in verbal form) as *danger*, *insult*, *seduction*, *shock,* and so forth. The 'coding' method also entails a corresponding 'appraisal' expressed as *fear*, *anger*, *wonder*, and so on (Frijda and Mesquita 1994: 57–59).

The appraisal, in turn, generates an 'action readiness' which may or may not find subsequent realization in the actual behaviour of the subject: fleeing, launching into an attack, manifesting attention, blushing, blanching, and so on. As the researchers emphasize, event coding, appraisal and action readiness are all contingent on the extent to which the event in question has impacted the subject's fundamental interests and values—a variable they dub *concern*, and which here will be referred to as *subjective involvedness*. The degree of the subject's involvedness determines whether the experience will materialize at all and, if it does, how intense it will prove to be.

At the same time, coding, appraisal, action readiness and even the nature of involvedness are all determined by regulatory processes that are themselves in large part determined by cultural norms, precepts, and taboos. According to

Frijda and Mesquita, 'cultures possess explicit verbal categories to identify classes of events with particular associated meaning and affective evaluations. […] A given event may be coded differently in various cultures. Different codings may relate similar events to different concerns and, thus, give rise to different emotions' (Frijda and Mesquita 1994: 57–59). So it is that between the experienced event, the value-world of the experiencing subject and the experience itself, shaped by whatever 'codings', 'appraisals', and 'action readinesses' are characteristic to it, there arises a flexible and yet relatively stable system of interrelationships which the American anthropologist and cultural psychologist Richard Schweder has termed 'an interpretive scheme', and which enables the subject to 'diagnose his somatic and affective experience' (Schweder 1994: 32–33).

As Clifford Geertz has written, 'in order to make up our minds we must know how we feel certain things; and to know how we feel about things we need public images of sentiment that only ritual, myth and art can provide' (Geertz 1973: 82). In this book, such 'public images of sentiment'—in the absence of which, as Geertz maintained, people can neither fathom out their own feelings nor even experience them—will be called *emotional matrices*. Culture offers us a gamut of these matrices together with protocols governing their social, age, and gender distribution. Experience-determining matrices assimilated in the context of people's idealized representations of themselves constitute their *emotional repertoire*.

This book will focus on 'emotional matrices', in spite of the fact that cultural psychology has a relatively robust tradition of understanding emotions as 'transitory social roles' (Averill 1980: 312), 'script-like narrative structures' (Schweder 1994: 37) and 'narrative emplotments' (Sarbin 1989: 185), among other definitions.

In Russian scholarship, a comparable conceptualization of the 'historical-psychological mechanisms governing human actions' was proposed by Yuri Lotman, who developed an original theory of role- and plot-defined behaviour:

> The hierarchy of significant behavioural elements is comprised of the sequence *gesture*, *action*, *behavioural text*. […] When it comes to real-life behaviour, which is complex and governed by a variety of factors, behavioural texts can remain incomplete, morph into new texts, and intersect with parallel texts. Yet on the level of individuals' ideal conceptualizations of their own behaviour, they invariably give rise to fully developed, meaningful patterns. Purposive human activity would be impossible if this were not the case.
>
> (Lotman 1992: I. 298, 307, tr. Leo Shtutin)

Following the tradition of the Russian Formalist school, Lotman eschewed consideration of the inner world of personality. Nevertheless, his attempt to apply techniques developed in the domain of literary analysis to the behaviour of

historical individuals compelled him to violate the Formalist taboo against any discussion of inner life and to advance the study of the 'psychological preconditions of behaviour' as an investigative imperative (Lotman 1992: I. 296). Lotman discerned these preconditions in the cultural models that guided the educated Russian nobility between the latter third of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth, an era during which 'the primary source of behavioural paradigms was high literature—literature removed from the everyday' (Lotman 1992: I. 262, tr. Leo Shtutin).

Educated Russian nobles of the eighteenth century, writes Lotman, constructed their own images in accordance with the norms prescribed by literature, and imposed said norms on their milieu. Their behaviour, generated by certain texts, emulated the poetics of their exemplars, and could therefore be read as a kind of text in its own right. In turn, their audiences, no less well acquainted with those selfsame exemplars, were able adequately to recognize literary behaviour and to form expectations, these generating resonance effects which further structured the poetics of the behaviour of the individuals in question (Lotman 1992: I. 248–268).

Although 'role-based', 'scenario-based', and 'narratorial' interpretations of an individual's emotional world can clarify many aspects of that world, they almost inevitably compel the researcher to iron out its complexities. It emphasizes the unity and continuity of emotional experience, presupposing, first, that subjects are aware of precisely what role they are playing and what plotlines they are putting into effect, and, second, that they are not simultaneously participating in the performance of completely different scripts. Neither of these presuppositions seems at all self-evident.

Thus, Dan McAdams, a steadfast proponent of the narrative theory of personality, writes of the 'vast but finite catalog of images' that 'each culture provides [to] its members' even as he emphasizes the 'uniqueness' of every individual's 'personal mythology'. McAdams does not elucidate the nature of this uniqueness, construing changes in an individual's self-identification as an upshot of rejecting one myth in favour of another (McAdams 1997: 60, 12, 102, and elsewhere.). Yet any empirical experience may well be—and frequently is—moulded by wholly distinct emotional matrices.

First and foremost, any correspondence between a 'public image of sentiment', a specific individual's particular situation, and that individual's idealized self-conceptualization can be comprehensive and absolute only in rare cases. If it is to become a 'programme of behaviour' (Lotman 1992: Vol. I: 296), a cultural paradigm must be *experienced*, and, in the process of being experienced, it not only serves to mould personalities but is also transformed itself. In 'coding' a given event or impression, individuals imbue it with meaning as per cultural norms and paradigms even as they adapt said norms and paradigms to their own unique problems and objectives.

Moreover, many people's *emotional repertoires* can comprise various, often poorly coordinated, and sometimes simply mutually exclusive, emotional matrices. As Barbara Rosenwein has shown, single individuals often simultaneously belong to different emotional communities, and must therefore find their bearings with regard to the wholly disparate 'rules of feeling' that each community prescribes (Rosenwein 2006). The more multifarious, intense, and potentially conflictive a person's 'emotional repertoire', the greater the 'individual idiosyncrasy' of his or her experiences. The process of dealing with these idiosyncrasies, defined by William Reddy as a 'navigation of feelings', can in certain cases engender new cultural forms and emotional matrices (Reddy 2001).

Let us return, in this perspective, to our already-articulated reflection regarding the lack of a requisite 'structural unity' between an experience and its expression. It is precisely the incongruence between latter and former that allows researchers to view individual experience through the optics of multiple cultural forms both 'at the input' (emotional matrices) and 'at the output' (behavioural acts), and, in so doing, to conceptualize the dynamics of the lived experience.

Let us content ourselves with a solitary example. Pushkin's famous anthological poem 'Labour' [Trud] was brought into being by the completion of the great labour of his life—the verse novel *Eugene Onegin*:

> Миг вожделенный настал: окончен мой труд
> многолетний.
> Что ж непонятная грусть тайно тревожит меня?
> Или, свой подвиг свершив, я стою, как поденщик
> ненужный,
> Плату приявший свою, чуждый работе другой?
> Или жаль мне труда, молчаливого спутника ночи,
> Друга Авроры златой, друга пенатов святых?
> (Pushkin 1962–1964: III. 184).

> [Long, long desired, it's here: an end to my years at this labour.
> Why, then, this curious ache, furtively gnawing my soul?
> Now I've accomplished my feat, do I stand like some surplus
> odd-jòbsman,
> Wage in his hand at day's close, stranger to all other toil?
> Or is it my labour I miss, my silent nocturnal companion,
> Friend of the aureate Dawn, friend to the gods of the hearth?
> (tr. Leo Shtutin)]

When he was working on his novel, the poet assumed that the 'long desired' moment would be encoded by him as an 'accomplishment of a feat'; but when the

moment actually arrived, he ended up encoding it as a 'leave-taking'. Instead, therefore, of the expected satisfaction, pride, and liberation, it was sorrow that came to be an adequate construal of the circumstances. The extreme level of involvedness in this case is self-evident.

The emotional matrices on which the author's initial expectations were based are quite clearly discernible here: these are, first and foremost, classical conceptions of the laurel-crowned poet (these buttressed by the hexameter measure) and, to some degree, an extensive repertoire of folk proverbs glorifying the completion of an undertaking. In contrast, the matrix wherein the work in progress and its protagonists become part of the poet's soul, such that taking leave of them generates the experience of severance, is tightly bound up with Romantic culture, and was perceived by Pushkin himself as innovative and unexpected. This is evidenced by the epithet *neponyatnaya* ('curious' in the verse rendering above, literally 'incomprehensible'), by the specification of the nature of its impact ('furtively gnawing my soul' in the verse rendering, literally 'secretly troubling me'), and by the three questions that comprise the entire text of the poem save for its first, declaratory line.

The shift Pushkin achieves here was partly prompted by the very historical semantics of the word *trud* ('labour'). In the culture of that era, labour was perceived, on one hand, as a curse, and, on the other hand, as the sole facilitator of a worthy existence (Febvre 1991: 364–391). Both of these semantic planes found reflection in the Russian language of the early nineteenth century, and in the language of Pushkin in particular (Slovar′ 2000: IV. 612–614). Hence the figure of the *podenshchik* (day-labourer) that materializes in the second couplet—only to give way in the third to a metaphorization of 'labour' as a 'companion' and 'friend'. It was precisely this 'interpretive scheme', which features here in an as yet tentative and interrogative form, that transformed 'Labour'—and its categorization of the experience of completing a long and important undertaking as one of 'parting' or 'loss'—into one of the primary matrices of the emotional repertoire of Russian culture.

Though seeking out maximally representative examples is standard practice for historians, exceptions to rules are arguably of greater significance within the study of individuals' emotional lives. As Carlo Ginzburg has written, norms do not in themselves provide us with information regarding the possibility of violations, while anomalies contain norms and violations alike—and thereby serve to signpost cultural fissures and possible directions of shifts (see Ginzburg 2004: 299). Yet more significant is the fact that an individual experience constitutes an anomaly per se, because it is generated by a misalignment, or at least a less-than-total congruence, between the emotional matrices that determine it. If each matrix belongs to a given emotional community as a whole, any conflict between them is unique, and reflective of an individual's particular situation.

The Production of 'Emotional Matrices' in Late Eighteenth-Century Russian Culture

A preference for the unique over the typical requires scholars to explain their choice of case study. If, as Clifford Geertz puts it, investigators of particular cases are to avoid becoming 'peddlers of singularities', they must 'contrive to place such singularities in an informing proximity, connect them in such a way as to cause them to cast light on one another. Contextualization is the name of the game' (Geertz 2000: xi). At the heart of this book is a detailed case study of a three-and-a-half-year period in the life of Andrei Turgenev, starting from November 1799, when he began to keep a systematic diary, to his death in July 1803. If we are to trace the history of his experiences, we must reconstruct his ever-evolving emotional repertoire and understand how the matrices that comprised it interacted with one another, determining the whimsical, and sometimes mysterious, logic of his decisions, judgements, and moods.

More than seventy years ago, David Riesman developed a historical typology of social personalities. According to this typology, it was on the cusp of the modern era that the 'tradition-oriented' personality type, which derives values and behavioural rules from the etiquette, rituals, and everyday practices of older generations, came to be replaced by the 'inner-oriented' type, which seeks, in various life situations, to adhere to consistent principles developed during youth. Riesman explains the nature of this personality type using the metaphor of a gyroscope—a device that can maintain a constant orientation and remains unaffected by external interferences (Riesman 2001).

In Russian culture, the transition between two personality types spanned the second half of the eighteenth century and extended into the early nineteenth. The conflict of the emotional matrices that determined Turgenev's experiences made itself most clearly felt in the context of his convoluted and eccentric love story. His desperate and fruitless attempts to resolve this conflict—one which ultimately led to his demise—can be understood through the lens of a macro-historical shift that manifested itself in the make-up of his personality and the circumstances of his fate. Understanding this process is much easier for us, enjoying as we do the benefit of historical distance, than it would have been for Turgenev's contemporaries, and, quite possibly, even for himself.

This kind of analysis entails a reconstruction of the emotional matrices assimilated by Turgenev, and my account of his emotional experiences is therefore preceded by a chapter in which I attempt to sketch out a general outline of the emotional culture of the late eighteenth century—the era when his personality crystallized into being. This chapter is devoted to a consideration of the most important domains for the production of relevant emotional matrices: namely, the court of Catherine II, which, in the latter third of the eighteenth century, shaped the emotional repertoire of the rapidly Europeanizing noble elite; the

circle of the Moscow Rosicrucians, who offered their own 'symbolic models of feeling', in many respects divergent from those of the court; and those works of literature, predominantly Western European but also Russian, which, by century's end, had become some of the primary shapers of the educated public's emotional repertoire.

Clifford Geertz has identified three principal domains for the creation of 'public images of sentiment': 'myth', 'ritual', and 'art'. Simplifying to an extreme degree, myth can be assumed to play a central role in archaic cultures, ritual in traditional ones, and art in modern ones. (Mass media and social networks can no doubt be added to this list if we are to address postmodern culture as well.) For the upper strata of Russian society, the eighteenth century was an era of transition from traditional to contemporary European culture; theatre, the art most closely associated with ritual, clearly acquired particular significance during this period (Turner 1982).

Uniquely among the arts, theatre is capable of presenting a socially sanctioned repertoire of emotional matrices in a maximally visual, fleshly form that has been comprehensively stripped of the happenstance of everyday life. At the same time, the audience comprises a particular kind of emotional community—one in which individual spectators have the opportunity to compare their own reactions to the performance with those of others in their reference group, and therefore also to evaluate the 'correctness' and adequacy of their feelings at the very moment that they are experienced.

These functions of performance could be realized to a particularly comprehensive degree in the practice of the court theatre. The heightened ritualization of court life served to blur the boundary between stage and auditorium, especially as the candles that illuminated the latter were not extinguished during the performance (see Johnson 1995: 11–13; Bergman 1977: 125), and also because the prevalence of amateur productions in the aristocratic milieu made it possible, within certain limits, for audience and actors to switch roles. The configuration and enrichment of the audience's emotional repertoire proceeded in parallel with the acquisition of fundamental social skills, all of this taking place under the steadfast eye of the monarch. Performances in the court theatre could only be used to 'mould the souls' of a limited audience, of course, but, in the cultural world of what was an absolutist state, the court was afforded the role of exemplar, and its practices and cultural norms were therefore destined for universal propagation.

If the theatre emerged as a kind of 'other-being' (*inobytie*) and symbolic projection of the court, then court life itself also reflected the poetics of theatrical performance. (Geertz 1980; Wortman 1995 et al.). During the monarchies of the early modern era, and particularly during the reign of Louis XIV—a monarch exemplar for many European and Russian sovereigns—the court theatre became, in and of itself, an important element of state ritual (Apostolidès 1981; Burke 1982: 6–9, 44–46 et al.).

The historical section of William Reddy's now-classic work, *The Navigation of Feelings*, begins with a detailed analysis of the 'emotional regime' established by the Jacobin dictatorship. According to Reddy, the cult of sincerity and sensibility, which became official during the Terror, arose in numerous 'emotional safe havens' that attracted those whose 'emotional objectives' were at odds with the rules and norms of court life.

In order to demonstrate this contrast, Reddy analyses a solitary episode from the history of the court of Louis XIV. This episode, which took place during a supper marking the engagement of one of the king's illegitimate daughters, Mlle de Blois, to his nephew, the duc de Chartres, is recounted in the memoirs of the duc de Saint-Simon. Despite the resistance of the duc de Chartres's mother, the duchesse d'Orléans, the king essentially compelled the duc and his father to agree to this shameful marriage:

> The king appeared completely normal. M. de Chartres was next to his mother, who looked neither at him nor at her husband, Monsieur. Her eyes were full of tears, which fell from time to time, and which she wiped away, looking at everyone as if she wished to see what kind of facial expression each was making. Her son also had reddened eyes…I noticed that the king offered Madame almost all the dishes that were before him, which she refused with a brusque manner that, to the very end, failed to put off the king or temper his polite attention.
>
> (Quoted in Reddy 2001: 141)

The king, Reddy believes, did not expect the Duchesse to control her emotions: 'Submission of the will, displayed through a minimal compliance with etiquette, was quite sufficient'. Reddy discerns a 'similar lack of interest in inner complexities' in Molière's depiction of Don Juan's conquests of women and in the amorous intrigues portrayed by Madame de Lafayette in *La Princesse de Clèves*, the most celebrated novel of the era (Reddy 2001: 141–142).

The thesis that Racine-era court society was indifferent to internal experiences seems rather debatable in itself; more importantly, however, it is not supported by the example cited by Reddy. Saint-Simon specifically draws attention to the voracious interest aroused in all those present by the emotional drama unfolding before their eyes; and the duchess herself, as the memoirist notes, 'look[ed] at everyone as if she wished to see what kind of facial expression each was making'. The following day, in the presence of all the courtiers, she gave her son, who had not, in her opinion, conducted himself with sufficient firmness, 'a box on the ear, so sonorous that it was heard several steps distant' (Saint-Simon 1889: 16). Moreover, Saint-Simon, who incessantly uses words such as 'comedy', 'stage', and 'backstage' when describing court life (Burke 1982: 7–8), and who compares the king's legitimizations of his illegitimate children to *apothéoses d'opéra* (Couvreur 1992: 379), specifically identifies a symbolic model within which the

duchesse's behaviour and experiences were perceived by others: 'She took long strides, her handkerchief in her hand, weeping without constraint, speaking pretty loudly, gesticulating; and looking like Ceres after the rape of her daughter Proserpine, seeking her in fury, and demanding her back from Jupiter' (Saint Simon 1889: 15).

The memoirist alludes here not only to an ancient myth but also to Jean-Baptiste Lully's *Proserpine*. An opera well known among the 'emotional community' to which Saint-Simon belonged, *Proserpine* was based on an eponymous tragedy by Philippe Quinault and was first staged at the court theatre in 1680—fourteen years prior to the ill-fated marriage. More specifically, Saint-Simon's allusion is to the aria sung by Ceres in the seventh scene of Act III, which sees the enraged goddess setting fields and villages ablaze (Quinault 1999: 37–39). A contemporary biographer of Lully, Manuel Couvreur, regards it as 'one of the most moving' arias written by the composer and remarks that 'the union of Jupiter's bastard daughter and her uncle Pluto [...] presages in remarkable fashion the 1692 marriage between mademoiselle de Blois and the duc de Chartres, son of the duc d'Orléans and nephew of Louis XIV'. '[I]n 1680,' he asks, 'was the king already thinking of marrying his bastard children into his own family?' (Couvreur 1992: 372, 378).

Contrary to Reddy's assertion, Louis XIV was not indifferent to his sister-in-law's wrath; rather, he was exercising 'control over the passions'—self-control being, as Norbert Elias has demonstrated, one of the primary objectives of the complex etiquette of the court (Elias 2001: I. 5; see also Elias 2002). The king, writes Saint-Simon, 'was not ignorant' of how 'scandalized all the world' had been by the marriages of his other illegitimate daughters to princes of the blood, 'and he could thus judge of the effect of a marriage even more startling' (Saint-Simon 1889: 15). Emphasized cordiality was an ideal means for the monarch to express the jubilation that had seized him, and to humiliate the grumbling nobility yet again. Instead of the etiquettical indifference written about by Reddy, the situation that presents itself to us is one of irreconcilable, demonstratively-clashing passions.

The king and the duchesse d'Orléans 'performed' their experiences, rendered them comprehensible to others, but these performances did not render the experiences themselves any less powerful or profound. According to the psychologist Ted Sarbin, a proponent of role theory, 'the passions are patterned actions in the service of resolving value-laden problems. Anger, grief, shame, exultation, and jealousy are rhetorical acts intended to convince others or self of one's moral claims' (Sarbin 1989: 192). Though hardly universal, this definition is perfectly applicable to the 'emotional regime' of court life—in order for an experience to take place, it must be 'presented' and adequately interpreted by others. It is precisely in this vein that Saint-Simon interpreted the scene of rage and despair to which he was witness.

We do not know to what extent the image of feeling constructed by Lully and Quinault on the basis of Roman mythology determined the experiences of the duchesse d'Orléans—the sole surviving vestige of these experiences is the testimony provided by a memoirist whose level of involvedness in the situation could not have been unlimited. If nothing else, it is evident that the emotional matrix within whose framework Saint-Simon interpreted the affair could not have been the only one that existed for the duchess: in her situation, demanding anything of Jupiter, the sole source of her misfortunes, would have been futile. That she publicly gave the duc de Chartres a box on the ear suggests that she did not conceptualize him as a kidnapped Proserpine and had invoked other symbolic paradigms of aristocratic honour as well.

Like Louis XIV, Catherine regarded the theatre as an institution of particular importance. Far from limiting herself to traditional forms of patronage—generous financial backing, appointment of senior dignitaries as heads of the theatre directorate, regular attendance of performances—she also played a direct role in the running of the theatre, penning didactic comedies and comic operas in whose production she would invariably involve herself, shaping the make-up of the repertoire, influencing the casting of roles, regulating the complex system of public access to various performances, and keeping an assiduous eye on the propriety of the audience (see Evstratov 2016).

Of the public institutions that served, in the France of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as 'emotional safe havens' for those discontented with the 'emotional regime' of the court, William Reddy singles out Masonic lodges for particular attention (Reddy 2001: 151–154). The Moscow Rosicrucians, as the staunchest, most radical participants of the Masonic movement (see Faggionatto 2005; Kondakov 2012), proposed a programme—essentially an alternative to that of the court—for the comprehensive reconstruction of the inner world of educated Russians. They regarded their order less as a 'haven of refuge' from a degenerate court milieu and more as a prototype for an ideal future world and harmonious interpersonal relations. Among the leaders of the Rosicrucian order were Ivan Turgenev, the father of this book's protagonist, and his close friend Ivan Lopukhin, who served as an icon of sorts for the young Andrei.

The Rosicrucian utopia—and indeed that of the Masons in general—was by no means devoid of theatricality: the famous lodge initiation ritual was, at the very least, equal in sophistication to court ceremonies, as were the various other protocols governing Masonic gatherings (Smith 1999: 30–37), especially if we take into account the initial disparities in financial and administrative resources. Much like court ceremonies, the complex and elaborate rituals of the Masons served the purpose of formalizing the existing lodge hierarchy and the status of each individual lodge member (Smith 1999: 112–135). But the actual spectrum of initiatedness was organized in Masonic lodges according to principles wholly divergent from those adopted at court.

The symbolic centres of these worlds were constructed in completely different ways. All those within Catherine's court, no matter how close or how far removed from the Empress, understood full well that this universe revolved around her sublime person, and in accordance with her will. Court ceremonies—not least among them ritualized theatrical performances—brought these hierarchical models into visible form. The highest authorities of the Rosicrucian order, meanwhile, were safely concealed from the eyes of the uninitiated—even lodge members could only hypothesize that their leaders were to be found somewhere in Germany, but knew neither their faces nor their names (Kondakov 2012: 194–195). The responsibility for showcasing ideal behavioural and emotional paradigms to rank-and-file Masons therefore fell to direct mentors, and to the community as a whole; the paradigms themselves were predominantly derived from the works of Western European mystics, particularly Jakob Böhme and his followers. The regular Rosicrucian gatherings of the era devoted the bulk of their time to reading and discussing fragments from these works (Vernadsky 1999: 182–183). The ritual of court life presupposed that any significant emotion would be theatricalized in accordance with the accepted canons; within Rosicrucian circles, by contrast, key emotional experiences were supposed to unfold in the innermost depths of the soul. Of course, the creation of the 'inner-oriented individual' was not at all the private province of the order's individual members: on the contrary, it was brought up for discussion at lodge meetings, and featured as a topic in the systematic correspondence and diaries that the Rosicrucians were expected to maintain. In a discussion of the practices of moral self-fashioning adopted in the early Christian communities, Michel Foucault remarks that

> the fact of obliging oneself to write plays the role of a companion by giving rise to the fear of disapproval and to shame. [...] [W]hat others are to the ascetic in a community, the notebook is to the recluse. [...] [T]he constraint that the presence of others exerts in the domain of conduct, writing will exert in the domain of the inner impulses of the soul. (Foucault 1997: 207–208)

The diary thereby became a kind of internalization of religious/moral precepts and taboos; and an internalization, too, of the generalized position of the reference group within which its members assimilated said precepts. A yet more effective mechanism for representing individuals to themselves and to others is, in Foucault's eyes, that provided by correspondence, which also serves as an instrument of self-discipline, since letter-writers invariably relive their letters' contents (Foucault 1983: 9–10).

Unlike the early Christians, the Rosicrucians were not hermits. Quite the contrary, in fact: many of them were high-ranking state personnel, and were compelled to exist simultaneously in different emotional communities predicated on divergent—and frequently antithetical—symbolic models of feeling.

The court theatre and Masonic lodges could mould the 'souls' of only a limited audience, not least because *exclusivity* was the very bedrock of these institutions. The empress did, of course, intend for the court to become a universal role model, while the Rosicrucians, for their part, believed that their teachings would result in the transformation of humanity. Nevertheless, such a mechanism for the propagation of emotional matrices required intermediary links.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the production of 'public images of feeling' increasingly came to be the province of literature, which provided paradigms of emotional coding to a broad circle of educated readers. The printed text, needless to say, is inferior to the theatrical *mise-en-scène* in terms of its capacity to render symbolic models of feeling visible; furthermore, it does not permit these models to be collectively assimilated *hic et nunc* (or, if it does, then only to a very limited degree), while simultaneously fine-tuning socially sanctioned forms of reaction to them.

On the other hand, books enable their readers to revisit already-undergone experiences, to review and refine their emotions by continuously gauging them against a relevant paradigm. The era's most popular works served as 'tuning forks' for readers' hearts; readers used them to verify to what extent they were feeling in unison with one another. According to Harry Levine, genuine self-identification with a work's protagonist is possible only when reading: between spectators and characters, by contrast, stand *actors* (Levine 1970: 46). Collectively reading and experiencing the same works facilitated the propagation of unified patterns of feeling across national barriers and state borders.

Any significant component of the mental life of educated individuals was explored by one of a number of writer-exemplars who set the mode of emotional response and ensuing behaviour. The European public learned the ways of love from *The New Heloise* and *The Sorrows of Young Werther*; they were taught to exult in nature by Thomson and Rousseau, to frequent cemeteries by Young and Gray, to withdraw from the world by Zimmerman. Furthermore, classical texts themselves often contained *modi legendi*: their protagonists are forever taking on the role of active readers, integrating into proposed symbolic models instructions for their assimilation (Darnton1984: 224–236). We need only recall that the critical juncture in Werther's story occurs after he and Lotte read Ossian's songs together, and that a copy of Lessing's tragedy *Emilia Galotti* lies open on his desk at the moment of his suicide.

The educated stratum of Russian society, then being drawn into a pan-European problematics—painfully so, and not always of its own volition—pivoted towards literature as well. In Russia, this manner of apprehending celebrated works acquired a particular intensity, since the conception of literature as an 'emotion manual' was reinforced by efforts to appropriate the Western type of culture. Russian authors made no attempt to camouflage the imitative nature of

their literary strategies. Far from it: they strived to make all their borrowings explicit and declarative. The authority of the famous foreign writers legitimized their own aspirations to serve as instructors of sensibility. Accordingly, they sought to present themselves as the most competent readers and explicators of the authors they strived to imitate (Kochetkova 1994: 156–189). We can observe here a specific chain of interpretations and imitations. Western authors would advance a paradigm of 'emotional coding' appropriate for a particular archetypal situation. Russian authors, in their turn, would do the same—while also bolstering their works with allusions to paradigmatic foreign texts in which analogous examples could be found. This enabled Russian readers not only to learn how to navigate given everyday circumstances, but also to master the correct *modus legendi*.

Such a transition, though many years in the making, definitively crystallized in Russian culture in Nikolai Karamzin's *Letters of a Russian Traveller*. The *Letters*, which Karamzin began publishing in instalments in 1791, came to serve as an unprecedented source of new emotional matrices for readers in the capitals and provinces alike, introducing them for the first time into the community of sensitive Europeans.

The Masons, too, regarded the book as their primary didactic instrument; that said, lodge meeting rituals represented an important affective resource for them. Karamzin, naturally enough, comprehensively rejected any kind of external rituality, though he did demonstrate normative practices of reading and contemplating what had been read. Yet more significant was the fact that he shifted the emphasis to literary works, these offering an incomparably richer repertoire of emotional matrices than both religio-moralistic texts and contemporary theatre, which operated largely within the restraints imposed by the canons of genre.

The sharp increase in the range of real-life situations now masterable thanks to an expanded spectrum of available paradigms met the fundamental needs of an audience whose life practices were becoming more complex, more diverse and more Europeanized. Having provided the reader with the opportunity to assimilate the astonishingly rich emotional repertoire of contemporary Europe, Karamzin managed to adapt his paradigms to Russian conditions.

Unlike Karamzin, Mikhail Muravyov was not only a writer but also a relatively high-ranking state official. He also belonged to a Masonic lodge, although not a Rosicrucian-aligned one. Muravyov embarked upon adapting the emotional matrices of European sentimental literature earlier than did Karamzin; in some ways, however, he came to be a disciple of his younger literary confrere, responding deeply to the impetus that the latter provided. His *Moscow Journal* (1797) is, on one hand, a literary work intended for an extremely narrow audience, and one familiar to the author; on the other hand, it is an intimate confession intended for a wider readership.

The Intimate Journal and Individual Experiences

In order to remain faithful to principles that have been impressed upon them, people must internalize said principles, make them integral to their being, and thenceforth evaluate their experiences and actions against them. Peter Burke, though generally rather critical of the idea that the self-reflective individual subject emerges only in early modern European culture, nonetheless remarks upon the rapid proliferation of increasingly individualized ego-documents that took place during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Burke 1997: 22–27). A significant driver of this proliferation was the diaristic impulse.

David Riesman regards the practice of diary-keeping as symptomatic of 'internally-oriented' individuals—people who feel forever compelled to work on their personalities, for which purpose they conduct what he calls 'time-and-motion studies' (Riesman 1991: 44). This kind of social practice was facilitated by factors including the privatization of time: mechanical clocks were becoming increasingly common in middle-class homes, allowing people to measure out the hours of own lives in an independent fashion (see Sherman 1996; Lejeune 2009: 58–60; Paperno 2004).

The earliest variation of the genre, which gained large-scale prevalence primarily in Protestant countries (see Webster 1996; Lejeune 2009: 68–74), was the confessional diary, wherein an internal observer (what Riesman dubs 'the scrutinizing self') embodies the point of view of a religious group. It was only in the second half of the seventeenth century that intimate diaries, intended primarily for re-reading by their own authors, began to achieve a degree of popularity (Didier 1976).

Our ability to think, speak and write about ourselves is clearly predicated on our dual existence as subjects and objects. William James, and after him George Herbert Mead, identified these poles of the self using the nominative and accusative forms of the singular first-person pronoun. The conscious and feeling 'I' is counterposed by 'Me'—an individual's self-image. 'The "I" of this moment,' writes Mead, "is present in the 'me' of the next moment. There again I cannot turn around quick enough to catch myself. I become a 'me' in so far as I remember what I said (Mead 1962: 174).

The distance between 'I' and 'Me', made explicit by the act of writing, can be constructed in different ways, depending on the genre of the ego-document. What comes to the fore in autobiography is the temporal gap between author and primary protagonist—one that is gradually overcome in the course of the narration. When the gap closes up, 'I' merges with 'Me', and the narrative is exhausted. 'An autobiography', as Philippe Lejeune notes,

> is virtually finished as soon as it begins, since the story that you begin must end at the moment that you are writing it. You know the end point of the story,

> because you have reached it, and everything you write will lead up to this point, explaining how you got there. An autobiography is turned toward the past […]. Even if the ending changes place during the writing process, I continue to coincide with it. I am always at the endpoint of my story. (Lejeune 2009: 191)

A private letter, on the other hand, is intimately bound up with the moment of its creation. A crucial self-distancing occurs here because letter-writers regard themselves through the eyes of their addressees, so to speak, and anticipate their reactions. The same, of course, applies to diaries specifically written to be read collectively, or at least allowing for that possibility. Intimate diaries, by contrast, serve as media of communication between authors and their future selves.

The diaristic genre, notes Philippe Lejeune, is fundamentally future-oriented:

> The diary is virtually unfinishable from the beginning, because there is always a time lived beyond the writing, making it necessary to write anyway, and one day, this time beyond will take the shape of death. A diary is turned towards the future. […] [I]t is […] the end that changes in the course of writing it. When I meet up with the future, it slips away from me by showing up once again in the beyond. To "finish" a diary means to cut it off from the future and integrate that future in the reconstruction of the past. (Lejeune 2009: 191)

If you are to send your future self such a missive, you must have a preliminary hypothesis about what kind of person you are destined to become or would wish to become. Even jottings that confine themselves to a straightforward recording of ongoing events are predicated on the non-obvious psychological assumption that the writer will find it interesting to recall these events in the future. Intimate diaries, focused as they are on self-analysis and self-improvement, project into the future whatever image their authors wish to associate themselves with, and on whose basis they analyse, evaluate, and judge their own actions and experiences.

In the 1940s, Lydia Ginzburg articulated a distinction potentially crucial to any analysis of the genre: that between self-value (*avtotsennost′*), which emerges out of 'shared values experienced with all the intensity of one's personal will-drive [*voleustremlenie*]', and self-conception (*avtokontseptsiia*), which represents the upshot of the adaptation of self-value to real-life circumstances (Ginzburg 2011: 74–75, 133, et al.). Since self-conception almost always fails to coincide with self-value, it often encompasses self-justification or self-recrimination (for a discussion of how Ginzburg's categories correlate with Alfred Adler's notion of *Persönlichkeitsideal* and Carl Rogers' notion of *self-concept*, see Zorin 2012).

In the confessional diary, the fixity of self-value is guaranteed by the authority of the community, although events and life impressions can sometimes force people to alter their self-conceptions. In the intimate diary, by contrast, accumulating experiences may prompt re-evaluations of self-value as well, with each