

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Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties

Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

DEMOCRACY AND THE CARTELIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

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RICHARD S. KATZ AND PETER MAIR[†]

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Preface

This book represents the culmination of a project that began at an ECPR Research Sessions meeting at the University of Mannheim in 1987. For a long time, it threatened to be one of those "much anticipated forthcoming books" that somehow never come forth. The project began simply as a data-collection effort. It appeared obvious to us that there were important changes happening in the organization of political parties that could have profound consequences for the way in which democracies work, and that these changes needed to be understood. But it also appeared obvious that before these changes could be explained—and at the beginning we had no favored "candidate" to be the explanation—they simply needed to be recorded in a systematically comparable way. With the financial support of the American National Science Foundation (grant SES-8818439) and the *Forschungsstelle für Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen* (FGE) of the University of Mannheim, and with the collaboration of a talented team of scholars, that is what we set out to do, and in 1992 we published *Party Organizations: A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960–90*, close to 1,000 pages, almost all of which were tables, documenting what had happened during those thirty years.

The scope of the project, both geographically and temporally, was largely determined by practicality. We want to be comprehensive, but limited funds meant that we could not include every democracy. Moreover, in an era before elaborate party websites and high-speed internet connections made remote access of extensive party archives possible, we believed that this research would require "boots on the ground" in each country included: someone personally to go to party headquarters and hector party officials until they delivered the data we wanted. Thus we only included countries for which we knew, or could readily identify, a local collaborator. The starting date of 1960 was chosen partially in the interest of manageability and partially on the, now recognized to be dubious, assumption that it would represent a reasonably stable "old normality" from which change could be assessed. The United States was included in part to make the project more appealing to the National Science Foundation (NSF) and in part because it represented a "different systems" comparator; inclusion of the protoparty system of the European Union (EU) reflected the strong bias in Europe at the time to include the EU in any project.

Once the data were in hand and we started our analysis, the question of scope became more complex. Clearly, we did not intend our conclusions to be relevant only to the twelve countries (plus the EU party federations) included in the data-collection effort, but equally we recognized that, as with any hypotheses that draw on history, or social structure, or institutional arrangements, our conjectures were going to be more appropriate to some times and places than to others. Even granted that observation, we were never entirely agreed regarding the appropriate scope for our work. Mair tended to have a more Euro-centric focus, in particular treating such Europe-specific events as the Maastricht Treaty as establishing differences between the members of the EU and those outside of it (and similarly to see the advent of the euro as establishing differences between countries within the eurozone and those outside it) that might be seen to limit the scope of our theorizing. Katz, on the other hand, tended to interpret these events as Euro-specific extreme examples of more general trends, such that while our conclusions might be especially relevant within the Eurozone, they were also applicable well beyond the borders of western Europe.

Indeed, both the idea of a set of cozy arrangements through which ostensibly competing parties work together to protect their shared interests, and the idea that this collusive behavior might be successfully challenged by those excluded, had roots in the experience of what Katz and Kolodny (1994) described as a "six-party" national party system of the United States, with presidential, Senate, and House Democrats, and similarly Republicans, in many ways organized and acting as three separate, if generally allied, parties. We saw American politics through the 1970s and 1980s as being characterized by what we would later call a "cartel" consisting of presidential Democrats and Republicans, Senate Democrats and Republicans, and House Democrats—but excluding the House Republicans, who had been in the minority since January 1955, and appeared to be condemned to permanent minority status. On the one hand, this meant that the other five parties had little need to accommodate their concerns, and on the other hand it meant that the House Republicans had little incentive to join with the others in acting "responsibly."[1] In the end, this led to Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America," which challenged the general elite consensus regarding the characteristics of "responsible" policy, put the Republicans in the majority in the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years, and by showing that a frontal attack on "the establishment" and its sense of what was acceptable could be electorally successful at the national level effectively broke the cartel.

Notwithstanding the significance of this American example, however, our thinking was largely rooted in the experience of the established parliamentary democracies of western Europe. Our early analysis of what we called

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[1] This was mitigated by the weak cohesion of American parties, which meant that even if there was little incentive for accommodation of the House Republicans as a party, the votes of individual Republican members of the House (and Senate) frequently were required by the majority party if it wanted to pass significant legislation.

"the three faces of party organization" (the party central office, the party in public office, and the party on the ground—Katz and Mair 1993), although in some important ways paralleling V. O. Key's (1964: 163–5) conception of American parties as comprised of "the party organization," "the party in government," and "the party in the electorate," assumed a more formal structure, and particularly a more formal sense of party membership and a more formal boundary between the party itself and a penumbra of loyalists and supporters (both individuals and organizations) than found in the United States. Nonetheless, even if our schema fits parties with formal membership structures more directly than it fits those without, the underlying insight, that all political parties—including those with only one member like Geert Wilders' *Partij voor de Vrijheid* or parties essentially paid for and run by a *patron* like Silvio Berlusconi's *Forza Italia*—should be understood as political systems in their own right remains. Moreover, we would suggest that the general principles that we suggested shape competition and cooperation among the three faces of membership-based party organizations should be expected to apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to other types of party organizations as well.

Similarly, our historical/adaptive account of the evolution of party organizations from elite to mass to catch-all to cartel initially appeared relevant only to the countries of western Europe in which parliamentary institutions, and thus rudimentary elite parties within parliament, developed before wide-scale suffrage expansion, perhaps with the addition of the democracies of the "old" British Commonwealth—and by an even greater stretch the addition of the United States, which might be argued to have been an early example of the catch-all model, but which never had approximated the mass party type. As the idea of a party cartel as a way of accounting for contemporary political events gained traction, however, it appeared to resonate with the experience of countries outside of its locus of origin notwithstanding that they had not experienced the same evolutionary processes. Moreover, although our original account of how a cartel party system evolved was rooted in the unique historical experiences of western Europe, our account of the social, economic, and political conditions that might lead to the establishment and maintenance of such a system was not. Simply, it might be possible for a country to "skip" some or all of the stages of the process and still arrive at the same result.

As with all theories dealing with complex social phenomena, it is impossible to identify a crisp set of cases to which our hypotheses should be expected to apply perfectly, and to contrast that to a crisp set of cases to which they should not apply at all. Rather than trying to construct a dataset including all of the variables, events, and processes in which we are interested for a well-defined but comprehensive set of countries—a task that would in any case be impossible—we have used, in addition to our own data, a variety of datasets originally constructed by others to address other questions and then either made publicly available in data archives or provided to us through the courtesy of the original investigators. The selection of cases was decided by their research priorities, with the result that our analyses are based on overlapping but not entirely static sets of cases. In many cases, we have drawn on the work of other researchers to provide examples without trying to replicate every observation in the full range of cases; we can only leave it to the reader to decide at what point a series of anecdotes cumulates to the status of data.

Any project that goes on for three decades accumulates an enormous backlog of debts of gratitude to an enormous number of people and institutions. Both constraints of space, and fear of inadvertently leaving someone out, preclude attempting to name them all. Certainly, we are indebted to the European Consortium for Political Research and its then chairman, Professor Rudolf Wildenmann, for helping to launch the "party organization project," and to the NSF, the FGE, and the numerous other funding bodies that helped to pay for it. None of this would have been possible without our collaborators in that project. Ideas were tried out on generations of our students—some of whom went on to do the research on which we have drawn in this book. Numerous colleagues, friends, and conference participants have read and commented on papers that later were incorporated into this work. Reviewers from Oxford University Press made invaluable suggestions for improvement to the completed draft. We have profited from their insights and are grateful for their contributions, but also absolve them of any blame for what we have made of their suggestions.

Finally, although this manuscript is being completed more than six years after Peter Mair's sudden and untimely death, it is indeed a co-authored work. At the time of his passing, we had developed a full outline for the book, and Peter had early drafts of three of the chapters for which we had agreed that he would take the lead. While I have edited those drafts extensively—so that, as I hope was the case with our earlier publications, it would not be evident which of us had originally drafted what—his insights are reflected not only in the chapters for which he wrote the first drafts, but in the chapters that I wrote as well. This is his book as well as mine, although I am sure it is not as good as it would have been had we been able to see it through to completion together.

One of the things I tell my students is that every book, no matter how carefully researched and edited and read and proofread, inevitably will contain mistakes. Notwithstanding what we say in the book about the desire to politicians (like everyone else) to take credit and avoid blame, I accept that the mistakes are mine.

Richard S. Katz

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1

The Problem

There is little dispute with the idea that "democracy is a messy concept." Nonetheless, most political scientists, most democratic politicians, and most of the growing "democracy-promoting industry," share a common, and relatively simple, understanding of democracy. At least in the modern age, they agree with Joseph Schumpeter's definition of democracy as a system "in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1962: 269). Moreover, in a large society meaningful competition for the people's vote requires both that the options among which the people are asked to choose be sufficiently limited in number, and that they be sufficiently coherent, that what might be called the "Ostrogorski problem"[1] can be mitigated. And providing those coherent options is identified as either a principal function, or else as the defining characteristic, of political parties. Parties also are understood to provide the coordination within representative assemblies, and across different branches or agencies of government, that is required for the efficient conduct of business. As a result, effective democracy is not just competition among individuals, but competition among individuals organized into political parties. Both as definition, and as the conclusion of an assumed causal process, democracy is what results when people are free to form political parties, those parties compete in periodic free and fair elections, and the winners of those elections take effective control of the government until the next elections.

If there is little doubt that "democracy is a messy concept," there is also a growing consensus that "democracies are in a mess," particularly with regard to political parties. As we will show later in this book, parties have become one of the *least* trusted political institutions; politicians are almost everywhere the *least* trusted professionals; with a few upward blips, turnout in elections is declining markedly, as is membership in political parties and identification with them. If political parties are divided into two groups—the mainstream parties that dominated post-war governments at least into the 1990s, on the one hand, and populist or anti-party-system parties, on the other hand—electoral support for the first group has declined (in many cases, plummeted might be a more accurate description), while support for the latter has grown.

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[1] "[A]fter 'the voice of the country had spoken,' people did not know exactly what it had said" (Ostrogorski 1903: vol. II, 618–19).

Not only have the post-1989 predictions of a universal triumph of liberal democracy proven to be overoptimistic with regard to the former Soviet bloc and the so-called Third World, even in its heartland of the first world the future of liberal democracy appears less secure than only a few decades ago. The natural question is how did this happen. E. E. Schattschneider's often quoted observation "that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties" and its less often quoted continuation that "the condition of the parties is the best possible evidence of the nature of any regime . . . The parties are not therefore merely appendages of modern government; they are in the center of it, and play a determinative and creative role in it" (1942: 1), is representative of the centrality accorded to parties in modern empirical analyses of democracy. Following Schattschneider's lead, we look to the parties to provide some of the answers to the question of how this, admittedly only the latest, "crisis of democracy" came about. In particular, we argue that the mainstream parties have formed, or at least have behaved in ways that could lead an outside observer to believe that they have formed, what is in effect a cartel. This cartel-like behavior has been driven by rational adaptation to social and political changes, but it has also rendered the mainstream parties unable or unwilling (often in the name of behaving "responsibly") to address many problems that confront their societies. This, in turn, has opened a space for challenges not just to the parties in power at any moment, but to the whole idea of liberal party democracy. While this is the particular theme of Chapter 7, the entire volume is directed at laying the groundwork for that analysis.

In arguing for the centrality of political parties to any understanding of democracy, Schattschneider (1942: 16) also complained that "the political parties are still the orphans of political philosophy." As van Biezen and Saward (2008) say, that complaint remains largely true seventy-five years after it was originally published. At a more mundane level, however, the perceived centrality of parties has led to widely accepted, and in some cases quite specific and detailed, prescriptions regarding how both parties and government more generally should be organized. These prescriptions frequently have been justified by a particular, albeit at the same time somewhat vague, idea of democracy as "democratic party government"(Castles and Wildenmann 1986; Katz 1987; Rose 1974). This, in turn, is often elaborated in the increasingly popular terms of a "principal-agent" model of party politics (Müller 2000; Strøm et al. 2003).

This principal-agent model and its associated prescriptions for the organization and behavior of individual parties, and for the relationships among the several parties, and among parties, citizens, and the state has exercised strong influence over the way both social scientists and "political engineers" think about establishing and maintaining healthy democracies. Our contention in this book, however, is that this model in fact has only quite marginal connection to the ways in which parties and party systems really work in the early twenty-first century. Moreover, we contend that the disconnect between the normative justifications of, and prescription for, party democracy, on the one hand, and the contemporary realities, on the other hand, is an important contributor to the current malaise. Many of the empirical claims about parties and party systems that we will be making—for example, that party membership has been declining nearly everywhere—have been recognized for some time. They have, however, generally been recognized only one at a time, and interpreted as independent "problems" that can be addressed individually, and rectified within the established principal-agent framework for understanding party government. In contrast, we propose a comprehensive framework that explains how these individual findings hang together, how they came about, and how, in particular, they undermine both the empirical validity and the theoretical utility of the standard principal-agent model of democracy—and how, in doing so, they pose an important challenge to the survival of party government—and potentially to the survival of democratic government as understood through the latter half of the twentieth century and beyond more generally.

THE SIMPLE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL OF PARTY GOVERNMENT

In its simplest form, the principal-agent model of democracy in a parliamentary system can be portrayed as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Starting on the right-hand side of the figure, the apparatus of the state (particularly the bureaucracy) works as the agent of the ministry, exercising authority delegated to it by the



FIGURE 1.1 Simple principal-agent model of democracy

Source: Katz (2014)

ministry in the pursuit of objectives set by the ministry. The ministry, which is thus the immediate principal of the state apparatus, is simultaneously the agent of the parliament, which is to say of the parliamentary majority as organized in a coalition of parties. Finally, the parties in parliament act as the agents of the electorate. The result is an unbroken chain of principal-agent links from the electorate to all of the government (parliament, ministry, state apparatus), ultimately making all of the government the agent of the electorate, and thereby rendering the whole arrangement democratic.

This highly schematic rendering of democratic party government glosses over many significant variations. Particularly from a European perspective, attention primarily focused on variants of what Beer, drawing on the British case, labeled "Socialist Democracy," rooted in both the social and the political theory of the mass party of integration (Beer 1969: ch. 3; Duverger 1959 [1951]: bk 1). The democratic theory associated with this can be expressed as the principal-agent model illustrated in Figure 1.2, in which the single "parties" box from Figure 1.1 is disaggregated into three separate parties, to allow the idea of elections as competition among alternatives, and at the next stage to allow the distinction between electoral winners and losers, to be made explicit. In this version of democratic party government, each party is the "political committee" of a particular segment of society (for example, of a social class or confessional group) and acts as its agent, with the social segments collectively encompassing the entire body of citizens. A coalition of the parties in parliament then negotiates the formation of a ministry as their agent; assuming that it is a majority coalition, and further assuming that its majority in parliament reflects the support of a majority in the electorate, it is therefore also the agent of the electoral majority—and if one accepts the principle that the majority is entitled to decide/act for the whole, it becomes the agent of the whole electorate. Finally, the ministry employs the state



FIGURE 1.2 Mass party principal-agent model with three social segments/parties and coalition government

Source: Katz (2014)

apparatus as its agent. The direct principal-agent chain from voters to parties to ministry to administration summarized in Figure 1.1 is thus maintained, with the administration still the ultimate agent of the voters.

Particularly in the later decades of the last century, an alternative version of this model, derived from economic theory and identified eponymously with Anthony Downs (Downs 1957), rather than being derived from sociology as interpreted, for example, by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), came to prominence. In this model, parties are teams of politicians (Downs 1957: 25; Schumpeter 1962 [1942]: 283; Schlesinger 1994: 6), rather than associations of citizens, and compete to be "hired" as the agents of the whole society, rather than operating as the already established agents of particular social segments. The principal-agent understanding of democracy, at least in stylized form, however, appears to be virtually the same—especially if the primary competitors are assumed to be either two parties or two distinct and stable coalitions. Even in a multiparty case, the graphic representation in Figure 1.3 appears essentially the same as that illustrated in Figure 1.2. The voters as principals choose a party to act as their agent, although in this case it is not majority support for a particular party or coalition, but rather that the governing coalition includes the party that represents the first preference of the median voter, that underpins legitimacy, whether or not the cabinet represents a majority coalition. The party (or coalition of parties) in parliament installs a ministry to act as its agent. The ministry employs the state apparatus as its agent. Yet again, government is the ultimate agent of the voters, and the system is, therefore, democratic.

This model (at this level of generality, it is reasonable—and common—to regard the models in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 simply as variants of the simple model in Figure 1.1) is very comforting for those who would like to reconcile the realities of modern politics with a normatively informed vision of democracy as "government of the people, by the people, for the people," although its



FIGURE 1.3 Downsian principal-agent model with three parties and coalition government

Source: Katz (2014)

appropriateness as an empirical model, as opposed to a normative ideal, has always been open to some question. Indeed, Blyth and Katz (2005) have gone so far as to suggest that the entire model might be reversed, with the cabinet acting as the agent of the administration (individual ministers arguing for their department's policies and budget) rather than its principal, the cabinet buying the support of MPs with the prospect of career advancement and promotion of pet policies, and the parties buying voters with policy promises and patronage.

Be that as it may, like all principal-agent relationships, those portrayed in this model are subject to "agency slack." One of the "core assumptions" of the canonical principal-agent is that the interests or preferences of the agent differ from those of the principal (Miller 2005: 205–6), and this creates incentives for shirking by the agent. Much of the literature on principal-agent relationships concerns ways in which such shirking can be contained, but at its base, it still retains the basic idea that initiative lies with the principal, so that outcomes ultimately can be traced to the interests or preferences of the principal. From this perspective, agency slack accounts for observed failures of agents to act optimally in the interests of their principals in much the way that friction accounts for the failure of falling objects to conform exactly to the predictions of the simple equations of first-year physics. As some exponents of "behavioral economics" (e.g., Cartwright 2011; Diamond and Vartiainen 2007) have argued in contrasting their approach to that of classical (or "rational choice") economics, it is possible for the divergences between model and reality to become so great that the model no longer provides even a useful baseline against which divergences can be assessed, and becomes instead an impediment to understanding.

For the principal-agent model to be appropriate for describing the relationship between citizens and parties requires that ultimate power rests with the citizens as principal. In Sappington's (1991: 47) words, "The principal is endowed with all of the bargaining power . . . and thus can make a 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer to the agent." As translated into the electoral sphere, this means at least that, on the one hand, the electorate must have a substantial choice among competing parties, and, on the other hand, that the cost of the potential sanction of electoral defeat to a party is sufficiently high as to "concentrate the mind wonderfully." The essence of our argument, first advanced some twenty years ago (Katz and Mair 1992a, 1995) but even more true today, is that these conditions are not well met in modern democracies: the choice offered to electors by the "mainstream parties" (i.e., those with a realistic chance of being in government in the medium term) has become progressively less substantial in the sense that changes of government are less directly tied to changes in policy or outcomes, and the cost to parties in the mainstream of losing an election (the difference in pay-offs between being a winner and being a loser) has been significantly reduced. Going beyond this simple observation, we make two additional claims. On the one hand, even if these changes can in some ways be traced back to long term social processes, many of these social processes are, in their turn, the result of government policies, and thus they are only partially exogenous to the parties. On the other hand, it is most immediately the intentional responses of the parties to these social processes, not the social changes themselves, that have undercut the basis for a principal-agent understanding of party government. In particular, our argument is that at the level of party systems, the mainstream parties, and most minor parties as well, have effectively formed a cartel, through which they protect their own interests in ways that sap the capacity of their erstwhile principal—the electorate—actually to control the parties that are supposed to be the agents of the electorate. While the appearance of competition is preserved, in terms of political substance it has become spectacle—a show for the audience of "audience democracy" (Manin 1997; de Beus 2011). Further, we argue, in order to facilitate this cartel-like behavior, political parties have adapted their own structures, giving rise to a new type of party organization, which we identify as the "cartel party."

This book is devoted to connecting these twin developments of waning substantive competition and political party transformation, along with the social, historical, and political processes that underpin them, to understanding their impact on both the practice of, and popular support (or not) for, democratic government, and to considering what these processes mean for the future of liberal democratic party government.

PARTY CHANGE

As is true of virtually all social processes, with the benefit of hindsight the roots of these developments can be found reaching back well before they were generally recognized to be significant—in our case, at least to the 1950s. Also, like most general social processes, they developed at different times and at different rates (and from different starting points) in different countries. Their acceleration and confluence at a level sufficient to pose a serious challenge to the practices and legitimacy of established institutions of party government are of fairly recent origin, however. We do not suggest that there was some golden age in which democratic party government functioned smoothly and with unquestioned legitimacy. Nonetheless, while the party government model was always an ideal type rather than a fully accurate description, an array of social changes have occurred, accompanied by changes in the parties themselves, that have moved reality so far away from the ideal type that even its heuristic utility must be questioned. The result is a far less sanguine view than the "triumph of democracy" literature (e.g., Mitchell 1997; Preston 1986) might lead one to expect.

At least into the 1980s, most theory and research concerning political parties, at least outside of the United States, was premised on the assumption that the norm, both empirically and evaluatively, was either the mass party of integration, or else the more modern catch-all party, still understood to be a variant of the mass party. This was what parties in democratic polities should be like, and how they should be organized and behave. To the extent that they did not meet these standards, they were, essentially by definition, somehow weak or failing. Philippe Schmitter's (2001) critical evaluation of the role of parties in the consolidation of the new democracies of the last quarter of the twentieth century provides a good example of the persistence of this mode of thinking. Even in the 1990s, however, it was apparent to some observers that the process of party organizational development and adaptation was more varied, more fluid, and more open-ended than that narrow conception allowed (Katz and Mair 1994).

In particular, the decline in partisan attachments (party identification, party membership, electoral turnout), declining social segmentation, increasing education and leisure time, all appeared to be undercutting the assumptions upon which the mass party model had been constructed. Simultaneously, the economic model upon which many government policies, especially those that defined the welfare state, had been built was also being called into question. Not surprisingly, accounts of party change (e.g., Katz and Mair 1992a) focused almost exclusively on domestic factors, whether social, political, economic, or institutional.

In retrospect, it is clear that the influence of factors drawn from the world of international politics might have been taken into account even then, and certainly need to be included now. In the early 1990s, economic globalization began to be recognized as a serious constraint on the capacity of all governments to manage their national economies. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Bloc, and then the Soviet Union itself, began to crumble. In February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed by the member states of the European Union (EU), with the national currencies of all of the then members of the EU except the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, Sweden, and Greece (which joined the rest in 2001) replaced by the euro on January 1, 1999, ending national control over monetary policy in the eurozone countries. In January 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established. The events between 1989 and 1999 obviously brought about major changes in international affairs, but they also had a profound impact on domestic politics in the advanced industrial democracies. Although Maastricht, the treaties that followed it, and the introduction of the euro are specific to the EU, the impact of the collapse of the Soviet empire and of economic globalization and the WTO has been felt far more widely.

These developments substantially undermined the stakes of traditional electoral competition, first by reducing the perceived importance of the left-right ideological divide that lay at the heart of most Western party systems, and that, whether implicitly or explicitly, fed off the Cold War divide; second by transferring control over a range of economic (and other) concerns beyond national borders to technocratic and largely non-partisan institutions like the EU system, the WTO, the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank—and to multinational corporations, some of which have budgets larger than the GDPs of many of the countries in which they operate; and third, even beyond the formal transfer of powers and responsibilities to institutions like the EU or the WTO, by facilitating an ideational shift (Blyth 2002) suggesting that what had traditionally been the central political concerns of inflation and unemployment now properly lay outside the control of national governments, and thus were no longer among the core responsibilities of the parties that formed those governments. We address all of these issues elsewhere in this volume, and particularly in Chapter 4.

These changes in the international arena interacted with the tendencies already noted in the domestic arena to give all significant political parties, no matter how bitter their rivalries had been in the past—and indeed no matter how intense their rivalries might appear to be in the present—a core set of common interests and common constraints, and thus also common incentives to cooperate, and to collude, to protect those interests. Cooperation and collusion, which are obviously important elements in our cartel thesis, become easier when the stakes of competition are reduced, and this was one of the results of the shedding of responsibility for managing the economy and of the end of the existential struggle between the "free" and "communist" worlds.[2]

THE CARTEL THESIS

We initially arrived at the idea that new patterns of relationships were emerging among parties, society, and the state, among the parties themselves, and within individual parties among their various "faces" (Katz and Mair 1993) inductively from a data-gathering project whose primary purpose was to document changes in party organizations from 1960, when the mass party was widely believed to be losing ground to the catch-all party as the dominant

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[2] While Huntington's (1966) struggle between Muslim and Western worlds may have an equivalent existential import, it does not represent a cleavage within the Western democracies with which we are concerned, because unlike the cleavage between socialism and capitalism, there have been no significant Islamist parties in the Western democracies.