A Commentary on Isocrates' Antidosis

YUN LEE TOO

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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For my parents and for George,
for their love and encouragement.

Methodological Preface

My primary interest in Isocrates' *Antidosis* is as a work of self-representation, and this commentary seeks to draw attention to the conventions and contexts which determine the portrait of the 'speaker' and of his community as offered by the oration. The current project is to reconsider what it might mean to produce a first person narrative for the public sphere, where this sphere is constituted by literary publication.

I use a commentary format to do this in order to recognize that Isocrates' speech is a complex amalgam of literary, rhetorical, philosophical, and legal discourses. Where my introduction will discuss larger thematic and ideological issues surrounding language in the speech and in its immediate intellectual and social contexts, the line by line commentary enables a more detailed archaeology of the iconographies presented to the reader by the rhetorician's work.

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Y.L.T.

New York
August 2007

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Abbreviations

AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
APF	*Athenian Propertied Families*
BICS	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
CA	*Classical Antiquity*
C&M	*Classica & Mediaevalia*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
GR	*Greece and Rome*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
PCPS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*
RhM	*Rheinisches Museum*
QJS	*Quarterly Journal of Speech*
TAPA	*Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*

Aeschines *Ag. Tim.* = 1; *embassy* = 2; *Ctes.* = 3.
Andocides *Mysteries* = 1; *Return* = 2; *Peace* = 3; *Alcibiades* = 4.
Isocrates *To Demonicus* = 1; *To Nicocles* = 2; *Nicocles* = 3; *Panegyricus* = 4; *To Philip* = 5; *Arcbidamas* = 6; *Areopagiticus* = 7; *On the Peace* = 8; *Evagoras* = 9; *Helen* = 10; *Busiris* = 11; *Panathenaicus* = 12; *Against the Sophists* = 13; *Plateicus* = 14; *Antidosis* = 15.

Introduction

MISE-EN-SCÈNE

In post-Periclean Athens a litigious individual (a 'sycophant') named Lysimachus charges with tax evasion a wealthy individual who, as a rule, avoids public life. The defendant has purportedly earned vast amounts of wealth from teaching rhetoric to foreign and Athenian youths, and he is obliged to defend himself against the allegation that he has corrupted the youth he has taught. He has now come before the citizens of Athens to make the speech of his life—for that is literally what is required, a speech to absolve himself of a capital charge (cf. *Antidosis* 21 and 28). He makes a speech which presents his character, activities, and whole life as more than a sufficient liturgy or public benefice taking the form of a tax payment in themselves.

The defendant is the 82-year-old (cf. *Antidosis* 9) rhetorician Isocrates. The legal text in question is the *Antidosis* (353 BCE), one of the author's later speeches and his longest work. An extraordinary piece of courtroom rhetoric as far as the author's corpus and as far as the surviving body of Attic legal oratory are concerned, the text is a carefully constructed fiction which owes its origins to an actual, historical trial.[1] At 15.5 Isocrates states that the present speech is prompted by his loss to a nameless opponent in a liturgy trial, and by the animosity towards him that became apparent from the trial. The experience of actually being called to a trial over the matter of a liturgy by a certain Megacleides made him realize the importance of offering an account of himself (15.4). Accordingly, the author has

[1] See Cartelier and Havet (1862), 197 and G. Mathieu, *Isocrates. Discours III* (Paris, 1966), 87–101.

fabricated a legal proceeding involving the question of the exchange of property (ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως);[2] he has made up a sycophant, no doubt a caricature of such historical figures; he has invented accusations, which are charges that might have been plausibly brought against a teacher of rhetoric, and he has composed the present oration in the form of an apology (cf. 8 and 12). He has, furthermore, exaggerated the severity of the fictional charge, presenting his life at stake, which is unlikely to have been the case, whereas a liturgy trial would normally only result in the loss of property, or perhaps, civic rights in light of continued refusal to undertake the economic obligation levied by the city.[3]

FICTION

Ancient biographers are uncomfortable with the *Antidosis* as a fictional text. In the life of the rhetorician falsely attributed to Plutarch, the author provides some confused details about the historical legal proceeding. He writes that Isocrates was summoned to undertake the funding of a trireme on three occasions. Owing to physical infirmity, the rhetorician's adopted son Aphareus argued two of these cases. One of these occurred around 356 BCE, when Aphareus defeated Megacleides, who himself was summoned to undertake the funding of a trireme, went to trial and attempted to claim that Isocrates was in fact wealthier and should therefore assume this responsibility. Isocrates himself argued and lost 'not a small amount' in the third case (Ps.-Plutarch 838a), one of only two legal proceedings that he engaged in during his whole life. Here the Plutarchan life clearly mixes up reality and fiction, embellishing a comment from the *Antidosis* that Isocrates and his son undertook no less than three trierarchies in total and performed other financial services for the city in way that exceeds what the laws require (cf. τὰς δ' ἄλλας λειτουργίας πολυτελέστερον λελειτουργήκατε καὶ κάλλιον ὧν οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσι, 15.145). Photius understands Oration 15 to have been delivered as an

[2] See below 5. [3] See Christ (1990), 147–69.

unsuccessful response to the claims of Lysimachus, no doubt extrapolating the 'outcome' from section 4 (cf. Ps.-Plutarch 839c; Photius 487b). Like Ps.-Plutarch, he also attributes the earlier, actual trial involving the trierarchy to the rhetorician's step-son, Aphareus who was an orator (Photius 487b; cf. Ps.-Plutarch 839c).[4]

But to insist upon a verbal performance—its historical occasion, for a forensic oration—is to disregard the fact that rhetoricians typically composed entirely fictional legal orations, whether as show-pieces to advertise their abilities, as didactic paradigms for their students, or even as pieces of social comments. Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes* and Antiphon's *Tetralogies* are the most notable examples of such fictive speeches; Isocrates' six legal orations may also be prior examples of forensic invention if one takes at face value the author's claim that he has never engaged in logography (e.g. 15.49–50).[5] Furthermore, the work's length makes it more suited to the audience of public recitation, rather than an audience of a publicly orated speech, which the author acknowledges as the audience for his text (cf. 15.12). To insist upon verbal performance for the *Antidosis* is, moreover, to deny one of the privileged dimensions of legal oratory, fictionality and invention. One might note that the epistemology of the lawcourt was one based not on truth, but on opinion and probability.[6] Accordingly, the speechwriter was obliged to redepict events, to the extent of fabricating, if the events did not conform to popular expectations (see Plato *Phaedrus* 273b1 and 273d3–4).

Recognizing the fictional status of the *Antidosis*, Richard Jebb proceeded to call into question the identity of the work as 'properly . . . "forensic" ' at the end of the nineteenth century.[7] Arnaldo Momigliano later pronounced the speech a 'rhetorical exercise', but he also historicized it as one that was significant in occupying an important position in the development of Greek autobiography. The rhetorician's fictional apology followed upon his endeavours at

[4] See discussion in Too (1995), 80 ff.

[5] See Howland (1937), 155 for the more standard but naïve suggestion that Isocrates' derogatory remarks about legal oratory are indications of the rhetorician's embarassment and shame at once having been such.

[6] See e.g. P. J. Rhodes, 'Keeping to the Point', 137–58 and J. Sickinger, 'The Laws of Athens: Publication, Preservation, Consultation', 93–109 in Harris and Rubinstein (2004).

[7] Jebb (1893), ii. 82 and Too (1995), 83–4.

biographical writing in the forensic speech *On the Chariot Team* (of Alcibiades) and in *Evagoras* (of the deceased Cypriot monarch and father of Nicocles, who was one of Isocrates' pupils).[8] Georg Misch had earlier, in 1949, identified the *Antidosis* as an important text in the development of 'autobiography' in antiquity, following Plato's (biographical) depiction of the philosopher Socrates.[9] For him, 'autobiography' is writing the self, where the portrait is assumed to be truthful, or sincere, and individualistic. Misch's historicization of the oration is one particular to the time in which he was writing (the first half of the twentieth century), while now 'autobiography', 'self', and 'representation' are problematic terms once the reader recognizes rhetorical discourse as a mode of performativity, of artful construction of self within and against the constraints of social expectation and literary convention, to name only the most obvious considerations.[10] Accordingly, Monique Trédé-Boulmer argues that ancient autobiography is a narrative which has its basis in a world constrained by civic community, social groups, and codified forms of expression.[11]

ANTIDOSIS

Fictions are inevitably to some degree reflections of social reality, and the *Antidosis* offers a literary image of the city-state in the fourth century.

In classical Athens, the 1200 wealthiest citizens, 120 from each of the ten tribes, were liable to undertake liturgies, a form of taxation which required them to finance various public concerns. These might

[8] Momigliano (1971), 48–49, and 51.

[9] Misch (1950), 173.

[10] See esp. S. Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-fashioning from More to Shakespeare* (Chicago and London, 1980), and in classics, work which addresses issues of '(self-) invention', 'personality', 'character', 'characterization', 'self' in Greek classical scholarship, e.g. C. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature in Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1990); M. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, 1995); C. Gill, *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1996).

[11] Trédé-Boulmer (1993), 13.

involve festival-related expenditures, such as the training of a chorus (*χορηγία*),[12] and the provision of athletic training (*γυμνασιαρχία*), or fleet-related ones, such as the command and maintenance of a ship in the fleet (*τριηραρχία*).[13] More rarely, the liturgy might entail the advance payment of a tax, known as *προεισφορά*.[14] The liturgy system was one that ensured that rich citizens exercised some of their resources in the interests of the community as a whole, and conservative authors of the period complain that if liturgies had previously been an honour, they were now a burden for the wealthy elite (cf. 15.159–160; 8.128; 7.35; Xenophon *Oec.* 2.5–6).

The exchange-trial is a form of redress for individuals summoned to undertake a liturgy but in their own view unable, or unwilling, to support such an expense, and according to the speaker of Oration 8, *On the Peace*, it has become emblematic of the negative side of Athens' rhetorical culture (cf. 128). This particular procedure was supposedly instituted by Solon, one assumes as part of his economic reforms (cf. Demosthenes *Against Phainippus* 42.1). In it the citizen called to account challenged another wealthy citizen to undertake the liturgy, or else to exchange properties—hence *ἀντίδοσις*[15]—on the basis that the second was richer and therefore more obliged to do so. If the second citizen agreed, the procedure ended here; however, if he refused to take up the liturgy, the first citizen would ask the other party to exchange his property with him and would then finance the liturgy from his new property.[16] If the second citizen resisted this offer, the case would then be brought as a *διαδικασία* to a jury which assigned the liturgy to the individual it judged to be actually richer.[17] While some scholars doubt whether an actual exchange of property was ever the outcome of such a legal proceeding, undisputable evidence for the existence of the procedure comes from, for example,

[12] Cf. Ps.-Xenophon *Ath. Pol.* 3.4; Antiphon 6.11–14; Demosthenes 21.13–15.

[13] Cf. Demosthenes 51.4–7; *IG*^{2} 1604–32.

[14] See Dem. 42.25; MacDowell (1978), 161 ff.; and Hansen (1991), 110.

[15] On the *antidosis*-procedure, see Michell (1940), 380–1; Davis (1981), 9–10, 76; Gabrielson (1987) and Christ (1990).

[16] The exchange procedure required that both parties to the suit would give take binding oaths, and three days later, submit inventories of their properties; see Dem. 42.1–2 and 11.

[17] For this reconstruction of the procedure, see Christ (1990), 161; Gabrielsen (1987), 23, denies that the *διαδικασία* could have been part of the process.

Lysias 4.1. Elsewhere, in Lysias 24, the speaker, an aged invalid seeking his pension, speaks as though personal properties would be exchanged as the outcome of such a trial when he notes that his accuser would prefer to undertake the funding of a chorus ten times over rather than receive his opponent's wealth if an *ἀντίδοσις* scenario were to arise (24.9). One might view the *ἀντίδοσις*-trial as the ultimate performance of destructive envy in the democratic city, for it is one motivated precisely by dissatisfaction at another having more than oneself.

The fiction of a liturgy trial establishes Isocrates as a member of the economically privileged class at Athens, and as a responsible member of his community who readily undertakes the responsibilities assigned to those of his standing (see 15.5 and 145). The performance of liturgies was frequently cited during legal proceedings as a mark of good citizenship. Litigants in trials often attested to their civic pride and to their identity as wealthy but also responsible citizens by citing their (or their family's) past undertaking of liturgic obligations (see e.g. 18.59–60; Lys. 7.31; 12.20; 19.57–64[18]; 21.1–11, cf. 19; 25.12; 26.3). But liturgy is more than simply the funding of public concerns. The speaker of Lysias 21 claims that the most onerous, and implicitly best, liturgy is to be an orderly and moderate citizen, one who is not controlled by pleasure or tempted by profit (21.19[19]), while at 7.5 Isocrates speaks of public office—the phrase employed is 'concern for common things' (*τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν*)—in the historical democracy as a 'liturgy' (*λειτουργίαν*) inasmuch as it was not undertaken for the sake of private gain.

In the *Antidosis* Isocrates engages in calculation of his own service to the state, and of his benefit to students in order to suggest that his teaching also is a liturgy. The particular issue under contention—what does Isocrates owe to his community as a consequence of his earnings?—brings to the forefront large issues regarding the value of the intellectual, especially the teacher of rhetoric, and his activities in the democratic community. The language which Isocrates employs

[18] The lives even attribute a choregia to Isocrates' father, Theodorus, [Plutarch] 836e and Zosimus *Isoc.* 1–3.

[19] Cf. *ταύτην εἶναι τὴν λητουργίαν ἐπιπονωτάτην, διὰ τέλους τὸν πάντα χρόνον κόσμιον εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα καὶ μήθ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἡττηθῆναι μήθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους ἐπαρθῆναι* (Lysias 21.19).

to describe the teacher–student relationship in the speech is implicitly that of liturgy. If the author admits to receiving fees from students (cf. 15.224–6), he opens to scrutiny what 'earning' means in his case. In particular, he insists that he has made no profit from his fellow citizens (cf. 15.39; also Ps.-Plutarch *Moralia* 837d) because he has given back to the city far more than the liturgical obligation laid upon him by the city would exact (15.323). His teaching of its young citizens makes them useful citizens (15.93–4), as their parents recognize. Despite paying fees (241), they 'rejoice', or 'feel gratitude (*χαιρουσιν*)'. (The verb *χαιρουσιν* also invokes the idea of *χάρις* or the 'favour', which, like *ξενία*, is the return in a reciprocal exchange.) In turn, Isocrates expresses his own gratitude (*χάρις*) to his students for what they have given to him as students (cf. 15.99 and 106 and commentary).[20]

The *Antidosis*, furthermore, makes a claim about the value of the rhetorician's teaching for the city. The civic-minded individual, who instructs in an orderly community, will have given back to his community far more than he has gained from it (15.158). By enriching the city, and indeed, Greece with his teaching, as he so emphatically claims in the speech, Isocrates has already given the city his wealth, and in effect, his whole life. The rhetorician has devoted his activities and pastimes selflessly (in his depiction) to the state, and the present speech serves both to emblematize and to rehearse that act of generosity, or sacrifice. For him to be condemned to death as a result of the trial is for Athens to be ignorant of the benefits and public service that have already been performed, and to be unaware that the trial is the dramatization of the rhetorician's literal and literary *βίος* as a liturgy. For his euergetism, the Athenian rhetorician hints that the city should express its own gratitude to their teacher by absolving him in the current 'trial'. After all, there is also a sense in

[20] See Too (1995), 108 ff. Elsewhere, Isocrates describes the advice he offers to the *ρεχιχαρπιεντσ* of the didactic works *To Demonicus* and *To Nicocles* as a gift (cf. *δῶρον*, 1.2 and *δωρεάν*, 2.2; also 15.40). Oration 2 ends with the observation that the donor of this speech, that is Isocrates, gives far more to the recipient unlike those who give certain presents which cost the recipient more (2.54): underlying this statement is acute awareness of the criticism of the professional teacher and his greed. The *Epistle to the Children of Jason* (6) is characterized as *ξενία*, as the gift which marks the guest-friendship and which will be answered in turn by the recipient (*Ep.* 6.4).

which Isocrates' contributions to Athens are beyond calculation. Rhetoric, as the speech will make clear again and again, is the basis of Athens' standing (e.g. 15.231, 250, 253–7, 299, 308). The skills and arts of language have been the reason for the city's military power, her hegemonic position in the Greek world, and indeed in the civilized world as a whole, with regard to might and culture. Isocrates is implicitly to be regarded as one of the individuals responsible for Athens' extraordinary position amongst other city-states.[21]

SELF-REPRESENTATION

In Greek antiquity, the dicanic speech was a privileged space for the depiction of one's civic 'self'. Legal process was one of the democratic conventions, like δοκιμασία or scrutiny of public officials, which Misch saw as fostering self-portrayal in classical Athens.[22] It provided the speaker with the opportunity to offer an account—indeed λόγος, which has the sense of both story or narrative and of reckoning, for instance—of himself, whether it was one he had written himself, or his logographer had constructed for him. The speaker of Lysias 16, Mantitheos, states that it is right for him to present an account of his whole life, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δοκιμασίαις δίκαιον εἶναι παντὸς τοῦ βίου λόγον διδόναι (Lysias 16.9), while Lysias 24 opens with the litigant thanking, ironically or not, the court for providing him with the chance to give an 'account of his life' (τοῦ βίου λόγον, 24.1).[23]

Of all Isocrates' works the *Antidosis* develops most fully the idea that the literary text might provide an image of its author as citizen.[24] Described by the author as 'an image of my thought and life' (εἰκὼν τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμοὶ βεβιωμένων, 15.7; cf. 13; 28; 44; 54; 69; 141; 143–4; 152; Too (1995), 188–9) (see below), it is carefully constructed as a vehicle for self-representation. The *Antidosis* enables the author to offer a justification of his intellectual

[21] See Ober (1989), 199.

[22] Misch (1950), 156–7.

[23] Also compare Gorgias *Palamedes* 28 and Too (1995), 188 ff.

[24] Misch (1950), 158 sees Isocrates as the first ancient author to develop autobiography as a literary task with the *Antidosis*.

profession as a service to Athens so as not to incur the displeasure and envy of his audience.[25] Isocrates is aware that literary representation of an individual was a project earlier undertaken by the philosopher Socrates in his trial at Athens, and the *Antidosis* conspicuously refers to Plato's *Apology of Socrates*, invoking the charges of corrupting the young and accepting large sums of money for his teaching.[26]

Overall, the image that Isocrates produces of himself is generated in response to, and against the background of, a particular social and political environment. Isocrates' Athens constituted a culture of litigation, to go by the portraits of ancient, and admittedly conservative, writers such as Thucydides (2.40.2) and Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 28.1 (also cf. Aristophanes *Acharnians* 38, 680; *Knights* 60). It was the age of the 'new politicians', of the men who challenged the aristocratic élite and aspired to political advancement and wealth through the practice of rhetoric. Men such as Cleon, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, Anytus and Meletus (the latter two being the prosecutors of Socrates) used their skills in oratory and in writing speeches for others to further their own positions in society by bringing unsavoury lawsuits against their victims, often members of the wealthy and leisured upper class. Such individuals were the city's upstarts, men who had to work for their living—Cleon and Anytus were depicted as tanners, Cleophon as a lyre-maker, Hyperbolus as a lamp-maker[27]—at least in the depictions of their (élite) opponents. Oratory was now their profession.

Because public oratory was the vehicle of social and political advancement for the 'new politicians' and litigation in particular had come to suggest civic irresponsibility in the forms of sycophancy

[25] As Paul Zanker has argued, it is only in the Hellenistic period that the representation of the intellectual—poet, philosopher, thinker, and so on—*qua* intellectual comes into being. The development of the idea of a distinct intellectual identity—poet, philosopher, literary scholar—is clearly connected with the Museum-Library phenomenon, especially in Alexandria, where the Ptolemies sponsor a professional intellectual class, and also in Pergamum (Zanker (1995), 90 ff.).

[26] See R. J. Bonner, 'The Legal Setting of Isocrates' *Antidosis*', *CP* 15 (1920), 193 and Debrunner Hall in Foxhall and Lewis (1996), 80 n. 10.

[27] See Aristophanes *Clouds* 551, 874–6, 1065; *Acharnians* 846; *Peace* 681. Also Finley (1962), 17–18 and Ste-Croix (1981), 290 and 603, n. 25; also Ste-Croix (1972), 235 n. 7, for such portraiture of these democrats as comic travesty.

and political meddling (πολυπραγμοσύνη[28]), rejection of this activity became the means of defining one's identity as a member of the traditional and moral establishment. Prominent residents of Athens frequently distanced themselves from dicanic activity as Isocrates does here or with the cliché plea 'unaccustomed as I am to public speaking' (e.g.15.26 and see also Andocides 1.1; Antiphon *Herodes* 1–2; *Stepmother* 1.3; *Tetr.* 2.1–2; 2.2.1; Plato *Apol.* 17c-d; Lysias 12.3; 19.2; 19.55; Demosthenes 27.1–2; 34.1; 58.3; Isaeus 8.5; 10.1). Isocrates makes his identity as a quietist especially apparent in three texts apart from the *Antidosis*. At 5.81, 12.9–10 and *Epistle* 8.7 he draws attention to his weak voice and to his lack of nerve—a loud voice and daring are necessary qualities for anyone who wishes to engage in demagoguery (15.190–1). The rhetorician presents himself as a 'quiet Athenian', the sort of individual, usually of privileged means, who withdraws from the verbal jostling and meddling of the democratic city, in this case to turn his attention to teaching and the composition of political speeches.[29]

The 'Isocrates' of the *Antidosis* is revealed through his (non-) actions. The defence begins with its author claiming that the current oration does not resemble any conventional lawcourt speech, or any display (*epideixis*). It is novel and different, opening the rhetorician to the charge of being 'out of place', 'strange', 'unconventional', conveyed by the adjective ἄτοπος (1; cf. 150). It is atypical because it deals with philosophy, that is, with rhetoric, which are synonymous for Isocrates for, unlike Plato, philosophy and rhetoric are arts primarily concerned with λόγος. Later, at section 179 Isocrates draws attention to the fact that his defence is idiosyncratic and extraordinary (cf. πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων), for he is after all dealing with a situation which is unlike any other (cf. περὶ πραγμάτων ἀνομοίων τοῖς ἄλλοις). These statements are in keeping with, and insist on, the idea that the activities of philosophy, its teachers and practitioners are distinct from those of all other arts (cf. section 263), and therefore, should be judged on their own terms. Philosophy is not a self-serving art but one concerned with the well-being of the

[28] See *Ant.* 48, 311–14; Ehrenberg (1947), Adkins (1976); Carter (1986).
[29] Cf. Carter (1986).

city and this understanding is at the heart of Isocrates' defence of himself.

Repeatedly in the *Antidosis*, he presents himself and his discourse as *unlike* anyone and anything else in the contemporary *πόλις*. In the middle portion of the speech, an associate warns Isocrates that he cannot expect a favourable reception if he insists on stressing how different his life and actions are from others (cf. *τόν τε βίον τὸν σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰς πράξεις . . . μηδὲ κατὰ μικρὸν ὁμοίας οὔσας ταῖς τούτων*, 143). Yet, the rhetorician aggressively embraces a politics of marginality as he readily draws attention to the fact that he permits his interlocutor to comment in this speech that he is uninvolved in the affairs of the city 'as no other citizen is' (cf. *ὡς οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν*, section 144); or that he has stood apart from all common matters (cf. *τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν κοινῶν ἐξέστηκας*, 145); and importantly, that he is unlike both contemporary sophists and lay people (cf. *ἀνομοίως ζῶντα καὶ τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ ἰδιώταις*, 148). Such counter-definition serves as a rejection of fourth-century Athens, somewhat negatively stereotyped by conservative authors of the period.

SOPHISTS

In the fourth century, 'teacher' (*διδασκάλος*) most immediately implies 'sophist', the professional teacher who makes unrealistic promises about his ability to pass on knowledge and skills in order to gain a personal fortune. Oration 15 is at one level precisely about where a professional teacher, whether *διδασκάλος* or *σοφιστής*, fits into the economy of the classical city, and this is no minor matter given the city's decision to be rid of Socrates in 399 BCE.[30] According to the conventional stereotype of the period, the contemporary 'sophist' is a distasteful figure who encourages the sycophantic activity of the lawcourts. Isocrates' earlier Oration 13, *Against the Sophists*, is a powerful polemic against current rhetorical pedagogy and its practitioners, and elsewhere in his speeches, individuals who would be

[30] See Appendix.

perceived as sophists, because they participate in Athens' verbal culture, are criticized for their greed, ambition, and unscrupulousness (cf. also 10.2–6).[31] At 11.43 'sophist' becomes a generic title for impotent and ineffectual individuals, while in the *Panathenaicus* the sophists are individuals who hold and act out personal grudges, misrepresenting the author's work, breaking it up and ruining it (see 12.5 and 16–17). The contemporary sophist is responsible for the misuse of language, but if this figure is caricatured as irresponsible and mean-spirited, his villainy should not be underestimated. Given that language is the basis of community, the sophist is necessarily the enemy of the city-state.

But the question of who might be a 'sophist' is one that becomes poignant in the fourth century. In the *Symposium*, Plato presents his audience with a Socrates who is to be seen as a sophist and who thus challenges society's perception of what this figure is. The philosopher of this dialogue is at once visibly unattractive, generally unshod, scruffy, common, simple in his words, but also beautiful, special, and a teacher of truths, like the unprepossessing Silenus statues which must be opened up to reveal images of the gods (215a4 ff.). But the more poignant 'other' for Socrates is Eros (Desire), harsh, unkempt, and unshod, but also resourceful, a practitioner of philosophy (*φιλοσοφῶν*) throughout his life, a clever sorceror, druggist, and a sophist (*σοφιστής*) (203d). The extended analogy suggests that if Eros is a sophist, then so too must the philosopher be one.[32] Plato redefines what the sophist is for this dialogue in an attempt to define the true philosopher, although elsewhere he emphatically draws a distinction between sophist as charlatan and philosopher. He is implicitly responding here, as in the *Apology of Socrates*, to the caricature of Socrates as a sophist in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, and his concern is to show that the noun 'sophist' need not denote the unsavoury and abstracted teacher of the comedy (cf. *Apology* 18b5 ff.). The point is that the case against Socrates is one derived from the misattribution of sophistic activity to a true philosopher, and the defence is based on the abolition of distinctions between philosopher and sophist.

[31] See Owen, 'Philosophical Invective' in Owen (1986), 347–64.
[32] See Aeschines *In Tim.* 173 for reference to Socrates as *τὸν σοφιστήν*.

Isocrates does not entirely reject the term 'sophist', and certainly, not as a description for himself. He may be adamant here and elsewhere that he is not a sophist in the sense conventionally understood by a fourth-century Athenian audience as he rejects the usage current in popular discourse. However, the *Antidosis* undertakes what must appear to be a lost cause in seeking to redefine and reinflect 'sophist', entailing a re-establishment, a reframing, of the term 'sophist' and its significations. Isocrates must acknowledge that 'sophist' is a derogatory term in fourth-century Athens, and in his own writing, it certainly functions that way, but he also reminds the fictional 'jury' of the *Antidosis* that the sophist might be something quite other. The rhetorician seeks to reappropriate the term 'sophist', and in so doing, to constrain the sphere of signification in the classical city. He reminds his audience that in an earlier democratic Athens, 'sophist' was a term of commendation (313), rehabilitating the word 'sophist' and rhetorical culture through a historicisation which sets out to demonstrate that verbal ability has been responsible for many of the things which made and now continue to make Athens a great city. Athens' original democratic founders were 'sophists', where the term denoted them as wise rulers. These are the men who freed the city-state from her various historical troubles—whether tyranny, slavery, or Persian invasion—by means of their verbal abilities.

If at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1180b35 ff. Aristotle speaks of the false claims of contemporary sophists to engage in politics, Isocrates reminds his audiences of the political nature of historical sophistry. So Solon, Athens' lawmaker and paradigmatic political teacher, was originally known as a 'sophist' (15.235 and 313). This sophist was responsible for Athens as the city which deserves to control Greek hegemony. As the leader (*προστατής*) of the people (archon 594/3 BCE), he established their laws, ordered their affairs, and made them adore the city (section 232). He was also the human agent who realized the capacities of *λόγος* as a medium which structures socio-political reality. The sophists Cleisthenes, Themistocles, and Pericles, moreover, did not neglect public discourse. According to the rhetorician, they in fact devoted themselves more to rhetorical discourse than anything else. Cleisthenes persuaded (cf. *λόγῳ πείσας*) the Amphictyons to lend him money from the treasury of Apollo in

order than he might expel the tyrants from power. Themistocles through his eloquence persuaded the Athenian ancestors to abandon the city in the Persian War and could only have done this through eloquence (ὃ τίς ἂν οἷος τ' ἐγένετο πεῖσαι μὴ πολὺ τῷ λόγῳ διενεγκών;), while Pericles, a good demagogue and the best orator (ῥήτωρ ἄριστος), decorated the city with temples, monuments, and other fine things so that visitors to Athens think the πόλις worthy to rule the Greeks and the rest of the world (15.233–4). (Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Damon, the teachers of Pericles, are also explicitly labelled 'sophists' (235).) Isocrates offers four aetiologies of Athens' power, each of which ultimately credits it to the λόγος of a sophist.

If Isocrates is to be regarded as a 'sophist', it is as the inheritor of the Solonic mantle;[33] he is Athens' self-appointed political saviour and political wise man, and not the disruptive political troublemaker of present-day Athens. Since the *Antidosis* is in part an attempt to combat what the author depicts as the crisis of signification at Athens, the εἰκών that he announces himself as offering of his life, character, and work is one which has the function of stabilizing, by historicizing, language in this world. The aitiological narratives, which trace civilized community to λόγος (cf. 15.253–6 and 3.5–9), and the nostalgic celebration of Solon at 7.16 are the means of patently establishing this genealogy. The rhetorician is after all the individual who rejects the oratory of the lawcourts (despite authoring six forensic speeches) and who insists that he writes nothing but λόγος πολιτικός, or political discourse, which deals only with matters of significance and of benefit to the city-state (cf. 15.45–7; also 12.2, 11[34]). The present dicanic apology is a case in point. Beyond taking the form of a self-justification, the *Antidosis* is also a didactic text through which the author instructs his fellow citizens in the true functions of rhetoric/ philosophy and its practitioners (see section 29 and discussion in the commentary, 59 and elsewhere). Elsewhere, in the *Areopagiticus* the rhetorician asks his audience to 'learn thoroughly' (καταμαθεῖν) what the city-state's historical constitution was, the lesson provided by this text (see 7.28). This is the archetypal 'sophist' that he invokes when advising Nicocles to become familiar with the famous poets and 'sophists' (cf. 2.13).

[33] See Ober (1998), 250. [34] Too (1995), 10–35.

Isocrates is also to be regarded as the professional teacher who in his turn bequeaths the Solonic mantle to his students. His pupils have included orators, generals, kings, and monarchs, the sort of people who ideally benefit their communities (15.30). Where Athens is specifically concerned, the rhetorician's pedagogy has been responsible for turning out men who were honoured with golden crowns for their services to the city (15.93–5). Among these pupils, the general Timotheus, son of Conon, stands out as the star pupil who increased the influence and power of Athens immeasurably through his military service (15.111, 121–2).[35] In a contemporary society which is ignorant of the true sophist's role, an individual like Timotheus can only be unappreciated—thus the general has been accused of being a traitor and forced to pay a fine of unprecedented sum (15.129).

RHETORIC

Isocrates' mode of self-fashioning is eccentric, although it is not initially evident as such to modern readers.[36] In effect, Isocrates' marked resistance to contemporary rhetoric and its culture is what paradoxically marks him as a master of rhetorical discourse in the fourth century. Writers in antiquity and in the Renaissance deemed Isocrates the pre-eminent rhetorician of classical Athens. Cicero presents Isocrates as a 'great orator and accomplished teacher' (*magnus orator perfectus magister*), whose home virtually became a school and speech workshop (*officina dicendi*) for the whole of Greece (*Brutus* 8.30). Quintilian describes the rhetorician as 'the most distinguished pupil of Gorgias', '*clarissimus Gorgiae auditor Isocrates*', notwithstanding disagreements between the two individuals (cf. *Institutio Oratoria* 3.1.13).

[35] Too (1995), 131–2.

[36] In the earlier 20th cent. Isocrates became a secondary figure in the historical and social (re)construction of Athens, perhaps precisely because he was Athens' foremost speech artist. See e.g. the less than flattering comments of Henri Marrou (1956), 131 and de Romilly (1958), 101. But more recently there have been attempts, often misguided, to rehabilitate the rhetorician.

As far as Isocrates was concerned, he was the pre-eminent practitioner of λόγος, and for this reason, the foremost representative of Athenian culture and its civilization. For writers in the fifth and fourth centuries, λόγος—both language and reason, as the Greek word denotes—is what distinguishes humankind from other living beings, and what ensures the superiority of this race in the order of things, despite its physical disadvantages (e.g. Sophocles *Antigone* 332–75 and Isocrates 15.293–4). For the rhetorician, if λόγος is the defining condition of humanity, it is furthermore specifically what makes possible the existence of civilized society, namely the political community. At 3.5–9, the former pupil of Isocrates and now Cypriot king, Nicocles, is made to declare that through λόγος men persuaded one another, associated with one another, created cities, established νόμοι, the cities' conventions or laws, educated, persuaded, disputed with one another, and invented the arts. (The encomium of λόγος, as the portion of the text is conventionally described, reappears verbatim at 15.253–6 with a significant reframing in the author's own voice so that 'Nicocles' is assimilated by the rhetorician and the passage functions as testimony to his own character, work, and life.) λόγος is the public discourse which both constitutes and announces the deliberate strategies that individuals use to devise images—good, bad, beautiful, ugly, truthful, misleading, and so on—of their societies. Rhetoric is at the essential core of any orderly, civilized community, enabling men to come together, to build cities, create laws and the arts which make community possible. It institutionalizes morality, makes possible debate, persuasion, and the instruction of others. Isocrates offers an aetiology of society as a verbal construction.

Furthermore, for any Greek rhetorician, λόγος is perceived to be a medium not just of creation, but also of endless verbal *re*-creation. At 4.8 Isocrates declares the nature (φύσις) of λόγοι to be such that what is great (τά μεγάλα) is made base (ταπεινά), what is grand (μέγεθος) becomes small (μικρά), and what is old (τὰ παλαιά) becomes new (cf. καινά). Consequently, the same topics may present themselves again and again for rhetorical treatment. By this statement the rhetorician himself remakes what may be regarded as an authoritative definition of rhetoric. Tisias and Gorgias are given the same powers of verbal transformation at Plato *Phaedrus* 267a, while Ps.-Plutarch has his