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ARISTOTLE *in* AQUINAS'S THEOLOGY

edited by

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Editors' Preface

This work investigates the role of Aristotelian concepts, principles, and themes in Thomas Aquinas's theology. The ten chapters are intended to provide an introduction to the significance of Aquinas's theological reception of Aristotle in certain major loci: the Trinity, the angels, soul and body, the Mosaic law, grace, charity, justice, contemplation and action, Christ, and the sacraments. Some of these chapters focus on the *Summa theologiae*, while others range more widely in Aquinas's corpus. Aristotelian concepts, of course, appear throughout Aquinas's theology. Jean-Pierre Torrell has pointed out that "the presence and influence of Aristotle in Thomas's writings no longer have to be shown. . . . Thomas retained so many important elements of Aristotle's thought that they cannot be numbered."[1] On the one hand, for quite some time, it has above all been the influence of Aristotle on Aquinas's *philosophy* that has been the center of attention. Thomas O'Meara states, "Often the approach to Thomas Aquinas during the neo-Thomist revival from 1850 to 1960 was to describe a philosophy. During that time far more books treated his philosophy than his theology. . . . A search through a library catalogue or a perusal of a bibliography of articles on Aquinas written prior to Vatican II yields more material on the metaphysics of an unmoved mover or the abstract description of philosophical virtues than on salvation by Jesus or the role of a sacrament."[2] On the other hand, perhaps in reaction to philosophical neo-Thomism, or perhaps because this Aristotelian influence appears no longer necessary to demonstrate, the role of Aristotle in Aquinas's *theology* presently receives less theological attention than does Aquinas's use of other authorities, especially in domains outside of theological ethics—so much so that in some theological circles the influence of Aristotle upon Aquinas's theology is no longer well understood.

When Aquinas describes his use of "authorities" in the *Summa theologiae*, he states that *sacra doctrina* accepts "the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason."[3] He carefully adds, however, that *sacra doctrina* "makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments," by contrast to the proper and incontrovertible

[1] Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, *Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception*, trans. Benedict M. Guevin (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), pp. 76–7.

[2] Thomas F. O'Meara, OP, *Thomas Aquinas Theologian* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp. xi–xii.

[3] *ST* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. English translation from: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 1 (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981).

"authority of the canonical Scriptures" and the proper but only probable authority of the Fathers.[4] His vision and practice of theology firmly avoid rationalism. In this light, Torrell aptly presents Aquinas as a "spiritual master" and a "mystic": "The figure who at times seems to be known only for his philosophy is also first and foremost a theologian, a commentator on Sacred Scripture, an attentive student of the Fathers of the Church, and a man concerned about the spiritual and pastoral repercussions of his teaching."[5] Aquinas is indeed "first and foremost a theologian." As Robert Barron writes: "When one interprets Thomas as a rationalist philosopher or theologian, one misses the burning heart of everything he wrote. Aquinas was a saint deeply in love with Jesus Christ, and the image of Christ pervades the entire edifice that is his philosophical, theological, and scriptural work. Above all, Thomas Aquinas was a consummate spiritual master, holding up the icon of the Word made flesh and inviting others into its transformative power."[6]

Not least because of the success of Torrell's masterful work, scholars today tend to focus on the biblical, patristic, and liturgical sources of Aquinas's theology, as well as on Aquinas's debts to Platonic insights such as participation.[7] But for this very reason, Aquinas's theological use of Aristotle requires

[4] *ST* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. See M.-D. Chenu's classic discussion of Aquinas's use of "auctoritates" in Marie-Dominique Chenu, OP, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, trans. Albert M. Landry and Dominic Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964), ch. 4.

[5] Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 2, Spiritual Master, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), p. vii. See also Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, *Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Bernhard Blankenhorn (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011); Paul D. Murray, OP, *Aquinas at Prayer: The Bible, Mysticism and Poetry* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

[6] Robert Barron, *Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master* (New York: Crossroad, 1996), p. 13.

[7] Among many excellent studies, see Thomas F. Ryan, *Thomas Aquinas as Reader of the Psalms* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000); Antoine Guggenheim, *Jésus Christ, grand prêtre de l'ancienne et de la nouvelle Alliance: Étude théologique et herméneutique du commentaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur l'Épître aux Hébreux* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2004); Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap., Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum, eds., *Aquinas on Scripture: An Introduction to his Biblical Commentaries* (London: T. & T. Clark, 2005); Matthew Levering and Michael Dauphinais, eds., *Reading Romans with St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012); Paweł Klimczak, OP, *Christus Magister: Le Christ Maître dans les commentaires évangéliques de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2014); Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1992); Rudi A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); Gregory T. Doolan, *Aquinas on the Divine Ideas as Exemplar Causes* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008); Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew Levering, eds., *Aquinas the Augustinian* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007). Recent works in moral theology and philosophy have continued to explore Aquinas's debt to Aristotle: see for instance Mary M. Keys, *Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Nicholas E. Lombardo, OP, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011); Daniel McInerny, *The Difficult Good: A Thomistic Approach to Moral Conflict and Human Happiness* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Fabrizio Amerini, *Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life*, trans. Mark Henninger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

renewed attention, lest the study of Aquinas's theology become one-sided. Our work, therefore, highlights the significance of Aristotle in Aquinas's theology. Readers will encounter here the great Aristotelian themes, such as act and potency, God as pure act, substance and accidents, power and generation, change and motion, fourfold causality, form and matter, hylomorphic anthropology, the structure of intellection, the relationship between knowledge and will, happiness and friendship, habits and virtues, contemplation and action, politics and justice, the best form of government, private property, and the common good.

Some general background to our topic will be helpful, since Aquinas's use of Aristotle should not be viewed in isolation from the whole of Christian theology. This is especially so in an introductory work such as the present volume, whose theological audience can be assumed to possess widely differing degrees of familiarity with Aristotle's reception in Christian theology over the centuries. It is no secret, of course, that strong critiques of Aristotle have been commonplace in the history of theology. For example, Gregory of Nazianzus, though benefiting from Aristotle's philosophy in some ways, nonetheless condemned Aristotle's "mean conception of Providence, his artificial system, his mortal view of the soul, and the human-centered nature of his teaching."[8] Likewise, Augustine complained that his reading of Aristotle's *Categories* led him to think of God as simply another substance.[9] And in the thirteenth century alone, the Catholic Church's hierarchy warned against the theological use of Aristotle in 1215, 1228, 1231, 1245, 1263, 1270, and 1277.[10]

During the Renaissance and Reformation period, Aristotle often came under particularly strong attack. Thus, in his Letter to Martin Dorp (1514), Desiderius Erasmus criticized "modern theology" as "so contaminated with Aristotle, with trifling ideas thought up by men, even with secular laws, that I hardly see how it can preserve the true savor of Christ, who is pure and uncontaminated."[11] Erasmus went on to ask rhetorically: "What connection is there, I ask you, between Christ and Aristotle? or between sophistical quibbles and the mysteries of eternal wisdom? Where will these labyrinths of questions

[8] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration* 27, in Gregory of Nazianzus, *On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters to Cledonius*, trans. Frederick Williams and Lionel Wickham (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002), p. 33. Gregory equally criticizes Plato for his doctrine of ideas and his hypothesis that souls are cyclically reincarnated.

[9] Augustine, *Confessions* IV,XVI; trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 69–70.

[10] Ulrich G. Leinsle, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), pp. 138–41 and 144–7. See also Robert Pasnau, "The Latin Aristotle," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*, edited by Christopher Shields (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 665–89.

[11] Desiderius Erasmus, "Erasmus' Letter to Martin Dorp (1514)," in *The Praise of Folly*, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 139–74, at 155.

get us?"[12] A few years later, Martin Luther rejected (as he put it) "the Thomistic—that is, the Aristotelian church."[13] In the course of arguing against transubstantiation, Luther observed that "Aristotle speaks of subject and accidents so very differently from St. Thomas that it seems to me this great man [St. Thomas] is to be pitied not only for attempting to draw his opinions in matters of faith from Aristotle, but also for attempting to base them upon a man whom he did not understand, thus building an unfortunate superstructure upon an unfortunate foundation."[14]

More recently, but along quite similar lines, Karl Barth affirmed that "the Christian Church certainly does not number Aristotle among its ancestors."[15] The Russian Orthodox theologian Sergius Bulgakov, for his part, warned that "within the limits of Aristotle's categories, there can be no man in general; human nature exists only in particular individuals (that is precisely why the heresy of tritheism grew out of the soil of Aristotelianism)."[16] And, voicing a representative postmodern viewpoint, the contemporary philosopher Gianni Vattimo has rejected "the attributes found in Aristotle's pure act or in Parmenides's Being, which stand radically opposed to the idea of Being as a creation of a free and loving God."[17]

As one would expect, however, defenders of the role of Aristotle in theology have not been lacking. Indeed, the depth and breadth of theological indebtedness to Aristotle over the centuries can easily go unappreciated today, even by scholars who recognize Aristotle's significance for Aquinas. Richard Rubenstein points out that for many centuries, Aristotle was utterly central in a wide variety of fields of study for Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scholars. During the medieval period, "one could not begin a discussion of metaphysics, natural science, logic, theology, ethics, aesthetics, or politics without referring

[12] Erasmus, "Erasmus' Letter to Martin Dorp," p. 155.

[13] Martin Luther, "The Babylonian Captivity of the Church," in *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings*, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1989), pp. 267–313, at 285. See Denis R. Janz, *Luther on Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor in the Thought of the Reformer* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag, 1989); Otto H. Pesch, *Martin Luther, Thomas von Aquin und die reformatorische Kritik an der Scholastik: Zur Geschichte und Wirkungsgeschichte eines Mißverständnisses mit weltgeschichtlichen Folgen* (Hamburg: Joachim Jungius-Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1994).

[14] Luther, "The Babylonian Captivity," p. 285.

[15] Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, part 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), p. 11. See also Thomas Joseph White, OP, "Introduction: Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, An Unofficial Catholic–Protestant Dialogue," in *Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: An Unofficial Catholic–Protestant Dialogue*, edited by Bruce L. McCormack and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), pp. 1–39.

[16] Sergius Bulgakov, *The Lamb of God*, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008), p. 67.

[17] Gianni Vattimo, *After Christianity*, trans. Luca D'Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 120.

to Aristotle's views and dealing respectfully with them."[18] Depending on the Latin translations that were gradually made available to them,[19] all high- and late-medieval Christian theologians in the West were in dialogue with Aristotle and with Muslim interpreters of Aristotle such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).[20]

In the Christian East, among the many Eastern Fathers who could be named, Basil the Great's *Against Eunomius* exhibits the fruitful influence of Aristotle's *Categories* and other works—as does John of Damascus's well-known *Philosophical Chapters*, which draws heavily upon the eclectic Aristotelianism of Nemesius of Emesa.[21] Indeed, Marcus Plested has demonstrated Aquinas's "continuity and affinity with a long tradition of Byzantine scholasticism going back to the Christological debates of the fifth century and recapitulated in John of Damascus."[22] The Byzantine scholasticism that Plested traces through the nineteenth century, a scholasticism that (at least with respect to the place given to Aristotelian philosophy) included Gregory Palamas, finds a parallel not only in the long tradition of Catholic scholasticism but also in the centuries of Lutheran and Reformed scholasticism, led by figures such as Francis Turretin.

[18] Richard E. Rubenstein, *Aristotle's Children: How Christians, Muslims, and Jews Rediscovered Ancient Wisdom and Illuminated the Dark Ages* (New York: Harcourt, 2003), p. 283.

[19] The series "Aristoteles Latinus" (medieval translations of the works of Aristotle), part of the "Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi," is of the greatest help in this regard. The project, still in progress, started in 1930, with the first volume being published in 1951. It is currently supervised and supported by the International Union of Academies. For instance, thanks to "Aristoteles Latinus," Marta Borgo was able to demonstrate that Aquinas's commentary on the first book of the *Sentences* makes use of no less than four different translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: Marta Borgo, "La *Métaphysique* d'Aristote dans le *Commentaire* de Thomas d'Aquin au I^{er} livre des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard: Quelques exemples significatifs," *RSPhTh* 91 (2007): pp. 651–92.

[20] See, for example, Marilyn McCord Adams, *Some Later Medieval Theories of the Eucharist: Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and William Ockham* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Russell L. Friedman, *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). While critical of Aristotle in certain respects—largely the very respects identified by Gregory of Nazianzus—the great medieval Muslim theologian and legal scholar Al-Ghazali likewise drew upon Aristotle, as did medieval Jewish theologians and legal scholars such as Maimonides, Gersonides, and Saadiah Gaon.

[21] See Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, *Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Andrew Louth, *St John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[22] Marcus Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 223. For a contrasting perspective, see David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Bradshaw holds that the bigger problem is Augustine: "Clearly the gulf separating Augustine from the eastern tradition is immense. It encompasses such basic issues as the nature of being, the simplicity of God, the intelligibility of God, and the final goal of human existence. What is perhaps most remarkable is that the Augustinian presuppositions we have sketched could come to dominate the thought of the West, while having virtually no influence in the East, and yet for almost a thousand years neither side recognized what had happened" (p. 229).

It is thus an exaggeration to say, as Fernand Van Steenberghen did, that in the thirteenth century, "For the first time Christian thinkers were to be confronted with Aristotle; his naturalistic view of the universe was to come face to face with the Christian outlook so long familiar to the minds of men."[23] Nonetheless, given the centuries-long absence of most of Aristotle's works from the Latin West, the thirteenth century marked in many respects a new beginning.[24] That this was so is demonstrated not least by the many commentaries on Aristotle's works authored by Aquinas and by his teacher Albert the Great.[25] This does not mean that Albert and Thomas were the first to integrate Aristotle in Latin scholastic theology. Their work had been prepared by many others, to the point that René-Antoine Gauthier suggested that Aquinas inherited an Aristotle "already entirely Christian" and that his effort was to give Aristotle a certain purity, in order to make him an instrument of his own theological reflection.[26] As Fergus Kerr remarked, "Thomas is palpably at home in Aristotle's world: a world that is saturated with purposefulness, a world that is meant to be understood in the sense that it is our nature as rational beings to inquire into the world's order and to come to understand it."[27]

Yet, what did it mean for Aquinas to be "at home in Aristotle's world"? In fact, in the late thirteenth century, some medieval thinkers such as Dietrich of Freiberg sharply criticized Aquinas for wrongly reading Aristotle,[28] that is, for submitting Aristotle to the requirements of Christian theology. In our day, the

[23] Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*, trans. Leonard Johnston (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 59.

[24] See Ralph M. McInerny, *The Question of Christian Ethics* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), pp. 4–5. See also Ralph M. McInerny, "Why I Am a Thomist," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 83 (2009): pp. 323–30; Jude P. Dougherty, "Wretched Aristotle," in *Indubitanter ad Veritatem: Studies Offered to Leo J. Elders SVD in Honor of the Golden Jubilee of his Ordination to the Priesthood*, edited by Jörgen Vijgen (Budel: Damon, 2003), pp. 126–32. For a rebuttal of theological and philosophical efforts to distance Aquinas from Aristotle, see also Ralph M. McInerny, *Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006).

[25] For the relationship between Albert's work and Aquinas's, see the introductions provided by Simon Tugwell in Simon Tugwell, OP, ed., *Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988).

[26] On this, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, vol. 1, The Person and his Work, trans. Robert Royal, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), p. 238.

[27] Fergus Kerr, *Thomas Aquinas: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 28.

[28] See Ruedi Imbach, "Pourquoi Thierry de Freiberg a-t-il critiqué Thomas d'Aquin? Remarques sur le *De accidentibus*," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 45 (1998): pp. 116–29. On this anti-Thomistic reception of Aristotle, see Catherine König-Pralong, "Dietrich de Freiberg: Métaphysicien allemand antithomiste," *RThom* 108 (2008): pp. 57–79. This issue of the French *Revue thomiste* (108/1) is entirely dedicated to anti-Thomism in medieval and modern thought.

degree of Aquinas's real indebtedness to Aristotle has been questioned by Mark Jordan in his *The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas*.[29] Wayne Hankey and Fran O'Rourke have emphasized the Neoplatonic character of Aquinas's thought, often against the view that Aristotle is Aquinas's primary philosophical source.[30] Hankey remarks with regard to Aquinas's philosophy of *esse*, for example, "What served to distinguish Thomas from Aristotle in this regard . . . in fact rather serves to distinguish his position as Neoplatonic as opposed to Aristotelian. Indeed, the characteristics meant to place Thomas and Avicenna together in the tradition of Exodus rather serve to identify their common filiation from Porphyry."[31] In light of Jordan's work and that of others, Kerr observes that calling Aquinas an "Aristotelian" "requires nuancing, in the light of recent scholarship, even if it is plausible at all."[32]

In the period leading up to the Second Vatican Council, Aristotle's role in Catholic theology became a matter of intense debate. Scholars associated with what came to be called the *nouvelle théologie* found the regnant scholastic forms of theology to be dry and overly abstract. They blamed much of this on the influence of Aristotle, as well as on Aquinas's baroque commentators who seemed to them to have minimized the biblical and patristic sources of Aquinas's thought and to have maximized the Aristotelian elements. At issue, in large part, was what is required to ensure the "scientific" character of dogmatic theology.

Marie-Dominique Chenu's early contribution to this debate, *Une École de théologie: Le Saulchoir*, was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1942 and led to his removal from his teaching position.[33] In later works, he

[29] See Mark D. Jordan, *The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992).

[30] See O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius*; Wayne J. Hankey, *God in Himself: Aquinas' Doctrine of God as Expounded in the* Summa Theologiae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). See also the balanced and erudite study by te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*.

[31] Hankey, *God in Himself*, p. 6. See also the numerous more recent studies by Wayne J. Hankey, including his "Denys and Aquinas: Antimodern Cold and Postmodern Hot," in *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, edited by Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 139–84. Simon Tugwell rightly observed that "Thomas had a much sharper awareness than Albert did of the differences between Aristotelianism and Platonism" (Simon Tugwell, OP, "Aquinas: Introduction," in *Albert and Thomas*, pp. 201–351, at 203).

[32] Fergus Kerr, *After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism* (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2002), p. 9.

[33] For discussion see Hans Boersma, *Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 135–48; McInerny, *Praeambula Fidei*, ch. 5: "The Chenu Case"; Janette Gray, R.S.M., "Marie-Dominique Chenu and Le Saulchoir: A Stream of Catholic Renewal," in *Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology*, edited by Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 205–18. See also the particularly important article by Thomas Joseph White, OP, "The Precarity of Wisdom: Modern Dominican Theology, Perspectivalism, and the Tasks of Reconstruction," in *Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Romanus Cessario, OP*, edited by Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), pp. 92–123.

addressed our topic directly. Thus, in *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, Chenu took note of "the innumerable Aristotelian threads that run through the warp and woof of the *Summa theologiae*," and he praised the ways in which Aquinas appropriated and transformed Aristotle's anthropology, "just as grace perfects nature without violence to its original structure."[34] At the same time, he cautioned that Aquinas can only rightly be called an "Aristotelian" so long as we recall that Aquinas's use of Aristotle, like Aelred of Rievaulx's use of Cicero, is "New wine in old skins!"[35] Chenu was critical of the Aristotelianism that he found in the neo-scholastic tradition, and he often complained of the confines of Aristotelian logic when taken too strictly.[36]

From the same time period, Josef Pieper's *Guide to Thomas Aquinas* devoted a good bit of attention to Aquinas's use of Aristotle. For Pieper, it was necessary to insist that Aquinas is not an "Aristotelian," lest the Platonic and Neoplatonic aspects of Aquinas's thought be overlooked.[37] Of course Pieper did not thereby mean to deny that Aquinas made extensive recourse to Aristotle. On the contrary, "We find Thomas giving us ever new shades of the fundamental Aristotelian position. Aristotle, he says, refuses to withdraw from the realities present to the senses, refuses to be distracted from those things that are evident to the eyes. And Thomas himself emphatically accepted this principle."[38] Yet Aquinas did not do so, Pieper emphasized, in the manner of some earlier medieval students of Aristotle, who embraced Aristotle's thought as an antidote to the spiritual symbolism that had previously dominated the medieval worldview. Pieper held that Aquinas instead "succeeded in uniting this hearty worldliness with the radicality of the evangelical spirit, which has always rather tended toward negation of the world, or at least toward unworldliness."[39] Entranced by the creation, Aquinas could embrace "Aristotle's fundamental attitude toward the universe, in his affirmation of the

[34] Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, pp. 29 and 31.

[35] Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas*, p. 29. For its force, Chenu's comparison requires that one know that one third of Aelred's *Spiritual Friendship* (along with the structure of this work) is drawn directly from Cicero's *De amicitia*.

[36] See for example Marie-Dominique Chenu, OP, *Is Theology a Science?*, trans. Adrian H. N. Green-Armytage (London: Hawthorn Books, 1959), p. 78. Nonetheless, Chenu affirmed that "the Church's preference for Thomism is based upon the coherence of a system which, through centuries of flux in philosophy and religious experience, has proved the best adapted to keep the truths of religion in their right place—truths which may easily become distorted by their very attractiveness, whether in the passionate preaching of the Gospel or in the discovery of the powers of pure reason. The maintenance of a wise balance guarantees the breadth of his thought" (p. 112). See also Pope John Paul II's reflections on Aquinas and Aristotle in his *Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of the Millennium* (New York: Rizzoli International Publications, 2005), pp. 39–41.

[37] Josef Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), p. 43.

[38] Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, p. 44.

[39] Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, p. 48.

concrete and sensuous reality of the world" precisely on theological grounds.[40] In Pieper's phrase, Aquinas could be both "*for* the 'Gospel' and *for* 'Aristotle.'"[41] Pieper concluded: "Thomas was neither Platonist nor Aristotelian; he was both."[42]

When Chenu and Pieper were writing, the theological interpretation of Aquinas generally emphasized his indebtedness to Aristotle. If today the theological situation is quite different, especially outside of the domain of theological ethics, it behooves us to examine why Aquinas found Aristotle's philosophy so valuable for all areas of theology. It is not possible in a short work to examine each of the *Summa*'s "innumerable Aristotelian threads." The scope of the present work is limited. But the studies contained here, written by theologians, philosophers, and medievalists, should help readers to see how and why Aquinas found Aristotle useful in Christian theology.

As a final step, let us briefly survey the ten chapters of this work. Some of them take as their main goal a faithful historical exposition of Aquinas's use of Aristotle on a particular topic. Others, while striving to describe Aquinas's use of Aristotle with historical accuracy, envision a primarily constructive and contemporary context for their work. The ordering of the chapters follows the plan of the (unfinished) *Summa theologiae*, beginning with God and ending with the sacraments. The opening chapter, by Gilles Emery, delves into Aquinas's use of Aristotle in his theology of the Trinity. As Emery shows, Aristotle is a major source for the structure, the concepts, and language that Aquinas employs in order to deepen his theological account of the revealed mystery. Serge-Thomas Bonino treats Aristotle's role in the angelology of Aquinas, both in his *Summa theologiae* and in other works such as his *De substantiis separatis*. Aquinas uses Aristotle to reflect upon the integrity of angelic nature and angelic action, the possible modes of angelic movement and knowledge, the immateriality of angels, and the fact that each angel is its own specific form. Raymond Hain treats Aristotle's influence on Aquinas's doctrine of the soul. Aquinas thinks that Aristotle considers the soul to be separable and immortal, but even so, the soul is the form of the body and thus is genuinely united to matter. On this basis, Hain addresses the issue of the resurrection of the body and the soul's existence after death. Matthew Levering takes up Aristotle's role in Aquinas's treatise on the Old Law. Aquinas uses Aristotle to help him show that the Mosaic law is a good and reasonable law, the kind of law that one would want one's community to have. Simon Francis Gaine examines Aristotle's role in Aquinas's theology of grace, and shows how Aquinas employed Aristotle to clarify important matters pertaining to our deification. Guy Mansini argues that Aquinas's understanding of charity as

[40] Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, p. 49. [41] Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, p. 49.
[42] Pieper, *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, p. 22. Pieper refers here to Louis-Bertrand Geiger, OP, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Vrin, 1942).

friendship accords, both strictly and analogously, with Aristotle's definition of friendship. Christopher A. Franks presents Aquinas's use of Aristotle with respect to the virtue of justice. Aquinas takes his definition of justice from Aristotle, so that our rights flow from our concretely embodied relational duties rather than grounding these relational duties. Mary Catherine Sommers discusses Aquinas's theology of contemplation and action. She notes that Aristotle offers eight arguments in support of the view that the contemplative life is better than the active life, and Aquinas uses all of them in *ST* II-II, q. 182. Yet Aquinas holds that Christ, though he did not live the contemplative life, lived the most perfect life. Corey L. Barnes reflects upon Aquinas's Christology as exhibiting what it means to do theology as an Aristotelian *scientia*, with particular attention to fittingness, *actiones sunt suppositorum*, instrumentality, and Christ's resurrection. Lastly, John P. Yocum traces Aquinas's use of Aristotle in his teaching on the sacraments. Aquinas combines Augustine's theory of signs with Aristotle's views of human learning through the senses. Aquinas also employs Aristotle's doctrine of causality to express the way in which the sacraments cause grace and lead us to our supernatural fulfillment.

We wish to express our particular thanks to Émile Friche, a doctoral candidate at the University of Fribourg who currently serves as Gilles Emery's Research Assistant. Émile unified the style of references in the footnotes, he helped to draw up the final bibliography and the indices, and he also contributed in numerous other ways to the preparation of this work.

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Matthew Levering

Contents

Abbreviations

Ang.	*Angelicum*
De malo	Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*
De potentia	Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*
De veritate	Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*
In Physic.	Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio libri Physicorum* (or *Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis*)
In Sent.	Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* (I *Sent.* = commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*, and so on)
Leonine ed.	Thomas Aquinas, *Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita*, Cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome–Paris: Commissio Leonina, 1882–)
Marietti ed.	Thomas Aquinas, *Opera* (Marietti: Turin)
PG	*Patrologia Graeca*, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris
RSPhTh	*Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*
RThom	*Revue thomiste*
SCG	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*
Sent. Ethic.	Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*
Sent. Metaph.	Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Metaphysicae* (or *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*)
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* (*ST* I = *Prima Pars*; *ST* I-II = *Prima Secundae*; *ST* II-II = *Secunda Secundae*; *ST* III = *Tertia Pars*)
Thom.	*The Thomist*
TS	*Theological Studies*

References to Aquinas's and Aristotle's works follow the standard divisions of these works and in some cases also include paragraph or line numbers of the relevant editions. In the references to Aquinas's works, numbers given in parentheses (no./nos.) refer to the paragraphs of the Leonine and Marietti editions. For details about editions and English translations of these works, see the bibliography.

In addition to abbreviations for Aquinas's works, we make use of other common abbreviations:

a.	*articulus*
aa.	*articuli*
ad	reply to an argument (to an objection)
arg.	argument (= objection)
ch(s).	chapter(s)

col.	column
dist.	*distinctio(nes)*
lect.	*lectio*
q.	*quaestio*
qq.	*quaestiones*
un.	*unicus*

The names of Bible books are abbreviated according to Michael D. Coogan, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Books of the Bible*, vol. 1, Acts–LXX (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. xxiii–xxx.

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1

Central Aristotelian Themes in Aquinas's Trinitarian Theology

Gilles Emery, OP

This chapter asks the following question: what are the central Aristotelian themes that Aquinas uses in his Trinitarian theology? Or, more generally: what is Aristotle's influence on Aquinas's account of the Trinity? In what follows, after some preliminary observations, I will limit myself to *explicit references* made to Aristotle in the context of Trinitarian writings by Aquinas, with no pretense of being exhaustive.

Two preliminary observations are in order. Firstly, in *ST* I, qq. 27–43, Aristotle is far from being the main source quoted or mentioned by Aquinas. That honor belongs, not surprisingly, to Holy Scripture. Aristotle is cited or mentioned explicitly twenty-four times (if we count a reference in an objection and its discussion in the reply as one single occurrence)—roughly the same as the number of references to Boethius. It is fewer than the number of citations of Hilary of Poitiers, and four times fewer than references to St. Augustine (whom Aquinas mentions a little more than one hundred times). Certainly, the mere number of explicit quotes and references is not enough in order to evaluate the importance of Aristotle (and of other authors as well), since Aristotle is present in the background of many texts that do not explicitly mention him. So, for example, there is no explicit mention of Aristotle in the first article of *ST* I, q. 27 on the processions, but the parallel article in the *De potentia* shows an explicit use of Aristotle (see section 1.3). A complete study of Aristotle's presence in Aquinas's Trinitarian theology goes beyond the scope of the present study. The metaphysics of being, act, and simplicity is omnipresent and plays a decisive role that will not be examined here.

Secondly, when St. Thomas deals with the mystery of the Trinity, his discourse proceeds on two levels. The first is that of the mystery itself, namely, the mystery of the Trinity as the "object" of faith and of theological contemplation, the mystery confessed and taught. Aristotle, not surprisingly, does not appear on this level; indeed, he is explicitly excluded from this level, since philosophers

were not able to discern that God is Triune, a truth that only revelation makes known. The second level is that of the *concepts* that allow us to account for the faith, and that of the analysis of our *language*, our mode of speaking about God (*intellectus fidei*). These two levels are closely interconnected but their distinction is essential in order to avoid confusions. The use of Aristotle is of capital importance on the second level. I have distinguished three spheres of influence: firstly, structural themes that shaped Aquinas's Trinitarian theology; secondly, central concepts of Trinitarian theology that are explicitly marked by the influence of Aristotle; and thirdly, the place of Aristotle's logic of signification and of predication, and of the Aristotelian doctrine on human knowledge.[1]

1.1. STRUCTURAL THEMES OF TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY DRAWN FROM ARISTOTLE

1.1.1. Immanent Action

At the very start of the study of "what concerns the Trinity of the persons in God" (*ST* I, q. 27, a. 1), Aquinas explains that the fundamental mistake of both Arianism and Sabellianism was to understand the divine processions as directed toward something external, so that neither of them posited a procession *within* God himself. The only way to do justice to the faith is to take the divine processions not as involving an action directed toward something external, but as involving an action that remains within the agent and that gives rise to a procession *ad intra*. Here, Aquinas does not refer to Aristotle, but in the parallel article of *De potentia* (q. 10, a. 1, corpus) he gives three references to Aristotle: *Metaphysics* X, to show how words implying movement—and that primarily apply to sensible things—can be attributed to immaterial beings;[2]

[1] Aquinas's indebtedness to Aristotle's *doctrines*, *concepts*, and *method* (including predication in Trinitarian theology) is underlined by James Doig, "Aquinas and Aristotle," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas*, edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 33–44, at 39–41. My references to St. Thomas's works are taken from the Leonine edition; when a work has not been published in the Leonine edition, I use the Marietti edition, with two exceptions: *Summa theologiae*, ed. Institutum Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviense, 5 vols. (Ottawa: Harpell, 1941–1945); *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, vol. 1, ed. Pierre Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929). English translations of St. Thomas are taken, with some modifications, from "St. Thomas Aquinas' Works in English," Dominican House of Studies, Washington, DC, accessed February 20, 2015, <http://dhspriory.org/thomas/>. English translations of Aristotle (including the division of Aristotle's works in books and chapters) are taken from *The Works of Aristotle*, trans. William D. Ross, 2 vols. (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952). In the limits of this study, I do not specify (apart from a few exceptions) the Latin translations of Aristotle used by Aquinas.

[2] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X,4 (1055a8–10); see also Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 67, a. 2, ad 3; *ST* I-II, q. 7, a. 1, corpus; *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus in communi*, a. 11, corpus.

De anima III, to show that "movement" (*motus*) can be taken in a broad sense for any kind of operation, including understanding as *actus perfecti*;[3] and *Physics* III, to distinguish such operation from movement as *actus imperfecti*.[4] It is on this basis that Aquinas develops his explanations of two kinds of operations that give rise to processions in creatures, and that are also said of God by analogy: firstly, "transitive operation" that leads to the procession of something external (creation, conservation, government); and secondly, "immanent operation" that gives rise to an immanent procession. The most illuminating reference to Aristotle is found at the beginning of the second book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*:

> There are, however, two sorts of operation, as Aristotle teaches in *Metaphysics* IX: one that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, such as the acts of heating, cutting and building. Now, both kinds of operation belong to God: the former, in that he understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; that latter, in that he brings things into being, preserves them, and governs them.[5]

Although Aristotle had hardly any idea of the "immanent procession" of a term really distinct from its principle in the acts of understanding and willing,[6] he provided Aquinas with the fundamental key that allows an account of the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, in order to avoid the pitfalls of Arianism and Sabellianism.

1.1.2. "Ordo Disciplinae": Processions, Relations, and Persons

Aquinas inherits the tradition that the divine persons are distinguished by *relative* properties; names like "Father" and "Son" signify a relation. However, he goes further than that in affirming that the divine persons are *constituted* by a relation ("personal relation"), and that the divine persons *are* relations that

[3] Aristotle, *De anima* III,7 (431a6–7); see also Aquinas, *ST* I, q. 18, a. 1, corpus.

[4] Aristotle, *Physics* III,1 (201b31–32); see also (among other references) Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1.

[5] *SCG* II, ch. 1 (nos. 853–854): "Est autem duplex rei operatio, ut Philosophus tradit, in IX *Metaphysicae*: una quidem quae in ipso operante manet et est ipsius operantis perfectio, ut sentire, intelligere et velle; alia vero quae in exteriorem rem transit, quae est perfectio facti quod per ipsam constituitur, ut calefacere, secare et aedificare. Utraque autem dictarum operationum competit Deo: prima quidem in eo quod intelligit, vult, gaudet et amat; alia vero in eo quod res in esse producit, et eas conservat et regit." Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX,8 (1050a23–b3). See also Aquinas, *Sent. Metaph.* IX, lect. 8 (nos. 1862–1865); *Sent. Ethic.* I, lect. 1, with the same reference to *Metaphysics* IX (Leonine ed., vol. 47/1, p. 6).

[6] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX,8 (1050a34–b1): "Of some there is no product (*ergon*) apart from the act (*energeia*); the act exists in them: so the seeing is in the one seeing, the contemplation is in the one contemplating, and life is in the soul."

subsist. In order to show this, the *Summa theologiae* unfolds in a precise order: firstly, processions (q. 27); secondly, relations (q. 28); and thirdly, persons (q. 29). This order is rooted in Aristotle's teaching on relation. Aquinas often recalls, with reference to Aristotle, that real relations can have only two foundations, that is, two causes that make a real relation exist in a subject: (1) quantity, and (2) action/passion. "According to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* V, every relation is based (*fundatur*) either on quantity, e.g. double and half; or on action and passion, e.g. maker and made, father and son, master and servant, and the like."[7] In fact, Aristotle's text mentions three kinds of "relatives."[8] Aquinas's commentary on the *Metaphysics* specifies that quantity and action/passion are the foundations of relations according to which "things are relative" insofar as these things are referred to something else, and not because something else is referred to them.[9] Put otherwise, only quantity and action/passion can be the cause of relations that are bilaterally real. On the one hand, quantity must be excluded from God. On the other hand, there is no "passive" in God: "The only 'passive' that we posit among the divine persons is grammatical (*solum grammatice loquendo*), according to our mode of signifying; i.e. we speak of the Father *begetting* and of the Son *being begotten*."[10] Thus, only actions remain to account for real relations. In God, these are "notional acts" (to beget, to spirate) that give rise to processions (to be begotten, to proceed), namely processions that correspond to actions that remain within the agent.[11]

This Aristotelian analysis of relation explains the structure of the first three questions of the *Summa*'s Trinitarian treatise: since the divine person will be understood as a subsisting relation (q. 29), the study of the person requires a teaching on relations (q. 28), which in turn presupposes a study of the processions (q. 27). The order of teaching will therefore be: processions,

[7] *ST* I, q. 28, a. 4, corpus: "Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in *V Metaphys*., relatio omnis fundatur vel supra quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium; vel supra actionem et passionem, ut faciens et factum, pater et filius, dominus et servus, et huiusmodi." *In I Sent*., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4: "Ut patet ex Philosopho, V *Metaph*., ubi dicit, quod quaedam fundantur supra quantitatem et quaedam supra actionem." *In Physic*. III, lect. 1 (no. 280): "Hanc igitur divisionem manifeste expressit Philosophus in *V Metaphys*.; sed hic breviter tangit, dicens quod *ad aliquid* aliud quidem est secundum superabundantiam et defectum; quod quidem fundatur super quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium; aliud autem secundum activum et passivum, et motivum et mobile." Explicit references to Aristotle on the foundation of relations are found in other places, for instance in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 9, corpus; q. 8, a. 3, arg. 7; q. 10, a. 3, arg. 2; *In I Sent*., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3.

[8] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V,15 (1020b26–1021b11). The third kind concerns the relative "as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception."

[9] Aquinas, *Sent. Metaph.* V, lect. 17 (no. 1026).

[10] *ST* I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 3. In God, "to proceed" is an *act*. See *In I Sent*., dist. 20, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1: "It is by one and the same operation that the Father begets and the Son is begotten, but this operation is in the Father and in the Son according to two distinct relations (*sed haec operatio est in Patre et Filio secundum aliam et aliam relationem*)."

[11] *ST* I, q. 27, a. 5, corpus: "Processiones in divinis accipi non possunt nisi secundum actiones quae in agente manent."

then relations, and finally persons. This order rests largely on Aristotle's teaching on the foundation of real relations.

1.1.3. Relative Opposition

Relative opposition is central to St. Thomas's Trinitarian theology: the divine persons are distinguished by virtue of relative opposition (which also accounts for the equality and consubstantiality of the divine persons).[12] The Trinitarian theme of "opposition" comes from St. Basil of Caesarea,[13] and was then elaborated in the Latin West by St. Anselm of Canterbury: Aquinas did not invent it, but developed his teaching in the line of St. Anselm. What characterizes Aquinas's teaching on relative opposition is the systematic analysis of "opposition," which is guided by Aristotle.

Firstly, Aquinas refers to Aristotle in order to show that "every distinction or division is either by quantity or by form," so that there can be no distinction among immaterial things except by some opposition.[14] Since there is no quantity in God, the distinction of the divine persons has to do with an opposition of the formal order:

> Every formal distinction is by reason of some opposition, especially in things of the same genus: because a genus is divided by contrary differences, by which the species are distinguished, as is said in *Metaphysics* X. Accordingly, if there be a distinction between the divine processions, this must be by reason of some opposition.[15]

[12] *ST* I, q. 28, a. 3.

[13] Basil of Caesarea, *Against Eunomius* II,28, in Basil of Caesarea, *Contre Eunome, Suivi de Eunome, Apologie*, trans. Bernard Sesboüé (Paris: Cerf, 1983), p. 120; see also II, 26 (p. 108): "*antithesis*." On this, see Gilles Emery, OP, *The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God*, trans. Matthew Levering (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), pp. 87–8.

[14] *In I Sent*., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 2, corpus: "Et ideo dicimus, quod nihil aliud est principium distinctionis in divinis, nisi relatio. Cujus ratio est, quia omnis distinctio vel divisio est vel per quantitatem vel per formam, secundum Philosophum. Secundum quantitatem vel materiam, divisio in divinis non est, cum non sit ibi quantitas et materia. Omnis autem distinctionis formalis principium est aliqua oppositio." *SCG* IV, ch. 24 (no. 3612): "In rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione . . . non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem." *In Physic*. III, lect. 12 (no. 394): "Est autem duplex divisio: una formalis, quae est per opposita; et alia secundum quantitatem." *Compendium theologiae* I, ch. 60: "Formalis distinctio non est nisi per oppositionem." See also *Sent. Metaph*. IV, lect. 3 (no. 566).

[15] *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 2, arg. 2: "Omnis autem formalis distinctio est per aliquam oppositionem, et maxime eorum quae sunt unius generis: nam genus dividitur contrariis differentiis, per quas species distinguuntur, ut dicitur in X *Metaph*. Oportet ergo, si processiones distinguantur in divinis, quod hoc sit ratione alicuius oppositionis." The argument is conceded. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X,8 (1058a9–10): "For all things are divided by opposites (*ἀντικειμένοις*)." Aquinas, *Sent. Metaph*. X, lect. 10 (nos. 2120–2121): "Videmus enim quod omnia genera dividuntur per opposita. Quod quidem necesse est. Nam ea quae non sunt opposita, possunt

Secondly, Thomas receives from Aristotle's *Categories* 10 (11b15–13b35),[16] *Metaphysics* V,10 (1018a20–21), and *Metaphysics* X,4 (1055a38–b1), the four kinds of "opposites" that he discusses in the context of Trinitarian theology: contradictories, contraries, opposites according to privation and possession, and relatives. He therefore holds: (1) the opposition of affirmation and negation; (2) the opposition of contrariety (*contrarietas*, which implies a diversity of form); (3) the opposition of possession and privation; and (4) the opposition of relation. On this basis, Aquinas notes (once again with Aristotle) that the oppositions of negation, contrariety, and privation either remove the other term or include an opposition of contradiction—which is not the case with relatives.[17]

According to Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle, the opposition of relation is the only one that *does not suppress* one of the terms, and which, in itself, *does not imply any imperfection* in one term by comparison with the correlative term.[18] This trait holds special interest for Trinitarian theology: it allows one to show that the divine persons are *distinguished* by "opposed relations of origin," while preserving the perfect *equality* and *consubstantiality* of these persons.

1.1.4. Two Immanent Actions in an Intellectual Nature: Understanding and Willing

Aquinas's account of the Trinity retains only two immanent actions in God, namely, *intelligere* and *velle*, which give rise to the processions of the Word (the Son) and of Love (the Holy Spirit).[19] The analogical foundation of this thesis can be found in the following statement: "In an intellectual nature, there are only two [operations that remain within the agent], namely, understanding and willing."[20] The analogy ("similitude") of the "diction of the word" and of

simul existere in eodem." In *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 5, corpus, Aquinas also refers to Aristotle's *De caelo* I,9 (278b1–8).

[16] On things "opposed as relatives," see Aristotle, *Categories* 10 (11b24–33).

[17] *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 8, ad 4: "Oppositio relationis in duobus differt ab aliis oppositionibus: quorum primum est quod in aliis oppositis unum dicitur alteri opponi, in quantum ipsum removet: negatio enim removet affirmationem, et secundum hoc ei opponitur; oppositio vero privationis et habitus et contrarietatis includit oppositionem contradictionis, ut IV *Metaph.* dicitur. Non autem est hoc in relativis." Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV,6 (1011b15–22).

[18] *In I Sent*., dist. 26, q. 2, a. 2, corpus; *SCG* IV, ch. 24 (no. 3612); *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 8, ad 4; *De potentia*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 13.

[19] *ST* I, q. 27, a. 5, corpus: "Processiones in divinis accipi non possunt nisi secundum actiones quae in agente manent. Huiusmodi autem actiones in natura intellectuali et divina non sunt nisi duae, scilicet intelligere et velle. . . . Relinquitur igitur quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo, nisi Verbi et Amoris."

[20] *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 9, corpus: "operationes quae non transeunt extra, sed manent in operante. Hae autem in natura intellectuali sunt solum duae, scilicet intelligere et velle."

the "spiration of love," on which the entire Trinitarian treatise of the *Summa* is built, rests precisely on this.

The absence of the theme of "memory" in *ST* I, qq. 27–43 represents a certain shift from Augustine's *De Trinitate*.[21] This shift is not completely new. Before Thomas, Albert the Great (who adopted an Arabic–Aristotelian epistemology) had proposed a reductive reading of Augustinian illumination, by replacing Augustinian memory with the agent intellect (whereas, for Augustine, memory is the site of the mind's illumination, the place where God dwells): in Albert's Dionysian commentaries, memory plays almost no role.[22] Thomas continued the trajectory that Albert started.

Aquinas's discussion of memory is extremely complex, and reveals an evolution of his own thought.[23] In the limited scope of this study, I will consider only one aspect of his teaching. For Aquinas, the "memory belonging to the mind" (by contrast with the sensitive memory) pertains to the intellect: "Memory is not a power distinct from the intellect."[24] To be more precise, memory is the place of the conservation of intelligible *species*, and it is part of the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). Aquinas grounds this view in his reading of Aristotle: "From its nature, the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But in *De anima* III, the Philosopher attributes this to the intellect . . . Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect."[25] The tension between the Augustinian heritage and Aristotelian psychology comes to the fore in the following objection, taken from the *De veritate*: "Different acts belong to different powers. But the possible intellect and memory, as part of the mind, have the same act, namely, to preserve species (*species retinere*). Now, *Augustine assigns this function to memory and the Philosopher assigns it to the possible intellect*."[26] Consequently, since the soul's powers are distinguished from one another by their acts and by the formal nature of their objects, Aquinas assigns memory to the intellect, here again

[21] The triad of memory, understanding, and will or love, is discussed in the context of the image of the Trinity (*ST* I, q. 93), but not in *ST* I, qq. 27–43.

[22] See Bernhard Blankenhorn, OP, "How the Early Albertus Magnus Transformed Augustinian Interiority," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 58 (2011): pp. 351–86. For what follows, I am indebted to Bernhard Blankenhorn, OP, "Aquinas as Interpreter of Augustinian Illumination in Light of Albertus Magnus," *Nova et Vetera* 10 (2012): pp. 689–713.

[23] See Marco F. Manzanedo, *La imaginación y la memoria según Santo Tomás* (Roma: Herder, 1978).

[24] *ST* I, q. 79, a. 7, corpus: "Memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu."

[25] *ST* I, q. 79, a. 7, sed contra; cf. a. 6, ad 1. Aristotle, *De anima* III,4 (429a27–29): "It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms,' though this description holds only of the intellective soul, and even this is the forms only potentially, not actually."

[26] *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 3, arg. 1 (emphasis mine). The answer reads: "Although memory as belonging to the mind is not a power distinct from the possible intellect, there is a distinction between memory and possible intellect according to orientation to different things" (*De veritate*, q. 10, a. 3, ad 1).

drawing on his reading of Aristotle's *De anima*.[27] Aquinas thus denies that memory may be a power different from the intellect.[28]

In the treatment of the *imago Dei* in *ST* I, q. 93, although St. Thomas does value the triad "memory, understanding, and will,"[29] memory plays no essential role. In Aquinas's view, Augustine "locates the image of the divine Trinity more in *actual understanding and actual willing*, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in certain way."[30] The image of the Trinity is found primarily in the *acts* of the soul—acts that have God as their object and that have a likeness with God's own acts (the diction of the Word, and the spiration of Love).[31] This modest place given to memory is due, at least in part, to the prevalence of Aristotelian psychology.

1.2. CENTRAL CONCEPTS OF TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

A good number of concepts central for Trinitarian theology are explained in direct reference to Aristotle. With no pretense of being exhaustive, I will limit myself to a presentation of the most significant ones.

1.2.1. Substance

In his discussion of the "person," Aquinas explains the word "substance" in reference to Aristotle. A special attention is paid to the distinction between "first substance" and "second substance" according to *Metaphysics* V,8 (1017b23–26) and *Categories* 5.[32] Aquinas specifies that, although the singular as such cannot be defined, Aristotle's definition of "first substance" ("the ultimate subject, which is not predicated of something else") concerns what pertains to the "common *ratio* of singularity."[33]

[27] *ST* I, q. 79, a. 7, corpus; cf. q. 77, a. 3, sed contra.

[28] On the interpretation of St. Augustine by Aquinas, see *ST* I, q. 79, a. 7, ad 1: "Augustine does not take these three (memory, intelligence, and will) as three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will." See also *ST* I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 3. We should note that, in his commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas accepted that every property (*proprietas*) consecutive to the essence of the soul may be called a "power of the soul" (*potentia animae*), so that "there are three powers distinct from another: memory, intelligence, and will" (*In I Sent*., dist. 3, q. 4, a. 1, corpus).

[29] See, for instance, *ST* I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 2.

[30] *ST* I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 3 (emphasis mine).

[31] *ST* I, q. 93, a. 8.

[32] *ST* I, q. 29, a. 2, corpus; *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 1, corpus.

[33] *ST* I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1.