VIRGINIE COLLOMBIER & OLIVIER ROY (EDS)

TRIBES AND GLOBAL JIHADISM

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(*Editors*)

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GLOSSARY

'Aib: Sin, sinful, shameful.

Aila: (pl. ailat) Lineage, extended family.

'Asabiyya: Any group of solidarity bound by personal ties or kinship relations.

Alizai: Major tribe of the Panjpai branch of the Durrani tribal confederation. One of the three biggest tribes in Helmand (see Noorzai and Barakzai for others). Apart from the first Taliban government (1995–2001), they provided Helmand's provincial governors between 1993 and 2005. They live in the north of Helmand, in the ancient district of Zamindawar (modern districts of Baghran, Musa Qala, Kajaki and northern Sangin).

Barakzai: One of the three biggest tribes in Helmand (see Alizai and Noorzai). Mohammadzai branch provided the royal lineage from 1826 to 1973. Concentrated in central Helmand, they control Gereshk. Generally fought under the Hizb franchise during the jihad in central Helmand.

Dawlat-i islami: 'Islamic state'.

***Harakat-e Enqelab-e Islami* (*Harakat*)**: Traditionalist Afghan mujahidin group fighting against Soviet forces. Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi was leader. Operated across southern Afghanistan. Was part of the 'Peshawar Seven' coalition of mujahidin parties. In Helmand, the most important commander was Nasim Akhundzada.

***Hizb-e Islami* (*Hizb*)**: Two factions: Khales and Gulbuddin. Gulbuddin faction prominent in Helmand. Most well-funded mujahidin party, but was dropped by Pakistan upon the rise of the Taliban in 1994. One of the two major mujahidin parties represented in Helmand alongside Harakat. Prominent commanders include Malem Mir Wali, Abdul Rahman Khan and Hafizullah Khan.

Ishaqzai: The most marginalised of the Durrani tribes in Helmand. Important under the Taliban during 1995–2001, they provided senior commanders for the movement. Heavily persecuted by the Alakozai post-2001. Mainly live south of Sangin, Now Zad and Garmsir although there are some in Nad-e Ali, where they moved (illegally) during the jihad.

Jahiliyyah: The time of 'ignorance' that preceded the Revelation of the Prophet Mohammad.

***Jamiat-e Islami* (*Jamiat*)**: Islamic political party in Afghanistan similar to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Oldest Islamic political party in Afghanistan. Communitarian ideology based on Islamic law but is also considered moderately progressive. From 1968 to 2011 the official leader of Jamiat was Burhanuddin Rabbani. Major commanders include Ahmad Shah Masoud and Ismail Khan. Akhwaendi was the Amir in Helmand.

Jihad: lit. struggle (Arabic). Like the religious terms of any religion this is open to different interpretations. Appears in the Quran as 'striving in the way of God' [as in a mental struggle]; however, can be interpreted to mean physical fighting.

Khalq/Khalqi: More extreme of the two factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Was in power in Kabul in 1978/9; however, the army remained Khalqi-dominated throughout the 1980s. Ideologically defined the militias in Lashkar Gah at the end of the 1980s. Important leaders include Taraki and Amin.

Kharoti: Important Ghilzai tribe. Very prominent in Nad-e Ali, where they compete with the Noorzai for district leadership. Important members include Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (leader of Hizb) and Hafizullah Amin (president in 1979). Closely allied to Taliban narrative in Nad-e Ali.

Mahaz: Mujahidin party led by Pir Gailani. Probably the most poorly funded party because they represented the old moderate (royal) order which the ISI did not wish to re-empower. Many commanders in Helmand allied with Mahaz and then switched when it was unable to provide them with enough weapons and funding.

Mahaz: system cf. nezami system. Channelled, patronage model of Taliban supply and organisation. Very similar to how the jihad was organised with the different parties being analogous to the different mahazes.

Malik: In Afghanistan, traditional clan and village leaders.

Mujahidin: lit. holy warriors. In the context of Afghanistan it means those who fought in the anti-communist resistance, but the fighters currently fighting the government also call themselves mujahidin.

Nezami: system lit. organised or military. cf. mahaz system. A more institutional, centralised form of supply and organisation instituted in 2009 by the Taliban. Not fully implemented in Helmand.

Noorzai: One of the big three Helmandi tribes (see Alizai and Barakzai). Previously, they were marginalised from Helmandi politics due to their location in Now Zad, Washir and Garmsir; however, during the 1990s they occupied abandoned land in Nad-e Ali and Marjeh, as they were in control of the Helmandi police in the post-2001 era. Also significant in Kandahar province.

Parcham / Parchami: Less extreme faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (see Khalq). Ruled from 1979 until 1992. Dominated Khad (and its successor organisations) during that time. Important leaders include Karmal and Najibullah.

Pashtunwali: Tribal customs among Pashtuns in Afghanistan.

Qabila: (pl. qaba'il) Tribe, clan.

Qaraba: Kinship.

Qaum: lit. kin group, tribe, race or people. Often used in the sense of a social solidarity group.

Taraki, Noor Mohammad: Afghan president from 1978 to 1979. A member of the more extreme Khalq faction of the People's Democratic

Party of Afghanistan, he was ousted by Amin. Responsible for the reforms (esp. land reforms) that caused so much damage and resentment in Helmandi society. Also a tribe.

Sharia: Islamic religious law.

Sadah: Supposedly descendants of the Prophet; may constitute a local cast of 'holy men'.

Sheikh: (pl. shuyukh) Tribal leader, elder; religious or spiritual leader.

Surge: US counter insurgency directed against the Sunni upheaval in Iraq in 2007.

Takfir: Declaring somebody an 'unbeliever' although they claim to be Muslim and might abide with the main precepts of Islam.

Ummah: The community of Muslims worldwide that are bound together by their religion.

'Urf: Customary law.

Watan: Territory, homeland.

INTRODUCTION

Olivier Roy

When looking at a map of the local Islamic emirates pledging allegiance to either al-Qaeda (AQ) or Islamic State (IS), or to those connected to them like the Taliban in Afghanistan, a strange phenomenon appears: they are all situated in tribal areas, meaning areas where tribal rules and customs are the predominant forms of social and/or political organization. Certainly, tribal areas are often remote and can provide better protection against state or foreign counter-insurgency operations, but this does not suffice to explain the association (Falluja in Iraq and Abyan in Yemen are not remote places). Of course, not all tribal leaders or tribesmen are jihadists (as highlighted by the case of the Egyptian Awlad 'Ali in Chapter 3 by Thomas Hüsken), and not all jihadists come from a tribe; but all 'Islamic emirates' are in tribal lands: Afghanistan, Pakistan, northern Iraq, Yemen, Sinai, Sahel, Somalia and, if we take a more flexible definition of tribes, the area under the influence of Boko Haram.

There is an old tradition of association between tribes and 'fundamentalist' leaders (for instance, the North-West Frontier Province in the British Raj, the Saud in Nejd, without going back to the Almohads and Almoravids). The state/tribe confrontation is not new, and neither

is the mobilization of tribes for jihad in the colonial context (the Mahdi in Sudan, the various '*mad mollahs*' in the Pashtun belt, Iraq in the 1920s, for instance, or Libya against the Italians). All used 'jihad' as the justification and tool for their resistance. But the meaning of jihad itself has evolved: the spread in less than thirty years of 'Islamic emirates' in tribal areas, from the Atlantic to the Indus, is very different from the colonial past: the jihadists nowadays do not fight to protect a specific territory; they proclaim a global jihad against a global enemy, and they connect to the global world by pledging allegiance to a global jihadist movement.

A personal encounter

My first encounter with a 'non-state Islamic state' was in August 1985, when I (illegally) crossed the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan somewhere east of Chitral during the mujahidin upheaval against the Soviet invasion. In the early morning, after crossing the Bashgal river, I was stopped at a mujahidin checkpoint and was asked to show my visa for the 'Islamic state' (*dawlat-i islami*), a visa that was supposed to be provided by the Islamic state 'consulate' in Chitral. I did not have one, but was granted a provisional visa to meet the 'amir', Mollah Afzal, trained in the Panjpir madrasa in Pakistan controlled by the Ahl-i Hadith movement (close to the Wahhabis). Because I had known the place for years, it did not take me long to understand that the 'Islamic state' in fact corresponded to the territory of the Kati tribe around Barg-i Matal. The traditional tribal leaders had disappeared, either killed, jailed or exiled, and *sharia* had supposedly replaced the local customs and traditions. There was an interesting consequence: the mollahs were making the men till the land instead of letting their womenfolk do it, in order to allow the women to stay at home and look after the domestic goat breeding, which until then had been men's work. Unfortunately, I was not able to go back later to assess the anthropological consequences of the Salafization of tribal customs. The local Salafis, as all these neo-fundamentalist militants called themselves, were either trained by Wahhabis or in more traditional Pakistani madrasas where the courses became 'Salafized' under Saudi influence, and they rapidly turned anti-Western. The beautifully carved wooden mosques and graves were erased, with the former replaced by ugly cement minarets. The scheme was repeated

some years later by the 'amir' Jamil ur-Rahman in the Pashto-speaking area south of Nuristan, which also corresponded to a tribe: the Safi. At the beginning, the only connection to a 'global Islam' was through the Salafi religious networks, which provided money, weapons and grants for study in their own madrasas, either in Pakistan or, increasingly, in the Gulf countries.

A year before, in 1984, I had travelled to the southern part of Afghanistan and discovered a network of madrasas turned into military units (*jabhahs* or 'fronts') stretching from the upper Arghandab valley to Kandahar. They called themselves 'Taliban' and would make the name famous ten years later. The scheme was slightly different: these madrasas were established in the midst of tribal areas, but extended their political control beyond the various tribal and clan boundaries (also because, as Mike Martin describes in Chapter 2, in southern Afghanistan tribes are territorially more intricate). The madrasa cadres came from the different tribes and clans in the area, but usually from clans or sub-tribes with lower status. *Sharia* was supposed to replace '*pashtunwali*', an unwritten tribal ethical code of the Pashtun people (I had no time to check if it worked or not). One last point: Sufi groups, which had been prominent in the area until then, were rapidly disappearing, although lip-service was still paid to some very old '*pir*' (like Pir-i Zakeri around Kandahar). Many Taliban did belong to families with a Naqshbandi tradition (and less often with a Qaderi one), but they gradually turned to Salafism.

In all these areas, the connection to global jihad came progressively and was based on three phenomena: the development of transnational Salafi networks for training and teaching; an expansion of smuggling (from the traditional pressure-cookers to new products like drugs and weapons, and from the strict border areas to Karachi and the Gulf); and last but not least, the rise of AQ, whose strongholds were mainly in Afghan Pashtun tribal areas and never in non-tribal areas. In 1994 the Taliban proclaimed the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' and provided sanctuary to AQ. In this case it was the global organization (AQ) that pledged allegiance to the local emirate (Taliban) and not the reverse (until some local Taliban groups shifted to ISIS after 2013).

The phenomenon of 'Islamic emirates' spread from Afghanistan to Pakistan, once again exclusively in tribal areas. The same patterns were

at work: local mollahs from the tribe took power by bypassing, expelling or killing traditional tribal leaders (*maliks*), whose power was based on their role as intermediaries between the central state and the local tribes. The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan even signed a truce with the central Pakistani government in 2006. Interestingly enough, the rise of these emirates often coincided with endeavours by the Pakistani army to rescind the special legal status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and impose state federal law instead of the local customary law. The mollahs counter-attacked by stating that they would agree with the cancellation of the special tribal status on one condition: the federal law should be *sharia*. However, because the federal law was not *sharia* and because the 'Taliban' were already implementing it, they argued that they did not need any kind of state supervision, due to the fact that they were ahead of the state in promoting *sharia*. Instead of resisting the state from below, the Salafization of the tribal system allows it to contest the state from above, from the position of a global ideology, and not to maintain local privileges and customs.

In this sense, the Afghanistan–Pakistan (AFPAK) area was the laboratory for the specific connection between tribes and jihad. However, the extension of the phenomenon from the Indus to the Sahel shows that this is not just a local issue.

A comparative approach

This book deals with specific case studies of encounters between tribalism, Salafism and jihadism. Of course, there is no ambition to be exhaustive. The book is just an attempt to make a comparative study of the relationship between tribes and jihad in the context of the extension of Salafism, in order to find some clues. The rooting of jihadism in some tribal areas is taking place in connection with a far larger expansion of Salafism among Middle Eastern tribes in places where the Muslim Brothers and comparable Islamist political movements had usually been unable to attract followers (with the exception of the north of Yemen). The Muslim Brothers were identified with the urban elite (teachers, civil servants, doctors, lawyers) associated with the state apparatuses that were distrusted by the tribes.

Three patterns emerge: 1) the shift towards Salafism and/or jihadism goes along with a contestation of tribal leadership and with a generational and social change within the tribe; 2) this shift is connected with a globalization of tribes, both through an extension of traditional smuggling activities into a more complex supranational market and through the expansion of global networks of Salafi madrasas and jihadist organizations; 3) this globalization of tribes allows them to plug themselves into a regional geostrategic game and to contest the central state from above and not just from below as before.

Do we need to define 'tribe'?

This is not the place for an extensive discussion of the concept of 'tribe' in the Middle East. Such a debate is to be found for instance in Dale F. Eickelman's seminal book.[1] Nevertheless, there is a minimal definition that can apply to most of the field studies that we present in this book: we use the term 'tribe' to indicate a segmented solidarity-based group (even if the solidarity is sometimes more ascribed than real), based on lineage (generally patrilineal and patrilocal), with an internal system of regulation (customary law, mediation to resolve conflicts) which excludes outsiders, an 'ideology' or at least a culture (hospitality, loyalty, honour) and an uneasy connection with state authorities, usually mediated by local notables ('*shuyukh*' or elders).

In this sense, a quasi-ethnic group (first defined by a specific language) can work as a tribe if it is in symmetric opposition to other groups and develops the same kind of solidarity among its members while maintaining ambivalent relations with the state. Loyalty to the group is presupposed and considered a given, which means that even when young members of the group go to town to escape the conservatism of the system, they remain ascribed to their group identity and might use it to find support.

There can of course be differences between different tribal areas, particularly as far as religion is concerned, such as the presence or otherwise of a non-tribal group of religious leaders, like the *sāyyad* in Yemen, or of a tradition of Sufism (a pattern often closely associated with tribes, as in pre-Qaddafi Libya).

We should also be careful not to essentialize tribesmen: they can make individual religious and political choices like everybody else (as

Hüsken shows in Chapter 3). The rooting of a Salafi jihadist movement or the tensions between Salafis and traditional Muslims might happen in the same way as they do in non-tribal areas. Moreover, the self-definition of a tribe might be shaped by an external perception: if the government thinks that tribal solidarity comes first, even if this is not really the case, it may engage in collective reprisals or discrimination against a tribe seen as 'dissident', thus renewing a fading solidarity (for instance, the Kanuri of Cameroon are perceived as supporting Boko Haram, and are therefore discriminated against by the security forces, stirring up some support for the movement).

However, despite the fluidity of identities, both members and non-members of a tribe agree that there are tribes, whatever value judgement they put on the fact and whatever anthropological definition might be given to tribalism. We will not delve further into discussing the scientific terminology of tribalism, but there is definitely a living tribal 'grammar' that underlies local politics.

An apparent contradiction

The connection between tribes and global Salafi–jihadism seems to be a contradiction. Jihadist leaders tend to pit the 'good' global Muslim militants (fighting for the *ummah*) against tribesmen (supposedly attached to narrow solidarities and interests).[2] Tribalism means segmentation, while in their view jihad is a call to unite the *ummah* and bypass segmentation (*'asabiyya*).[3] A tribe is defined by the existence of customary law and lay instances of negotiations, while jihadist organizations and Salafis promote *sharia* and *sharia* courts. Tribal leaders are lay elders, usually from dominant lineages; jihadist leaders are young self-made men who came to prominence either through war or religious preaching, while Salafi religious leaders, whatever their personal familial background, draw their legitimacy from their religious knowledge and their mastery of preaching techniques. Tribes are very often associated with a Sufi order (usually constituting a parallel religious hierarchy distinct from lay tribal notables); Salafism is strongly opposed to Sufism and its practices: Salafis have been destroying mausoleums and graves, and usually contest the two parallel systems of leadership—one 'lay', the other religious. Hence Salafism appears as an onslaught against tribes.

Then why should tribes be attracted by Salafism and jihadism? There are two levels of explanation. Tribes may embrace the jihadist cause for practical and circumstantial reasons, but more importantly their embrace of jihadism might correspond to an internal sociological change and to a repositioning in the regional geostrategic context allowing the tribe to contest the state no longer from below but from above. In this sense, joining Salafi–jihadism is a way to recast tribal structures, not to suppress them.

An empirical and practical alliance

When local tribes are in trouble, they might find in the jihadist movement a useful tool for regaining influence. The fighting capacity of jihadist organizations enhances the status of tribes (Yemen, Taliban on both sides of the borders, Iraqi Sunnis). Tribes gain direct access to resources and the global world by connecting to Salafi and/or jihadist movements. They can maximize their assets in the traditional game of contesting (and instrumentalizing) the central state: they might be recognized as legitimate or at least indispensable actors by the big powers (the West) in order to stabilize a situation or to find a political solution (the 2007 surge in Iraq). This is even more true when these 'central states' have been seriously reduced to fragility by situations of armed conflict. Central states are indeed no longer so centralized or capable when their capacity to impose their rule and authority have been deeply weakened. In short, by translating a local struggle into a regional or even global one, tribes increase their agency. But this 'rational actor' explanation does not explain why tribesmen should stick to a jihadist agenda that might also backfire or attract more repression, not only from the state but also from foreign forces.

Reciprocally, jihadists find in tribal areas a sanctuary: tribes are often (but not always) situated in remote areas; they value hospitality, and any retaliation from the state against tribes may entail greater solidarity with the 'internationalists'; tribesmen are armed and the state apparatus may be absent or weak, reducing its ability to gather intelligence or to launch military operations. Moreover, the central state might even play the role of buffer or mediator between local jihadist tribesmen and foreign military forces (almost always US forces) by convincing the

latter that any attack on the tribes will have a destabilizing effect on the central power (a constant game in Afghanistan and Pakistan). Thus, the complex relationship between tribes and jihad is in fact based on a quadrangle: the tribe, jihadist forces, the central state and foreign military actors.

Who manipulates whom? In Yemen and Afghanistan, the tribes seem to have had the final say so far. In Iraq they have been superseded by ISIS. In Pakistan, there is no clear winner and a fragile balance has been established between the state, the tribes and the jihadists.

Joining jihad, for whatever reasons and even when it is just for opportunist motivations, automatically entails a recasting of the power relations within the tribe. It also positions the tribe differently in its traditionally ambivalent relations to the central power. As Mbowou says, 'In this context, the declaration of war constituted a sudden requalification of the local reality.'

Recasting tribalism in a new world order

From smugglers to global jihadists

It is not by chance that most of the tribes we are referring to have a long tradition of smuggling. In most of these cases (Yemen, North Cameroon, along the Durand line, Egypt's Sinai and Libya), the tribe straddles a border, a fact that creates an opportunity to develop an economy based on smuggling. The modern state is both an opportunity (it creates borders) and an obstacle (it fights smuggling). The best economic opportunity for tribes is not to seize the state and erase the borders, but to make the state impotent and transform the border into an economic bonanza.

However, the nature of smuggling has changed: this is no longer just an issue of proximity to the border; smugglers need to extend their networks to more distant places (Karachi and the Gulf for the different Taliban fronts, for instance). This also implies increasing the tribe's military resources. Smuggling has become more 'dangerous' and militarized: in a context of regional wars and with a proliferation of modern weaponry, smugglers must be able to confront the state or regional rivals militarily, instead of the police and gendarmerie. The level of weaponry has increased considerably during the last fifty years: the old

Lee Enfield rifle has been supplanted by the AK 47, rocket launchers and artillery. Warfare has replaced the occasional skirmishes between smugglers and border police. Jihadist military organizations are better adapted to the new situation, recasting the 'benevolent smuggler' narrative into that of jihad. Nowhere is smuggling more 'political' than on the borders between Egypt and Israel, Egypt and Libya, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Cameroon and Nigeria.

However, in order to extend the space for smuggling operations (which have become global business transactions instead of just illegal border crossings) regional networks are needed, and these networks are often either provided by or based on religious Salafi networks. There is a strong connection between labour migration, business travel and the religious mobility of young men in search of diplomas and status who benefit from grants and scholarships to study in Gulf madrasas. These different kinds of mobility all involve the same people, who can make more money than their fathers (whose potential wealth is based on land and staple products more than on cash). Of course, neither enrolment in foreign madrasas nor the combination of labour and religious migration is specific to tribes. However, in the case of tribes there is an amplifying effect: this kind of business is based on trust and on the need for a stable connection between home and abroad, plus the benefit of armed protection (or of strong enough tribal patronage to deter extortion). The export of 'tribal solidarity' and the capacity of the tribe to re-integrate both estranged and prodigal sons allow it to make the best use of the generational crisis and its members to find or create a new constituency by playing on both the traditional codes and customs and on the need for social change.[4]

There is a strong but indirect link between Salafism and the upgrading of smuggling from a local activity into global business networks. It empowers the youths who are the effective smugglers (Cameroon) or who have had religious education in Salafi madrasas (Pakistan). They master the globalization of both circulation and ideas, and can maximize their newly acquired economic and cultural capital. Tribes that look anthropologically more conservative might in fact be more effective in making room for their returning children than more urbanized societies, because these children keep their 'seat' in the tribal system whatever their personal trajectory, and may turn this seat into a trampoline for

acquiring higher status by maximizing their new 'capital' acquired abroad. Their migration is always presented as a success story.

This 'diasporization' of tribes through the displacement of youths may be increased by repression (Cameroon) or invasion (Afghanistan), but in all cases it switches the legitimacy provided by the wealth and/or religious knowledge of traditional elites to new categories of young entrepreneurs, who often belong to less powerful clans because these are the first to leave.[5]

Salafism as a tool for recasting tribal dynamics

We should not equate the process of Salafization with that of jihadism, however: Salafization is a larger phenomenon that does not always lead to jihadism (as for the Awlad 'Ali, studied by Hüsken), but jihadism is always connected with an ongoing Salafization. Both are linked to a mutation of leadership and internal competition within tribes. Radicalization first expresses resentment against traditional leaders, either because they collaborate with the state for their own benefit (Cameroon) or because they are unable to ensure adaptation to change.

In fact, tribes are not egalitarian: polarization between tribal notables and 'commoners' (people of lower lineage and youths) has often increased during recent decades because the economic assets at stake have increased (smuggling, state allowances). Salafism allows new and younger leaders to emerge at the expense of traditional Sufi leaders. Salafism is linked with travel and globalization, because the new religious leaders have been educated elsewhere, and often abroad. Moreover, Salafi leaders can mobilize new sources of revenue (grants to study abroad, funds to build mosques), while the revenues of Sufi orders are mainly local (gifts from believers). The Sufi orders have missed the opportunity to become global in tribal areas (unlike the Sufi orders in western Africa, like the Tijannya, which have become a successful global organization).

Nevertheless, the link between the crisis of tribal structures and the breakthrough of Salafism does not mean that the tribe is disappearing as a tribe. For dominated clans or for would-be leaders it is a good opportunity to contest the power of the traditional elite without antagonizing the tribe as such. They just claim to have greater legitimacy and effi-

ciency (through their belonging to international networks), specifically when the tribe is confronting a foreign assailant (Afghanistan, Iraq). If Salafi leaders are usually not the traditional tribal leaders, they belong to a lineage, which helps (lower lineages versus superior ones). In short, local actors refer to the tribe as a specific entity even if what constitutes this specificity at one time might have changed structurally. In any case, kinship works, at least for the moment.

However, when jihadist movements take over non-jihadist Salafi networks, they may target the very tribal structure by requiring young activists from the tribe to show that their loyalty to the movement is above their loyalty to their parents and lineage, for instance by joining military and security units under the direct command of jihadist leaders (as Boko Haram and ISIS do). This is certainly the point where the interests of the tribe and the interests of the global jihadist organization might diverge.

The generational issue is the key

In a sense, Salafization corresponds to the assertiveness of a new generation of young males who can play the 'holier than thou' game with the older generation. However, it seems that Salafism and jihadism are not just tools with which to challenge traditional tribal leaders. It is not just a matter of competition, as much as of redistribution of traditional roles, including gender roles. Salafism appears as a new way to recast traditional gender and generational patterns for the benefit of young males. It goes along with more exclusion and seclusion for women. Women are first excluded from participation in religious life: religious performances that Sufism and 'popular' Islam used to allow (visits to the saints' graves, rituals concerning fertility etc.) have been forbidden by the Salafists, who have not provided a new position in the public space for women; something the Muslim Brothers did (by setting up the 'association of Muslim women', accepting women into the labour market if they wore the new 'Islamic' garb, establishing separate women's schools, appointing female candidates in elections, etc.). The model that I saw in Nuristan in 1985 spread: women were more and more excluded from farming activities outside the house. The *niqab*, which prevents women from working, is spreading in tribal areas (in