

HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES



EDITED BY

Richard M. Sorrentino
Susumu Yamaguchi



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RICHARD M. SORRENTINO AND SUSUMU
YAMAGUCHI



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PREFACE

This handbook is the result of the two co-editors joining forces in order to call others to do likewise and bridge the field between experts in motivation and cognition, and experts in cross-cultural research. Being well evidenced by a recent surge of research interest in the area of culture and psychology, the cultural perspectives are now recognized as indispensable for research in cognition, motivation, and their interplay. It is now widely recognized that both cognition and motivation are culturally embedded, as this handbook is devoted to this issue.

Although interests in cross-cultural research in psychological functioning have long been prevalent especially among psychological anthropologists (such as the culture-and-personality school), the mainstream social psychologists have not paid much attention to cultural research until 1990s, when they faced challenges from cultural psychology and indigenous psychology. Advocates of both cultural psychology and indigenous psychology have been criticizing mainstream psychology as being, among other things, bounded by its ungrounded commitment to natural science orientations. On one hand, cultural psychologists questioned the validity of assumed solutions applicable to all people in all cultures. They also criticized the assumed "psychic unity" that people are fundamentally the same. Indigenous psychologists, on the other hand, argued that human mentality needs to be understood in a particular cultural context. For both parties, the assumption of universality of human mental functioning was too simplistic.

The assumed universality of empirical law becomes questionable once psychic unity of human being is challenged. Stimulated by such challenges, empirical work has flourished in the past 10 years. A growing number of social psychologists in North America launched cross-cultural projects. Also, Asian social psychologists started to raise their voices from a cultural perspective. The establishment of the Asian Association of Social Psychology in 1995 was symbolic of growing Asian voices.

As the mainstream psychology met with challenges from cultural psychology and indigenous psychology, the editors of this volume met at a Society for Experimental Social Psychology conference (which is undoubtedly a meeting of mainstream social psychologists) in New Orleans in this period of the rise

of cross-cultural research. Rather than confronting with each other, we learned from each other and agreed to launch this project. We invited authors from both social psychology and cross-cultural psychology, expecting that they would elucidate the interplay among motivation, cognition, and culture for the readers. Hopefully, this volume will prove useful for a rapidly growing number of scholars interested in the interplay among motivation, cognition, and cultures.

In publishing this book, we wish to express sincere appreciation to many people. Most important, we want to thank the contributors to this volume, whose enthusiasm and commitment to the project is reflected in their respective chapters. We joyfully learned tremendously from each chapter. In addition, we are also grateful to Barbara Makinster, Senior Developmental Editor, for her efficiency in guiding the book throughout the entire production process. One of us (RMS) would also like to thank his fourth year honors psychology class for their helpful comments on many of the first drafts of chapters in this book. We had many enjoyable discussions, much of which was passed back to the contributors. Finally, but not the least important, we would like to thank our wives and children, grand children, and mothers for their affection and support during this project: Judy, Eric, Emily, Michael, Giuliana, Rose, Rumiko, Aya, Megumi, and Kazuko.

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MOTIVATION AND COGNITION ACROSS CULTURES

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This handbook has its historical roots in the late 1970, early 1980 period. During that time social cognition was in its heyday and social motivation was flat on its back. The reason for this, according to Sorrentino and Higgins (1986, Chapter 1) can perhaps be traced back to the rise of behaviorism in North American psychology. Until that point, various views relating motivation and/or cognition to behavior were flourishing. Darwin (1872) carried considerable weight, as did Freud (1917/1955) and McDougall (1908), in putting forth instinct as the underlying motivational force accounting for behavior. On the other hand, others were putting forth a primarily cognitive and/or rational viewpoint as the basis for behavior. James (1890), for example, stressed the importance of will and the self in determining what he called voluntary behavior. The structuralists and functionalists as well as the phrenologists (e.g., Galton, 1883; Titchener, 1899), argued that the mind and various streams of consciousness were all that were worthy of study. There was, however, a third and ultimately, overwhelming, viewpoint that won the day – behaviorism. This school of thought rejected all other approaches – or any approach that focussed on the internal machinations of the individual. Watson (1930, p. 5) the “father of behaviorism” said:

The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking, and emotion as they were subjectively defined.

This statement, which reflected the predominant feeling among North American psychologists at the time, obviously did little to promote the fields of motivation, cognition, and social psychology. It is interesting that cognition was the last of the three areas to fully recover from the attack of the behaviorists.

The behaviorist program and the issues it spawned all but eliminated any serious research in cognitive psychology for 40 years. The rat supplanted the human as the principal laboratory subject, and psychology turned to finding out what could be learned by studying animal learning and motivation.

Anderson (1980, p. 9)

Motivation, however, could not be swept aside as a by-product of learning principles, as Hull (1943) had hoped to do. Tolman's (1932, 1959) empirical demonstrations of purposive behavior in animals met the rat behaviorists head on, until they were forced to embrace the concept of motivation as something other than a learning phenomenon. Social psychology was also soon to re-emerge, largely through the influence of Lewin (1935, 1951), whose field theory had concepts that were strikingly similar to those of Tolman (see Atkinson, 1964).

It is important to note that these theories were not motivational or cognitive, but both. The expectancy-value theories of Tolman and Lewin took account of both motivational and cognitive factors when attempting to predict behavior. Tolman, in predicting maze behavior, spoke of the expectancy of the goal and the demand for the goal. Lewin, in research on level of aspiration and decision making, spoke in terms of potency and valence. When a rat moves through a maze or a human moves through his or her life space, it is done purposively, and both motivation and cognition are important elements in accounting for this behavior.

Although Tolman's points were well taken, prompting Hull and the neo-Hullians (e.g., Miller, 1948; Spence, 1956) to modify their viewpoint, the influence of B. F. Skinner (e.g., Skinner, 1953), a staunch theoretical behaviorist, continued to dominate in that area. Within social psychology, however, models involving the interactive effects of motivation and cognition flourished well into the early 1970s. This was a direct consequence of Lewin's charismatic appeal, which enabled him to pass many of his theoretical ideas to his students and associates and to their students (e.g., Festinger, Cartwright, Zander, Back, Atkinson, Deutsch, Kelley, Schachter, Zajonc). Indeed, much of social psychology up to that point could be traced to Lewin and others (e.g., Bruner, Heider, Newcomb) who saw the importance of both motivation and cognition in their theories.

In the 1970s, a major shift in emphasis began occurring in social psychology; cognition emerged as the dominant force, and motivation declined to a secondary element. This reversal may be directly attributable to the rejection of motivational concepts in the study of cognition and perceptual processes in general psychology. As Anderson (1980) pointed out, cognitive psychology did not begin to emerge from the attack of the behaviorists until this time. He cited three areas that account for the information-processing approach that emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s: human factors research in World War II (see Broadbent, 1958; Atkinson & Schiffman, 1968), interest in artificial intelligence

(e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972), and psycholinguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 1957). Anderson cited Neisser's (1967)-*Cognitive Psychology* as the book that gave "a new legitimacy to the field." Motivation had little place in these three areas. These nonmotivational information-processing concepts began to influence research and theory in social psychology in the late 1970s, with the premise that cognition can account for many behaviors that others claimed to be motivated.

In an earlier period, the premise had been quite the opposite. The "New Look" argued that motivation could account for many responses that others claimed to be strictly perceptual. Bruner (1957, p. 123), for example, wrote:

About ten years ago I was party to the publication of an innocent enough paper entitled, 'Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception.' It was concerned with what at that time was the rather obscure problem of how extra-stimulus factors influenced perception, a subject then of interest to only a small band of us – Gardner Murphy, Nevitt Sanford, Muzafer Sherif, and a few others. Obviously, Professor Boring is quite right about the mischievousness of the Zeitgeist, for the appearance of this paper seemed to coincide with all sorts of spirit-like rumbling within the world of psychology that were soon to erupt in a most unspirit-like torrent of research on this very topic – perhaps three hundred research reports and theoretical explications in the ten years since then.

Bruner then went on to present, in this classic article, his views on perceptual readiness, in which the New Look plays an important role. His notion regarding category accessibility, for example, was that it was determined by learning and by "the requirements of search dictated by need states and the need to carry out habitual enterprises such as walking, reading, or whatever it is that makes up the round of daily, habitual life" (Bruner, 1957, pp. 148–149). He concluded his article with the following statement:

In conclusion, it seems appropriate to say that the ten years of the so-called New Look in perception research seem to be coming to a close with much empirical work accomplished – a great deal of it demonstrational, to be sure, but with a promise of a second ten years in which hypotheses will be more rigorously formulated and, conceivably, neural mechanisms postulated, if not discovered. The prospects are anything but discouraging.

The New Look is gone. Bruner was correct in that the New Look carried on for 10 years and, indeed, might have had its heyday in the 1960s. The notion of motivational influences on perception and cognition was highly discussed, though always controversial in perception (e.g., Dember, 1960) and cognition (e.g., Harper et al., 1964). In the Harper et al. (1964) book, there is a section of particular relevance to the present volume. It is entitled, *Cognition, Motivation and Personality*, and it includes articles that deal with effects of motivational processes on cognition (Henle, 1964) and cognitive aspects of motivation (Prentice, 1964) as well as some very interesting contributions by investigators of social behavior. Here we have Schachter and Singer's (1962) classic article on cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state; Festinger's articles on the motivating effects of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1958) and the psychological effects of insufficient rewards (Festinger, 1961); and many others (e.g., Pettigrew, 1958; Berkowitz, 1960; Secord & Backman, 1960).

Hence, as a consequence of the New Look, there was a very rich sense of the interplay among motivation, cognition, and social behavior.

In the early 1980s, all of this camaraderie between motivational and cognitive theorists faded. In books on sensation and perception (e.g., Levine & Shefner, 1981; Coren et al., 1984), the New Look and motivation are mentioned rarely if at all. Similarly, no mention of the New Look or motivation is made in Anderson's (1980) cognitive psychology book, *Cognitive Psychology and Its Implications*. When it comes to social psychology, the situation was similar. For example, in a highly influential book by Nisbett and Ross (1980), the New Look is discussed, as is motivation, but both are treated as peripheral to central human inference processes. In much of psychology, then, the New Look and its impact were no longer felt. Indeed, in some areas of social cognition, there was evidence of hostility toward anyone who would dare use the term "motivation" in anything other than a pejorative manner. One of our undergraduate students, for example, on arriving at a graduate center well known for social cognition, proudly presented the results of his honors thesis (subsequently published in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*) at a conference. The student was cautioned by his new advisor not to mention the study "around here" – the reason being that since the study involved a motivational construct, the student might jeopardize his standing with the faculty.

What appears to account for the demise of the New Look is the fact that motivation was seen as an alternative explanation for a cognitive process. Rather than studying the interaction of motivational and cognitive processes, a battle developed regarding which of the two, motivation or cognition, was a better explanation for the phenomenon. Dember (1960), for example, pointed out that in the classic experiment by Bruner and Goodman (1947), in which children overestimated the size of coins compared to neutral discs, the results might not be due to motivation, as was originally proposed, "but more simply by a culturally acquired association between value and size" (Dember, 1960, p. 340). Research on perceptual defense (e.g., Postman et al., 1948; Blum, 1954) also fell under heavy criticism, mostly because of methodological shortcomings.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, social psychologists were quick to jump on the bandwagon. Social-cognitive theorists also attempted to put motivational theories to rest with alternative explanations. Thus, for Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 247), biases and problems in inference or behavior are often due to information-processing errors and cognitive limitations – the notion of "people as faulty computers." Self-serving biases in attribution and prejudice, for example, may not be at all motivational:

In both cases nonmotivational factors seem sufficient to account for most of the phenomena. In the case of so-called ego-defensive biases in attribution, it is clear that actors usually hold preconceptions and possess evidence that on purely intellectual grounds would seem to justify, if not demand, asymmetric responses to success and failure. In the case of prejudice, it seems clear that stereotypes of ethnic or racial groups are similar to the schemas or theories that encapsulate socially based knowledge of many other categories of people, objects, or events.

A similar “faulty computer” perspective on judgmental errors and biases may be found in the works of Cantor and Mischel (1977), Dawes (1976), Markus (1977), Hamilton (1979), and Miller and Ross (1975).

Contrary to the history of research and theory in social psychology, and in spite of the teachings of many current practitioners’ advisers whose lineage could be traced back to Heider and Lewin, the “cold” approach became the predominant theme in the study of social behavior. Indeed, even motivational theories of achievement behavior were under attack from cognitive theorists. Trope (1975) argued that differences in behavior as a function of achievement-related motives are primarily due to differences in cognitive information seeking, not affective arousal. He and Weiner (1972) argued that preferences for tasks of intermediate difficulty on the part of success-oriented persons (see Atkinson, 1964; Atkinson & Raynor, 1974) are due to the fact that such tasks are most diagnostic of the person’s ability, rather than being due to the interaction of motivational and situational components that the affective theory specifies. In the area of social behavior, then, cognitive theories became the *Weltanschauung*.

It was during this time that one of the most cognitive of cognitive social psychologists, Tory Higgins, arrived at my (RMS) university and remained there for a few years before moving on. Whereas Tory was a strict cognitive theorist at the time, I was trying to defend motivational theorists. Before long, we began trying to convince the other that our field was more important than the other’s. It did not take long for us to realize that both motivation and cognition were not only important, but also must be considered together. In so doing, we developed the notion of the Warm Look. We argued that just as “hot” cognitions are insufficient explanations for information processing and perceptual processes, so, too, is the “cold” approach an inadequate explanation for social phenomena. The Warm Look reflects the blending of “cold” cognitive and “hot” motivational processes; motivation and cognition are, in fact, inseparable. Sorrentino and Higgins (1986, Chapter 1, p. 8) wrote,

Behavior is not a product of hot cognitions, as suggested by the New Look perspective, nor of cold cognitions, as suggested by the ‘faulty computer’ perspective. In addition, it is not simply that cognition leads to motivation and motivation leads to cognition. Rather, each is a property or facet of the other. They are synergistic in that they operate together to produce combined effects. What we are saying, then, is that whatever determines behavior is neither hot nor cold – it is warm.

Following our synthesis of ideas, it became apparent that we should try to do what we can to help bring the two fields back together. In order to accomplish this, we decided that we would come up with the first handbook of motivation and cognition. We contacted the best people we could think of who were experts in either motivation or cognition and asked them if they would be willing to write a chapter emphasizing the synergism of motivation and cognition. The original *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition* (Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986) was highly cited and became so successful that two more volumes were produced (Higgins & Sorrentino, 1990, Vol. 2; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1996, Vol. 3).

The present handbook is a natural extension of this series. Recognizing the importance of motivation and cognition to the study of cross-cultural research, Susumu and I contacted some of the people that contributed to the original series and asked them to write a chapter stating how their current research and theory was affected by differences across cultures. As a result, we got some very interesting chapters in the current volume. These chapters are included in the first part of the book, where we have loosely clustered together those chapters which attempt to show the importance of motivation and cognition for the study of cultural differences and similarities. In the original volume, Julius Kuhl (1986, p. 407) nicely defined affect, motivation, and cognition:

It is assumed that cognitive, emotional, and motivational subsystems relate to the world in three different ways. The term cognition is reserved for those processes that mediate the acquisition and representation of knowledge about the world, i.e., processes that have a representative relation to the world of objects and facts. Emotional (affective) processes evaluate the personal significance of those objects and facts. Motivational processes relate to the world in an actional way, e.g., they relate to goal states of the organism in its attempt to produce desired changes in its environment.

Kuhl went on to discuss some interesting interactions among the three subsystems in terms of three motivational phenomena: choice, persistence, and effort. His discussion is a tour de force that shows why each of these subsystems must be taken into account in any theory of human behavior. In Chapter 2 of this volume, he and Heidi Keller aim to improve our understanding of the role of emotion across cultures by taking a closer look at the cognitive, emotional, and developmental differences that have been observed in cross-cultural research on independent and interdependent orientations; providing a theoretical explanation for the observed pattern of cognitive, emotional, and developmental differences between cultures that lean more toward individualistic or interrelated orientations; elaborating the role affect regulation plays in modulating the interaction between diverging cognitive processing styles; and deriving from this theoretical analysis an elaborated model extending the framework of independence and interdependence to overcome some conceptual difficulties involved in this contrast.

In the original volume, Judy Short and I (Sorrentino & Short, 1986) presented our initial theory of uncertainty orientation. We tried to show that previous research and theory on achievement behavior may have confused information value with affective value. We introduced our views on uncertainty orientation with the notion that uncertainty orientation is primarily an informational variable, whereas achievement-related motives are primarily affective variables. Thus, all those aspects of achievement situations that are informational in nature (e.g., information about the self or the environment) are related to individual differences in uncertainty orientation. All those aspects that are related to affective arousal (feeling good or bad about the self or the environment) are due to achievement-related motives (as well as to any other source of motivation aroused by the situation). In Chapter 2 of the present volume, I, along with Andrew Szeto, John Nezlek, Satoru Yasunaga, Sadafusa Kouhara, and Yasunao Ohtsubo extend this theory to

cross-cultural studies. We present research suggesting that although controversy currently rages regarding whether individualism and collectivism truly distinguish Eastern and Western societies, or whether it may be more meaningful to speak of an independent versus interdependent self, or whether people have or do not have self-esteem, a plausible major distinction may be that most East–West differences might be a function of how these societies cope with uncertainty, and how this shapes the behavior of its constituent members. We also show that so-called differences in emotional responding and self-esteem may be a function of underlying individual differences in achievement-related motives and whether the individual's means of handling uncertainty are consistent with his or her culture's method of resolving uncertainty.

Perhaps one of the most provocative chapters in the original series was that by Bargh (1990). There he presented one of his most complete statements regarding nonconscious motivation and cognition. Bargh raised the issue of how much control a person exercises over his or her own thought and behavior in social situations. What other agents of control exist and what is the extent of their influence? Bargh argues that while responses may be strongly influenced by the environment and preconscious processes, an intervening intention is required to make the response itself. Intentional, goal-directed responding can overcome automatic tendencies in information processing and action. Bargh suggests that the key question then becomes, "Where do goals come from?" He proposes that instead of being under "executive" control, much goal-setting activity may be initiated by patterns of environmental features. It may be the environment itself that activates the goal or intent. More specifically, chronic representations of goals (or intents) and those environmental features with which they are frequently and consistently associated (e.g., because these are the situations in which the goals are typically pursued) may become interconnected in memory. Thus, goals or intentions would be automatically activated whenever relevant situational features were present in the environment. And these goals and intentions can guide thought and behavior outside of awareness in the service of the individual and not simply to satisfy the desires or demands of the social environment.

John, along with Eric Uhlmann, and Andrew Poelhman, continues to be provocative in Chapter 4 of this handbook. These co-authors tackle the fascinating topic of the universality of religion, but from an implicit motivation and cognitive framework. Rather than attempt a comprehensive theory of the ultimate origins of religious faith, they discuss evidence for two classes of empirically supported psychological contributors: *cognitive defaults* and *existential needs*. Both of these sets of variables exert a profound yet largely implicit (i.e., intuitive, unconscious) influence on the development, content, transmission, and maintenance of religious faith. Theistic cognition is so deeply ingrained that even atheists, agnostics, and less religious people display implicit responses consistent with religious beliefs.

William Swann was also a contributor to the original series (Swann, 1990). Swann considers the interplay of self-enhancement and self-verification. He asks, "What do people want to believe about themselves?" He argues that both self-enhancement